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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
(IN)SECURITY OF THE CHOSEN PEOPLE: 
THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SHI‘A STRATEGIC CULTURE 
by 
Sayed Amir Mirtaheri 
Florida International University, 2012 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Mohiaddin Mesbahi, Major Professor 
This dissertation explores the theological foundations of Shi‘a strategic cultures 
within the theoretical framework of Neo-Traditionalism and rule-oriented 
Constructivism. In terms of methodology, it uses historical analysis based on mainstream 
Muslim historiographies, and discourse analysis of major classical Shi‘a texts. The 
dissertation identifies three Shi‘a concepts of Shahādah, i.e. martyrdom, Taqīyyah –
loosely translated to precautionary concealment– and Wilāyah/Walāyah as the 
theological foundations of various Shi‘a strategic cultures. While –mystical– Shahādah 
refers to “idealistic” metaphors in Shi‘a Islam based on the story of Shi‘a third Imām, 
Taqīyyah essentially refers to “commonsense counsel of caution.” Shahādah provided the 
Shi‘a community with a sense of metaphysical security through salvation when the 
community was deprived of prospects for social prosperity. It belittled physical pain and 
worldly defeat by emphasizing the ideal of fighting for justice. This also led to an 
essentially different understanding of Jihād in Shi‘a Islam compared to Sunnī Islam. In 
contrast to Shahādah, the doctrine of Taqīyyah was a proactive and pragmatic strategy 
chosen by Shi‘a minority and aimed at survival. The doctrine of Taqīyyah highly valued 
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the collective and individual survival of Shi‘a Muslims. It socialized them with a cautious 
attitude towards politics and towards state. The Aristotelian prudence embedded in 
Taqīyyah eventually became Shi‘a modus vivendi for many centuries. Finally, the Shi‘a 
ontology of Wilāyah/Walāyah refers to the exoteric and esoteric aspects of the 
metaphysical structure of the world through which the Grace of God is bestowed upon 
men according to Shi‘a Islam. Wilāyah and Walāyah constituted one of the central points 
of distinction between Sunnī Islam and Shi‘a Islam. At the same time, they socialized 
Shi‘a Muslims with a sense of authority essential for the protection of a persecuted 
community. More importantly, however, they projected Shi‘a community as the 
protectors of the “heart of Islam.” This allowed the seemingly contradictory doctrines of 
Shahādah and Taqīyyah to coexist in Shi‘a strategic thinking; for a “special community” 
were believed to be allowed to resort to special measures for its protection.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION  
The General Context of the Research 
More than three decades ago, a throne that had seated kings for thousands of years 
crumbled in the face of a Shī‘ah1 revolution in Iran. Amidst the surprise of many 
observers, both inside and outside the country, a group of Shī‘ah Muslims had achieved a 
noticeable strategic “success.” The Revolution was soon dubbed the “Islamic” 
Revolution, which was reasonable to the extent that Shī‘ah Islam is one of the two 
popular versions of the religion. Yet, the generic term “Islamic Revolution” tends to 
eclipse the inherently Shī‘ī2 character of that Revolution. This Shī‘ī character manifested 
yet more in the political system that emerged after the Revolution in complex –and at 
times paradoxical– ways. As many scholars of Islam and Iran have noted, the Revolution 
in Iran and the following political system are but one of the many potential outcomes of 
Shī‘ah history. It is not possible, in other words, to reduce an ancient non-homogenous 
tradition to merely three decades of political experience. Yet, the Revolution and the thus 
far viable political system that followed it are among the main reasons for the production 
of studies such as this one. 
The unexpected “success” of Ayatollah Khomeini in establishing an “Islamic 
state” becomes more challenging to explain when one compares Khomeini’s political 
accomplishments with those of his counterparts in the Sunnī world. Even two decades 
                                                 
1 Throughout this dissertation, I have generally used ALA-LC transliteration system for Arabic terms, 
names, titles and phrases. For Arabic words that have been Latinized, I have used the most common –or 
one of the most common– English version(s).   
2 Shī‘ī is the adjective form of the noun Shī‘ah. 
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after his death, Ayatollah Khomeini’s political “victory” remains unparalleled among the 
Muslim aspirants of politicized Islam. Except for the notable exception of the ill-fated 
Taliban state in Afghanistan, prominent advocates of “political Islam” in the Sunnī world 
have either failed to establish an “Islamic state” or have chosen not to pursue such an 
objective. In stark contrast, an obscure Ayatollah toppled one of the oldest royal systems 
in the world to establish the first “Shī‘ah Republic.” Meanwhile, in Sunnī Arab Middle 
East, secular Arab nationalisms of the Nasser era –with its socialist undertone– were 
shattered by the repeated defeat of Arab national armies at the hand of Israeli military 
forces. The subsequent religious backlash to that secular project generally failed to 
succeed as long as it adhered to its rigid ideological tenets. The lack of “success” was 
despite the forceful emergence of Mujahedeen in Afghanistan and their military 
achievements. Mujahedeen did take credit for bringing down one of the two superpowers. 
Their sympathizers in the Sunnī Arab world, however, failed to bring down a single –and 
much weaker– Arab dictator. In contrast, the recent wave of uprisings in the Arab world 
during the “Arab Spring” succeeded with much ease and rapidity in toppling down a 
series of dictators. The success can be attributed to a variety of complex causes. Yet, 
radical forces of “political Islam” seem to be receiving a small share of the credit for the 
success. Recent Arab uprisings differed markedly, both in their form and in their 
objectives, from the type of social movements that ideologists of older generations 
including Khomeini would wish.  
Similar to Ayatollah Khomeini, radical Sunnī ideologists fiercely challenged the 
conservative and mostly pro-West dictators and kings in various Arab countries, yet to no 
avail. The long record of their repeated defeat forced many of them to abandon –or at 
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least tone down– political struggle and a few of them to go underground. The resulting 
environment did indeed allow for a new younger generation of activists to emerge and 
surprise the world in 2010. The failure of Sunnī ideological movements in the past 
decades also led to the birth of terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda. These 
organizations were, in part, the result of a radicalizing political environment that denied 
meaningful forms of political participation –participations that would have arguably 
marginalized some of the radical voices.  
There is the notable exception of Taliban reign in Afghanistan. A peculiar 
combination of superpower engagements during the Cold War and socioeconomic factors 
created an environment fertile for a Sunnī radical group to seize power –and to 
marginalize almost any other voice in the country. Yet, the experience proved an unviable 
one. Taliban was not remotely as competent as their western neighbor in defying the 
United States and in maintaining their hold on power. The contrast begs the question of 
why Shī‘ah ideologists succeeded in toppling arguably one of the most powerful kings in 
the world, establishing a new political order, surviving one of the longest and most brutal 
wars of the past century, and withstanding the constant pressure from the international 
order.  
My dissertation aims at contributing to better understanding of the root causes of 
the contrast between Shī‘ah and Sunnī politics. It does so by applying the notion of 
strategic culture in the context of Security and Strategic Studies. The notion of strategic 
culture tries to captures the foundational socio-cultural themes that shape a country’s, a 
nation’s, or a people’s strategic and security behaviors. It asks what historical, 
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geographical, social and political trajectory a group of people have had to endure.3 On the 
basis of the answers to this question, strategic culture studies strive to understand and 
explain the actions and reactions of the people in question through a “general 
framework.” It must be noted, however, that in the present dissertation, strategic culture 
is not considered as a substitute for material forces. It is, instead, assumed that such 
material factors have been translated into certain cultural practices and belief systems. 
These beliefs and practices have in turn affected material realities. The strategic culture 
of a people, in other words, may be understood as a “compressed story” of the –lived, 
projected and/or imagined– experiences of those people throughout history, as much as 
such compression may be possible.  
Purpose 
The main purpose of my PhD dissertation, therefore, is to better understand the 
basic tenets of Shī‘ī strategic cultures. It looks into Shī‘ah theology and history to 
understand how the minority Shī‘ah community understood its existence vis-à-vis the 
majority Sunnī world; and how such understanding was translated into Shī‘ī strategic 
doctrines. These doctrines have had enduring effects in Shī‘ī conceptualizations of the 
notions of security and threat.4 Conceptualizations of security among Shī‘ah Muslims 
                                                 
3 Linking the question of strategy to the notion of culture –and that of identity– is one of the results of post-
Cold War questions and challenges in Security Studies. The contributions of the “Copenhagen School” of 
Security Studies are particularly relevant here. See, for instance, Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & de Wilde, J. 
(1998). Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers; and Williams, 
Michael C. (2007). Culture and Security: Symbolic Power and the Politics of International Security. New 
York: Routledge.       
4 The author acknowledges that using rather general terms such as “Shī‘ah Islam” and “Shī‘ah Muslims” 
might be problematic. There is a considerable diversity among Shī‘ah Muslims and this study does not 
assume the existence of a singular homogenous Shī‘ah Islam. Taking such diversity of experiences and 
doctrines into account, the research aims at identifying the influential yet common perceptions and 
doctrines –partially– shaping political behaviors of Shī‘ah communities throughout history. 
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bear a close relation to their treatments of the notion of justice and the institutions of 
political power. It is, therefore, consequential in Shī‘ī understandings and 
implementations of social movements on the one hand, and those of state and sovereignty 
on the other. Given the above context, the study serves as a bridge between the political 
theology of Shī‘ah Islam, its political history, and Security Studies literature in 
International Relations.            
Research Questions and Dissertation Structure 
In tackling the question of Shī‘ah strategic cultures, the primary question is which 
concepts have been central in shaping Shī‘ahs’ worldview when it comes to their 
existence. What constitutes, in other words, the “philosophy of existence” for Shī‘ah 
Muslims. Inquiring about Shī‘ī “philosophy of existence” will allow us to better 
understand the notions of security, survival, and threat as understood by Shī‘ahs, for it is 
this philosophy that provides Shī‘ah Muslims with deeper-than-instinct answers for why 
the community needs to protect its survival.   
After careful review of historical and theological sources in Shī‘ah Islam, the 
study identifies three central concepts upon which Shī‘ī strategic cultures rest. These are 
–in the order of presentation in this dissertation– the doctrine of Shahādah (i.e. 
martyrdom), the doctrine of Taqīyyah –or so-called “expedient concealment,” and the 
foundational notions of Wilāyah and Walāyah.5 The three concepts are not equal in terms 
                                                 
5 The words Wilāyah and Walāyah come from the same Arabic root w-l-y, which has various meanings. The 
word Wilāyah usually means “sovereign power,” “rule,” and “authority.” The word Walāyah generally 
means “to be a friend,” “friendship,” and “guardianship.” In Shī‘ah theology, Wilāyah and Walāyah 
respectively refer to external and internal aspects of the “metaphysical structure” of the universe around 
which the world is organized, and through which the Grace of God is believed to be bestowed upon man. 
See Chapter V for more discussion. 
6 
 
of the emphases laid upon them in Shī‘ah theology.6 The first two, however, appear as 
parallel forces throughout history. The two were to balance Shī‘ah Muslims’ aspirations 
for their ideals on the one hand and their often dreadful and unfavorable material 
conditions on the other. Before a brief discussion of these two, however, it is worth 
paying attention to the notions of Wilāyah and Walāyah upon which the first two 
doctrines rest.  
If one is asked to squeeze the “philosophy of existence” –or raison d’être– of 
Shī‘ah Muslims into one concept, there is arguably no better answer than the dual notions 
of Wilāyah and Walāyah. Chapter V will include a more comprehensive study of the two 
concepts, the literal meanings of the terms, as well as their nuanced differences. For the 
purpose of introduction, however, it suffices to say that Wilāyah and Walāyah 
respectively refer to the external and internal aspects of a uniquely Shī‘ī ontology.7 
Walāyah refers to a “metaphysical structure” through which the Grace of God is 
bestowed upon men. Accordingly, there must always exist “infallible” saints who are 
carriers of Walāyah and who are the “metaphysical centers” of the universe. Shī‘ah 
Muslims maintain that the line of these “holy bearers of Walāyah” goes back to Adam. 
After Adam, the most prominent “bearers of Walāyah” were the prophets, though the 
                                                 
6 As will be discussed later, neither Shahādah nor Taqīyyah are central theological notions in Shī‘ah Islam. 
In contrast, Wilāyah and Walāyah are foundational notions in Shī‘ah theology; and they are closely 
associated with the Shī‘ī principle of imamate. In comparison, Shahādah and Taqīyyah may be considered 
as secondary theological notions, which appear on the list of subjects in various theological works of Shī‘ī 
authors.  
7 It must be noted that Shī‘ah Muslims and –Shī‘ah and non-Shī‘ah– Ṣūfīs are similar in their emphasis 
upon the notion of Walāyah. Despite the similarity, however, Shī‘ī articulation of Walāyah and its coupling 
with Wilāyah –as well as their clear emphasis on the role played by the immediate family of the Prophet in 
connection to both Wilāyah and Walāyah– constitute a unique version of the two concepts. See Chapter V 
for more discussion. 
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honor was not exclusive to them. Following the death of Prophet Muḥammad, the “seal 
of the prophets” according to Islam, the line of prophecy was broken indefinitely. In order 
to compensate for the absence of the prophets as the categorical “bearers of Walāyah,” 
Shī‘ah Muslims turned to the Prophet’s direct descendants from his daughter, Fāṭimah 
bint Muḥammad.8 Twelve individuals, according to majority of Shī‘ah Muslims, were 
recognized as the “bearers of Walāyah” and the channel via which the Grace of God was 
–and has been– distributed throughout men. These individuals are called Imām by Shī‘ah 
Muslims.9 Without such “bearers of Walāyah,” Shī‘ah Muslims believe, the world would 
not exist for the simple reason that its existence hinges upon the Divine Grace.10 
At the same time, the highly esoteric and mystical notion of Walāyah was 
paralleled with a more mundane notion of Wilāyah, which refers to exoteric authorities. 
With such powerful “inner and universal authority” bestowed upon the “bearers of 
Walāyah,” it was only reasonable for Shī‘ah Muslims to believe that, more than anyone 
                                                 
8 605 – 632 C.E. 
9 For more information on Shī‘ah Islam and the Shī‘ah Imāms, see Ṭabāṭabā’ī, Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn. 
(1975). Shi‘ite Islam. Trans. S. H. Nasr. Albany: State University of New York Press. A useful collection of 
articles can also be found in Nasr, S. H., Dabashi, H., & Nasr, S. V. R. (Eds.). (1989). Expectation of the 
Millennium: Shi‘ism in History. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
10 According to Shī‘ah sources, following the death of the eleventh Imām, the line continued in a 
miraculous fashion. His young son, the twelfth Imām, went into “Occultation”; and ever since, he is 
believed to continue functioning as the “bearer of Walāyah” indirectly. According to the doctrine of 
Occultation, the twelfth Imām, Muḥammad ibn Ḥasan –also known by his epithets al-Mahdī and al-Qā’im 
(b. 868 C.E.)– will return at the end of the world. It is by his death that, due to the final closure of the line 
of the “bearers of Walāyah,” the world is believed to come to an end. This means that in Shī‘ah Islam, the 
central notion of Walāyah is directly connected to Shī‘ah eschatology. A brief discussion of Shī‘ah 
eschatology and the doctrine of the “hidden Imām” is offered in Chapter V in relation to the general 
framework of this dissertation. For more information, see Sachedina, Abdulaziz A. (1981). Islamic 
Messianism: The Idea of the Mahdi in Twelver Shi‘ism. Albany: State University of New York Press; 
Modarresi Tabatabaii, Hossein. (1993). Crisis and Consolidation in the Formative Period of Shi‘ite Islam: 
Abu Ja‘far Ibn Qiba Al-Razi and His Contribution to Imamite Shi‘ite Thought. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press; and chapter 2 in Nasr, S. H. et al (Eds.). Expectation of the Millennium.   
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else, these “holy people” have the right to external authority. In matters of judiciary and 
governance, who else could fulfill the duties better than the “bearers of Walāyah,” they 
asked. Therefore, the Imāms appeared as the best candidates for ruling Muslim society. 
The logical extension of inner Walāyah into external Walāyah proved to be consequential 
in Shī‘ī understanding of legitimate political power, and later on its uncomfortable and 
half-hearted accommodation of the modern state; for implicit in the attribution of 
Wilāyah to the Imāms was the conclusion that any other political power is an unjustified 
and, therefore, despotic rule. In fact, the strong anti-political-power drive in Shī‘ah Islam 
has its roots in the above theological argument. Some of the implications of this drive 
will also be discussed throughout this dissertation and especially in relation to the central 
principle of justice in Shī‘ah Islam. More specific implications of the notions of Wilāyah 
and Walāyah –for instance in regards to the modern nation-state– are beyond the scope of 
this dissertation and other scholars have written extensively on those subjects.11 
Before turning to the two doctrines of Shahādah and Taqīyyah and their relations 
with the ontology of Wilāyah and Walāyah, it is useful to review the principle of justice 
in Shī‘ah Islam in an introductory fashion. Justice seems to have been among the 
universal concerns of men. Yet, one may observe an acute attention to the principle of 
                                                 
11 The far-reaching impacts of Shī‘ah political theology on the modern institution of the nation-state 
became clear to me through a series of extensive interviews with Professor Mohiaddin Mesbahi during Fall 
2008.  
As the reader will find throughout my dissertation, I have extensively benefited from Professor Mesbahi’s 
insightful comments, feedback, and analyses on numerous occasions. This has been the result of my 
extensive interviews with Professor Mesbahi between Spring 2008 and Spring 2012, as well as his lectures 
in various graduate seminars including his graduate seminars on Islam in International Relations (Spring 
2007) and on Security and Strategic Studies (Fall 2007). From this point, I will refer to Professor Mesbahi’s 
comments and analyses by using M. Mesbahi, Interviews or M. Mesbahi, Lectures depending on the 
category.  
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justice, its value, and its implications among minority communities. Such an attention is 
clearly the case for Shī‘ah Muslims. Their emphasis on justice, or ‘Adl, might indeed be a 
reflection of their harsh and bleak social history. Being a small minority within an 
antagonistic Sunnī majority and living for centuries under the threat of persecution by 
Sunnī rulers, Shī‘ah theologians turned to the question of justice for two interrelated 
reasons: explanation and hope. They expounded upon the notion of Divine Justice and 
elevated it as one of the “five pillars” of Shī‘ah Islam.12 Divine Justice was to provide 
desperate Shī‘ah Muslims with a big-picture understanding of the world in which their 
current misery and plights were but a passing and temporary phase. The big picture, they 
argued, was at the end essentially just and undeniably good –despite “short periods” in 
which the evil surpassed the good. Divine Justice also provided Shī‘ah Muslims with a 
promise of the ultimate salvation from internal and external calamities. For these reasons, 
justice appears heavily in Shī‘ah eschatology to the extent that the end of times is marked 
by the “triumph of justice over injustice.” Furthermore, ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib13, the first 
Shī‘ah Imām and the second most venerated figure in Shī‘ah Islam, is often seen as the 
epitome of justice and just ruling by Shī‘ah Muslims.14 Throughout history of Shī‘ah 
Islam, ‘Alī has been seen as the role-model for rulers and kings. These kings have often 
                                                 
12 Along with Divine Justice , or al-‘Adl, the “five pillars” are the doctrines of Unity –al-Tawḥīd–, afterlife 
–al-Ma‘ād–, prophet-hood –al-Nubuwwah–, and imamate –al-Imāmah. Note that imamate in Shī‘ah 
reading refers to the status of the descendants of the Prophet and their possession of Wilāyah and Walāyah. 
The term, therefore, has quite different connotations in Shī‘ah and Sunnī Islams.   
13 600 – 661 C.E. He is also known by his epithet Amīr al-Mu’minīn. From this point, wherever the single 
name ‘Alī is used in this dissertation, it refers to ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib. 
14 For a short period of time, ‘Alī reigned as the Muslim caliph. In fact, he is the fourth Sunnī caliph and the 
last of the “Four Rightly Guided” caliphs according to Sunnī Muslims. His caliphate was marked by 
internal turmoil in the Muslim world and several civil wars, which eventually led to the assassination of 
‘Alī by an extremist Muslim group. The assassination paved the way for the rise of the Umayyad dynasty.  
10 
 
been exhorted by Shī‘ah community to follow ‘Alī’s example of just rule; even though 
the mainstream Shī‘ah belief holds that all rulers will eventually fail to live up to ‘Alī’s 
high standards. Shī‘ah narration of ‘Alī’s life and rule becomes so idealistic that it is 
difficult to imagine an ordinary person equaling him in piety or in justice. Although the 
emphasis on justice in Shī‘ah Islam goes beyond the above examples, they seem to 
sufficiently convey the point. Given the importance of justice in Shī‘ah Islam, I have 
discussed –directly or indirectly– its implications for Shī‘ī strategic cultures throughout 
the dissertation.  
One of the central doctrines shaping Shī‘ī strategic cultures is the doctrine of 
Shahādah or martyrdom.15 Much has been written on martyrdom in Islam and in Shī‘ah 
Islam. The large body of literature has contributed to better understanding of the Shī‘ī 
understandings of martyrdom. At the same time, certain mistakes in reading the Shī‘ī 
doctrine of Shahādah have caused common misunderstandings. These misunderstandings 
have been exacerbated following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As a result, 
there is a tendency among some writers to lump the ancient and complex doctrine of 
Shahādah in Shī‘ah Islam together with the modern phenomenon of suicide killing. One 
of the root causes of these misunderstandings has been a confusion of Sunnī 
understanding of external Jihād –or holy exertion– with its Shī‘ī understanding. Here, the 
principle of justice and its priority for Shī‘ah Muslims appear once again. In Sunnī 
discourses, the notions of Jihād and martyrdom are associated with the Prophetic tradition 
of wars with the “infidels” for the “spread of Islam.” In Shī‘ī discourses, however, Jihād 
                                                 
15 The centrality of the doctrine of Shahādah in Shī‘ī strategic thinking became clear to me through my 
interviews with Professor Mesbahi [M. Mesbahi, Interviews, Fall 2008]. 
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and martyrdom are closely associated with the third Shī‘ah Imām’s16 battle with another 
group of Muslims in his efforts to “protest against injustice.” It must be noted that Shī‘ah 
jurists have often followed the examples of Sunnī jurists in understanding external Jihād 
as fighting with the “infidels.” Yet, their legal writings diverged from Shī‘ī popular 
discourses on Jihād for two reasons. One was the geography of Shī‘ah Muslims that 
allowed only limited encounters with the so-called “infidels.” For the most part, Shī‘ah 
Muslims lived in enclaves surrounded by a larger Sunnī community who were not –at 
least technically– “infidels.” As such, the idea of “Jihād with infidels to spread Islam” 
was irrelevant. The other reason has been the history of Shī‘ah Muslims’ access to power. 
During the formative centuries of Shī‘ah Islam, Shī‘ah Muslims had no or limited access 
to power –and sovereignty. The limited access prevented them from any meaningful 
engagement in wars with “infidels.” Following the death of the Prophet, it was mainly the 
first three Sunnī caliphs –and specially the second caliph, ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb– who 
engaged in territorial expansion of Muslim world. The early caliphs, in other words, did 
militarily engage the “infidels” and needed judicial codebooks for the conduct of external 
Jihād. Mainstream Shī‘ī beliefs, however, held the legitimacy of the reign of the first 
three caliphs –as well as their acts of war and peace– in question. In contrast, the short 
reign of the fourth caliph and the first Shī‘ah Imām, ‘Alī, was generally colored by 
internal conflicts and civil wars to such an extent that no major incidence of engagement 
with the “infidels” occurred. Following the assassination of ‘Alī, the rise of the Sunnī 
Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties meant a long period of inferiority for Shī‘ah Muslims. 
                                                 
16 The third Shī‘ah Imām is Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alī (626 – 680 C.E.), who was also a grandson of the Prophet. He 
is known by his epithets Abā ‘Abd Allāh and Sayyid al-Shuhadā’. From this point, wherever the single 
name Ḥusayn is used in this dissertation, it refers to Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alī. 
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During the aforementioned period, it was generally the Sunnī Muslims who were the 
conquerors and the empire-builders.17 In response, Sunnī jurists had to come up with 
elaborate and complex codes of conduct concerning external Jihād –with “infidels”– and 
concerning its aftermath. Many of these codes were later on found their ways into the 
writings of Shī‘ah jurists, even though Shī‘ah Muslims had more limited encounters with 
the “infidels.”18  
In general, early Shī‘ah jurists’ replicating the codes of external Jihād from their 
Sunnī colleagues has had limited relevance to Shī‘ah community; for the prime metaphor 
of martyrdom in Shī‘ah Islam came from the death of the third Imām, Ḥusayn.19 As 
mentioned before, his martyrdom did not happen in a Jihād with the “infidels.” Instead, it 
was a group of fellow Muslims who slaughtered Ḥusayn and his companions and 
imprisoned the survivors. What has made Ḥusayn’s battle an “exemplary Jihād” in Shī‘ah 
Islam –and his martyrdom a “supreme act of sacrifice”– was his struggle against 
“injustice.” Ḥusayn’s martyrdom has left a profound imprint on Shī‘ah collective 
consciousness. There is arguably no other single incidence in the history of Shī‘ah Islam 
that can be compared with what happened in Karbalā in 680 C.E. For over a thousand 
years, Shī‘ah Muslims recognize the anniversary of his martyrdom with processions and 
                                                 
17 See, for instance, Bennison, Amira K. (2009). The Great Caliphs: The Golden Age of the ‘Abbasid 
Empire. London: I.B.Tauris & Co. This is, of course, not to dismiss the important Shī‘ī contributions during 
this period or the so-called “Shī‘ah century” from 945 to 1055 C.E. [Ibid. p. 45]. See also Piscatori, James. 
(1986). Islam in a World of Nation-States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
18 See Faghfoory, Mohammad H. (forthcoming April 2012). Ethic of War and Peace in Shi‘ite Islam. In G. 
M. Reichberg & H. Syse (Eds.), Ethics of War and Peace in World Religions. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
19 Ḥusayn and a number of his close companions were killed in 680 C.E. in Karbalā [see Ṭabāṭabā’ī, Sayyid 
Muḥammad Ḥusayn. Shi‘ite Islam. pp. 196-200; and Nasr, S. H. et al (Eds.). Expectation of the 
Millennium. pp. 45-57]. 
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mourning while remembering the “extreme injustice” committed against the “Master of 
the Martyrs.”20       
In regards to the study of Shī‘ī strategic cultures, the story of Ḥusayn created an 
important conceptual framework. A central question in studying a people’s strategic 
culture is whether they have specific conceptualizations of the notion of security in 
contrast to others. For Shī‘ah Muslims, Ḥusayn’s martyrdom has served as a metaphor of 
security throughout the centuries. The metaphor, of course, is a peculiar and somewhat 
paradoxical understanding of security; for by all worldly and material measures, Ḥusayn 
failed in his –political or otherwise– quest. Most of his companions were killed and the 
remaining members of his family had to go through a long journey of humiliation at the 
hands of their captors. Yet, Shī‘ah Muslims found in such utter insecurity and pain 
inflicted upon Ḥusayn a foundation for their understanding of security. While Chapter III 
deals with this issue in more detail, the gist of the Shī‘ī attitude was to view Ḥusayn’s 
martyrdom as the “ultimate salvation” –leading to a sense of permanent and 
“metaphysical security” unachievable through any other means. The utmost insecurity of 
death at the hand of an unjust oppressor was deemed the source of greatest security. The 
above Shī‘ī understanding of security is clearly articulated in the response that Ḥusayn’s 
surviving sister, Zaynab bint ‘Alī21, gave to the Umayyad caliph, Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah22. 
                                                 
20 One of the epithets of Ḥusayn among Shī‘ah Muslims is Sayyid al-Shuhadā’ meaning the “Master of the 
Martyrs.” Originally, the exalting epithet belonged to Ḥamzah ibn ‘Abd al-Muṭallib, the Prophet’s beloved 
uncle and companion, who had been killed in 625 C.E. in the Battle of Uḥud. Shī‘ah Muslims still use the 
title of “Master of the Martyrs” in reference to Ḥamzah ibn ‘Abd al-Muṭallib, albeit rarely.  
21 d. 682 C.E. 
22 d. 683 C.E. 
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Following the Battle of Karbalā, when Zaynab bint ‘Alī and other prisoners of war 
entered Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah’s court in Damascus, Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah inquired 
Zaynab bint ‘Alī about the sufferings and humiliations she and her family had to go 
through. In doing so, Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah also implied the fall of the prisoners from the 
Grace of God. Reportedly, Zaynab bint ‘Alī responded that “[in what we have endured] I 
did not behold anything but of great beatitude.”23 
In the centuries following the Battle of Karbalā, Shī‘ah Muslims went through a 
long period of external insecurity and socioeconomic pressure. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that they saw the story of Ḥusayn as an extreme version of their own difficult 
condition; and that they sought relief in remembering the “ultimate sacrifice” of Ḥusayn. 
The story, despite its tragic and sorrowful quality, appeared as a story of hope. It 
sanctioned a belief that the utmost insecurity will eventually turns into ultimate and 
blissful salvation. It was understood as the fulfillment of the Qur’ānic repeated 
promises24 that with each period of difficulty, there shall be a time of comfort –even 
though such comfort may come after death.  
In the formative period of Shī‘ah Islam, therefore, the notions of Shahādah and 
Jihād were developed differently by Shī‘ah Muslims compared to their Sunnī 
coreligionists. During the same period, a more pragmatic and practical doctrine of 
expediency also appeared due to the forces of reality. The doctrine was called the doctrine 
of Taqīyyah –often loosely translated to “precautionary concealment.” Compared to the 
                                                 
23 The words of Zaynab bint ‘Alī has been reported in various Shī‘ī sources including ‘Allāmih Majlisī, 
Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 45, p. 116. 
24 See the Qur’ān 94:5 and 94:6. 
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doctrine of Shahādah, the doctrine of Taqīyyah was a more proactive response to the 
hostile environment. The elaborate theological Shī‘ī edifice around the notion of 
Shahādah emerged partly as a reaction to a sociopolitical landscape that seemed to offer 
no prospect of security for Shī‘ah community. In response, religious leaders of the 
community took refuge in the notion of “metaphysical security” epitomized in Shahādah. 
This is not to deny the grounds of Shahādah as a “religious act” in –Shī‘ah– Islam. 
Rather, it is to argue that the rise of Shahādah –and the accompanying accommodation of 
pain and suffering– in collective consciousness of Shī‘ah community was in part a 
reaction to social realities. 
In contrast, Taqīyyah was a proactive and finely calculated strategy by a 
persecuted people. The word has often been translated as “precautionary concealment” or 
“cautionary dissimilation,” which is not precise –although they do convey one of the 
commonly understood implications of the term. The more detailed discussion of the 
meanings and implications of the term will be presented in Chapter IV following the 
seminal contribution of the late Professor Hamid Enayat.25 For the purpose of 
introduction, however, it must be said that the term Taqīyyah refers to “commonsense 
‘counsel of caution’.”26 The underlying principle behind Taqīyyah is close to Aristotelian 
prudence.27 As such, Taqīyyah was a call for caution, deliberation, and sound judgment 
                                                 
25  See Enayat, Hamid. (1982). Modern Islamic Political Thoughts. Austin: University of Texas Press. 
26 See Ibid. p. 175. 
27 The notion of prudence at the heart of the doctrine of Taqīyyah became clear to me through my personal 
communications with Professor Mohsen Kadivar during September 2010. I am also indebted to Professor 
Farhang Rajaee for an insightful conversation regarding the notion of prudence in Aristotle’s political 
philosophy and in Taqīyyah [F. Rajaee, personal communication, July 7, 2011]. For an insightful discussion 
of prudence within a different religious context, see Bireley, Robert. (1990). The Counter-Reformation 
Prince: Anti-Machiavellianism or Catholic Statecraft in Early Modern Europe. Chapel Hill: University of 
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among members of a persecuted minority. The doctrine valued the survival of the Shī‘ah 
community as well as Shī‘ah individuals. Furthermore, the drive for survival went 
beyond natural instinct and was, implicitly or explicitly, linked to Shī‘ah “philosophy of 
existence” –i.e. Wilāyah and Walāyah. If one can view one’s community as a “chosen 
community” in the sense of receiving the Grace of God, one can feel a strong religious 
duty to protect the community’s survival too.  
The introduction of the doctrine of Taqīyyah by Shī‘ah Imāms had immediate 
consequences for the Shī‘ah community and its security. According to Shī‘ah Muslims, 
the principle of prudence was observed by ‘Alī in his long period of political silence 
during the reign of the first three caliphs, whom mainstream Shī‘ah Muslims came to 
regard as illegitimate successors to the Prophet. Yet, it was after the catastrophic events of 
Karbalā and the slaughters of their third Imām that Shī‘ah community began to reflect 
more on the notions of prudence and expediency. The Battle of Karbalā evinced, inter 
alia, the extremely precarious hold of Shī‘ah community on survival. If the highly 
venerated and respected grandson of the Prophet were not spared, who would, Shī‘ah 
Muslims asked. Thus, at the same time that Shī‘ah community began to nurture a 
passionate love for Ḥusayn and his “ultimate act of worship,” they also devised a strategy 
of survival. The strategy was further elaborated upon by the subsequent Shī‘ah Imāms. 
More important than their words, however, the principle of prudent action was 
manifested in the behaviors of these later Imāms. Unlike their predecessor, Ḥusayn, they 
often treated matters of politics with extreme caution.28 They even treated the avengers of 
                                                                                                                                                 
North Carolina Press.  
28 Although this claim generally applies to most of the Shī‘ah Imāms who followed Ḥusayn, there are few 
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Ḥusayn with alertness refusing to openly and actively support their military campaigns. 
The extreme caution allowed Shī‘ah community to revive after the devastating blow it 
had endured in Karbalā. The community grew in number and later Shī‘ah Imāms, 
especially the fifth and the sixth Imāms,29 managed to disseminate a large corpus of 
theological, legal and juridical teachings. These teachings later on served as one of the 
foundations of Shī‘ah jurisprudence.  
Not surprisingly, the doctrine of Taqīyyah proved to be a double-edged sword. 
The extraordinary possibilities embedded in it called for a balancing force against 
potential misuse. The central question was the “proper” application of Taqīyyah, or what 
may be called “principled Taqīyyah.” In Shī‘ah theology, there are several provisions 
regarding the religiously sanctioned practice of Taqīyyah. The most important balancer 
against the forces of expediency released by the doctrine of Taqīyyah, however, has been 
the example of the Shī‘ah patriarch, ‘Alī. He is generally praised by Shī‘ah Muslims as a 
“man of principle,” a saint who refused to “compromise his values” for the sake of 
expediency and practical calculations. Additional discussion on ‘Alī’s legacy of 
“principled action” and its resulting paradigm in Shī‘ah Islam can be found in Chapter IV. 
Following Chapter V on Wilāyah and Walāyah, Chapter VI offers the concluding remarks 
for this dissertation by putting together the doctrines of Shahādah and Taqīyyah within 
the central Shī‘ah ontology of Wilāyah and Walāyah.  
                                                                                                                                                 
exceptions. Arguably the most important exception to this generalization is the seventh Imām, Mūsā ibn 
Ja‘far, also known by his epithet al-Kāẓim (744 – 799 C.E.), who was more politically active and, as a 
result, spent many years in the prison of the Abbasid caliph.  
29 These are Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī, also known by his epithet al-Bāqir (677 – 732 C.E.) and Ja‘far ibn 
Muḥammad, also known by his epithet al-Ṣādiq (702 – 765 C.E.).  
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Theoretical Framework and Methodology 
Following the above overview of the structure of this dissertation, I will briefly 
identify the theoretical framework of this research based on the prominent schools of 
thought in International Relations. Theoretically speaking, this dissertation has a hybrid 
framework. It tries to follow a combination of “neo-traditionalist” (or “neoclassical”) 
Realism30 on the one hand and rule-oriented Constructivism31 on the other. The two-sided 
framework allows me to take into account both the role of ideas and the forces of 
realities; for it appears to be problematic to give prominence to one at the expense of the 
other –at least when it comes to Shī‘ah history. Whether ideas are more influential in 
shaping the reality or vice versa may depend on the specific time and place the two 
collide. Nevertheless, a combination of Neoclassical Realism and Constructivism seems 
to provide the flexibility needed to understand the complexities abundant in Shī‘ah 
political theology. The combination accommodates how the social reality of being a 
minority was translated into certain ideas and doctrines in Shī‘ah Islam –e.g. the original 
elaboration of the doctrine of Shahādah or the proactive response in the doctrine of 
Taqīyyah. It also explains how certain ideas and doctrines in Shī‘ah Islam have changed 
the social reality –e.g. the impacts of the notion of prudence at the heart of the doctrine of 
                                                 
30 For more information on “neo-traditionalist” or “neoclassical” Realism, see Lobell, S. E., Ripsman, N. 
M., & Taliaferro, J. W.  (Eds.). (2009). Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press; Cozette, Murielle. (2008). What Lies Ahead: Classical Realism on the Future 
of International Relations. International Studies Review, 10, 667-679; Rose, Gideon. (1998). Neoclassical 
Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy. World Politics, 51(1), 144-172; and Vasquez, John A. (1998). The 
Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.  
31 See Onuf, Nicholas. (1989). World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International 
Relations. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. See also Sterling-Folker, Jennifer. (Spring 2002). 
Realism and the Constructivist Challenge: Rejecting, Reconstructing, or Rereading. International Studies 
Review, 4(1), 73-97.  
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Taqīyyah or, in modern times, the consequential revival of and revisions in the doctrine of 
Shahādah. As such, Neoclassical Realism/Constructivism seems to be an effective 
theoretical framework to understand the swirl of ideas and reality in Shī‘ah history as 
well as the inevitable complexities and, at times, contradictions.        
Neoclassical Realism may be considered as the return of Classical Realism 
following the relative decline of reductionist Neorealism in International Relations. 
Neoclassical Realism revives the emphasis on a more reflective mode of research in 
which human nature, history, and their interactions are taken seriously. Such an 
Augustinian-Niebuhrian sensitivity makes it possible to appreciate the complexities 
surrounding human existence and human conditions.32 For its ability to accommodate 
complexities, Classical Realism is potentially capable of conducting “Phenomenological 
studies”33 of religions and religious beliefs in international relations. Conducting such a 
task seems to be more difficult within the rationalistic framework of Neorealism or that 
of Liberalism. Many examples, including Morgenthau’s reference to certain religious 
aspects of international relations and the notion of “tragedy,” indicate Classical Realism’s 
dormant capacities in this regard.34 In addition to its reflective mode of research, the 
study of ethics and the engagement of normative questions in Classical Realism35 provide 
                                                 
32 See Niebuhr, Reinhold. (1932). Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics. New 
York: Charles Scribner’s. 
33 See the following Chapter for more discussion.  
34 See, for instance, Morgenthau’s trilogy of human nature including the “biological,” “rational,” and 
“spiritual” aspects, as well as his pessimism regarding the potential of rationality and the promises of 
modernity [see Morgenthau, Hans J. (1946). Scientific Man vs Power Politics. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press]. 
35 See, for instance, Carr, E. H. (2001). The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of 
International Relations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
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the necessary, albeit primitive, foundation for the study of religion in international 
relations. The question of norms relates to the second element of my theoretical 
framework, namely norm-oriented Constructivism.36  
Despite important potential of Classical Realism in terms of understanding 
normative questions, this school of thought has yet to offer a systematic framework for 
addressing such questions. The challenge of addressing normative questions is where the 
contributions of Constructivism in general and rule-oriented Constructivism in particular 
are significant. Except for Neorealism, there is arguably no other school of thought in 
International Relations that offers a solid “theoretical system” as rule-oriented 
Constructivism does.37 The Constructivist theoretical system is based on a well-thought-
out set of concepts and a clear pattern of interaction among those concepts. When it 
comes to the study of religion in International Relations, therefore, I share with 
Kubálková that rule-oriented Constructivism is more capable of understanding religion 
compared to other Constructivist or non-Constructivist schools of thought.38 As explained
                                                 
36 I use norm-oriented Constructivism and rule-oriented Constructivism interchangeably. In an analytically 
insightful review of Constructivism, Burch differentiates between the two and names the works of scholars 
such as Ruggie and Finnemore as examples of norm-oriented Constructivists and those of theorists such as 
Onuf and Kratochwill as examples of rule-oriented Constructivists. One perceivable difference is the notion 
of identity, which Onuf is reluctant to use. Though insightful, however, the distinction does not seem to be 
decisive. Within rule-oriented Constructivism, norms can still be accommodated as less formal rules. In 
addition, resorting to the notion of identity is not always necessary to explain the effects of norms/rules on 
social agents as Onuf’s notion of “rule/Rule” seems to deliver a similar function. In any case, I borrow 
from both rule-oriented and norm-oriented versions of Constructivism in my research. See Burch, Kurt. 
(2002). Toward a Constructivist Comparative Politics. In Daniel Green (Ed.), Constructivism and 
Comparative Politics (pp. 60-87). New York: M. E. Sharpe; Ruggie, John G. (1998). Constructing the 
World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization. New York: Routledge; Finnemore, Martha. 
(1996). National Interests in International Society. New York: Cornell University Press; Onuf, Nicholas. 
World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations; and Kratochwil, 
Friedrich V. (1989). Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in 
International Relations and Domestic Affairs. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
37 See in particular Onuf, Nicholas. World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and 
International Relations. 
38 See Kubálková, Vendulka. (2003). Toward an International Political Theology. In F. Petito & P. 
Hatzopoulos (Eds.), Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile (pp. 79-105). New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
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before, it is also the closest theoretical framework in International Relations to the 
Phenomenological approach I am pursuing in my research. I will not use Neorealism and 
Liberalism due to their inherent positivism and behavioralism, which render them less 
capable of understanding religious phenomena. I also will not use Wendt’s Structural 
Constructivism due to the disabling ambiguity of the notion of “structure” at the heart of 
his theory.39 It is not, in other words, clear to me how one can devise a research question 
using Wendt’s rather nebulous notion of structure. 
Since the topic of my research is the evolution of the notion of security in Shī‘ah 
history and Shī‘ah theology, I use historical analysis of the overall changes in material 
conditions of Shī‘ah Muslims in parallel to discourse analysis of their theological works. 
Historical analysis is the favorite method of Classical/Neoclassical Realism while 
discourse analysis is more at home with Constructivism. Indeed, theological discourses 
both reflect and affect material conditions. Therefore, the two methods are in constant 
dialogue here and are not dealt with separately. I will use discourse analysis to review the 
relevant concepts in selected texts40 of Shī‘ah Islam –including the primary sources such 
as the Qur’ān and the Ḥadīth collections, as well as the secondary sources such as 
exegesis on the Qur’ān and jurisprudential treatises by prominent Shī‘ah Fuqahā (i.e. 
jurists). The historical analysis will be used to better understand the relevant practices in 
the history of Shī‘ah Islam.  
 
                                                 
39 See Wendt, Alexander. (1999). Social Theory of International Politics. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
40 See the list of Classical Sources in the Bibliography.  
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In terms of specific texts used in this research, the works of some prominent 
Shī‘ah Fuqahā have been of particular importance.41 These figures include –but are not 
limited to– Muḥammad ibn Bābawayh (Shaykh al-Ṣadūq), al-Sharīf al-Raḍī, Shaykh al-
Mufīd, al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā, Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, Amīn al-Islām Ṭabarsī, Aḥmad ibn Idrīs al-
Ḥillī, Muḥaqqiq Ḥillī, ‘Allāmih Ḥillī, Muḥammad ibn Makkī (Shahīd al-Awwal), 
Muḥaqqiq al-Karakī, Shahīd al-Thānī, Muḥaqqiq al-Ardabīlī, Mullā Muḥsin Fiyḍ 
Kāshānī, al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī, ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Fāḍil Hindī, Ja‘afar Kāshif al-Ghiṭā’, Mullā 
Aḥmad Narāqī, Shaykh al-Anṣārī, and Ṣāḥib al-Jawāhir.      
From a certain perspective, the present dissertation is a humble addition to the late 
Professor Hamid Enayat’s Modern Islamic Political Thought. While Professor Enayat 
addressed some central questions in Political Theory of Shī‘ah and Sunnī Islam, I hope to 
contribute to our knowledge of Shī‘ah Islam by addressing some related questions in the 
field of Strategic Studies. Indeed Enayat briefly addresses notions such as Shahādah and 
Taqīyyah in his important work. He does so, however, within the framework of political 
theory and political ideas. Given its relevance and importance, his foundational work has 
been reviewed and discussed in Chapters II, III, IV and V.42 On the basis of his initial 
thoughts and contributions, I will try to shed some more lights on the strategic 
consequences of these political doctrines, their historical and theological backgrounds, 
and their essential and strategic connection to the notions of Wilāyah and Walāyah. 
                                                 
41 I am indebted to Professor Mohsen Kadivar for his help in identifying the key figures among classical 
Shī‘ah jurists and theologians in regard to the subject of this dissertation [M. Kadivar, personal 
communication, September 22, 2010]. 
42 I am indebted to Professor Farhang Rajaee who first directed me to Hamid Enayat’s important 
contribution. Through a number of conversations regarding this dissertation in 2011, Professor Rajaee 
helped me to better understand the essential relationship between the present research in the field of 
Strategic Studies and Professor Enayat’s foundational work in the field of Political Theory.     
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CHAPTER II 
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Introduction 
Given the multidisciplinary nature of the research question in my dissertation, 
different bodies of literature have been examined. In particular, I review the literature on 
religion produced by the International Relations discipline as the literature for which my 
research is a case study. I then explore parts of the Security Studies literature within 
International Relations to further contextualize my study. In fact the notion of strategic 
cultures comes from this subset of International Relations literature and the study of 
strategic culture in Shī‘ah Islam lies within an emerging strategic culture literature. The 
main interlocutors of my research are, therefore, those scholars in the field of strategic 
culture studies in International Relations discipline. In a larger context, however, my 
study belongs to Political Science literature and not that of Religious Studies, although 
some of the relevant Religious Studies literature on Shī‘ah Islam must be engaged. The 
related Religious Studies literature, however, have been used within the theoretical 
frameworks of International Relations. In fact, one of the contributions of this dissertation 
is to convey and represent some of the Religious Studies literature on Shī‘ah Islam to 
scholars of International Relations in an accessible fashion.    
It is also important to emphasize that my dissertation is strictly narrowed to the 
study of the majority Twelver Shī‘ah Islam and not other versions of Shī‘ah Islam such as 
the Ismā‘īlīs or Zaydīs. In other words, whenever the term Shī‘ah is used in this 
dissertation, it refers to Twelver Shī‘ah unless otherwise specified. Some of the general 
results of my study, however, may be cautiously extended to other branches of Shī‘ah 
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Islam. In addition, in order to better understand specificity of the Twelver Shī‘ī doctrines 
and practices, references may be made to relevant arguments in other –Sunnī or Shī‘ah– 
branches of Islam whenever necessary.    
International Relations: Religion and Secularism 
There is a challenge associated with any study of religion conducted within the 
framework of the modern Social Sciences. The challenge arises from the fact that these 
sciences are generally secular in their paradigms. As one of the products of the 
Enlightenment, the modern Social Sciences followed the powerful convictions of that age 
about the fate of religions. The influential thinkers of the Enlightenment understood 
Christianity and, by extension, other religions of the world as fading phenomena 
belonging to the past. Religions were, at worst, collections of pre-modern man’s distorted 
view of the world he lived in or, at best, a necessary stage of man’s “progress” towards 
modernity. As a result, the rise of the Enlightenment had rendered this pre-modern stage 
an obsolete one. The modernist faith arguably relied on two assumptions about the 
function of religions and on the two associated developments in Europe. The first 
projected function of religions was to provide men with explanation of the world. With 
the emergence of the European scientific revolution in the centuries that preceded the 
Enlightenment and with the success of the experimental modern sciences in explaining 
the world, it was only reasonable for the Enlightenment philosophers to question the 
ability of religions in explaining how the world worked.43 The second presumed function 
                                                 
43 For more philosophical discussions of faith-reason interaction in the contemporary world, see Habermas, 
Jürgen. (2002). Religion and Rationality: Essays on Reason, God and Modernity. Cambridge: The MIT 
Press; and Habermas, Jürgen, et al. (2010). An Awareness of What is Missing: Faith and Reason in a Post-
secular Age. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
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of religion was to serve as a foundation for individual and collective identities. With the 
Church in disarray after the Reformation and the rise of powerful nationalism and the 
modern nation-states, this function was also fulfilled by other non-religious entities. 
Nationality began to supersede religious ties in defining men’s allegiances. These two 
developments, i.e. scientific revolution and the rise of the modern nation-states, led to the 
relative demise of Christianity in Europe. Yet, despite the prediction of the “progressive” 
Enlightenment thinkers, the rest of the world did not follow the suit. Not only have 
religions not disappeared from our social scenery, some of the major events of the second 
half of the twentieth century can only be understood as a comeback of religions to the 
fore. As a result, many scholars of modern Social Sciences have begun to reconsider 
some tenets of the prevailing secular worldview. Despite the scholarly efforts to 
accommodate the revival of religions, the academic Social Sciences are not yet a fully 
open environment for studying religious phenomena. Study of religions is even more 
challenging when it comes to International Relations, arguably the most secular of all 
Social Sciences. As mentioned above, the relative demise of Christianity and the 
disappearance of God as a point of reference in Europe from the sixteenth century 
onward has been one of the permissible causes of the rise of the modern nation-states. In 
fact, some scholars of International Relations consider the modern nation-states as 
modern secular gods and nationalism as a modern secular religion.44 Therefore, 
International Relations emerged as a secular discipline by default due to the secular 
nature of the object of its study. The historical trajectory, in turn, renders studies on 
religion in International Relations particularly challenging.  
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Despite all the difficulties, there appeared a surge in a new type of literature on 
religion in International Relations after the end of the Cold War. As Berger argues, this 
emerging literature questioned “[t]he [validity of the] proposition that modernity 
necessarily leads to a decline of religion.”45 As a result, many International Relations 
scholars involved themselves in the discussion of religion while not quite comfortable in 
doing so. Wallerstein’s analysis is a sample outcome of such a situation. While 
acknowledging the gap in the scholarship and the necessity of inclusion of religion, he 
appears to maneuver around the difficult how questions.46 The wary accommodation of 
religious phenomena in International Relations might be an indication of still-deep 
attachments to secularized paradigms. In fact, Berger claims that there are two exceptions 
to the “desecularization” of the world today. One is Western Europe and the other is 
students with “Western-type higher education […] in the humanities and social 
sciences.”47     
The now undisputed argument about the necessity to take religions into account 
does not provide us with much insight anymore. The more difficult question is how to 
take religions into account. Here, most of the literature in International Relations seems 
to be ambiguous in its approaches. An example of this ambiguity may be found in the 
analysis put forward by Fox and Sandler.48 The authors argue for the necessity of adding 
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47 Berger, Peter. Secularism in Retreat. p. 45. 
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religion to Realism for religion has an important legitimizing function for governments 
and for their policies. Furthermore, religion plays a significant role in local conflicts, and 
in contrast to the Enlightenment presumptions, it is still a fundamental source of 
“identity.” Yet, the lack of a clear vision on how to include religion in the study of 
international relations seems to have led to the authors’ acknowledgment of the 
methodological and epistemological deficiencies. They conclude that their book “leaves 
us with as many questions as answers”49 in regards to the study of religion. Fox and 
Sandler’s conclusion is in no way uncommon as many of the works on religion in 
International Relations indicate similar methodological and epistemological uncertainties. 
A part of the problem in secular studies of religion arises from traditional secular 
convictions. Hurd, for instance, claims that, “[t]o seal its claim to moral superiority, 
secularism denominates ‘religion’ as the domain of the violent, the irrational, the 
undemocratic, [and] the ‘other’.”50 Hurd also provides a brief historiography of the 
concept of the “secular” in the West and argues that secularism is intertwined with the 
notion of “taking possession.” According to Hurd, “in the Westphalian era, the term ‘to 
secularize’ referred specifically to the laicization of church lands.”51 As such, secularism 
has had, from its origin, certain totalitarian potential and tendencies. In a similar vein, 
Esposito examines some cases of historical ties between secularism on the one hand and 
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50 Hurd, Elizabeth S. (2004). The Political Authority of Secularism in International Relations. European 
Journal of International Relations, 10(2), 235-262. p. 237.  
51 Ibid. p. 241. 
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suppression and dictatorship on the other.52 Built upon her assessment of secularism and 
its “aggressive” nature, Hurd questions the secularist hegemony in International 
Relations.53 
At the same time, one must not ignore or underrate certain secularist innovations 
to accommodate study of religious phenomena within the secular framework of the 
modern Social Sciences. Casanova, for instance, offers a nuanced understanding of the 
challenges secularization is facing in the West.54 He aims to understand and 
accommodate the role of religion in the public sphere within the framework of modern 
secularization project. To do this, secularization itself must be revisited, Casanova argues. 
He differentiates between three elements of the concept. The first element is the 
Enlightenment premise that religious beliefs and practices are declining as a result of lack 
of validity and thus relevance. The second element of secularization is what one may call 
the French perspective, or laïcité, which emphasizes the public-private dichotomy. Laïcité 
then brushes religion and religious practices to the latter sphere. The last is the Anglo-
Saxon approach that revolves around the separation of political authority, i.e. the state, on 
the one hand and the religious authority, i.e. the church, on the other. According to 
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Casanova, the first element has been falsified in many parts of the world –though it is 
arguably still valid in Western Europe.55 The second element, on the other hand, fails to 
understand religions’ public roles. It is, therefore, the last element that is the central pillar 
of modern secularization according to Casanova. It is also this last element that offers a 
viable solution in secular study of religions and public religiosity. Following the Anglo-
Saxon interpretation of secularization, one may defend the public role of religions while 
remaining faithful to the basic tenets of secularization.56   
Geertz’s approach is also an example of secularist novelty to study religion 
without abandoning secular premises. By defining religion as a “cultural system,” Geertz 
is opening the possibility of Huntingtonian treatment of religion where religion is 
subsumed in a rather nebulous notion of civilization or culture. Geertz defines religion as  
“(1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, 
pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) 
formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) 
clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the 
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moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.” 57 (emphasis in the 
original)    
The definition is cautiously articulated so that it allows Geertz to “take religions 
seriously” while remaining within the boundaries of secularism. In particular, the notion 
of religious symbols being “clothed” in “an aura of factuality,” which seems to be the 
implicit consensus in the secular academia, is pronounced here following the reference to 
the “long-lasting” power of such symbols. 
Given the above general context, the diverse jargon of the emerging literature on 
the subject of religion in International Relations may be organized within four 
conceivable frameworks. These, in the order of divergence from the basic premises of 
modernism, include the Enlightenment, Identity, Phenomenological and Traditionalist 
approaches.  
The first possible analytical framework is the classic modern stance. The 
Enlightenment approach asserts that religions are to fade away –at least from the public 
sphere. As such, religions gradually become of lesser significance in social analyses. It is 
an Auguste Comte approach in which it is assumed that humanity is “growing out of 
religion.” The Enlightenment approach seems to have been the mainstream perspective 
towards the study of religion in International Relations until recently when the events of 
the last couple of decades forced many scholars of International Relations and Political 
Sciences to search for alternative analytical frameworks.58 The search has led to the 
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emergence of a literature in International Relations that follows the Identity approach and 
–to a lesser extent– the Phenomenological approach.   
The second analytical framework is the Identity approach in which religion is 
acknowledged as a subjective force with certain objective manifestation such as rituals. 
This subjective force partially shapes the identity and thus behavior of social actors 
interacting with it. The Identity approach is arguably close to Durkheim’s sociology of 
religion in which religion is a socially constructed reality serving to orient individuals 
and societies.59 In the Identity approach, religion is often seen as a phenomenon similar to 
ethnicity. Religion could be used, for instance, as an instrument at the disposal of political 
actors to legitimize their actions or to mobilize the masses. By avoiding deep engagement 
of religions, the Identity approach dodges some difficult questions. In particular, it 
overlooks the theoretical challenge that the rise of religions has posed to the discipline of 
International Relations. In International Relations, therefore, the Identity approach 
towards religion remains essentially “functionalist,” i.e. sensitive to political functions of 
religion in international politics. Religions are seen as one of the compartments of the 
“identity structure” and as such, they can be measured and analyzed by associated and 
manifested behaviors. Arguably one of the most influential pieces on International 
Relations and religion, The Clash of Civilizations, follows this approach.60 Huntington 
                                                                                                                                                 
with. See Raines John. (Ed.). (2002). Marx on Religion. Philadelphia: Temple University Press; and 
Mendieta, Eduardo. (Ed.). (2005). The Frankfurt School on Religion: Key Writings by the Major Thinkers. 
New York: Routledge. 
59 See Durkheim, Émile. (2001). The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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borrows the term from the prominent “Orientalist,” Bernard Lewis.61 Lewis employs 
civilizational conceptualization62 to understand the Muslim world. In fact, The Clash of 
Civilization may be seen as an example of the “Orientalist” literature63 in International 
Relations. More nuanced versions of the Identity approach can be found in the literature 
in which religions are seen as the foundation of normative power for certain actors. In 
Shi‘a Revival, for instance, Vali Nasr takes such an instrumentalist approach towards 
religion.64 Within the Identity approach, it is a frequent solution to view religion as an 
ideology, so that religion can be treated in the same way that nationalism has been 
analyzed. The appeal of the Identity approach is that the reduction of religion to ideology 
obviates the necessity of difficult theoretical and methodological innovations. The same 
concepts and methods that have been employed in understanding ideologies, or ethnicity, 
can now be applied to a new “case,” namely religion. The Identity approach seems also to 
be the favorite approach for scholars who tend to think within the (neo)Realist frame of 
thought in International Relations. For this group of scholars, accommodation of non-
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material forces is not always unproblematic. Furthermore, the Identity approach is 
compatible with the Constructivism of the type Wendt advocated;65 for this version of 
Constructivism engages the concept of identity and that of culture.  
In addition to Wendt’s Constructivism, scholars writing within the Identity 
approach sometimes engage Classical Realism as a potentially capable theoretical 
perspective to understand religion in international relations. Writing in the aftermath of 
September 11 terrorist attacks, Keohane begins with the argument that “[w]e need to 
synthesize insights from classical realism, institutionalism, and Constructivism, but we 
also need to take alternative worldviews—including religious ones—more seriously.”66 
His analysis shows the angle via which an Identity approach tackles the question of 
religion. Keohane justifies the use of Classical Realism in studying religious worldviews 
because, according to him, Classical Realism “takes very seriously the human desires to 
dominate or to hate.”67  
Thomas explores religion and international conflict by viewing religion as, inter 
alia, “a form of ideology,” “a form of identity,” “a form of ‘soft power’,” and as –rather 
ambiguous notions of– “civilization or culture area.”68 One may argue that the broad and 
uncertain analytical framework behind these many descriptions characterizes the Identity 
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approach. The next step is to discuss “[t]he religious challenge to international society”69 
caused by the confrontation of “strong religions” versus “weak states.” Hence, Thomas’s 
analysis may be considered as a mainstream example of the Identity literature on religion 
in International Relations.70 Once again, the author calls for “taking religion seriously” 
and declares that the twentieth century was “the last modern century.”71 This is in line 
with Gellner’s implicit dismissal of “non-fundamentalist” religiosities as inconsequential 
while making a scathing attack against “nihilist” postmodernism.72 Gellner paints a world 
in which three forces of “religious fundamentalism,” “rationalist fundamentalism,” and 
“relativist postmodernism” compete with each other. His analysis of Muslim 
“fundamentalism” offers some fresh, albeit debatable, insights. Yet, it is the convenient 
comparison of categorically disparate phenomena such as religions and “scientific 
methods”73 that appears problematic in Gellner’s work. In his argument against the “end 
of modernity,” Thomas also follows such clear-cut categorizations and convenient 
comparisons. Thomas claims that the weakening of modern sociopolitical structures is 
caused by a deepening identity dilemma; 
“Ernest Gellner has argued that since the period of colonial 
occupation the developing countries have been confronted with a 
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dilemma: should they emulate the West and spurn their own culture 
in order to gain equality in power, or should they affirm their own 
cultural and religious traditions but remain materially weak?”74  
In line with Asad’s criticism of Geertz’s notion of “religion as a cultural system,”75 
Thomas believes that in response to the above identity dilemma, religiosity has changed 
in certain parts of the world. For instance, a new –privatized– religion has been 
“invented” in order to serve modern nation-states through shaping “the identity of the 
community.”76 It must be mentioned, however, that along with his mainly identity-based 
argument, Thomas examines the ethical cores of major religious traditions in the world as 
well. These ethical cores, according to Thomas’s phenomenological observation, have 
noticeable potential for shaping international relations. The phenomenological analysis 
leads Thomas to write about religions’ potential roles in promoting peace or fighting 
poverty.  
A similar oscillation between the Identity approach and the Phenomenological 
approach77 can be found in Thomas’s other works.78 The author recognizes the crisis of 
modernity and the role played by the quest for “authenticity” in response to that crisis. 
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Thomas views this quest as one of the forces behind the worldwide rise of religions. To 
the extent that Thomas’s analysis strives to “rethink” the interaction of religion on the one 
hand and international cooperation, diplomacy, international conflicts, development, and 
democracy on the other, the work tilts towards the Phenomenological approach. The 
content of this rethinking, however, is not far from the Identity approach; for the 
emerging turn towards faith, Thomas argues, is the result of the “search for authentic 
identity, meaning and economic development.”79 The significance of religions in 
international relations, therefore, remains tied to the provision of transnational identity 
and soft power. 
A number of scholars writing within the Identity approach have focused on the 
study “fundamentalism” instead of religions. One prime example of this is the Chicago 
Fundamentalism Project. Defined as an attempt by “true believers [...] to arrest the 
erosion of religious identity,” fundamentalism is understood by Almond and Appleby as a 
response to securitization of religion.80 Reporting the findings of the Chicago Project, 
Almond and Appleby review a variety of arguably disparate phenomena under the same 
rubric of fundamentalism. The authors acknowledge the limitations of using the term 
“fundamentalism.” Yet, they go on to explain the increasing visibility of different 
religions by resorting to the notion of “enclave culture.” The conceptual reduction allows 
Almond and Appleby to associate various, otherwise dissimilar, challenges together. 
Moreover, by building their analysis of religions in international relations around the 
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notion of “enclave cultures,” Almond and Appleby formulate the problématique of 
religion for International Relations as an enclave one. They seem to take for granted 
secularization as the status quo order of the world “attacked by strong religions.”            
Antoun also uses the term fundamentalism to identify an “orientation” that fights 
against the “ideology of modernism.”81 Here, fundamentalism appears as an identity 
bastion. Antoun analyzes his anthropological observations in Jordan to pinpoint what he 
believes are the essential characters of fundamentalism, namely traditioning, totalism, 
activism, scripturalism, search for purity, selective modernization, controlled 
acculturation, and perception of history as good-evil struggle. Similar to the 
cultural/civilizational approach of Huntington, however, the definition appears to be 
nebulous and the conceptual boundaries of the notion of fundamentalism remain under-
defined in some of these characteristics. 
As noted above, some scholars of the Identity approach tend to ideologize 
religions. Juergensmeyer, for instance, argues that the world is experiencing a rise of 
ethnic “religious nationalism” against secular states. This is partly a result of the crisis 
and failure of secular versions of nationalism in fulfilling ethno-national demands.82 
“Religious nationalism” in turn leads to a “new Cold War” according to him.83 This type 
of nationalism is the “ideology [that] combines traditional religious beliefs in divine law 
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and religious authority with the modern notion of the nation-state.”84 The turn to religion 
was, according to Juergensmeyer, an attempt “to build a “postcolonial” national 
identity”85 at the time when the newly born countries strived for an enduring foundation 
for the definition of the self. On the basis of the above analysis, Juergensmeyer concludes 
that the problem is not a religious but a political one. The treatment of religion as 
primarily a competing ideology continues to shape Juergensmeyer’s later works on 
religious violence. For instance, he employs a rather contradictory notion of “cosmic 
war”86 waged by terrorists and emphasizes its “theatrical power” in impressing the 
terrorists’ audience.87 Along with his Identity approach, Juergensmeyer does sometimes 
engage phenomenological observations. He does so in particular to understand the 
mindset of those involved in acts of religious violence. These phenomenological 
observations also allow him to identify some of the socioeconomic contexts of such 
violent acts. For instance, he believes that social isolation and loss of agency are among 
the forces shaping the socioeconomic contexts of terrorism.88 Juergensmeyer’s working 
compromise between the Identity approach and phenomenological observations 
eventually leads to his rather counterintuitive conclusion that “[t]he cure for religious 
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violence may ultimately lie in a renewed appreciation for religion itself”89 or, in other 
words, in employing religions’ potential to contain their potentially harmful tendencies. 
The third approach is the Phenomenological one, which studies religions with 
methodological “empathy.” The notion of methodological empathy is related to Weber’s 
notion of “empathy.”90 It highlights the necessity of understanding the religious 
“perspectives” in order to understand religious behaviors and identities. The 
Phenomenological approach is also in line with the phenomenological movement in 
philosophy.91 One assumption of the Phenomenological approach is that, unless studied 
from within, religions cannot be fully understood and explained. Therefore, the 
Phenomenological approach takes religions seriously in their own terms but only because 
religions have been taken seriously in their own terms by their followers. The 
Phenomenological approach strives to understand, as much as possible, what it means to 
be a dedicated Muslim, Buddhist, Christian or Hindu. It strives to, in other words, 
understand the lived experience of a believer. Compared to the Identity approach, the 
Phenomenological approach allows a deeper appreciation of the difficulties involved in 
the study of religion and also a better understanding of the new possibilities and 
limitations emerging from the rise of religions in international affairs. That is why some 
of the more nuanced works on religion in international relations92 belong to the 
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Phenomenological approach. The Phenomenological approach is more akin to those 
scholars who write and think within the Constructivist school of thought in International 
Relations. In fact, Wendt’s notion of “culture” as “shared knowledge affecting identity 
and behavior” can also be used in Phenomenological studies, albeit Wendtian 
Constructivism seems to be more suitable for the Identity approach discussed above.93 
The Phenomenological approach seems to be more comfortable using Onuf’s systematic 
Constructivism.94 Here, religion can be seen as a normative system or, as Onuf puts it, a 
system of rules.95       
Kubálková advocates the development of the subfield of International Political 
Theology.96 She maintains that, given the emphasis put by religions on texts and 
interpretations, Onuf’s linguistic and rule-oriented Constructivism is the proper analytical 
framework for the development of International Political Theology. Besides this 
intriguing suggestion, however, her discussion of International Political Theology 
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remains, for the most part, on the abstract level. Viewing religion as a speech act, 
Kubálková uses a post-positivist secular language to define religion as a “system of rules 
(mainly instruction-rules) and related practices, which act to […] explain the meaning of 
existence including identity, ideas about self, and one’s position in the world, […] thus 
motivating and guiding the behaviour of those who accept the validity of these rules on 
faith.”97 Kubálková’s definition, for its emphasis on the function of religions in defining 
identity and in guiding behavior, is close to the Identity approach. Yet, the abstract level 
of International Political Theology renders Kubálková’s conceptual contribution flexible 
enough to be employed by those scholars who conduct phenomenological studies of 
religions.   
Within the Phenomenological paradigm and in one of the insightful pieces written 
on religion in International Relations discipline, Laustsen and Wæver employ the 
Copenhagen School of Security Studies to analyze securitization of religion.98 Their 
argument begins with taking the orientation common in Identity approach literature on 
religion, namely with the inquiry about the link between religions on the one hand and 
questions of threat and security on the other. Religion is one of the “sectors” in which a 
securitizing agent can perform a securitizing speech act. Acknowledging the limitations 
of the identity-based and “functionalist” definition of language, Laustsen and Wæver 
argue for the necessity of defining religion in the ways it appear to the believers, i.e. a 
phenomenological definition. They use various notions and analyses by Kierkegaard, 
                                                 
97 Kubálková, Vendulka. (2000). Towards an International Political Theology. Millennium - Journal of 
International Studies, 29, 675-704. p. 695. 
98 See Laustsen, Carsten B., & Wæver, Ole. (2000). In Defence of Religion: Sacred Referent Objects for 
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Bataille, and Smart to substantiate such phenomenological definition of religion; and they 
argue that such definition must take into account the “doctrinal,” “ritual,” 
“mythic/narrative,” “experiential/emotional,” “ethical/legal,” “social,” and “material” 
dimensions of the Sacred.99 According to the authors,  
“religion has three main dimensions. It has faith as the guiding 
principle of discourse. This faith is only possible due to a distinction 
between immanent and transcendent, and this distinction is finally 
reinterpreted as a distinction between sacred and profane. On the 
one hand, the transcendent is interpreted as that which is given by 
divine speech, purity, timelessness, supernatural powers, goodness, 
benevolence/forgiveness/salvation, and sublimity. […] On the other 
hand, the earthly realm is interpreted as characterised by ‘writing’, 
impurity, selfishness, constraints by time and space, the ordinary, 
evil, egoism/revenge, and the representable/copies. All seven 
dimensions propose a way of overcoming this separation of the 
earthly and the divine. These mediating practices are scriptures, 
rituals, myths, miracles, ethics, care/community, and 
iconography.”100     
The above definition of religion is indeed a broad and comprehensive one. Despite the 
phenomenological originality put into this definition of religion, Laustsen and Wæver 
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return to the Identity approach when exploring the security linkage between language and 
religions. Because of the sacredness of the Sacred, the authors argue, securitization of 
religion is almost automatic when a threat to a religion is perceived by the adherents to 
that religion. On the other hand, the language of “fundamentalism” is almost inherently a 
securitizing language. Finally, Laustsen and Wæver end up with a rather “reductionist” 
assertion that the “three main ways religion can be involved in international politics” 
include: 
“1. A religious group is considered to be a threat to the survival of 
the state. 2. Faith is seen as threatened by whoever or whatever ‘non-
religious’ actor or process (states, technology, industrialism, 
modernism, etc.). 3. Faith is seen as threatened by another religious 
discourse or actor.”101  
In other words, there seems to be a disconnect between the authors’ extensive effort to 
define religion in phenomenological terms in the first part, and the analysis of 
securitization of religion in the second part of their argument. The definition seems to 
remain almost insignificant in the analysis. 
As noted above, the use of the term “fundamentalism” has not been limited to the 
scholars writing within the Identity approach. Karen Armstrong, for instance, uses it in 
reference to “embattled forms of spirituality.”102 Combined with her Phenomenological 
approach in studying religion, the above conceptualization of “fundamentalism” allows 
Armstrong to contextualize the phenomenon within the broader trend of the rise of 
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religions. It must be noted, however, that the Phenomenological approach began with the 
larger question of the crisis of secularization.103 Therefore, the Phenomenological 
approach tends to treat “fundamentalism” as only one of the extreme manifestations of a 
deeper and more consequential transformation happening in the social world. As a result, 
the Phenomenological approach sometimes views the role played by religion for 
believers as one of protection. Religious beliefs, religious rituals, and religious 
communities are assumed to function as a “Sacred Canopy”104 shielding the believers 
against subjective horrors of modernity –for instance nihilism and the crisis of meaning 
of life and that of suffering– as well as protecting them against objective pains and 
sufferings abundant in life. This role implies certain social dynamics and political 
consequences at the time when secularization appears to be in retreat.105   
The methodological “empathy” towards religion among some Phenomenological 
scholars has also led to the emergence of a literature on the “constructive” side of the rise 
of religion. Gopin argues optimistically about the potential of common values among 
                                                 
103 See Husserl, Edmund. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. 
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world religions.106 These values include “empathy,” “pacifism,” “sanctity of life,” 
“compassion,” and “discipline.”107 Such commonalities, Gopin argues, could serve as a 
foundation for conflict resolution and peacemaking.108 In the same vein and with a 
“leftist” twist, Falk argues for the potential benefits in the resurgence of religion in 
controlling the unleashed forces of globalization; and, by invoking the example of 
Gandhi, in helping to create a global ethical order, a “humane global government.”109 
Unlike scholars writing within the Identity approach, those working within the 
Phenomenological framework have, thus, begun to question the validity of secularist 
dogmas in the Social Sciences. Despite this questioning, however, they rarely make a 
radical departure from the secular premises of the Social Sciences. In fact, Enlightenment 
“functionalism” can still be recognized in the Phenomenological literature. A common 
theme here is the call to engage religious creeds emphasizing social justice and human 
dignity for the betterment of the world. Religions appear as useful instruments towards 
achieving secular objectives. At the bottom line, both the Identity approach and the 
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Phenomenological approach can become “instrumentalist,” the former by seeing religion 
as a destabilizing instrument available to potentially anti-status-quo political actors; the 
latter by viewing religion as a potentially beneficial instrument at the disposal of status-
quo political leaders or mainstream reformers. It must be noted that the discussion of the 
potential benefits of engaging religions in the Phenomenological literature has sometimes 
been balanced with the acknowledgment of the evidence of the dangers posed by 
religious revival to world security and prosperity. 
Seiple and Hoover follow the Phenomenological approach in investigating the 
nexus of security and religion.110 The contributors to this edited volume cover, among 
other aspects, the potential social values of religion –especially those within the 
Abrahamic family– in contributing to issues such as promotion of peace or human 
dignity. The notion of “religious freedom” is a recurring theme in the book and it has 
even been tied to national, regional, and international security. Jean Elshtain goes as far 
to argue for “military intervention […] guided by, not narrow realpolitik, nor by naïve 
humanitarianism, but by religiously grounded philosophy of justice as equal regard” 
(emphasis in the text).111 Along similar lines, Johnston and Sampson have edited a 
collection of articles on conflict resolution mechanisms and potential offered by world 
religions.112 The Phenomenological approach as presented in Johnston and Sampson’s 
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volume stands in stark contrast to the Enlightenment approach. It acknowledges various 
historical and social roles played by religion and asserts that such roles should be 
welcomed in the future. Cases of contributions of religion to conflict resolution, 
peacemaking, and peacekeeping are presented as the evidence, according to the authors, 
for such an embrace. Eventually, the authors of this edited volume try to re-introduce the 
“religious dimension of statecraft,” which implies that besides war, great powers, balance 
of power, diplomacy, and international law, one should add religion as the sixth pillar of 
the “international society.”113  
Oscillating between the Identity and the Phenomenological approaches, Norris 
and Inglehart use statistics and argue that religiosity is correlated with the level of 
perceived security –or insecurity.114 Security, according to Norris and Inglehart, is 
defined in terms of basic human security, which means access to the essential means of 
survival and a minimum level of welfare. Taking refuge in religion, therefore, is a 
reaction to the perceived insecurity of a world that is filled with poverty, hunger, and 
disease. In a sense, despite their secular undertone and their consequential dismissal of 
the meaning-of-life crisis in the secularized world, Norris and Inglehart come close to 
explaining one of the key functions of religion, namely to offer a shelter from 
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113 See Bull, Hedley. (1995). The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
114 See Norris, Pippa, & Inglehart, Ronald. Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide. 
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 unavoidable contingencies of life. Their argument in International Relations parallels 
Berger’s argument in Sociology of Religion.115  
The last approach comes from Traditionalism, or Perennialism, in Religious 
Studies. Traditionalism has by and large been marginalized in Social Sciences literature. 
The prominent Traditionalists such as René Guénon, Frithjof Schuon, Ananda 
Coomaraswamy, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Titus Burckhardt, Martin Lings and Huston Smith 
are unique in modern academia for they take religions seriously on their own terms.116 
Furthermore, they treat religions or, as they often called them, religious Traditions not 
only as a subjective force shaping actors’ identity and behaviors, but also –and more 
importantly according to these authors– as an objective reality. In other words, 
Traditionalists stand in sharp contrast to the cardinal premises of the secularized modern 
Social Sciences and indeed modernity itself. For the most part of history, according to 
Traditionalists, humankind believed in the existence of parallel unseen universes along 
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with our visible and tangible world. Mankind also moved ahead, according to these 
scholars, and developed a variety of discourses to explain the relationship between the 
various universes. On the basis of these discourses and doctrines, man also “discovered” 
a variety of practices and techniques to engage the metaphysical forces of the other 
worlds. These techniques were sometimes in such a way that their employment would 
leave certain visible and tangible marks on the “physical” world.  
Modern Social Sciences have in general remained silent about the possibility of 
the existence of such unseen metaphysical structures in the world. In contrast, 
Traditionalists call for the necessity of opening up to such a possibility. They insist that 
religions are built around a “real system” that lies beyond human capacity to be fully 
understood. Evidently, the current ethos of modern Social Sciences is reluctant to take 
such drastic strides away from the convenient secularized academia. The reluctance 
might be one of the reasons why Traditionalism, despite more than a century of extensive 
academic scholarship, remains rather marginalized in the modern academia in the West. 
At the same time, the core shortcomings of the secular Social Sciences in the study of 
religions, Traditionalists argue, lie in their hesitation, or inability, to accommodate a 
Traditionalist perspective.              
According to Traditionalists, the disagreement between the secular foundations of 
the modern Social Sciences on the one hand and religions on the other relates to the 
Christian background of these Sciences. They argue that an implicit assumption of the 
modern Social Sciences projects Christianity as the generic religion and its history and 
fate as the generic history and fate of other religions. The decline of religious observance 
in Western Europe, therefore, was interpreted as the inevitable future of other religions. 
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According to Traditionalists, by remaining caught in Western Europe’s experience in 
regards to religion, the modern Social Sciences have become structurally and 
psychologically less able to understand the revival of religion. In particular, these 
Sciences have missed the relative inconsequentiality of the fall of Christianity in Europe 
for different religious traditions in other parts of the world or even for Christianity in 
other places. The rather unique stances taken by Traditionalists on issues related to 
religious traditions have deterred some scholars from engaging in a serious conversation 
with them. As a result, the Phenomenological approach seems to be the closest modern 
Social Sciences can get comfortably to a more or less comprehensive study of religion. 
Besides these four general approaches, there exists also a body of literature in 
International Relations that aims at tracing modern secular institutions such as the state 
back to its religious roots –and particularly to the religious doctrines of the pre-
Enlightenment era. The well-known literature on the Christian roots of Just War theory 
and secular jus in bello and jus ad bellum and the Augustinian legacy as well as the 
reference to and the revival of the Natural Law tradition in International Relations are 
some prominent examples of such literature.117 There is also the Schmittian literature on 
political theology, which interprets sovereignty as an institution of secular divinity. This 
literature also takes “the concept of the political” to a whole new level in which “the 
political” is deemed as an existential backbone of man’s identity.118 Following this 
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Schmittian tradition, Carlson and Owen deal with post-9/11 sovereignty and the roles 
religion could play in armed conflicts, military intervention, globalization, justice and 
human rights.119 The dichotomy of the sacred versus the sovereign is explored in the 
book. This dichotomy, according to Carlson and Owen, is one of the most significant 
aspects of the rise of religions and religious commitments. Both the modern, Western 
nation-state and the sacred are self-referential and both demand, according to the authors, 
complete loyalties from those paying allegiance to them. The result is an almost 
automatic conflict between the two. Appleby calls the same dilemmatic situation as 
“Serving Two Masters.”120 The competition between religious God and the secular gods, 
i.e. modern nation-states, provides certain potential for “constructive”121 and 
“destructive” impacts of religion on international politics.122 One basic question, 
nevertheless, is whether the underlying tension between “totalism” of religion on the one 
hand and the “totalitarian” foundation of the modern nation-state on the other is 
sustainable and containable or not. In any case, this literature, although it engages 
religion, cannot be properly considered as a literature on religion in international 
relations. Instead, it functions as an exploration of the sometimes disputed religious roots 
of secular International Relations and international relations. As such, this particular  
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literature does not extensively contribute to our understanding of the revival of religions 
in the world and its implications.  
In terms of studying religions in International Relations, one particular “barrier of 
entry” has been the more recent entanglement of religion and security. The introduction 
of many contemporary International Relations scholars to the question of religion has 
been through the phenomenon of terrorism. The entanglement, therefore, of International 
Relations’ study of religion with Security Studies literature has been almost by default. In 
particular, the Security Studies literature on threat perception, non-traditional sources of 
violence, and fourth-generation warfare has colored the study of religions in the 
discipline. This in turn has exacerbated the complexities involved in the task of studying 
religions. The resulting “reductionism” has been paralleled with the tendency among 
some International Relations scholars to be as “limitationist” or minimalist as possible in 
the study of religion. The minimalism has encouraged research agendas that follow 
applied and selective approaches in order to predict the potential consequences of the 
revival of religions for international security. Such research approaches have sometimes 
had to compromise the totality of religions as systems of thought and modes of living in 
favor of immediate concerns for national and global security.     
On the basis of the survey of literature on religion in International Relations, my 
study on the theological foundations of Shī‘ī strategic cultures basically follows the 
Phenomenological approach as explained above. It attempts to understand as much as 
possible the fundamental concepts that have shaped Shī‘ī perceptions of security and 
threat as these concepts have been understood by Shī‘ah Muslims throughout history. The 
Phenomenological approach has been chosen because the Enlightenment approach and 
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the Identity approach seem to have serious shortcomings in studying religions. These 
methodological and conceptual shortcomings have rendered them less capable of proper 
analysis of religions and their roles in today’s world. As for the Traditionalist approach, 
there exist several difficulties that render a Traditionalist research in International 
Relations especially challenging. In particular, there is no extensive Traditionalist 
literature in Political Sciences, Sociology, and International Relations at this point that 
one may engage and to which one may contribute. Nearly all of the currently existing 
Traditionalist literature lies within the realm of Religious Studies. As yet, it is not clear 
how the Traditionalist scholarship can be systematically and consistently employed in 
other branches of the Social Sciences. Nevertheless, this study benefits from some of the 
Traditionalist insights in the study of Shī‘ah Islam. In particular, the presented study of 
the Shī‘ī notions of Wilāyah and Walāyah in Chapter V would have not been possible 
without insightful contributions made by Traditionalist scholars who have written on the 
esoteric foundations of Shī‘ah Islam. To summarize, although this study generally follows 
the Phenomenological approach, it also borrows to the extent possible from 
Traditionalists in their study of religions in general and Shī‘ah Islam in particular.             
Security Studies: Islam and Strategic Culture 
In addition to the general literature on religion in International Relations, this 
study belongs to a sub-set of literature within Security Studies. In this part, the present 
study on strategic cultures in Shī‘ah Islam will be contextualized in the narrower 
literature on strategic cultures. As mentioned before, this literature is emerging within the 
Security Studies in International Relations and strives to understand “the relationship 
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between culture and strategy.”123 It asks how culture and cultural institutions affect and 
shape the strategic perceptions and responses of culturally different actors. There is, 
therefore, an assumption underlying this literature that claims strategic doctrines and 
behaviors124 are not completely universal. In this context, to the extent that religions have 
been a building block of various cultures,125 this study of strategic concepts in Shī‘ah 
Islam would be a direct contribution to the literature on strategic cultures in International 
Relations.  
The notion of strategic culture goes back to the Cold War era when a number of 
scholars suggested that some of the Soviet strategic behaviors might have ideological or 
cultural roots.126 Snyder defined strategic culture as the “sum total of ideals, conditional 
emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of the national 
strategic community have acquired though instruction or imitation and share with each 
other with regard to nuclear strategy.”127 The impacts of the Cold War structure of 
international relations may be recognized in Snyder’s state-centric definition and the 
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focus on “nuclear strategy.” Nevertheless, the definition acknowledges the possibility of 
different strategic styles based on non-material forces.  
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ideologically bifurcated global 
system, the notion of strategic culture could now be employed in studying the behaviors 
of various (state or non-state) actors. The post-Cold War world also appeared to be less 
ideologically organized. As a result, the term “culture” in strategic culture was employed 
in reference to a broader range of human phenomena including religious belief systems. 
This broader employment of strategic culture may be found in the post-Cold War 
conceptualization of strategic culture by one of the so-called “first generation” theorists 
of the notion. Gray maintains that culture is the “context” of various strategic 
behaviors.128 The “strategic cultural context for strategic behavior,”129 in other words, 
directly and indirectly informs actors and institutions. The more flexible130 
conceptualization of strategic culture has paved the way for a new generation of studies. 
These include, for instance, Johnston’s study of Chinese strategic culture;131 Katzenstein 
edited volume on culture and national security;132 Kier’s study of French and British 
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culture-doctrine nexus between the World Wars;133 Krause’s edited volume on the role of 
cultural factors in disarmament and arms control;134 Duffiled’s study of the post-Cold 
War non-Neorealist security strategy of Germany;135 Glenn et al.’s edited volume on 
national strategic cultures in India, Nigeria, Japan, Australia, Russia and Germany;136 
Sondhaus’s study of national “ways of war”;137 Mufti’s study of Turkish “Republic” 
strategic culture;138 and a number of studies on European Union’s emerging –or 
projected– strategic culture.139        
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Buzan et al. offer a new framework for studying the notion of security. This 
framework involves a “securitizing agent,” for example states, international 
organizations, or religious authorities that, through a successful speech act, establishes 
the perception of an existential threat. This threat is articulated within one or more 
“security sectors,” including political, military, societal, cultural, environmental or 
economic. The main thrust of a securitizing speech act is to claim that the source of the 
threat is existentially endangering a valued “referent object” such as a country, a culture, 
the environment, a religion, or an ethnic group.140 Therefore, the process of securitization 
has to engage some cultural and social elements in order to be successful. The cultural 
dimension of securitization is why, according to these authors, war as the ultimate 
measure or response to the securitization of an object also involves some cultural and 
social aspects. War is deemed as a totalizing phenomenon that engages all muscles of the 
parties involved. The totalizing nature of war implies some culturally specific as well as 
some universal aspects.  
The particularity of each collective act of violence may arise from particular 
cultures involved in the act. At the same time, all collective acts of violence show some 
common features. For example, certain common elements in all strategic cultures have 
appeared due to the pragmatic concerns for functionality. Throughout history, various 
cultures have copied each others’ strategic behaviors and doctrines. For instance, Liddell-
Hart’s “indirect approach” that emphasizes speed and maneuverability became one 
element of a “thin universal strategic culture” in the last century.141 The Sun Tzuean and 
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economical element of surprise aimed at destroying enemy’s physical and mental 
equilibrium was soon copied and adopted by various cultures around the globe. In a 
similar vein, blitzkrieg became a universal element of strategic cultures due to its success 
during the Second World War. Mearsheimer goes further to argue that most modern 
conventional wars have shown three common and general strategies: attrition to exhaust 
the enemy, limited aims strategies, and, indeed, blitzkrieg.142 In addition to these common 
strategies, the evolution of warfare from the first generation to the fourth generation has 
produced universally adopted practices and doctrines.143  
Most of these generic aspects of strategic cultures are rooted in technological 
development, strategic inventions, and functionality. The first generation warfare brought 
with itself a generic military culture of ranks and military-civilian distinctions. The 
monopoly of state in using systemic violence to achieve political objectives was also 
strengthened. The second generation of warfare brought by itself the practice of indirect 
fire, psychological and radio warfare rooted in technological development or strategic 
innovation. The third generation introduced universal elements of mechanized warfare 
(technology), new methods of using military technology such as blitzkrieg (strategy), and 
the increased role of surprise and speed. The fourth generation of warfare, however, has 
been more problematic. It challenged the monopoly of states in employing systemic 
violence and, in doing so, partially shaped a new universal strategic culture.144  
                                                 
142 See Mearsheimer, John J. (1983). Conventional Deterrence. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
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As militarily and technologically weaker actors began to accommodate elements 
of the fourth generation warfare, the stronger players also developed counter-strategies 
such as counter-revolutionary and counter-guerrilla warfare.145 Again, one unintended 
consequence has been the spread of similar doctrines and practices around the globe, 
including the blurring boundary between civilians and military personnel, between zones 
of conflict and those of peace, and between military campaigns and political processes of 
nation- or state-building.146  
Another more or less universal aspect of strategic cultures emerged in the last 
century has been the extremely totalizing image of war.147 War was deemed as a practice 
that engaged various aspects of a society’s life from military to politics, economics, 
financial networks, culture, education and, in cases where religion was involved, the so-
called “cosmic level.” The religious element projected an “essentialist” fight between the 
forces of good and the forces of evil. Within this context, an alternative generic strategic 
culture appeared. Mesbahi calls this alternative a generic strategic culture of 
“resistance.”148 The examples of universally adopted techniques and doctrines of 
resistance ranged from Mao’s manual for guerrilla-warfare and techniques of hit-and-run, 
to Lawrence’s prescription for defeating the enemy without engaging its main force, to 
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Castro’s techniques of revolutionary warfare. All these techniques transcended cultural 
and geographical differences and generated a generic strategic culture of resistance. 
Indeed, each local revolutionary group changed and modified certain aspects of these 
guidelines in order to accommodate geographical, cultural, political, and economic 
contingencies. Nevertheless, certain generic elements remained in place.     
Along with these transformations, some developments also happened in the nature 
of war that, in turn, affected various strategic cultures universally.149 Examples of these 
transformations include introduction of electronic warfare, joint campaigns, encryption 
techniques, and development of various “Special Forces.” Yet, most of these generic –and 
technical– elements of strategic cultures were unintended consequences of technological 
developments, strategic innovations, or functional successes. In contrast, one of the first 
major attempts in modern time to create a generic strategic culture by design happened in 
1648 C.E. in Westphalia. Following decades of religious wars, the Treaty of Westphalia 
monopolized the states’ right to resort to violence. The Treaty also fortified a universal 
notion of nonintervention by sanctioning the concept of sovereignty. War appeared as one 
of the resources exclusively at the disposal of the newly-born institution of modern state. 
It became Clausewitzian –or purely instrumental– war, or the “continuation of politics by 
other means.” Westphalia marked the end of the mercenary strategic cultures of the 
Middle Ages, the “absolutist” strategic cultures of the Reformation, or the elaborate and 
ceremonial strategic cultures of the demising European nobilities. The new generic 
strategic culture was evolved and further solidified in 1713 C.E. by the Utrecht Treaty in 
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which “balance of power” was recognized as a pillar of European politics and a 
foundation of peace in Europe. As mentioned before, in this European strategic culture, 
war was deemed an accepted leverage to keep the “balance” in place.  
Napoleon contributed to the next major development in the generic strategic 
culture. Mesbahi argues that Napoleon turned the Hobbesian notion of state on its 
head.150 It was no longer the state’s responsibility to provide its subjects or citizens with 
security. Instead, it was the citizens’ responsibility to protect and secure the state. As 
many scholars of strategic cultures have noticed, the Napoleonic wars brought the notion 
of “nations in arms” to the center of an increasingly universal strategic culture. According 
to Mesbahi, this development totalized –or “absolutized”– the notion of war within 
various strategic cultures.151 The transformation also glorified the practice of war in a 
sharp contrast to the Clausewitzian “instrumentalist” conceptualization of the practice. 
Yet the enormous costs of engagement in a prolonged state of war involving the whole 
population proved to be unsustainable. This led to re-appreciation of the notion of 
balance of power in European strategic cultures as the foundation of peace. Many 
Western strategists and thinkers of Classical Realism such as Kissinger, Carr, Kennan, 
and Morgenthau saw war as more or less something devoid of any majesty and awe. 
Another consequential development took place during the Paris Peace Conference 
in 1919 following the First World War. An implicit universal notion appeared that, at least 
on the level of propaganda, projected war as a criminal act. The language adopted by the 
League of Nations almost equated war with aggression. This was to usher in an important 
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change of language within the universal strategic culture; for various strategic cultures 
around the globe followed the anti-aggression language that had aimed at de-normalizing 
war –albeit without any substantial change in strategic doctrines and behaviors.152  
Carr famously attacked the conceptualization of war within some of the more 
sanguine liberal strategic cultures. In his The Twenty Years’ Crisis, Carr argued that the 
League of Nations had mistaken the absence of war for a stable and sustainable peace.153 
The League had wrongly assumed, in other words, that the status quo was acceptable to 
all. Carr also denied that non-violence was a permanent possibility. He asserted that the 
proposed “international law” would simply remove war as an instrument at the disposal 
of states to protect their security and to maintain the balance of power without providing 
any effective substitute. It was the adoption of this new strategic culture by some 
European powers that led, according to Carr, to the Second World War. Therefore, Carr 
and other Classical Realists argued for a cautious “re-normalization” of war as an 
undesirable yet necessary instrument. Following the Second World War, most strategic 
cultures around the globe seemed to have accepted a similar image of war as the 
“ultimate instrument of foreign policy” or the so-called “last resort.” In unusual 
symbioses, therefore, different and inconsistent elements of the Clausewitzian 
“instrumentalist” notion of war, the Napoleonic totalized notion of war, the liberal anti- 
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war discourse, and the Classical Realists’ war-as-the-last-resort notion began to appear in 
various strategic cultures.   
Meanwhile, nuclear weapons disturbed the universal and local strategic cultures. 
Many strategic analysts believed that the nuclear technology had led to a qualitative 
change. In contrast to almost all other elements within different conventional strategic 
cultures, a nuclear war could not have a meaningful objective, they argued. Brodie and 
others developed a new strategic paradigm for the nuclear age. They declared that such 
weapons made total wars obsolete.154 The change called for a major adjustment in various 
strategic cultures. At the same time and on a more practical level, the doctrine of nuclear 
deterrence appeared to be more powerful compared to conventional deterrence. On the 
more philosophical and moral level, however, a taboo soon began to emerge around 
nuclear weapons. The weapons’ massive scale of destructive power made them a different 
and disturbing category. Caught between pragmatic concerns and grave moral 
consequences, many strategic cultures responded hypocritically to the nuclear age as on-
the-surface condemnation of the expansion of nuclear weaponry became more or less a 
universal practice. It must be mentioned, however, that there is a counter-argument 
against the half-normative, half-pragmatist treatment of nuclear arms. Waltz, for instance, 
claims that a certain “sobering” and universal effect is embedded in the process of 
becoming a nuclear power. Not surprisingly, Waltz’ problematic claim has come under 
serious attacks by his critics. 155   
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As we review the universal changes that took place in various strategic cultures, it 
is worth paying some attention to the consequences of the Vietnam War. In particular, 
Vietnam gave birth to a modern just war theory that, in turn, shaped the discourse and 
paradigms of various strategic cultures. Michael Walzer developed a secular version of 
jus ad bellum and jus in bello. He employed the old analogy between individual and state 
and their corresponding rights.156 The foundation of his just war theory, therefore, was no 
longer Christian Natural Law tradition and the affiliated notion of “obligations.” Instead, 
the modern articulation of the notion of natural rights, which had been popularized by, 
inter alios, John Locke, served as the theoretical foundation for Walzer’s theory. Since all 
states must provide a minimum level of security for their citizens, Walzer argued that war 
of self-defense is inherently legitimate. At the same time, he qualified this claim by 
including the principle of proportionality and that of distinction between civilian and 
military targets. The two principles soon became the pillars of just war discourse in 
various strategic cultures. This was yet another layer of legal turns in strategic paradigms 
that tried to distinguish between “aggression” and “self-defense.” In nearly all the wars of 
the past couple of decades, the parties involved have accused the other side to be the 
aggressor while justifying their own actions on the ground of self-defense.  
Beyond these generic elements borrowed and adopted by various strategic 
cultures, there have been exclusive elements in a number of local strategic cultures. These 
specific items and discourses arise from unique cultural settings and historical 
trajectories. It is the study of these culturally specific features and their roots that has 
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been the research focus of strategic culture literature. For instance, Japan and Germany 
embarked on an aggressive social re-construction of their strategic cultures following the 
Second World War.157 Both countries aimed at transforming their respective strategic 
cultures from a militaristic one towards a culture built around “trading states.”158    
Similar to the cases of Germany and Japan, it is possible to distinguish several 
other national strategic cultures in today’s world. For instance, Israelis developed an early 
strategic culture rooted in religious imageries and theological discourses. Mesbahi argues 
that the image of weak David played a crucial role in shaping young Israel’s strategic 
culture when the newly-born state perceived itself as weak and vulnerable under 
existential threat.159 Although the decisive military successes of Israeli army in the 1960s 
and the 1970s decreased the relevance of the Davidian image, Israeli strategic culture has 
remained distinct in many aspects as Israel continues to see itself in an exceptionally 
hostile environment. China under Mao also developed a distinct strategic culture. 
Johnston argues that Maoist China combined elements of Confucianism, Sun Tzu’s 
teachings, and Marxism with lessons from Chinese historical experiences. Underlying 
this symbiosis was the Cold War image of the world as a zero-sum battlefield between 
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Capitalism on the one hand and Communism on the other.160 The resulting Chinese 
“offensive realism,” according to Johnston, did not develop based on structural 
calculations. Instead, it was rooted in the multi-faceted cultural background of Maoist 
China. In a similar vein, Lenin developed a Marxist version of just war theory. Believing 
that Communism cannot survive in one country and that expansion of Marxism is a 
necessity, Lenin argued for a distinct strategic culture that condoned violence if it 
facilitated the emergence of universal Communism. According to Mesbahi, this 
ideologically specific strategic culture was in line with Lenin’s forceful 
“volunteerism.”161 An assertive “volunteerist,” Fanon also believed that violence is an 
inherent and “just” part of anti-colonial resistance.162 A similar line of thought gave birth 
to several nationalistic and socialist strategic cultures that viewed violence as inevitable 
means towards a justified goal.  
Finally, the United States has also developed a unique strategic culture. Similar to 
other specific strategic cultures, the United States’ strategic culture is a symbiosis of 
various distinct discourses and paradigms added to the generic elements of strategic 
cultures.163 In particular, the United States has adopted and combined discourses of 
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“exceptionalism,” “utopianism,” “legalism,” and “isolationism” in its formulation of 
foreign policy, and thus in the creation of its strategic culture.164 In the twentieth century, 
Gaddis argues that the Pearl-Harbor experience restarted the forces of expansion, 
“unilateralism” and hegemony in American strategic culture. These responses, he claims, 
are the generic reaction to a surprise attack in American strategic culture.165 Others 
emphasize the role played by the Vietnam War that ended the post-World War II strategic 
paradigm in the United States and led to what Roskin calls the “Vietnam generational 
paradigm” of non-intervention.166 The unexpected end of the Cold War, according to 
Mesbahi, contributed to an era of “triumphalism” in the United States’ dynamic strategic 
culture.167 It was in the context of this updated strategic culture that the first Persian Gulf 
War was framed as a legitimate response by the community of states (under the United 
States’ leadership) to Iraq’s violation of international law. The second Persian Gulf War, 
however, illustrated a significant transformation that had taken place in American post- 
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9/11 strategic culture. It showed a departure from the principle of non-intervention in 
American strategic culture.168  
The various strategic cultures that have appeared around the globe have not been 
completely unique. They indeed have been consciously and unconsciously influenced by 
the universal strategic doctrines and practices. We have already recognized these 
universal elements as a thin universal strategic culture in which various branches of local 
strategic cultures have their roots. In this context, Islam has also partially shaped various 
strategic cultures in different Muslim societies. For instance, some scholars argue that 
within the Muslim version of just war theory, it is speculated that Muslims may be the 
unjust party involved in war.169 Other elements of Muslim religious beliefs, theological 
doctrines, and jurisprudential rulings have historically shaped Muslim strategic cultures. 
Meanwhile, a family of distinct strategic cultures appeared in Shī‘ah Islam. The 
emergence of these cultures was the result of a variety of causes including the historical 
trajectory of Shī‘ah community and their level of access to political power. In particular, 
the experience of Shī‘ah Muslims living for a long time as a minority group has colored 
these strategic cultures. On the other hand, Shī‘ah Muslims’ understanding of Islam and 
their version of the religion provided the theological foundation for these unique strategic 
cultures. The result of this symbiosis of history and theology has been Shī‘ī strategic  
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perspectives that show noticeable differences compared to those of the majority Sunnī 
Muslims.  
Vali Nasr and Roy Mottahedeh both notice the centrality in Shī‘ah history of the 
killing of the third Shī‘ah Imām, the Prophet’s grandson, in Karbalā in the seventh 
century.170 The event gave more visibility to Shī‘ahs as a religious community conscious 
of its minority status within the larger Muslim community. As a result, notions such as 
resistance, pain, suffering, and martyrdom embodied in the story of the Prophet’s 
grandson were established in Shī‘ah theology and, later on, in Shī‘ī strategic cultures. As 
will be discussed later, however, the foundation of Shī‘ī strategic cultures goes further 
back to the time of the Prophet. The root of these distinct strategic cultures is in the way 
‘Alī, the first Shī‘ah Imām, and few other companions of the Prophet understood the 
Prophet’s message. It is true that one of the central pillars of Shī‘ī strategic cultures has 
been the notion of Shahādah171 embodied in the dramatic events of Karbalā. It is also true 
that the historical experience of the Shī‘ah community as a persecuted and harassed 
minority following the Battle of Karbalā led to the rise of cautionary doctrines such as 
Taqīyyah172 in Shī‘ah theology and Shī‘ī strategic cultures. Yet, these two elements of 
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Shī‘ī strategic cultures, namely Shahādah and Taqīyyah, could have not coexisted without 
the ontology of Wilāyah and Walāyah.173 The roots of the Shī‘ī notions of Wilāyah and 
Walāyah go back to ‘Alī and his companions’ understanding of the core message of the 
Prophet. The centrality of Wilāyah and Walāyah in the Shī‘ah-Sunnī split has sometimes 
been neglected by reduction of the split to a matter of political succession to the Prophet. 
However, a proper understanding of Shī‘ī strategic cultures is not possible without 
revisiting the notions of Wilāyah and Walāyah. Among these three central notions of Shī‘ī 
strategic cultures, the literature on Shī‘ah Islam has often focused on the first, namely the 
doctrine of Shahādah. The focus has been, partly, the result of the emergence of Iran’s 
“Islamic state” and the following eight-year war between Iran and Iraq. In fact, Mesbahi 
argues that during the long War, martyrdom became a powerful element of the Iranian 
strategic culture. He goes further to argue that, during the War, the “backbone of Iran’s 
national security” became the doctrine of Shahādah.174   
In contrast to most of the cases of strategic cultures reviewed above, Shī‘ī 
strategic cultures are not necessarily “national” strategic cultures. Instead, these strategic 
cultures informed the collective attitudes of various Shī‘ī communities and their –
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religious and political– leaders when it comes to the issue of survival. The fact that the 
early Shī‘ah community was the victim of persecution for a long period of time meant a 
constant preoccupation in the community about their survival. This preoccupation 
brought into the fore the type of questions that lie at the heart of any strategic culture. The 
resulting metaphors and strategies of survival then constituted the content of Shī‘ī 
strategic cultures.      
It must be re-emphasized that the nationally, religiously, or ideologically specific 
strategic cultures are often embedded in the thin generic strategic culture discussed 
above. Specific cultures have been eclectic in picking and choosing certain generic 
elements; and they have developed unique packages of “norms and values” as well as 
“strategies and models”175 regarding the notions of security, threat, survival, and the use 
of force. Therefore, to talk about specific Shī‘ī strategic cultures does not mean to neglect 
or deny generic elements that Shī‘ī actors may have adopted in their strategic doctrines 
and practices. Similar to any other local strategic culture, Shī‘ī strategic cultures include 
various universal elements. Many of these universal elements have been rooted in 
historical experiences and doctrinal innovations. Examples include the Clausewitzian 
“instrumentalist” approach to war, the Napoleonic absolutized image of war, the liberal 
anti-war paradigm, the Realist accommodation of war as the last resort, resistance and 
revolutionary warfare as well as various elements of the universal notion of just war. 
Despite these universal factors, however, Shī‘ī strategic cultures have their unique themes 
rooted in Shī‘ah Muslims’ historical experience and in Shī‘ah theology. My dissertation 
is, therefore, a contribution towards understanding the theological foundations of these 
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specific strategic cultures while paying attention to the accompanying historical 
developments.          
Shī‘ah Studies: Shī‘ah and Orientalism 
The rising significance of religions in today’s social and political environment has 
led to the engagement of Religious Studies literature by scholars in other branches of 
Social Sciences. In terms of Islamic Studies in general and Shī‘ah Studies in particular, 
this has sometimes meant a rather uncritical reading of a literature partly shaped by 
“Orientalism.” Despite important contributions that “Orientalist” scholars have made to 
our understanding of Muslim world and Muslim history, the school of thought has certain 
limitations. These limitations may become particularly consequential when the 
“Orientalist” perspective is being applied to the study of Islam in other branches of Social 
Sciences such as International Relations. When it comes to the study of Shī‘ī strategic 
cultures, having a phenomenological perspective is essential in the study of the subject. 
Among all the limitations of the “Orientalist” school of thought, the most relevant to the 
subject of this dissertation is that “Orientalists” explicitly or implicitly project Shī‘ah 
Islam as “Shī‘īsm” and/or as an ideological “sect.” In fact, this conceptualization of 
Shī‘ah Islam has a close affinity to the Identity approach discussed above. It, therefore, 
shares some of the general limitations of the Identity approach in the study of religion.  
Madelung, for instance, offers a review of the early religious schools and “sects” 
in Islam.176 He juxtaposes “Shī‘īism” and “Khārijīsm”177 as two early Islamic 
                                                 
176 See Madelung, Wilferd. (1985). Religious Schools and Sects in Medieval Islam. London: Variorum 
Reprints; and Madelung, Wilferd. (1988). Religious Trends in Early Islamic Iran. Albany: State University 
of New York Press. In Madelung, Wilferd. (1992). Religious and Ethnic Movements in Medieval Islam. 
Hampshire: Variorum, reader can find some of Madelung’s works on early Islamic eschatology. 
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movements.178 Such categorization of Shī‘ah Islam is consequential and leads to the 
treatment of Shī‘ah (Imāmī) Islam as a “sect.” In fact, this Shī‘ah-as-a-sect approach has 
not been uncommon within Oriental Studies. The formulation was used, later on, to 
partially fill the knowledge deficit in International Relations about Islam in general and 
about Shī‘ah Islam in particular. The popularity of the “Orientalist” reading of the Shī‘ah-
Sunnī split among International Relations scholars has been partly because these scholars 
seem to be analytically more comfortable in using political notions such as sects. The 
familiar language would obviate digging into more difficult questions of theology and 
religion. The result has been the emergence of a mainstream “Orientalist” International 
Relations literature on Shī‘ah Islam. As the corollary to this, terms such as “sectarian 
violence” have appeared in Security Studies to understand Shī‘ah-Sunnī dynamics within 
the Identity approach.   
One of the most influential founding fathers of Oriental Studies in the West is 
Ignác Goldziher. The extent of meticulousness and diligently wrought fine details in his 
                                                                                                                                                 
177 “Khārijīsm” refers to the Khawārij, a movement that gained visibility in the final years of ‘Alī’s rule as 
the fourth Muslim caliph. The original Khawārij may be considered among the earliest violent extremist 
groups in Muslim history and the first major Takfīrī group, i.e. those declaring [other Muslims] disbelievers 
[upon committing a sinful act]. The Arabic term Khawārij is the plural for Khārijī that literally means “one 
who has gone out” or “one who is outside.” The label is an indication of mainstream Muslims’ rejection of 
the movement and its principles. The literalist and strictly Sharī‘ah-oriented Khawārij initially supported 
‘Alī’s caliphate against his major challenger, Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān. They soon, however, turned 
against ‘Alī and took issue not only with his political decisions but also with his interpretation of Islam –an 
interpretation that was to serve as one of the main foundations of Shī‘ah Islam and Shī‘ah theology. This is 
why throughout history Shī‘ah Muslims took strong stances against the Khawārij. Eventually, ‘Alī was 
assassinated by one of the fanatic members of the Khawārij. In the centuries that followed, the Khawārij 
divided into various groups such as Azāriqah and Yamāmah and gradually faded away [see Feirahi, 
Davoud. (2009). Tārīkh Taḥawwūl Duwlat dar Islām. Qum: Intishārāt Dānishgāh Mufīd. pp. 236-7; Aḥmad 
ibn Abī Ya‘qūb, Tārīkh Ya‘qūbī, Vol. 2, pp. 191-3; and Abū al-Fatḥ Shahristānī, al-Milal wal-Niḥal. Vol. 1, 
pp. 114-37].The group has continued its fringe existence to this day and has steadily become softer in its 
doctrines and practices to the extent that today’s main descendants of the Khawārij are the peaceful ‘Ibādīs 
residing in Oman as well as some smaller communities living in parts of North Africa.      
178 See Madelung, Wilferd. Religious Schools and Sects in Medieval Islam. p. 128. 
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works should be seen as the signature of the early generation of Oriental Studies in 
Europe.179 The scrupulous examination of ancient Muslim texts, which was the hallmark 
of these early Oriental Studies, was more or less lost in the works of later generations of 
“Orientalist” scholars. Writing more than a century ago, Goldziher’s list of research 
interests and questions may appear outdated. His exhaustingly objective style, however, 
is still of major benefit for anyone who wishes to study Islam, especially within the 
Identity or Phenomenological frameworks. At the same time, the early Oriental Studies 
sophistication contrasts to some “reductionist” generalizations that became the feature of 
the works of “Orientalists” such as Bernard Lewis. Despite his nuanced scholarship, 
however, Goldziher still views Shī‘ah Islam –or what he calls “Shī‘īsm”– as a sect. It is 
implied, therefore, that Shī‘ah religious doctrines have been formulated and articulated a 
posteriori by Shī‘ah Muslims to theorize an essentially political dispute. Goldziher even 
goes further and concludes that Shī‘ah Islam is a diversion from the Islamic orthodoxy; 
and that it potentially contradicts the basic conceptualization of God in Islam.            
Based on the “Orientalist” historiography, Madelung turns his attention to the 
politics of the Shī‘ah-Sunnī split and deals with the historical debate over the succession 
of the Prophet.180 Unlike the mainstream “Orientalist” literature, Madelung offers a rather 
sympathetic account of the early history of Shī‘ah Islam; and his historiography comes 
close to that of mainstream Shī‘ah Muslims. He presents ‘Alī as an “idealist” and a true 
believer caught among some “consummate, coolly calculating” power-seeking political 
                                                 
179 See in particular Goldziher, Ignác. (2006). Muslim Studies (Vol. I). Chicago: Aldine Publishing; and 
Goldziher, Ignác. (1971). Muslim Studies (Vol. II). New York: Aldine Publishing.    
180 See Madelung, Wilferd. (1997). The Succession to Muhammad: A Study of the Early Caliphate. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   
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actors.181 In his historiography, however, the consequential and doctrinal differences 
between Shī‘ah Islam and Sunnī Islam, which are necessary for proper understanding of 
the later developments, are overshadowed by the focus on politics. Issues such as 
political authority, legitimate sovereignty, and justice on the exoteric level of the Shī‘ah-
Sunnī split are underscored at the expense of esoteric questions of Wilāyah, Walāyah, 
Divine Justice, and metaphysical hierarchies. The implicit consensus, therefore, has been 
that Shī‘ī theological edifice was a later development providing a justification or 
explanation for the early political split of the Shī‘ah Muslims from the majority of the 
Muslim community. ‘Alī’s exoteric and esoteric formulations of Islam in his words, 
teachings, and actions are generally overlooked. These exoteric and esoteric differences 
between Shī‘ah Islam and Sunnī Islam are, however, among the root causes of the 
qualitatively different politics of Shī‘ah Muslims compared to that of the Sunnīs.  
Some scholars have tried to address this deficiency in the literature. Amir-Moezzi, 
for instance, argues that the early history of Shī‘ah Islam was heavily esoteric.182 The 
Shī‘ah Imāms183 were viewed by their followers as divinely guided spiritual authorities 
with supernatural knowledge. They were believed to be the raison d’être of the universe 
and the channel through which the Divine Grace is bestowed upon man. In this esoteric 
environment, Shī‘ah Muslims perceived themselves as a special community responsible 
                                                 
181 Ibid. p. 39. 
182 See Amir-Moezzi, Mohammad A. (1994). The Divine Guide in Early Shi‘Ism: The Sources of 
Esotericism in Islam. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
183 As briefly discussed in Chapter I, these are the twelve descendants of the Prophet who are the supreme 
religious authorities –along with the Prophet and the Qur’ān– for Twelver Shī‘ah Muslims. The first Shī‘ah 
Imām, ‘Alī, is often considered as one of the Muslim archetypes of spiritual devotion and esoteric 
achievements.   
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for protection of the sacred institution of Wilāyah and Walāyah.184 Towards this goal, 
Taqīyyah185  was also seen as the duty of Shī‘ah Muslims. It must be mentioned, 
however, that this self-perception was challenged by a minority group within the Shī‘ah 
community, the proponents of the doctrine of ‘Ulamā al-Abrār –i.e. “the Pious Scholars.” 
These minority Shī‘ah theologians maintained that the Imāms were specially learned and 
highly pious, yet regular, human beings.186 Yet, the majority of Shī‘ah Muslims gradually 
believed in a special esoteric place of their Imāms in the metaphysical and spiritual 
hierarchy of the universe. The special status of the Imāms was later on translated to 
certain theological doctrines including that of the “infallibility” of the Imāms or ‘Iṣmah. 
These later theological doctrines have had a less esoteric undertone according to Amir-
Moezzi. Even though the early Shī‘ah esotericism gave way to, in Amir-Moezzi’s words, 
a “theological-juridical-rational Imamism,”187 it always played an important role in 
Shī‘ah version of Islam. The esotericism accompanied Shī‘ah exotericism and, in fact, 
influenced Sunnī esoteric traditions as well. The strength of esoteric themes in Shī‘ah 
Islam has been such that they have made a powerful and ironic return in modern times 
within an unusual context of modern Iranian politics.188  
                                                 
184 See Chapter V. 
185 As briefly introduced before, the term generally implies caution and prudence in order to protect one’s 
safety or property. See Chapter IV for more detail. 
186 See Kadivar, Mohsen. (2006). Qarā’at Farāmūsh Shudih: Bāzkhānī Naẓarīyih “‘Ulamā Abrār” –Talaqqī 
Awwalīyih Islām Shī‘ī az Aṣl “Imāmat”. Madrisih, 1(3), 92-102. 
187 Amir-Moezzi, Mohammad A. The Divine Guide in Early Shi‘Ism. p. 61. 
188 A brief discussion of the mystical dimensions of modern Iranian politics and the utilization of the Shī‘ī 
mystical doctrines such as Wilāyah and Walāyah for the institution and maintenance of political power is 
offered in Chapter V.  
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At the same time, the exoteric question of justice began to surface partly in 
response to the Shī‘ah community’s minority status. Justice is indeed a universal theme in 
various Muslim political philosophies. Therefore, the question of justice appears in 
various places in Rosenthal’s review of the medieval political philosophies in Sunnī 
Islam.189 The work covers prominent Muslim theologians, jurists, scholars, and 
philosophers such as al-Fārābī (d. 950 C.E.), Ibn Sīnā (d. 1037 C.E.), al-Māwardī (d. 
1058 C.E.), al-Ghazzālī (d. 1111 C.E.), Ibn Rushd (d. 1198 C.E.), Ibn Taymīyah (d. 1328 
C.E.) and Ibn Khaldūn (d. 1406 C.E.). A central theme in the book is the relevant 
discussions in Fiqh, i.e. [Muslim] jurisprudence, which served as the theological 
foundation for the institution of caliphate. It is important to note that the caliphate is a 
quintessentially Sunnī institution and Shī‘ah Muslims seldom refer to it. In Sunnī 
political philosophies, the institution was deemed necessary for two related reasons. 
These were to “defend the faith”190 and to “command the faithful.”191 A dual system of 
Mulk-Dīn appeared where the bearers of Mulk, i.e. the rule, should observe and respect 
religion, or Dīn. The Mulk-Dīn system led to a somewhat “constitutionalist” approach 
towards the institution of caliphate in which the sovereignty of the caliph was not self-
referential. The notion was further corroborated by a Ḥadīth, or tradition, of the Prophet 
that described Dīn, i.e. religion, and Mulk, i.e. political authority, as “twins.” While this 
                                                 
189 See Rosenthal, Erwin. (1962). Political Thought in Medieval Islam: An Introductory Outline. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
190 Ibid. p. 8. 
191 Ibid. p. 26. 
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dual system remained at the core of Sunnī political philosophies,192 the challenge of 
reconciliation between reason and Dīn/Sharī‘ah remained a primary matter of 
philosophical speculations among Sunnī Ḥukamā’, or theosophers. In these speculations, 
the question of justice often appeared as a secondary concern. Rulers’ obligations to 
promote justice usually followed the central obligation of the sovereign to uphold 
Sharī‘ah. In other cases, the two obligations were deemed as identical: “[t]he caliph is the 
defender of the faith, the dispenser of justice.”193 The above pattern shaped Sunnī 
political philosophies for the most part of the Medieval Age.194  
Lambton examines Iranian medieval theories and practices of government 
especially during the (Sunnī) Saljūq period.195 The mainstream Sunnī framework during 
this period was the theory of imamate.196 The theory was manifested in the divinely 
constituted office of the caliph following the examples of the four “Rightly Guided 
                                                 
192 Ibid. p. 8. This is, according to Rosenthal, parallel to Ibn Khaldūn’s distinction between Sīyāsah al-
‘Aqlīyah (the politics of reason or rational politics related to the notion of Mulk above) and Sīyāsah al-
Dīnīyah (the politics of religion or religious politics related to the notion of Dīn above). 
193 Ibid. p. 26.  
194 Rosenthal also notes the enduring impact of Plato’s Republic on Muslim political philosophy. In fact, 
Plato’s philosopher-king related to the dual functions of the institution of caliphate. Similar to the 
philosopher-king, the caliph was expected to make normative as well as political decisions and to heed both 
forces of morality and reason. Al-Fārābi, in particular, developed a Muslim version of Plato’s philosopher-
king in his influential Ārā’a Ahl al-Madīnah al-Fāḍilah [Al-Fārābi, Abū Naṣr (1985). On the Perfect State. 
USA: Oxford University Press]. Furthermore, Plato’s political “idealism” partially shaped the mainstream 
philosophy of power both in Sunnī Islam and in Shī‘ah Islam. 
195 The Saljūq dynasty ruled parts of Persia, the Central Asia, the Levant and today’s Turkey from the early 
eleventh century to the early fourteenth century. See Lambton, Ann K. S. (1980). Theory and Practice in 
Medieval Persian Government. London: Variorum Reprints.  
196 The word comes from the same root as the Arabic word Imām does. However, imamate here has a 
different connotation compared to the same notion in Shī‘ah Islam. In Sunnī terminology, imamate means 
the headship or leadership of the Muslim Ummah. 
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Caliphs” and the Prophet.197 Trusted in the institution of imamate was the custodianship 
of Sharī‘ah that rendered the state “Islamic.”198 
The crisis and eventual fall of the institution of the caliphate199 and the rise of the 
institution of the sultanate200 affected Sunnī political philosophies. The historical 
transition was reflected in a dual quest to theorize a viable Muslim political structure. The 
sultanate was to preserve “Islamic” character of the society on the one hand and to 
maintain its political unity in the face of outside enemies on the other. The sacredness 
long attributed to the institution of the caliphate, however, made the transition difficult. 
Some Muslim philosophers strove to –at least theoretically– save the caliphate. They 
tried to synthesize the institutions of caliphate/imamate and sultanate in one framework. 
It was an effort to emphasize the continuity of a “sacred” office that went back to the 
Prophet himself. Nevertheless, many including ibn Taymīyah had to give in to the 
abolition of the institution of the caliphate. Ibn Taymīyah even accepted the possibility 
according to religious law of having more than one Imām, i.e. political leader, among 
Muslims and rejected the religious obligation and necessity to uphold the institution of 
the caliphate. The accommodation of the reality and the fear of chaos went so far that it 
                                                 
197 The four “Rightly Guided Caliphs” are Abū Bakr, ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān, and ‘Alī 
whose caliphates extended from 632 C.E. to 661 C.E. 
198 See also Rosenthal, Erwin. Political Thought in Medieval Islam. 
199 The demise of the institution of the caliphate was due to a variety of causes including challenges from 
within the Muslim world. It was the Mongol invasion, however, and the fall of Baghdad in 1258 C.E. that 
sealed the fate of the Abbasid caliphate.      
200 It must be mentioned that Ottoman sultans sometimes viewed the institution of sultanate as the 
continuation of the institution of caliphate. The necessity of having blood relation to the Prophet at the heart 
of the institution of caliphate, however, created some challenges for the Ottoman sultans’ formulation of 
their political legitimacy as caliphs.   
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reached an unusual pitch. Al-Khunjī argued that the Imām, i.e. the political leader, was 
“the bearer of power, whether he was righteous or unrighteous.”201 Al-Khunjī’s extreme 
stance has become, rather unduly, a common theme in Shī‘ī critiques of Sunnī political 
philosophies ever since; for as a minority, Shī‘ah Muslims had developed quite different 
theories of political legitimacy based on the “righteousness” of the bearer of power. 
Lambton then follows the familiar categorization of Muslim theories of 
government into those developed by Muslim philosophers and influenced by ancient 
Greek political philosophies and those put forward by Muslim jurists and characterized 
by the centrality of Sharī‘ah.202 In between the two categories lies the so-called “Mirrors 
for Princes” literature, or Sīyāsat-Nāmih. These medieval pamphlets of recommendations 
for rulers often include philosophical, moral, practical, and juristic arguments.203 In 
contrast to mainstream Shī‘ah political thought, the question of legitimacy of caliphate is 
largely brushed away in Sunnī theories of state. A common theme was to resort to the 
necessity of the state for provision of a Sharī‘ah-based order. Viewing Shī‘ah Islam as a 
“sect,”204 Lambton argues that “Shī‘īsm” originally initiated as “simply a political 
legitimist movement.”205 The author also makes the rather sweeping claim that “[n]o 
                                                 
201 See Lambton, Ann. Theory and Practice in Medieval Persian Government. p. 181. 
202 See Lambton, Ann K.S. (1981). State and Government in Medieval Islam: An Introduction to the Study 
of Political Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
203 These numerous pamphlets were written in the same spirit that Machiavelli’s Prince seems to have been 
written in. They often address the questions of power, justice, and how to maintain political authority. At 
the same time, the notion of political expediency is discussed in some of these “Mirrors for Princes” 
literature creating an important leeway for the sovereign to justify its actions. 
204 Ibid. p. 213. 
205 Ibid. p. 219. 
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Muslim political theory of state […] asks the question why the state exists.”206 Yet, she 
acknowledges that the removal of the Abbasid caliph during the Mongol invasion posed 
much less of a challenge to Shī‘ah Muslims compared to their Sunnī coreligionists.207 
The easier accommodation of the fall of the caliphate was in fact a result of Shī‘ahs’ 
having been more comfortable in questioning the legitimacy and the necessity of the 
state. One of the earliest theoretical questions that Shī‘ah jurists strove to answer was 
how to deal with what they perceived as a “fundamentally illegitimate political 
structure.” The perceived illegitimacy was rooted in Shī‘ī categorization of all political 
powers during the Occultation208 as the illegitimate “usurper” of Imāms’ authority.209 The 
Shī‘ī stance led to a variety of doctrines including Taqīyyah elaborated and expanded by 
prominent religious figures such as Shaykh al-Mufīd210.  
 
                                                 
206 Ibid. p. 1. 
207 Ibid. p. 224. 
208 As briefly discussed before, the Occultation refers to the Shī‘ī doctrine that asserts the Shī‘ah twelfth 
Imām, Muḥammad al-Mahdī, disappeared in 873 C.E. into occultation. From 873 C.E. to this day, Shī‘ah 
Muslims believe, he has lived miraculously and has practiced his Walāyah as a “hidden Imām.” He will 
return, according to Shī‘ī beliefs, at the end of time ushering in the last stage of human history, which is 
marked by universal justice and prosperity. For more detail on Shī‘ī eschatology, see Chapter V. Given the 
fact that legitimate political authority relates to the notion of Wilāyah and belongs to the Imāms according 
to Shī‘ah Islam, early Shī‘ah jurists viewed all other worldly powers as usurpation and, thus, illegitimate. 
This stance shaped the mainstream political philosophy in Shī‘ah Islam until the Iranian Revolution of 
1979. The dynamics of Shī‘ī doctrine of Occultation within Shī‘ah political philosophy became clear to me 
through my interviews with Professor Mesbahi [M. Mesbahi, Lectures, Spring 2007, and M. Mesbahi, 
Interviews, Fall 2010].   
209 Reviewing the jurisprudential efforts of Shī‘ah Muslims to deal with the question of political power, 
Lambton argues that Imāmīyah –i.e. Shī‘ah Muslims– isolated themselves from the reality. According to 
her judgment, they developed a highly unrealistic political doctrine in which any this-worldly power was 
deemed illegitimate [see Lambton, Ann K.S. State and Government in Medieval Islam, p. 300]. 
210 d. 1022 C.E. 
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The difficulties and confusions caused by the absence of Imām’s authority during 
the Occultation led to the gradual emergence and prominence of Shī‘ah Mujtahīds.211 
They assumed some of the functions of state in administering the Shī‘ah community. The 
Shī‘ī position vis-à-vis the institution of the caliphate also rendered the question of Ẓulm, 
i.e. tyranny, an important theme in Shī‘ah political thought. As Lambton notes, Ẓulm was 
universally perceived as “the great evil”212 by Shī‘ah jurists. Lambton also recognizes 
certain potential paradoxes within Shī‘ah political philosophies, which caused some 
ambiguity in the legitimacy of political power during the (Shī‘ah) Safavid period213 in 
Persia as the Shī‘ah Shahs and the Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā214 competed with each other in 
identifying their respective spheres of authority.       
Keddie has written a detailed account of Iran’s modern history.215 The account is 
built on the long-term interest of Keddie in the dynamics of religion and politics in Iran. 
The book reviews the uneasy relations between the religious ‘Ulamā and the royal court 
during the Safavid and Qājār216 dynasties. She also looks into the evolution of the 
                                                 
211 Mujtahid refers to those Shī‘ah religious scholars who have cultivated in themselves the jurisprudential 
knowledge and the skills necessary for extracting religious laws on single or multiple subject matters.   
212 Ibid. p. 225. 
213 1501 – 1736 C.E.  
214 The word ‘Ulamā is the plural for the word ‘Ālim, which means “possessor of knowledge,” and 
traditionally refers to religious scholars in Muslim world. For an insightful account of the ‘Ulamā-laity 
interactions throughout the history of Islam, see Bulliet, Richard W. (1994). Islam: The View from the Edge. 
New York: Columbia University Press. 
215 See Keddie, Nikki. (2006). Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 
216 1785 – 1925 C.E. 
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financial structure around the offices of the high-ranking ‘Ulamā.217 The financial 
structure, in turn, resulted in the independence of ‘Ulamā from the state –in contrast to 
their Sunnī counterparts. The rising power of the ‘Ulamā eventually led to their 
involvements in the Constitutional Revolution218 in Persia, the Oil Nationalization 
movement of 1953, and finally in the Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran. While Keddie’s 
book is rich in presenting the relevant historical data, it does not offer an analytical 
framework to understand the grand dynamics of political thought in Shī‘ah Islam.  
Such an analytical approach can be found in another work by Keddie where the 
author investigates the forces of resistance, revolution, and stability in Iranian Shī‘ah 
Islam.219 The type of dualism Keddie tries to illustrate, i.e. between revolutionary 
potential in Shī‘ah Islam and the “quietist” necessities of maintaining a stable political 
structure, is particularly important; for a parallel dualism may be found in Shī‘ī strategic 
cultures as well. In fact, a part of this dissertation is to show a similar “idealist-
pragmatist” dynamic manifested in the doctrines of Shahādah and Taqīyyah. While 
claiming a “revolutionary nature”220 in Iranian Islam, Keddie does not explore the 
theological and doctrinal roots of it. Instead, she emphasizes the institutional privileges, 
the organizational structure, and the financial independence of the Shī‘ah clergy as the 
                                                 
217 This financial structure was developed due to various religious alms paid to elite ‘Ulamā. In Shī‘ah 
Islam, these alms included “Khums” –i.e. one-fifth of idled property to be paid annually–, “Zakāt” –i.e. the 
traditional Muslim alms paid on selected items– and “Waqf” –i.e. religious endowments. To organize the 
financial transactions between the merchant class and the ‘Ulamā, an intricate and ever-growing bazaar-
‘Ulamā network emerged. 
218 1905 – 1907. 
219 See Keddie, Nikki. (1995). Iran and the Muslim World: Resistance and Revolution. New York: New 
York University Press. 
220 Ibid. p. 5. 
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force behind this “revolutionary nature.”221 The mainstreaming Uṣūlī School of Shī‘ah 
jurisprudence,222 Keddie maintains, provided high-ranking Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā, or the Marāji’, 
with a powerful status. They could now play an active role in matters social and political. 
The peculiar organization of ‘Ulamā and their economic independence, however, was 
rooted in Shī‘ī strategic discourses on political power as well as the social reality of 
having been a minority for a long time. 
Keddie also investigates the examples of modern “political revival” in the Muslim 
world.223 This wave of “political activism” began to emerge in the past two centuries as a 
response to colonialism and imperialism. The tobacco “movement,” which was the 
precedent to Persia’s Constitutional Revolution, has been of central historical and 
symbolic importance. Keddie reviews the 1891-2 tobacco boycott in Persia and the 
central role played by the alleged fatwā –i.e. religious rulings– of a Mujtahid, Grand 
Ayatollah Shīrāzī. The fatwā created a mass boycott that eventually turned out to be a 
successful political action.224 The boycott is symbolically important for it was among the 
                                                 
221 Related arguments may be found in Keddie, Nikki. (1983). Religion and Politics in Iran: Shi‘ism from 
Quietism to Revolution. New Haven: Yale University Press. The book is a useful collection of articles by 
prominent scholars covering a variety of subjects such as the early developments in the notion of imamate 
and authority, the Uṣūlī-Akhbārī divide, the qualified openness of the “gates of Ijtihād,” the pro-status quo 
stances of ‘Ulamā, the bazaar-‘Ulamā interactions, as well as a brief review of the political thoughts of 
important figures such as Ayatollah Kāshānī, ‘Alī Sharī‘atī, Ayatollah Bāqir Ṣadr, and Ayatollah Khomeini. 
222 The Uṣūlī-Akhbārī split is one of the main divisions in the history of Shī‘ah jurisprudence. The Uṣūlīs 
generally give a higher status to independent reasoning in religious rulings. In contrast, the Akhbārīs argue 
for stricter and more literal adherence to religious texts, the traditions of the Prophet, and those of the 
Shī‘ah Imāms. For more discussion, see below and also Nasr, S. H. et al (Eds.). Expectation of the 
Millennium. pp. 280-6. 
223 See Keddie, Nikki. (1966). Religion and Rebellion in Iran: The Tobacco Protest of 1891-92. London: 
Frank Cass; Keddie, Nikki. (1968). An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings 
of Sayyid Jamal al-Din “al-Afghani”. Berkeley: University of California Press; and Keddie, Nikki. (1972). 
Sayyid Jamal al-Din “al-Afghani”: A Political Biography. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
224 The alleged fatwā is reported to be issued in 1891 in response to a wide range of concessions given to a 
85 
 
first times when the power of the ‘Ulamā vis-à-vis the state and the colonial powers came 
to the light. In addition, the success of the boycott led to the rise of the Shī‘ī doctrine of 
Nafy-i Sabīl –i.e. Refusal of [others’] Way [to dominate Muslims].225 This doctrine 
encouraged Shī‘ah Muslims to remove any way by which non-Muslims might dominate 
Muslim nations. It also functioned as a religious creed for obtaining “independence.”    
In a similar context, Keddie traces the influence of Shī‘ī doctrines on Jamāl al-Dīn 
al-Afqānī,226 in shaping his response to imperialism. The Shī‘ī notion of Ijtihād227 proved 
to be essential for al-Afqānī though he usually represented himself as a Sunnī Muslim. 
According to Mesbahi, al-Afqānī’s alleged role in soliciting the famous boycott fatwā in 
                                                                                                                                                 
British citizen, Major Talbot. The concession was granted in 1890 by Nāṣir al-Dīn Shah of the Qājār 
dynasty in order to cover parts of the Persian state’s large budget deficit. Included in the concession was a 
monopoly right for the cultivation, sale, and export of tobacco products. Threatened by the economic 
prospects of the concessions, the domestic tobacco industry in Persia protested. Eventually, it is reported 
that Grand Ayatollah Shīrāzī issued a fatwā banning the use of tobacco and emphasizing that observing the 
ban was a religious duty. The widespread observance of the fatwā forced the Shah to revoke the concession 
deal with Major Talbot. See Keddie, Nikki. Religion and Rebellion in Iran; and Abrahamian, Ervand. 
(1982). Iran between Two Revolutions. Princeton: Princeton University Press. p. 73.     
225 The most important religious foundation for this doctrine is the verse 4:141 of the Qur’ān, which states 
“[…] and never will God grant to the unbelievers a way (to triumph) over the believers” [consulted with 
Yūsuf ‘Alī’s translation]. This doctrine was officially adopted into Iran’s Constitution after the Revolution 
of 1979 [see The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran, Articles 152 and 153].   
226 Also known as Jamāl al-Din Asadābādī, al-Afqānī (d. 1897 C.E.) was arguably one of the major figures 
in the Muslim political revival in the nineteenth century. Although he did have some religious education, 
the extent of this education is not known. Al-Afqānī travelled extensively throughout the Muslim world and 
resided in various places including Egypt, Persia, and Turkic Ottoman Empire as well as Europe. A 
“political activist” interested in strategic alliance among various Muslim powers against imperialism, al-
Afqānī influenced the next generation of Muslim “revivalists” such as the Egyptian jurist, Muḥammad 
‘Abuh (d. 1905). See Keddie, Nikki. An Islamic Response to Imperialism; and Keddie, N. Sayyid Jamal al-
Din “al-Afghani.” 
227 Ijtihād means the systematic extraction of new religious rules from authentic sources and via legitimate 
methods by a Mujtahid. It has been defined as the “process of arriving at judgements on points of religious 
law using reason and the [science] of principles of jurisprudence” [see Subḥānī, Ja‘far. (2001). Doctrines of 
Shi‘i Islam: A Compendium of Imami Beliefs and Practices. Trans. By Reza Shah Kazemi. London: 
I.B.Tauris. p. 182].     
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the tobacco “movement” illustrates his capacity to think strategically.228 Al-Afqānī 
managed, in other words, to employ the dormant power of the Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā to advance 
his political agenda. Meanwhile, one may find the trace of the quintessentially Shī‘ī 
doctrine of Taqīyyah in his life229; for al-Afqānī proved to be a versatile man who had an 
incredible level of flexibility and prudence in accommodating different settings both 
within and without the Muslim world. In fact, al-Afqānī is, according to Keddie, one of 
the first Muslims in modern times who practiced the strategy of Taqīyyah not only as a 
survival strategy but also as a means to exert political influence. This is why scholars 
such as Mesbahi believe al-Afqānī to be historically an important Shī‘ah strategist.230  
The notion of Ijtihād and the doctrine of Taqīyyah illustrate some of the strategic 
potential of Shī‘ah Islam. It also reminds the relevance of theology in shaping social 
phenomena. The rather “essentialist” Identity approach embedded in the “Orientalist” 
literature sometimes makes it difficult to analyze such strategic potential of theology. 
Without taking into account the role of religious ideas in shaping Shī‘ah history, 
including ideas about political power, justice, and security, it is not possible to understand 
why, for instance, modern Iran has had such an active political dynamics in the past 
century including the Constitutional Revolution of 1905, the Nationalization of Oil 
movement of 1953, the “White Revolution” of 1963, the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the  
 
 
                                                 
228 M. Mesbahi, Lectures, Spring 2007. 
229 See Keddie, Nikki. An Islamic Response to Imperialism. pp. 18-9. 
230 M. Mesbahi, Lectures, Spring 2007. 
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Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, the Reformist movement in the 1990s, the rise of Iranian neo-
conservatives in the 2000s, and the recent “Green movement” of 2009.231  
Amir-Arjomand offers an informative examination of Shī‘ah history.232 During 
the period in which the Shī‘ah Imāms were present233, Amir-Arjomand notices certain 
periods of “political quietism” by the Imāms.234 The rather long periods of “political 
quietism,” in turn, provided a strong religious justification for acquiescence of Shī‘ah 
Muslims to non-Shī‘ah rulers. During the “major Occultation,” or al-Ghaybah al-Kubrā, 
with the important exceptions of some Shī‘ah rebellions, “political quietism” became the 
Shī‘ah modus vivendi. The “quietism” was also an expedient strategy that contributed to 
the survival of Twelver Shī‘ah Muslims. Amir-Arjomand views the doctrine of Taqīyyah 
as an indication of de-politicization of Shī‘ah Islam due to the prevailing social realities. 
By paying attention to Shī‘ī tradition of “political quietism,” Amir-Arjomand tries to 
                                                 
231 The relatively quiet period in Iran’s modern history between the Constitutional Revolution in 1905 and 
the Nationalization of Oil movement in 1953 was due, in part, to the international context of this period. As 
Keddie notes, this international context of Iranian politics included the two World Wars and the extensive 
and aggressive involvement of Russian and British governments in Iranian affairs. In terms of domestic 
politics, foreign powers’ interventions were among the most important determining factors in this period. In 
addition to this international context, the transition in 1926 from the Qājār dynasty to the Pahlavī dynasty 
(1925 – 1979) in between the two World Wars played a role in the containment of anti-status quo social 
forces in Iran. See Keddie, Nikki. (1980). Iran: Religion, Politics and Society: Collected Essays. New 
York: Frank Cass. 
232 See Amir-Arjomand, Said. (1984). The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam: Religion, Political Order, 
and Societal Change in Shi‘Ite Iran from the Beginning to 1890. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
233 This period extends from 632 to 941 C.E. according to Shī‘ī beliefs. The period from 874 to 941 C.E. is 
called the period of “minor Occultation.” Shī‘ah Muslims believe that during this period, the twelfth Imām, 
Muḥammad al-Mahdī, remained in contact with his followers through four representatives. These included 
‘Uthmān ibn Sa‘īd (d. 875-6 C.E.), Muḥammad ibn ‘Uthmān (d. 917-8 C.E.), Ḥusayn ibn Rūḥ Nawbakhtī 
(d. 937-8 C.E.), and ‘Alī ibn Muḥammad Samurī (d. 941 C.E.). Shortly before the death of the last 
representative in 941 C.E., it is believed that al-Mahdī announced the beginning of his “major Occultation” 
lasting till this day and ending at the end of history.   
234 This “political quietism” was particularly noticeable during the imamate of the fourth, the fifth, the 
sixth, the ninth, the tenth, and the eleventh Shī‘ah Imāms. See Chapter IV for more discussion.   
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balance Keddie’s argument regarding revolutionary potential in Shī‘ah Islam.235 It is with 
the combination of the two traditions that one may explain as distinct political actors as 
Ayatollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Sīstānī236 within the same analytical framework.  
In terms of historical developments, the Shī‘ī Safavid dynasty rose from the more 
“activist” tradition in Shī‘ah Islam.237 Within the increasingly successful Safavid political 
system, a mutually beneficial arrangement emerged between the Safavid royal court on 
the one hand and the Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā on the other. The amicable relations began with the 
declaration of Shī‘ah Islam as the religion of the state in Persia in 1501 C.E. by Shāh 
Ismā‘īl I238. The Iranian Shī‘ah Islam was further strengthened by the migration of a 
group of elite Shī‘ah Fuqahā239 from the Jabal al-‘Āmil region in Ottoman Syria240 to 
                                                 
235 It seems, however, that Amir-Arjomand interprets “political quietism” of Shī‘ah Muslims as an 
indication of secularization of Shī‘ah Islam. This is not an unproblematic interpretation for it is inconsistent 
with the later developments in Shī‘ah history. The extent of Shī‘ah “political activism,” especially in the 
modern era, shows that secularization never really took roots among Shī‘ah Muslims. This, indeed, does 
not mean dismissing the practical and political significance of “quietism” in Shī‘ah Islam and its 
consequences. Eventually, however, the loose separation of political and religious authorities during the 
Safavid and the Qājār periods proved to be unsustainable as the institution of monarchy gradually lost its 
power and the institution of ‘Ulamā gradually increased its influence. 
236 Ayatollah Sīstānī (b. 1930) is the current Za‘īm, or Head, of the Shī‘ah seminary in Najaf, Iraq. His 
approach towards politics appears to be close to cautious “pragmatism” or “quietism” of the traditional 
Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā. 
237 It is important to acknowledge the Sunnī Sufi roots of the Safavid dynasty in addition to its Shī‘ī ones. 
In fact, some scholars have suggested that the adoption of Shī‘ah Islam as the religion of the new-born 
Safavid state might have had something to do with the political calculations vis-à-vis the Sunnī Ottomans 
[see for instance Abisaab, Rula Jurdi. (1994). The Ulama of Jabal ‘Amil in Safavid Iran, 1501-1736: 
Marginality, Migration and Social Change. Iranian Studies, 27(1-4), 103-22]. Despite these alleged 
political calculations, one cannot ignore the strong religious reverence, if not adherence, of the founders of 
the Safavid dynasty towards Shī‘ah Islam. 
238 d. 1524 C.E. 
239 The word Fuqahā is the plural for the word Faqīh, which means jurist or the scholar of jurisprudence. 
240 Jabal al-‘Āmil is a mountainous region located in today’s Lebanon; for centuries the region had been a 
Shī‘ah enclave. When the Safavid rose to power in Persia, they needed a strong theological and intellectual 
articulation of their political legitimacy vis-à-vis the well-established institution of the sultanate in Ottoman 
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Persia.241 The long list of the ‘Āmilī ‘Ulamā in Safavid Persia include some very 
prominent Shī‘ah theologians, philosophers, and Mujtahids such as Muḥaqqiq al-Karakī 
also known as Muḥaqqiq al-Thānī (d. 1533 C.E.), Zayn al-Dīn al-‘Āmilī also known as 
Shahīd al-Thānī (d. 1558 C.E.), Shaykh al-Bahā’ī (d. 1621 C.E.), Mīr Dāmād (d. 1631-2 
C.E.), and Muḥammad al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī (d. 1692 C.E.).  
Amir-Arjomand believes that the complex Safavid system led to the separation of 
the realm of religion from that of politics.242 The assumption of total separation of 
politics and religion is, however, problematic. Muḥaqqiq al-Karakī, for instance, obtained 
special privileges during the reign of Shāh Ṭahmāsp. His religious authority and Shāh 
Ṭahmāsp’s obedient reverence towards him was often translated to political influence. 
Muḥaqqiq al-Karakī was granted the title of “Mujtahid al-Zamānī”243 referring to his 
status as the Mujtahid who represented the hidden Shī‘ah Imām, Muḥammad al-Mahdī, at 
the time. The official title survived after Muḥaqqiq al-Karakī and was given to prominent 
Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā throughout the Safavid period. The office of Mujtahid al-Zamānī signified 
                                                                                                                                                 
Empire. Formulated as the continuation of the sacred institution of the caliphate, the Ottoman sultanate 
posed a major legitimacy challenge to the young Safavid rule. To address this challenge, the Safavid found 
in Jabal al-‘Āmil the much-needed Shī‘ī intellectual powerhouse. It must be mentioned that the emergence 
of Jabal al-‘Āmil as a prominent center of Shī‘ah education was in part due to the relative demise of Ḥullih, 
the traditional center of Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā in Iraq. Therefore, the Safavid court invited the high-ranking Shī‘ah 
‘Ulamā of the remote Jabal al-‘Āmil to migrate to Persia’s capital city of Isfahan. Many of these ‘Ulamā 
accepted the invitation. As a result, a major center of Shī‘ah scholarship and intellectual production 
emerged in Safavid Persia during the reigns of Shāh Ismā‘īl I, Shāh Ṭahmāsp (d. 1576 C.E.), and Shāh 
‘Abbās I (d. 1629 C.E.).          
241 See for instance Abisaab, Rula Jurdi. (2004). Converting Persia: Religion and Power in Safavid Empire. 
New York: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd.  
242 Amir-Arjomand, Said. The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam. 
243 It has been argued that the title of Mujtahid al-Zamānī is the Safavid equivalent of modern title of Grand 
Ayatollah. Given the association of Mujtahid al-Zamānī with the highest religious office in the Safavid 
court, however, this does not seem to be the case for, unlike Grand Ayatollah, the title of Mujtahid al-
Zamānī often signified a single highest-ranking religious authority.  
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the political legitimacy of the Safavid Shahs through their projected association with the 
hidden Imām, i.e. the ultimate source of political legitimacy in Shī‘ah Islam.  
While the assumption of a complete separation of politics and religion is 
questionable, the Safavid system did provide the religious authorities with a breathing 
space to flourish. They now benefited from the political and financial support of an 
increasingly powerful state. In a matter of decades Sunnī Persia turned Shī‘ah and 
arguably the most powerful Shī‘ah state in history was born. In parallel, an increasingly 
influential class of Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā with complex institutions emerged. After a relatively 
short period of marginalization under Nādir Shāh (d. 1747 C.E.) of the Afshār dynasty244 
and during the short-lived Zand dynasty245, the Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā regained their legitimizing 
power with the rise of the Qājār dynasty in 1785 C.E. At the same time, while the court-
’Ulamā relations retained certain financial dimensions, the latter gradually established its 
relative financial independence from the former.  
During the same period of Shī‘ah history the Uṣūlī School of thought gained the 
upper hand in their competition with the Akhbārīs. While the difference between the two 
theological strands of Shī‘ah Islam cannot be said to be a clear-cut one, there are certain 
and potentially consequential distinctions. The Uṣūlīs grant, in general, a higher status to 
independent reasoning in religious rulings. They advocate Ijtihād as a systematic use of 
human reasoning faculty in studying authentic religious sources in order to issue fatwās 
to address new questions and challenges. In contrast, the Akhbārīs protested what they 
                                                 
244 1736 – 1796 C.E. 
245 1750 – 1794 C.E. Note that neither the Afshār dynasty nor the Zand dynasty succeeded in claiming the 
whole Persian territory leading to the overlap of their reigns over different parts of Persia.  
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believed to be an unacceptable intervention of human understanding in modifying 
“eternal and sacred laws” of God. The Akhbārīs obtained some momentum in the early 
Safavid period as a result of the teaching of Muḥammad Amīn al-Astarābādī (d. 1627 
C.E.). Al-Astarābādī severely criticized the mainly Uṣūlī Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā of the past.246 He 
preached stricter and more literal adherence to the traditions of the Prophet and those of 
the Shī‘ah Imāms. The Akhbārīs did not approve of Ijtihād and gave a minimum role to 
reasoning.  
In contrast, the Uṣūlīs believed in an ever-expanding role of Ijtihād. The 
increasing importance of Ijtihād also meant that Fuqahā were to play yet more significant 
role in Shī‘ah society. It was the Fuqahā who were believed to be equipped with the 
necessary knowledge and skills to use their reasoning in extraction of new religious laws. 
They developed an elaborate Science of Principles –i.e. ‘Ilm al-Uṣūl– to guide jurists in 
systematic generation of new bodies of Shī‘ī laws. They also created the institution of 
Marja‘īyah during the Qājār period. A Marja‘ was a qualified Faqīh who had mastered the 
Science of Principles and had obtained a firm grasp of Shī‘ah religious sources, including 
the Qur’ān, the traditions and Ḥadīth of the Prophet, and those of the Shī‘ah Imāms. A 
Marja‘ was allowed to extract new laws for his followers and the Shī‘ah community 
                                                 
246 The noticeable majority of prominent Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā have been Uṣūlī. The list include influential figures 
such as Shaykh al-Mufīd, Shaykh al-Ṭūsī also known as Shaykh al-Ṭā’ifah (d. 1068 C.E.), Muḥaqqiq Ḥillī 
(d. 1277 C.E.), ‘Allāmeh Ḥillī (d. 1325 C.E.), Muḥaqqiq al-Karakī, Shahīd al-Thānī, Ja‘far Kāshif al-Ghiṭā’ 
also known as Shaykh al-Akbar (d. 1813), Shaykh al-Anṣārī (d. 1864 C.E.), Ākhūnd Khurāsānī (d. 1911), 
and ‘Allāmeh Nā’īnī (d. 1936). Prominent Akhbārī ‘Ulamā included Muḥammad Amīn al-Astarābādī, 
Mullā Muḥsin Fiyḍ Kāshānī (d. 1680 C.E.), ‘Allāmeh Majlisī (d. 1699/1700 C.E.), and Muḥammad al-Ḥurr 
al-‘Āmilī. It must be re-emphasized, however, that the categorization is for analytical purposes and not a 
strict one. For instance, ‘Allāmeh Majlisī may be considered as a moderate Akhbārī as he was also under 
the influence of some tenets of the Uṣūlī School of jurisprudence. See Nasr, S. H. et al (Eds.). Expectation 
of the Millennium. pp. 280-6 for more discussion of Uṣūlī-Akhbārī divide. 
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could direct their religious questions to him. Marāji‘247 became sources to be followed as 
well as points of reference for the community. This was a consequential transformation in 
Shī‘ah history as it further institutionalized the authority of the Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā in their 
relations to the laity. Indeed, the development was not possible without the rise of the 
Uṣūlīs for the Akhbārīs rejected the institution of Marja‘īyah altogether.                
Amir-Arjomand’s other contribution covers the next centuries of Shī‘ah history in 
Iran up to the Islamic Revolution of 1979.248 The more extensive and forceful efforts to 
marginalize the ‘Ulamā in social, educational, juridical, and political matters began under 
the Pahlavī dynasty. In particular, Amir-Arjomand investigates the causes of the 
Revolution. The hypothesis about the relative secularization of Shī‘ah Islam suggested in 
his previous works, however, leads him to dismiss the powerful non-“quietist” dynamics 
of Shī‘ah Islam. Amir-Arjomand emphasizes the “success” of the Shah’s modernization 
project. At the same time, he notices that Khomeini’s Revolution was a watershed in 
political philosophy of Shī‘ah Islam in terms of theorizing and implementing a 
“legitimate state” during the “Occultation of the Twelfth Imām” –or fī ‘aṣr al-ghaybah.249 
                                                 
247 The word Marāji‘ is the plural for the word Marja‘. 
248 See Amir-Arjomand, Said. (1988). The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
249 Another informative collection of articles is Amir-Arjomand, Said. (1988). Authority and Political 
Culture in Shi‘ism. Albany: State University of New York Press. This is an edited volume in which the 
essays by the editor and by Etan Kohlberg are particularly of interest, although not all the arguments are 
beyond debate. One point in case is Amir-Arjomand’s assumption –presented in his other works too– that 
Ayatollah Khomeini illustrates a revolutionary departure from Shī‘ah tradition of political philosophy. This 
is in line with Amir-Arjomand’s assertion about the relatively successful secularization of Shī‘ah Islam 
during the Safavid and the Qājār periods. While it is true that Ayatollah Khomeini articulated a major 
change in Shī‘ah political theology and especially in the scope of Wilāyat Faqīh, one can argue that he 
merely used traditional Shī‘ī concepts and doctrines such as Ijtihād, Wilāyah, and Walāyah in 
unprecedented ways [see Chapter V for more discussion of Wilāyah and Walāyah]. Therefore, the tradition 
Amir-Arjomand is referring to might be, as Shī‘ahs sometimes use this analogy, the Ḥusaynī, i.e. the 
“activist” or revolutionary, tradition in contrast to the Ḥasanī, i.e. the “quietest,” tradition of Shī‘ah Islam.  
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For the first time, the Uṣūlī notion that Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā can succeed the Shī‘ah Imāms in 
certain capacities was taken to its logical extreme. Khomeini argued that Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā 
are not only the religious authority in the absence of the Imāms, but also a legitimate 
political authority.250             
Hairi has written a historical account of the consequential era of the Constitutional 
Revolution from 1905 to 1911.251 It reviews the intellectual origins of the Revolution and 
the role played by the ‘Ulamā for or against “Constitutionalism” –then perceived as a 
modern template for political structure of the state. The book also includes a review of 
the foundations of Shī‘ah political theology such as the issue of the succession to the 
Prophet, the “infallible” Imāms –or the doctrine of ‘Iṣmah–, the Occultation and the 
institution of Marja‘īyah.252 As noted before, The Constitutional Revolution was an 
important prelude to the Islamic Revolution of 1979. It also surfaced some of the 
difficulties Shī‘ah theologians had to tackle when it came to engagement in modern 
politics. The split among the ‘Ulamā in response to the Constitutional Revolution was 
exemplified in the pro-Constitution Akhūnd Khurāsānī253 (d. 1911) in Najaf and pro-
                                                 
250 For a primary source on Ayatollah Khomeini, see Algar, Hamid. (1981). Islam and Revolution: Writings 
and Declarations of Imam Khomeini (1941-1980). Berkeley: Mizan Press.   
251 See Hairi, Abdul Hadi. (1977). Shiism and Constitutionalism in Iran: A Study of the Role Played by the 
Persian Residents of Iraq in Iranian Politics. Leiden: Brill.   
252 As mentioned before, the institution of Marja‘īyah –or “Marja‘ al-Taqlīd,” i.e. the “Source to be 
Followed,”– is a rather recent development that gained prominence during the Qājār period. The 
establishment of the office is sometimes attributed to Shaykh Muḥammad Ḥusayn Najafī in 1846 C.E. [see 
Faghfoory, Mohammad H. Ethic of War and Peace in Shi‘ite Islam]. During the Safavid period, however, 
the high-rank ‘Ulamā were called “Nuwwāb Imām,” which is plural for “Nā’ib Imām” meaning Imām’s 
vicegerent. The idea of ‘Ulamā being the vicegerent of the Imāms was popularized in particular by 
Muḥaqqiq al-Karakī. He also put this notion in practice by leading the Friday Prayer, a religious role 
previously believed to be exclusive to the Shī‘ah Imāms.   
253 Akhūnd Khurāsānī is one of the most influential Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā of modern times. His contributions to 
‘Ilm al-Uṣūl, i.e. the Science of Principles, has been monumental as his works are among the standard 
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monarchy Shaykh Faẓlullāh Nūrī254 in Tehran. Hairi reviews Tanbīh al-Ummah wa 
Tanzīh al-Millah written by ‘Allāmih Nā’īnī (d. 1936), one of the prominent students of 
Akhūnd Khurāsānī. The book is arguably the most important religious text of the era 
dealing with the issue of political power in Shī‘ah Islam. ‘Allāmih Nā’īnī acknowledges 
the limitations of the constitutional system, including “its parliamentary political 
structure,” compared to the ideal Shī‘ah political structure, i.e. a system in which the 
political power is in the hand of the “infallible” Shī‘ah Imām. ‘Allāmih Nā’īnī makes his 
case mostly based on Shī‘ī theological arguments but also by some borrowings from anti-
tyranny literature of the period. He refuted Shaykh Faẓlullāh Nūrī’s pro-monarchy stance. 
Nevertheless, even ‘Allāmih Nā’īnī maintains the Mujtahids’s right to “veto” any “anti-
Islamic” legislation. Hairi concludes that while Shaykh Faẓlullāh Nūrī “understood that 
constitutionalism cannot be brought into conformity with Islam,” ‘Allāmih Nā’īnī was 
“confused with wrong or vague interpretations of modern concepts … [such as] the 
meaning of liberty and equality in democracy.”255  
It is true that Shaykh Faẓlullāh Nūrī’s opposition to the establishment of the 
Parliament in Persia after the Constitutional Revolution was partly related to the paradox 
of sovereignty and self-referentiality of modern nation-states in Shī‘ah Islam.256 Yet, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
textbooks in various Shī‘ah seminaries today. Akhūnd Khurāsānī also played a significant political role in 
the Constitutional Revolution. By sanctioning the Revolution, he protected the “Constitutionalists” against 
being labeled as non-Muslims. His contributions to Shī‘ah political philosophy, however, remain 
understudied. One of the recent studies to address this deficiency has been produced by Mohesn Kadivar in 
Farsi [see Kadivar, Mohsen. (2007). Sīyāsat-Nāmih Khurāsānī. Tehran: Kawīr Publications].    
254 Shaykh Faẓlullāh Nūrī was executed in 1909 by the verdict of a pro-Revolution court presided over by 
another Shī‘ah clergy.   
255 Hairi, Abdul Hadi. Shiism and Constitutionalism in Iran. p. 234. 
256 M. Mesbahi, Lectures, Fall 2007, and M. Mesbahi, Interviews, Fall 2011. 
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“confusion” mentioned above was universal as both Shaykh Faẓlullāh Nūrī and ‘Allāmih 
Nā’īnī had to deal with similar theoretical challenges. The confusion later on manifested 
itself in the fact that, in 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini implemented some of ‘Allāmih 
Nā’īnī’s ideas, such as the veto power of a council of Mujtahids, and adopted a similar 
anti-tyranny257 tone. Yet, it was Shaykh Faẓlullāh Nūrī who became the iconic figure 
among the revolutionaries after the Islamic Revolution. He was praised by Ayatollah 
Khomeini258 despite the fact that Shaykh Faẓlullāh Nūrī had been adamantly against the 
idea of parliamentary legislation or women’s suffrage. Both of these were endorsed by 
Ayatollah Khomeini. Unlike Khomeini, Shaykh Faẓlullāh Nūrī was also a prominent pro-
monarchy figure. This indicates Ayatollah Khomeini’s hovering between “pro-modern” 
ideas of ‘Allāmih Nā’īnī –in his endorsement of the partial sovereignty of the 
Parliament– on the one hand and the “anti-modern” position of Shaykh Faẓlullāh Nūrī in 
his rejection of certain “non-Islamic” aspects of modern states on the other.  
The theoretical difficulties of modern politics for Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā, therefore, cannot 
be easily reduced to conclusions such as “incompatibility” or “compatibility” of Islam 
and modern nation-state. Instead, the complex dynamics that such theoretical and 
theological challenges have put in motion must be recognized; for there is no single or 
simple “Shi’i theory of government”259 as Hairi suggests.    
                                                 
257 A rather common term to refer to the notion of “political tyranny” in modern political discourses of 
Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā has been the term Istibdād.  
258 This must be added, however, that Ayatollah Khomeini’s praises for Shaykh Faẓlullāh Nūrī mostly 
occurred before the Revolution of 1979 and in the early years after the Revolution. It has been suggested 
that as Ayatollah Khomeini struggled with the practical requirements of statecraft, he distanced himself 
from arguably uncomplicated political ideas of Shaykh Faẓlullāh Nūrī [M. Mesbahi, Lectures, Fall 2007, 
and M. Mesbahi, Interviews, Fall 2011].     
259 Hairi, Abdul Hadi. Shiism and Constitutionalism in Iran. p. 55. 
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Hamid Enayat’s Modern Islamic Political Thought is one of the most important 
contributions to the study of modern political thought in the Muslim world. The book 
includes two sections particularity relevant to this research, namely a brief discussion of 
the doctrine of Taqīyyah and a more extended discussion of the doctrine of Shahādah in 
Shī‘ah Islam. The basic definition, history, and modern revisions of the two concepts 
have been briefly explained. Enayat views the martyrdom of Ḥusayn as a powerful and 
dramatic experience with potential rhetorical power for modern Shī‘ī politics. The event, 
furthermore, should be contextualized in the central paradigm of justice in Shī‘ah Islam. 
Such an approach would allow to understand the enduring legacy of the massacre of 
Karbalā in reshaping the notion of Jihād in Shī‘ah Islam compared to the same notion in 
Sunnī Islam.260 The resulting Shī‘ī doctrine of Shahādah and Jihād enabled, for instance, 
the Iranian state to successfully brand its war with the neighboring Muslim country, Iraq, 
as Jihād without denying the Muslim-hood of the Iraqi nation. This was in contrast to 
Iraqi state’s nationalistic propaganda against Iranian “‘Ajams.”261 In addition to the 
discussion of Shahādah, Enayat discusses the doctrine of Taqīyyah within his study of 
political theory in Shī‘ah Islam. Even though the section dedicated to Taqīyyah is a short 
one, it provides a foundation for the study of the doctrine in Shī‘ī strategic cultures here. 
This is why in Chapter IV of this dissertation, which discusses the doctrine of Taqīyyah, I 
will start with Enayat’s analysis of the subject.  
 
                                                 
260 In the following Chapter, a more detailed discussion of Shahādah is offered and the differences between 
the Shī‘ī and Sunnī understandings of the notion of Jihād are also explained.  
261 The word ‘Ajam means non-Arab and when used by contemporary Arabic speakers, it sometimes have 
derogatory connotations.  
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The inclusion of Shī‘ah Islam along with Sunnī Islam in Enayat’s book renders it 
a significant contribution to a literature that has often focused on Sunnī Islam. Enayat 
makes this important contribution with a refreshing perspective in studying –Shī‘ah– 
Islam: 
“The distinguishing features of Shī‘īsm in relation to Sunnīsm should 
be sought not only in its fundamental principles, but perhaps more 
importantly in its ethos, in the tone of historically developed attitudes 
which have informed and infused the Shī‘ī stance on the 
controversial issues of Islamic history, society and dogma. […]. In 
trying to understand this ethos, one has to deal with ‘historical 
Shī‘īsm’, namely, a Shī‘īsm which has taken shape in the actual 
living experience of specific groups of Muslims […].”262  
Dissertation Contributions 
As reviewed above, this dissertation engages three bodies of literature, namely 
studies of religion in International Relations, studies of Shī‘ah Islam in Religious Studies, 
and studies of strategic cultures in the sub-field of Security Studies in International 
Relations. Within the first body of literature, the dissertation belongs to the 
Phenomenological approach, although it also employs some of the Traditionalist insights 
about Shī‘ah Islam. These Traditionalist contributions will be particularly important in 
Chapter V on the notions of Wilāyah and Walāyah.  
                                                 
262 Enayat, Hamid. Modern Islamic Political Thought. p. 19. It must be mentioned that, in this dissertation, 
the use of the term Shī‘īsm, which is usually an “Orientalist” term and which has been used by Professor 
Enayat, has been generally avoided. Needless to say, the use of the term by Professor Enayat does not mean 
his work is an example of the contemporary “Orientalist” literature 
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As for the studies of Shī‘ah Islam within Religious Studies, this dissertation 
avoids contemporary “Orientalist” reductions and simplifications by employing the 
Phenomenological approach. In particular, it disagrees with the reduction of Shī‘ah Islam 
to a political “cult,” a “sect,” or an ideology.  Instead, it treats Shī‘ah Islam as a self-
referential understanding of Islam. In fact, one of the central contributions of this study is 
to bridge the gap between phenomenological studies of Shī‘ah Islam in Religious Studies 
on the one hand and Security Studies of Shī‘ah Islam on the other. While insightful 
studies of Shī‘ah Islam have been conducted in recent decades, most of them have 
remained within the framework of Religious Studies. It is the intention of this study to 
bring parts of that knowledge in a systematic fashion and in a familiar language to the 
students of International Relations. The main audience of this research is, therefore, the 
scholars of Security Studies in International Relations. More specifically, this dissertation 
is a direct contribution to the growing body of literature on various strategic cultures. 
Two points must be re-emphasized in this regard. First, the notion of Shī‘ī strategic 
cultures does not refer to pure paradigms of security. As mentioned above, a Shī‘ī 
strategic culture contains some uniquely Shī‘ī elements embedded within a universal 
culture of security. Secondly, this study of the theological foundations of Shī‘ī strategic 
cultures is itself a foundational study. In other words, it does not engage and analyze 
specific manifestations of Shī‘ī strategic cultures throughout history. Instead, it strives to 
understand the generic paradigms of such manifestations. Therefore, this study will serve 
as a framework for future analyses of various Shī‘ī strategic cultures in different places 
and times. 
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Finally, my study is essentially an extension to the late Professor Hamid Enayat’s 
Modern Islamic Political Thought. In recent decades, there has arguably been some shift 
of interest from political thought studies towards Strategic Studies when it comes to 
Shī‘ah Islam. This dissertation engages the doctrine of Shahādah, the doctrine of 
Taqīyyah, and the ontology of Wilāyah and Walāyah with this shift in mind. It engages 
the doctrine of Shahādah and Aristotelian prudence at the heart of Taqīyyah primarily to 
understand their strategic implications. It also employs the notions of Wilāyah and 
Walāyah as key concepts to better understand Shī‘ah Islam. In analyzing these various 
concepts, this dissertation benefits from the studies on Shī‘ah political thought. Yet, it 
keeps its focus on strategic implications of such thought. At the same time, it does so with 
a phenomenological sensitivity or, in Hamid Enayat’s words, with an eye on the “actual 
living experience”263 of Shī‘ah Muslims. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
263 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER III 
SHAHĀDAH: METAPHOR OF AN IDEAL 
Introduction 
On October 10th of the year 680 C.E.,264 Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alī, the grandson of the 
Prophet Muḥammad,265 was killed in the Battle of Karbalā in today’s Iraq. Along with 
him, nearly all of his reportedly seventy male companions were slaughtered and their 
families were taken as prisoners. Ḥusayn had been on his way to the city of Kūfah266 to 
allegedly establish his rule.267 En route to Kūfah, Ḥusayn and his companions were met 
                                                 
264 The date coincided with Muḥarram 10th of the year 61 in Muslim calendar. As will be explained, this day 
has obtained a significant religious symbolism in Shī‘ah Islam. 
265 At the time, Ḥusayn was the third Shī‘ah Imām following his father ‘Alī and his brother Ḥasan ibn ‘Alī 
–i.e. the second Shī‘ah Imām also known by his epithet al-Mujtabā (624 – 670 C.E.). The rest of the twelve 
Shī‘ah Imāms are direct descendants of Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alī. 
266 Kūfah is located in today’s Iraq to the south of Baghdad. The city was the last capital of ‘Alī during his 
reign as the fourth Muslim caliph –from 656 C.E. to his death in 661 C.E. It was in the great mosque of 
Kūfah that ‘Alī was assassinated. In Shī‘ah popular culture, the city and its residents at the time often 
signify those who betrayed the first three Shī‘ah Imāms –namely ‘Alī, Ḥasan ibn ‘Alī, and Ḥusayn. This 
betrayal was, according to Shī‘ah popular narrative, despite the Kūfīs’ belief in these Imāms’ piety and 
righteousness as well as their knowledge of the Imāms’ political legitimacy.  
267 In the past couple of decades, there have been some discussions regarding Ḥusayn’s actual intentions in 
his politically provocative journey towards the strategic city of Kūfah. The mainstream Shī‘ah account 
refers to “thousands of letters” from the Kūfīs inviting Ḥusayn to move to the city and to “reclaim his right 
to the caliphate” [see ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥar al-Anwār, Vol. 44, p. 376; Aḥmad ibn A‘tham al-Kūfī, Kitāb 
al-Futūḥ, Vol. 5, pp. 27-31; Shaykh al-Mufīd, al-Irshād, Vol. 2, p. 36; and Sayyid Muḥsin al-Amīn al-
‘Āmilī, A‘yān al-Shī‘ah, Vol. 1, pp. 589-90]. Some “revisionist” Shī‘ah historiographies, however, have 
queried such explicit political intentions behind the journey. According to these “revisionist” accounts, 
Ḥusayn left his hometown of Medina due to an increasing political pressure mounted against him and his 
followers. They refer to Ḥusayn’s escape to Mecca to take refuge in the “Holy City” from caliph Yazīd ibn 
Mu‘āwīyah’s persecution; and they notice that Ḥusayn left Mecca for Kūfah only after he realized that 
Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah would not observe the traditional Muslim belief in the sanctity of the city of Mecca 
[see Aḥmad ibn Abī Ya‘qūb, Tārīkh Ya‘qūbī, Vol. 2, pp. 241-2]. In fact, it seems that Ḥusayn himself was 
not optimistic that the Kūfīs would honor their invitations. This is probably why some of Ḥusayn’s 
companions suggested withdrawing into inaccessible mountains of Yemen. Feirahi argues that Ḥusayn, who 
had expected an eventual military engagement with the army of Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah, preferred the 
geostrategic region of Iraq, which was at the heart of the Muslim world, to the distant mountains of Yemen 
[see Feirahi, Davoud. Tārīkh Taḥawwūl Duwlat dar Islām. pp. 228-9]. Those who believe that Ḥusayn was 
forced to leave Mecca for Kūfah also refer to a reported sermon he gave once he encountered the first 
divisions of Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah’s army. In the sermon, Ḥusayn emphasizes that he –and not Yazīd ibn 
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by an army of Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah. Ruling from Damascus, Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah was 
the self-proclaimed heir to his recently deceased father Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān,268 the 
first caliph of the Umayyad dynasty.269 Unlike Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān, who had been 
a master of realpolitik270 and a cunning challenger of ‘Alī and Ḥasan ibn ‘Alī271, Yazīd 
ibn Mu‘āwīyah lacked the necessary political skills and the support network. He also 
failed to keep at least the appearance of piety and faithfulness that had been associated 
with the office of the caliph. As a result, Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah faced stiff political 
opposition to his caliphate and had to rely on more brutal measures to establish his rule. 
In particular, it was necessary for him to extract by force or otherwise a pledge of 
allegiance from influential figures throughout the Muslim world.    
When demanded to offer his pledge of allegiance to Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah in 
Medina, Ḥusayn refused to recognize the legitimacy of the young “extravagant” son of 
Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān. The refusal was, of course, only the latest of a long series of 
tensions between the two families of the ‘Alawīs, i.e. the sons of ‘Alī, and the Umayyad, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Mu‘āwīyah– is the legitimate “bearer of Wilāyah.” He then continues that if the enemy does not recognize 
his Wilāyah, he is ready to “return to Medina” without recognizing Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah’s caliphate [see 
Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, Vol. 4, p. 303; see also Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah wal-
Nihāyah, Vol. 6, pp. 257-60; and Abū al-Ḥasan Mas‘ūdī, Murawwij al-Dhahab wa Ma‘ādin al-Jawhar, Vol. 
2]. This offer was rejected leading to Ḥusayn’s eventual martyrdom. Despite these recent “revisionist” 
historiographies of the event, it has been the mainstream narrative of the journey presented above that gave 
birth to some unique turns in Shī‘ī strategic cultures. This is why Feirahi argues that the martyrdom of 
Ḥusayn in Karbalā became the “driving force of all non-Shī‘ī (such as Zubayr’s) and Shī‘ī movements [… 
that] eventually brought Banī Umayyad [caliphate] down” [see Feirahi, Davoud. Tārīkh Taḥawwūl Duwlat 
dar Islām. p. 231].     
268 d. 680 C.E. 
269 661 – 750 C.E. 
270 For some interesting accounts of Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān’s political ingenuity and originality, see 
Feirahi, Davoud. Tārīkh Taḥawwūl Duwlat dar Islām. p. 206.  
271 From this point, wherever the name Ḥasan is used in this dissertation, it refers to Ḥasan ibn ‘Alī. 
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i.e. the sons of Umayyah. ‘Alī himself had fought Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān in the 
inconclusive and controversial Battle of Ṣeffīn272. When ‘Alī had been elected as the 
fourth caliph, he had commanded Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān, then the governor of the 
province of al-Shām273, to relinquish his power.274 Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān refused 
this command and, instead, challenged ‘Alī’s right to caliphate. He soon became the 
leader of anti-‘Alī political forces and the tension culminated in the Battle of Ṣeffīn. The 
inconclusive battle led to a period of bifurcated political rule in the Muslim world 
towards the end of ‘Alī’s life.   
Following the death of ‘Alī, his eldest son Ḥasan assumed the position of 
caliphate for a short period of time. Only after a military encounter with Ḥasan and 
Ḥasan’s concessions to a peace treaty in the face of certain defeat,275 Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī 
Sufyān secured his caliphate. The truce, however, did not put to rest the deeper 
theological and political disagreements between the descendants of the Prophet276 on the 
one hand and the emerging Umayyad court on the other. The Battle of Karbalā, therefore, 
came in the context of such history of hostility between the sons of ‘Alī in Medina and 
                                                 
272 657 C.E. 
273 This is today’s Syria as well as parts of Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey and Iraq.  
274 The decision of ‘Alī to remove Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān from his governorship post has often been 
viewed as an example of the former’s lack of interest in “pragmatism” and “political expediency” by Shī‘ah 
Muslims. A more detailed discussion of ‘Alī’s particular political approach can be found in the following 
Chapter under “Principled Action and Expediency: The Legacy of ‘Alī.”  
275 The encounter took place in 661 C.E. near the city of Kūfah. According to mainstream Shī‘ah 
historiography, it was the widespread mutiny of the Kūfīs in Ḥasan’s army that forced him to withdraw 
from the battle. Ḥasan eventually accepted the unfavorable terms of a peace treaty with Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī 
Sufyān. At the time, Ḥasan believed that “whatever spares blood is better than whatever causes it be shed” 
[see Madelung,Wilferd. The Succession to Muhammad. p. 323]. 
276 ‘Alī and his sons are often called Ahl al-Bayt by Shī‘ah Muslims. The term literally means the “People 
of the House [of the Prophet],” for ‘Alī’s first two sons were the Prophet’s grandchildren. 
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the sons of Umayyah in Damascus.  
The Foundations of Shī‘ī Doctrine of Shahādah and Its Implications 
Along with the assassination of ‘Alī277, the event of the slaughter of the Prophet’s 
grandson in Karbalā brought the notion of Shahādah278 to the Shī‘ah Muslims’ self-
narrative.279 The notion of Shahādah had been developed during the life of the Prophet. 
The Prophet had engaged in a series of wars against the “infidels.” The wars had resulted 
in the death of a sizeable number of the Prophet’s companions that, in turn, demanded 
theological elaboration on their spiritual status and fate. A number of verses280 in the 
                                                 
277 As mentioned before, ‘Alī was assassinated in 661 C.E. in Kūfah by a member of Khawārij, a fanatic 
and literalist Muslim movement. A brief introduction of this group can be found in Chapter II.  
278 The Arabic word Shahādah comes from the Arabic root sh-h-d (i.e. دھش ). According to Wehr’s Arabic-
English Dictionary, sh-h-d means, inter alia, “to witness”; “to experience personally”; “to be present”; “to 
undergo”; “to testify”; “to die as a martyr”; and “to utter the Moslem profession of faith.” The root sh-h-d 
and its derivatives appear more than seventy five times in the Qur’ān. The term has been used in the Qur’ān 
with a multitude of meanings. Martyrdom is not, however, its primary meaning in the Qur’ān. In Classical 
Arabic, Shahādah primarily means testimony and bearing witness; and Shahīd means the one who testifies 
or the one who is the witness [to the truth of some affairs]. Both terms in Arabic have a connotation of 
truthful testimony based on certitude. The secondary meanings of the terms Shahādah and Shahīd are 
martyrdom and martyr. In modern times, the secondary meanings of these terms have obtained more 
significance due to their usage in a number of political paradigms concerning the Muslim world. This is 
similar to the term Jihād that primarily means exertion and secondarily fighting wars. As for why the term 
Shahādah has been used in Islam to refer to martyrdom, there have been several explanations. Some have 
argued that martyrs will “bear witness to the Divine Truth” –or Divine Mercy– on the Day of Judgement 
[see Muḥammad ibn Manẓūr, Lisān al-‘Arab]. Others have referred to the Qur’ānic verse that declares 
martyrs to be alive, “finding their sustenance in the presence of their Lord” [3:169, Yūsuf ‘Alī’s 
translation]. According to this verse, since martyrs are in fact alive, they are witness to all affairs and, 
hence, their title is Shahīd. There have also been more esoteric explanations for the Ṣūfīs sometimes call 
those who achieve the highest level of spiritual ascendance martyrs. This highest level refers to the 
annihilation of the Ṣūfī’s ego in the Divine Presence and the unification of the former with the latter. Since 
there is an element of self-sacrifice or annihilation of the self in the Divine Self, the Ṣūfī literature has used 
the term Shahādah to describe this state of the soul. Employing this Ṣūfī theme, some have argued that 
martyrs are called Shahīd in Islam for they bear witness to the highest and most sacred Truth in the world, 
i.e. the Truth of Unity of all beings. As will be further discussed below, the Ṣūfī themes play an important 
role in the Shī‘ī understandings of Shahādah and the spiritual state of Shahīds.          
279 The reader can find a useful summary of Shahādah in Shī‘ah political thought in Enayat, Hamid. 
Modern Islamic Political Thought. pp. 181-94.  
280 See, for instance, 2:154; 3:157, 169-171, 195; 4:74; 9:111; 22:58; 47:4-6. Also note that various 
Prophetic Ḥadīths reinforced the Muslim notion of martyrdom. See for instance ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥār al-
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Qur’ān, therefore, deal with the notion of Shahādah and the “blissful status” of Shahīds in 
the eyes of God. Even though this general veneration of Shahādah preexisted the 
emergence of the Shī‘ah-Sunnī schism, the turn of events in the early history of Islam 
gave birth to a fairly different doctrine of Shahādah in Shī‘ah Islam281 compared to the 
dominant Sunnī Islam. 
 
The incident in Karbalā, in particular, showed vividly the grave vulnerability of 
the Shī‘ah community. It led to an acute sense among Shī‘ahs of being threatened by 
fellow Muslims. At the same time, it was seen as evidence that the traditional etiquette of 
respect and reverence for supposedly inviolable and sacred matters was falling apart in 
the Muslim society. Even having blood relations to the Prophet and belonging to a family 
of such high stature could not spare one’s life, Shī‘ahs deduced. In the honor-driven Arab 
society of the time, the notion of one’s household being imprisoned and exiled was 
appalling. The fact that such an affront had been committed to the wives and children of 
Ḥusayn and his companions in Karbalā solidified the belief among early Shī‘ah Muslims 
that they were on their own. In an overwhelmingly Sunnī society and at the dawn of the 
Muslim empires of the Umayyad and the Abbasid282, Shī‘ah Muslims were but a weak 
minority on the fringe. This observation begged for a constant consciousness of their 
minority status and its implications. It also meant the necessity of elaborating theological 
                                                                                                                                                 
Anwār, Vol. 97, pp.1-16; al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī, Wasā’il al-Shī‘ah fī Taḥṣīl al-Masā’il al-Sharī‘ah, Vol. 11, pp. 
8-10; Muḥammad ibn Ismā‘īl al-Bukhārī, al-Ṣaḥīḥ, Vol. 3, pp. 199-235; and ‘Alā al-Dīn ‘Alī al-Hindī, 
Kanz al-‘Ummāl fī Sunan al-Aqwāl wal-Af‘āl, Vol. 4, pp. 397-407. 
281 See al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī, Wasā’il al-Shī‘ah fī Taḥṣīl al-Masā’il al-Sharī‘ah, Vol. 11, p. 8; ‘Allāmih Majlisī, 
Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 45, p. 118; ‘Alī ibn Abī-Ṭālib, Nahj al-Balāghah, Sermon 119; and Ibid. Letter 53. 
282 750 – 1258 C.E. 
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doctrines as well as survival strategies in order to weather the increasingly harsh 
environment. It was in this context that Shahādah was re-visited by early Shī‘ah Muslims 
as a paradigm to take refuge in. 
In the face of the utter physical defeat of Ḥusayn in Karbalā and obliteration of 
nearly all his close companions and the male members of his family, the doctrine of 
Shahādah was to instill a sense of respect, honor, and even victory. Again, the notion of 
“victorious martyrdom” had existed in Islam and had been elaborated upon in some 
verses of the Qur’ān. The story of Ḥusayn, however, brought it to a whole different level. 
The sufferings that Ḥusayn had to go through in the hands of fellow Muslims began to be 
understood as the generic story of Shī‘ah Muslims.283 As a result, some scholars of Islam 
have argued that in the story of Ḥusayn, Shī‘ah Muslims found a mythology for their 
identity as well as the identity of their enemies.284 The fact that the Muslim society 
silently watched the slaughter of the grandson of the Prophet and, by and large, did not 
protest it proved to be a wake-up alert for the Shī‘ah community. The community had to 
come in term with its precarious position. To provide itself with a psychological relief 
from the burden of this overwhelming vulnerability, the early Shī‘ah community 
developed an elaborate doctrine of sacred suffering and martyrdom. The thrust of this 
doctrine was the “metaphysical security”285 of a community so utterly deprived of 
                                                 
283 According to Hamid Enayat, “[t]he memory of Ḥusayn’s martyrdom serves as an everlasting exhortation 
to the Shī‘īs of all times to brave their numerical inferiority in the face of firmly established majorities” 
[Enayat, Hamid. Modern Islamic Political Thoughts. p. 20]. 
284 Soroush, Abdolkarim, Lecture titled “‘Aqlānīyat wa Shahādat,” December 15, 2010, Rockville, 
Maryland. Retrieved from www.drsoroush.com on February 29, 2012.  
285 Shī‘ah Muslims commonly refer to the month of Muḥarram, i.e. the month in which Ḥusayn was killed, 
as the month of “victory of blood over the sword” to signify this puzzling notion of “metaphysical 
security.” The notion emphasized the eventual and absolute, yet otherworldly, security of the Shī‘ah 
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physical security. 
Along with this notion of “metaphysical security,” there emerged a mainstream 
Shī‘ī belief that Ḥusayn was well aware of his fate when he embarked on the journey 
towards Kūfah. He allegedly refused to escape from the battlefield when offered the 
chance and famously declared hayhāt min al-dhillah, meaning “woe unto the 
wretchedness.” The phrase has ever since become an element of the Shī‘ī discourses on 
Shahādah, which belittled “wretched survival.” Such consciousness regarding the 
honorable versus the wretched life had of course serious implications for a persecuted 
minority community. In fact, had it not been accompanied with the more pragmatic 
doctrine of Taqīyyah286, the doctrine of Shahādah could arguably have led to a much 
more difficult historical trajectory for Shī‘ah Muslims. 
At the same time, Shahādah provided the early Shī‘ah community with the much-
needed source of inspiration and with a sense of honor. The notion of “metaphysical 
security” asserted Ḥusayn’s martyrdom to be for a supreme cause and not in vain, a 
sacrifice that, according to Shī‘ah Muslims, brought him to ultimate security and serenity 
in the Presence of God. It has been reported that, once encountered with the army of 
Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah, Ḥusayn delivered a sermon. He put forward his grim assessment 
of the state of the Muslim society in which “the worldly life has been transformed and 
turned into a more depraved one. [People] have been turning their backs on righteousness 
and they are doing so as a habit […]. Do not you see [O my foemen!] that the good has 
                                                                                                                                                 
community in the Divine “grand scheme” and despite the worldly insecurities and persecutions. For more 
discussion, see Chapter V.     
286 See the following Chapter. 
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been forgotten and the evil is not been inhibited? [It is in such conditions that] a believer 
would rather to meet God [through death]. And, indeed, I do not see this as death so much 
as salvation, and I do not see living under injustice as anything but misery.”287 In another 
famous passage attributed to Ḥusayn, he addresses the motivation behind his journey 
towards Kūfah. He says “I have left [Medina] to straighten the affairs of my grandfather’s 
[i.e. the Prophet’s] Ummah; I intend to enjoin the good and to prohibit the evil.”288 The 
latter announcement includes a major claim and begs the question of which specific 
“good” and which specific “evil” Ḥusayn was referring to. 
To answer this question, one must note that prior to Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah’s claim 
to caliphate, his father, Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān, had ruled the Muslim world for about 
a decade. During this decade, Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān’s caliphate remained, for the 
most part, unchallenged. Ḥusayn, similar to his elder brother, followed a more or less 
“quietist” approach vis-à-vis Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān. It was only after Yazīd ibn 
Mu‘āwīyah’s rise to power that Ḥusayn openly expressed his strongest protests against 
the “state of affairs” in his “grandfather’s Ummah.” Ḥusayn goes as far to declare that “it 
shall be the end of Islam if someone such as Yazīd [ibn Mu‘āwīyah] is to be in charge of 
                                                 
287 Various Shī‘ah sources have reported longer or shorter versions of the sermon. See ‘Allāmih Majlisī, 
Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 44, p. 192; Ibn Shu‘bah al-Ḥarrānī, Tuḥaf al-‘Uqūl, p. 245; and Sayyid ibn Ṭāwūs, al-
Luhūf fī Qatlā al-Ṭufūf, p. 48.  
Note that in many Ḥadīths attributed to Ḥusayn, one can find a similar theme where he contrasts honorable 
death in fighting injustice on the one hand and living miserably under injustice on the other. Ḥusayn 
unequivocally praises the former course while loathing the latter. “Dying honored and free is better,” he 
declares, “than living in humiliation” [‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 44, p. 192; and Shaykh 
‘Abbās al-Qumī, Nafs al-Mahmūm, p. 562]  and “death is desired compared to submission to abjection” 
[Najm al-Dīn Ja‘far ibn Namā Ḥillī, Muthīr al-Aḥzān wa Munīr Subul al-Ashjān, p. 54; and Shaykh al-
Qumī, Nafs al-Mahmūm, p. 562].    
288 See ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 44, p. 329. 
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the Muslim Ummah.”289 The noticeable shift means that the “evil” Ḥusayn was trying to 
remove from the society was more than political injustice or an “imperfect ruler,” for 
Ḥusayn believed that Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān’s claim to the caliphate was as unjust as 
that of Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah. Yet, he accepted the former’s rule as de facto; and he did 
not consider it as an “irreversible development” in the Muslims’ affairs. The caliphate of 
Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah appeared to be qualitatively different. If left unchallenged by 
Muslims, Ḥusayn believed, Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah’s caliphate would lead to “the end of 
Islam.”   
The key to understanding Ḥusayn’s uncompromising opposition to Yazīd ibn 
Mu‘āwīyah is the essentially Shī‘ī notions of Wilāyah and Walāyah. As will be further 
discussed in Chapter V, the two notions constitute a particular Shī‘ī ontology –a specific 
understanding of the “metaphysical structure” of the world. Wilāyah and Walāyah refer, 
respectively, to the exoteric and esoteric aspects of a sacred hierarchy around which the 
world is believed to have been organized. In Ḥusayn’s view, what happened with Yazīd 
ibn Mu‘āwīyah’s laying claim on the caliphate was an unacceptable violation of such 
sacred hierarchies. With his “non-Islamic” outward behaviors and his alleged denial of 
the Divine Revelations to the Prophet, Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah epitomized, in Ḥusayn’s 
eyes, a major deviation in Muslim affairs. In fact, he mentions a number of Yazīd ibn 
Mu‘āwīyah’s “blatant” violations on the eve of his martyrdom. He describes Yazīd ibn 
                                                 
289 See Sayyid ibn Ṭāwūs, al-Luhūf fī Qatlā al-Ṭufūf, p. 18. Note that in the peace treaty concluded between 
Ḥasan and Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān, there was an item prohibiting Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān from 
creating a hereditary caliphate [see Aḥmad ibn A‘tham al-Kūfī. Kitāb al-Futūḥ. Vol. 4. pp. 290-1; and also 
Aḥmad ibn Abī Ya‘qūb, Tārīkh Ya‘qūbī, Vol. 2, pp. 214-5]. To Ḥusayn, Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah’s claim to his 
father’s caliphate was, inter alia, a violation of that treaty too. The inherited caliphate was, to Ḥusayn, a 
clear indication of a return to pre-Islam patterns of tribal politics in the Arabian Peninsula [see Feirahi, 
Davoud. Tārīkh Taḥawwūl Duwlat dar Islām. pp. 201-4].   
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Mu‘āwīyah as an “unjust ruler who has turned what is forbidden by God into something 
allowed; who has broken the Covenant[290] of God; who is against the tradition of the 
Prophet; [and] who rules over God’s devotees by injustice and arrogance.”291 By 
“straightening the affairs of the Prophet’s Ummah,” therefore, Ḥusayn intended to reverse 
such a deviation from Wilāyah and Walāyah.292 As such, the more exoteric issue of 
political injustice seems to have been secondary in Ḥusayn’s dramatic and fatal protest 
against Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah.   
There is one other indication that short-term political objectives were not a 
priority in shaping Ḥusayn’s decisions. In a number of occasions during his final journey 
from Medina to Karbalā, it has been reported that Ḥusayn gave permission to and even 
encouraged his companions to leave; and many of them did so. Had short-term 
considerations been a factor, Ḥusayn arguably would have not allowed such a large 
number of desertions. The last of these permissions for leaving came at the last night 
                                                 
290 For the notion of the “Original Covenant” in Islam, see the Qur’ān 7:172 [“When thy Lord drew forth 
from the Children of Adam –from their loins– their descendants, and made them testify concerning 
themselves, (saying:) “Am I not your Lord (who cherishes and sustains you)?” They said: “Yea! We do 
testify.” (This) lest ye should say on the Day of Judgment: “Of this we were ignorant.””]; 36:60 [“Did I not 
make a Covenant with you, o ye Children of Adam, that ye should not worship Satan?”]; and 33:72 [“We 
did indeed offer the Trust to the Heavens and the Earth and the Mountains; but they refuse to undertake it, 
being afraid thereof; but man undertook it; –he was indeed unjust and ignorant” [Yūsuf ‘Alī’s translation]. 
291 Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, Vol. 4, p. 304. 
292 Ḥusayn’s assertion that he was the “bearer of Wilāyah and Walāyah” can be recognized in his answer to 
Walīd ibn ‘Aqabah, then governor of Medina. After the death of Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān, Walīd ibn 
‘Aqabah approached Ḥusayn to solicit his pledge of allegiance to Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah. Refusing Walīd ibn 
‘Aqabah’s request, Ḥusayn says “we [i.e. the Shī‘ah Imāms] are the channels of the [Divine] Message; and 
[we receive] constant visitations from the angles; and [we are] the conduits of the [Divine] Mercy; and with 
us, God began and to us, He shall conclude… [This is why] a man such as I shall not pledge allegiance to a 
man such as him [i.e. Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah]” [see ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥar al-Anwār, Vol. 44, p. 325; and 
Aḥmad ibn A‘tham al-Kūfī, Kitāb al-Futūḥ, Vol. 5, p. 14].    
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before the final day of ‘Āshūrā293. In that dramatic night when imminent death was 
looming over Ḥusayn’s camp, he called his men to a meeting. After describing their 
precarious situation and the prospect of their death, Ḥusayn says “I believe it will be 
tomorrow when the enemy attacks us. Now, I shall permit you all to leave and I absolve 
you from your [previous] oath of allegiance [to myself]. So benefit from the darkness of 
night [to save your lives]! … For these people are only after me.”294 In this last-night 
sermon, Ḥusayn also prayed for those who would desert him to be rewarded by God. As a 
result, Shī‘ah Muslims have often viewed Ḥusayn’s martyrdom as the ultimate and 
supreme act of individual sacrifice295 to protect Islam. The fact that the Imām of the 
                                                 
293 ‘Āshūrā in Arabic means the number ten or the tenth. The events of Karbalā occurred on the tenth day of 
the month of Muḥarram in Muslim calendar. Shī‘ah Muslims commonly refer to the day of Ḥusayn’s 
martyrdom as the day of ‘Āshūrā; and they generally believe that the Qur’ānic reference to the “ten nights” 
refer to, inter alia, the first ten nights of Muḥarram 680 C.E., when Ḥusayn and his small group of 
companions camped in Karbalā. The promise of heavens for the “peaceful” or “confident soul” at the end 
of this Qur’ānic chapter has also been believed to be bestowed upon Ḥusayn [see the Qur’ān 89:2, 27-30 
and Shaykh Makārim al-Shirāzī, Tafsīr Nimūnih, Vol. 26, pp. 440-3. Retrieved from www.andisheqom.com 
on January 19, 2012].   
294 The last-night sermon has been reported in various Shī‘ah and Sunnī sources. See for instance 
Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, Vol. 4, pp. 317-8; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil fīl-Tārīkh, Vol. 
4, pp. 57-8; Shaykh al-Mufīd, al-Irshād, Vol. 2, p. 91; and Sayyid ibn Ṭāwūs, al-Luhūf fī Qatlā al-Ṭufūf, p. 
55.  
295 The martyrdom of Ḥusayn is the closest equivalent in Islam –within its strict monotheistic framework– 
to the Crucifixion of Jesus in Christianity. In both cases, there is a sacrificial element; although in the 
mainstream Shī‘ah story of Ḥusayn, he does not have a Divine nature. In describing Ḥusayn’s martyrdom, 
Shī‘ah’s sixth Imām, Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad, says “[Ḥusayn] offered his blood [to God] to save [God’s] 
devotees from ignorance and confusion” [see ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥar al-Anwār, Vol. 98, p. 210; and 
Muḥammad al-Riyshahrī, al-‘Aql wal-Jahl fīl-Kitāb wal-Sunnah, p. 163]. Also, in an alleged conversation 
between Ḥusayn and his step-brother, Muḥammad ibn Ḥanafīyyah, one can find yet another sacrificial 
imagery. When Muḥammad ibn Ḥanafīyyah tried in vain to dissuade Ḥusayn from embarking on his 
dangerous journey towards Kūfah, Ḥusayn replied that God had wanted to “see him [i.e. Ḥusayn] 
martyred” [see Sayyid ibn Ṭāwūs, al-Luhūf fī Qatlā al-Ṭufūf, pp. 39-40]. Although the actual occurrence of 
this dramatic conversation has been questioned, the imagery has percolated to a great extent into Shī‘ī 
narration of Ḥusayn’s martyrdom.  
In addition, similar to the Christian convictions regarding Jesus’ Crucifixion, Shī‘ah Muslims believe that 
commemoration of Ḥusayn and mourning for his martyrdom is one of the means towards salvation [see, for 
instance, ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 44, p. 278; Ibid. Vol. 44, p. 289; al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī, Wasā’il 
al-Shī‘ah fī Taḥṣīl al-Masā’il al-Sharī‘ah, Vol. 14, pp. 500-9; Shaykh ‘Abbās al-Qumī, Nafs al-Mahmūm, p. 
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whole Shī‘ah community viewed the upcoming martyrdom as an individual religious 
duty and not a collective responsibility of his people had serious strategic implications. It 
strengthened those theological arguments that viewed the doctrine of Shahādah as an 
ultimate and exceptional resource. The fact that the deserted companions296 had been 
absolved from their allegiance to the Imām and had been prayed for by the Imām further 
reinforced this notion. The understanding of Shahādah as an ultimate measure became an 
important permissive cause for Shī‘ah theologians to develop the more pragmatic 
doctrine of Taqīyyah.  
In terms of shaping the strategic paradigm of Shī‘ah Islam, the individualistic and 
non-pragmatic approach of Ḥusayn has had yet another implication. As will be discussed 
in the following Chapter on Taqīyyah and prudence, on several occasions, the Shī‘ah 
Imāms did appear to be little concerned with “pragmatism.” The result was the 
emergence of a paradigm of “principled action” in Shī‘ah Islam along with that of 
Taqīyyah. Principled action, one might say, is the Shī‘ī equivalent of Kant’s –
deontological– “categorical imperatives.”297 The notion emphasizes acting in accordance 
to “principles” regardless of the worldly consequences. Two prime examples of adherents 
to such an approach in the history of Shī‘ah Islam have been the first and the third Shī‘ah 
                                                                                                                                                 
27; and Enayat, Hamid. Modern Islamic Political Thought. pp. 181-3]. It is interesting to note, however, 
that Shī‘ah Muslims –and the Shī‘ah Imāms– have traditionally compared the martyrdom of Ḥusayn with 
that of John the Baptist [see ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 14, p. 168; Ibid. Vol. 14, p. 175; and 
Shaykh al-Ḥuwayzī, Tafsīr Nūr al-Thaqalayn, Vol. 3, p. 324].       
296 It must be noted that those companions who abandoned Ḥusayn have been widely censured by Shī‘ah 
Muslims throughout history. Yet, they have not been considered as non-Shī‘ah by the virtue of deserting 
their Imām due to the explicit permission they had received.  
297 See Kant, Immanuel. (2011). Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: A –German-English Edition. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
112 
 
Imāms, namely ‘Alī and Ḥusayn. While ‘Alī’s legacy of principled action in Shī‘ah Islam 
will be discussed in the next Chapter, it is worth looking into this byproduct of Karbalā 
here. Some of the –mostly earlier– Shī‘ah jurists have argued that Ḥusayn was not certain 
about the outcome of his journey towards Kūfah. These jurists suggest that Ḥusayn left 
Medina based on rational calculations and with the hope of establishing his political rule 
against Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah in Kūfah. The turn of events, however, forced him to 
choose between humiliation and death in Karbalā and he, being of such an “honorable 
lineage,” chose the latter.298  
Mainstream Shī‘ah Fuqahā, in contrast, have believed that Ḥusayn was well 
aware of his destiny even prior to embarking on his journey towards Kūfah. Either 
thorough prophecies or by accurate calculations of the political environment, Ḥusayn 
knew that Kūfah would not support his political bid and that he would die. Yet, he did not 
draw back. This, many Shī‘ah commentators have argued, was due to Ḥusayn’s 
adherence to the paradigm of principled action and his low regard for 
“consequentialism.”299 Some of the later Fuqahā, on the other hand, have tried to 
combine the two interpretations. While acknowledging Ḥusayn’s knowledge of his 
destiny, these jurists argue that the “Islamic principle” for which Ḥusayn left Medina was, 
indeed, to establish an “Islamic state” in Kūfah. He knew that he would not succeed. 
Nonetheless, he embarked, according to these jurists, on his journey towards martyrdom 
to set a model for his Shī‘ah followers. Prominent among the Shī‘ah jurists who have 
                                                 
298 See, for instance, Enayat, Hamid. Modern Islamic Political Thoughts pp. 190-4; and Ṣāliḥī Najafābādī, 
Ni‘matullāh. (1970). Shahīd Jāwīd. Tehran: Unknown. 
299 See ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 44, p. 329.   
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developed this synthetic explanation –or re-elaboration– is Ayatollah Khomeini (d. 
1989).300 Each of the above three explanations of Ḥusayn’s martyrdom have important 
implications for Shī‘ī strategic cultures. The legitimacy of expediency and “pragmatism” 
as well as the significance of establishing a –Shī‘ah– state in Shī‘ah Islam all pertain to 
how Shī‘ah Muslims interpret Ḥusayn’s actions. In particular, the interpretation affects 
the Shī‘ī criteria for engaging in war or opting for peace and for how much such 
decisions rely on pragmatic or deontological considerations.  
     
It must be re-emphasized that the veneration of Shahādah in Shī‘ah Islam and the 
singular place given to the “Master of the Martyrs” also indicated the special character of 
Ḥusayn’s actions. It is worth noting that out of the twelve Shī‘ah Imāms, who are all 
considered “infallible” by Shī‘ah Muslims, it was only Ḥusayn who was killed on the 
battlefield. By most measures, Ḥusayn’s tradition is an exception among the Shī‘ah 
Imāms. The majority, if not all, of the Shī‘ah Imāms after Ḥusayn followed a cautious 
and prudent course of actions. Strategically speaking, this also contributed to the 
emergence of the notion that Shahādah is a measure to be employed in extraordinary 
situations. Enayat argues that  
“[w]ith the increasing tendency of the Shī‘īs to a passive form of 
taqiyyah, and acquiescence in the established order, the concept of 
the martyrdom of Ḥusayn as vicarious atonement prevailed over its 
interpretation as a militant assertion of the Shī‘ī causes. 
                                                 
300 See, for instance, Ayatollah Khomeini, Ṣaḥīfih Nūr, Vol. 17, pp. 52-61. Retrieved from www.tebyan.net 
on January 23, 2012. 
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Concomitantly, weeping, and not edification or political 
indoctrination, came to be recognised as the sole aim of all 
reminiscence of Ḥusayn.”301 (emphases in the text) 
The spectacle of Karbalā proved to be a charismatic one for Shī‘ah Muslims. It 
led to annual commemoration of the martyrdom of Ḥusayn in the Muslim month of 
Muḥarram by Shī‘ah Muslims. The Muḥarram processions, which are not unlike 
Christian commemoration of the passions of Christ on Good Friday, continue to be one of 
the major Shī‘ah religious ceremonies.302 These annual ceremonies were sanctioned and 
encouraged by the leaders of the early Shī‘ah community –and notably by the Shī‘ah 
Imāms who succeeded Ḥusayn.303 The Shī‘ah Imāms also encouraged their followers to 
use the opportunity of commemorating Ḥusayn’s martyrdom to revisit the central notions 
of Wilāyah and Walāyah in Shī‘ah Islam.304 One can conceive of at least two strategic 
implications of these commemorations. First, they functioned as an annual reminder of a 
                                                 
301 See Enayat, Hamid. Modern Islamic Political Thought. p. 183. 
302 Throughout centuries, the processions of Muḥarram have developed into an elaborate and complex ritual 
with cultural, social, and indeed political implications. The processions often extend the first ten nights of 
the month of Muḥarram culminating in the massive processions of 10th of Muḥarram –the day of ‘Āshūrā. 
Most devout Shī‘ah Muslims, however, observe a general attitude of sorrow for the following forty days –
i.e. till the end of the Muslim month of Ṣafar. The processions have entered into the realm of public arts in 
the form of a genre of dramatic representations called Ta‘zīyih. On 10th of Muḥarram, artists reproduce the 
events of Karbalā and the martyrdom of Ḥusayn in Ta‘zīyih. See Malekpour, Jamshid. (2004). The Islamic 
Drama. Portland: Frank Cass Publishers. Professor Richard Bulliet believes that the formal “ritual” of 
commemorating the martyrdom of Ḥusayn was first developed during the reign of the Shī‘ah Būyid 
dynasty in Persia in the tenth and eleventh centuries [R. Bulliet, personal communication, March 5, 2010]. 
See also Enayat, Hamid. Modern Islamic Political Thought. p. 181-2. 
303 See ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 98, pp. 1-106 for numerous reports regarding 
commemoration of Ḥusayn on various religious occasions as well as by making pilgrimage to the site of his 
martyrdom.    
304 See Chapter V and ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 71, p. 354. In the Ḥadīth reported by 
‘Allāmih Majlisī, the Shī‘ah Imām encourages his followers to meet each other frequently and to use every 
gathering opportunity “to revive and strengthen the Imām’s Amr.” Here, Amr, which can loosely be 
translated into “affairs,” appears to refer to the Imām’s Wilāyah and Walāyah.  
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turning point in the history of Shī‘ah Islam.305 It caused socialization and internalization 
of a strategic attitude towards pain, loss, and suffering. Secondly, the processions 
functioned as a hallmark ritual of Shī‘ah Muslims to distinguish them from the majority 
Sunnī Muslims. As a collective effort towards an elaborate ceremony, it also strengthened 
the community bonds much needed for a minority group to survive.        
While informing the collective identity of Shī‘ah Muslims, the events of Karbalā 
began to be theorized by prominent Shī‘ah jurists. The effort aimed at reconciling 
Ḥusayn’s assertive and proactive actions on the one hand and other Shī‘ah Imāms’ 
political “quietism” on the other. As will be discussed in Chapter V, the notions of 
Wilāyah and Walāyah were central in the accommodation of the two seemingly 
contradictory approaches within a single theological framework. To the early Shī‘ah 
jurists, however, a primary theological challenge was the tension between Ḥusayn’s 
journey to Karbalā and the Qur’ānic prohibition against self-destruction expressed in the 
verse 2:195. The verse categorically rejects committing suicide.306 As will be discussed in 
the following Chapter, the universal prohibition of self-destruction in this verse has 
served as one of the main theological justifications for the doctrine of Taqīyyah in Shī‘ah 
Islam. One of the general deductions drawn from the verse has been, for instance, the 
limits of a Muslim’s duty “to enjoin the good and to prohibit the evil.” Shī‘ah jurists often 
argue that if such an enjoining or prohibiting may lead to one’s destruction, one must 
                                                 
305 The martyrdom of Ḥusayn in Karbalā was a major turning point in Shī‘ah history and not, as some 
scholars have claimed, the starting point of Shī‘ah Muslims as a community. As will be discussed in 
Chapter V, the distinct foundation of Shī‘ah Islam compared to Sunnī Islam has been the notions of 
Wilāyah and Walāyah going back to the time of the Prophet.   
306 “Make not your own hands contribute to (your) destruction” [2:195, Yūsuf ‘Alī’s translation]. 
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avoid it. The fact that Ḥusayn had framed his journey towards Karbalā as an attempt to 
“enjoin the good and prohibit the evil”307 along with the mainstream Shī‘ī belief that he 
had known the result of this journey created a major theoretical dilemma for Shī‘ah 
jurists.  
The early generations of Shī‘ah jurists resolved the tension by explicitly or 
implicitly suggesting that Ḥusayn was not certain about his coming death when he 
embarked on the journey towards Kūfah. Some of these jurists have argued that, given his 
high stature in the Muslim society, Ḥusayn felt he would not be harmed. Some prominent 
Shī‘ah jurists such as Shaykh al-Mufīd, al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā (d. 1044 C.E.), Shaykh al-
Ṭūsī, and Amīn al-Islām Ṭabarsī (d. 1153 C.E.) have suggested this line of argument.308 
The belief in Ḥusayn’s incertitude about his fate was later on rejected by the mainstream 
Shī‘ah jurists as well as the laity. During the early centuries of Shī‘ah Islam, the notion of 
‘Iṣmah –or the “infallibility of the Imāms”– gradually became an established Shī‘ī 
popular belief. Meanwhile, the notion was further elaborated by various Shī‘ah jurists and 
theologians. The far-reaching implications of the belief in the infallibility of the Imāms 
and the “Imām’s penetrating knowledge of the universe” contradicted309 the arguments 
                                                 
307 See ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 44, p. 329. 
308 See, for instance, Shaykh al-Mufīd, al-Masā’il al-‘Akbarīyyah; al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā, Tanzīh al-Anbīyā’; 
Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, Talkhīṣ al-Shāfī; and Amīn al-Islām Ṭabarsī, Majma‘ al-Bayān. 
309 It is not difficult to find similar cases in early Shī‘ah texts where the image and the status of the Shī‘ah 
Imāms do not quite match the subsequent Shī‘ī belief in their infallibility and their extraordinary 
knowledge. In fact, scholars such as Mohsen Kadivar have used some of these texts to argue that early 
Shī‘ah Muslims viewed their Imāms as “extremely knowledgeable and pious, yet fallible men.” The reader 
can find other examples of the discrepancy between the current mainstream Shī‘ī belief in the infallibility 
of the Imāms on the one hand and the early depictions of them in Shī‘ah sources on the other in Modarresi 
Tabatabaii, Hossein. Crisis and Consolidation in the Formative Period of Shi‘ite Islam. 
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proposed by early jurists310 regarding Ḥusayn’s possible lack of certainty about his 
imminent death in Karbalā when he left Medina.  
Arguably aware of the growing tension between the above solution and the belief 
in the infallibility of the Imāms, al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā and Amīn al-Islām Ṭabarsī 
proposed another possible explanation.311 They argued that, given the increasing political 
pressure on Ḥusayn to announce an oath of allegiance to Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah, Ḥusayn 
had really had no other choice. In other words, Ḥusayn was to choose between humility 
of being forced to support Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah or an honorable death; and he chose the 
latter course. The explanation is further supported by Ḥusayn’s various statements 
comparing the two options. The above line of argument has received a more favorable 
response by later Fuqahā. These Fuqahā often viewed Ḥusayn’s martyrdom as a 
watershed in Islam that had been predicted even by the Prophet himself.312 The above 
theological explanation was also important in shaping Shī‘ī strategic cultures; for it 
projected Ḥusayn’s action –as a manifestation of Shahādah par excellence– to be a 
proactive one. It was a conscious decision made in accordance to the “principles” at a 
                                                 
310 It must be noted that the above argument is not the only explanation proposed by Shaykh al-Mufīd and 
other early Shī‘ah jurists. There are other possible explanations offered by these jurists that are more 
compatible with the belief in the infallibility of the Imāms.    
311 See Murtaẓawī, S. Ḍia’. (1998). ‘Āshūra dar Fiqh. Qum: Intishārāt Daftar Tablīghāt. 
312 There are various secondary Shī‘ah sources that attribute a number of Ḥadīths to the Prophet and ‘Alī 
containing prophecies regarding the fate of Ḥusayn and his martyrdom in Karbalā. These Ḥadīths often 
highly praise Ḥusayn as a “chosen devotee” to God and depict his future journey towards his death as an 
epic one [see, for instance, Shaykh al-Islām al-Juwiynī, Farā’id al-Simṭayn, Vol. 2; and al-Qundūzi al-
Ḥanafī, Yanābi‘ al-Mawaddah li-dhawī al-Qurbā]. Various Shī‘ah sources have also reported that, once 
about to leave Medina, Ḥusayn wrote to his fellow clan members of Banī Hāshim to accompany him in his 
journey towards Kūfah. According to these reports, in this letter, Ḥusayn predicted martyrdom for himself 
and his companions and humiliation for those of Banī Hāshim who stayed behind [see Ibn Shahr Āshūb, 
Manāqib Āl Abī Ṭālib, Vol. 3, p. 230; and Ḥasan ibn Sulaymān al-Ḥillī, Mukhtaṣar Baṣā’ir al-Darajāt, p. 6. 
See also also ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 44, p. 310].    
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time of severity and insecurity.    
‘Allāmih Ḥillī, however, took the discussion to a new level.313 His argument 
comes closer to Shī‘ī interpretation of Islam and the implications of the notions of 
Wilāyah and Walāyah. ‘Allāmih Ḥillī argues that the decision for Hudnih, i.e. truce, 
ceasefire or peace treaty, and Ḥarb, i.e. war, lies in the province of the Imām’s 
authority.314 The authority comes from the Wilāyah of Imām or his exoteric status in the 
sacred and “metaphysical hierarchy” of the world. An Imām possesses an “extraordinary 
knowledge” of the “Reality” behind the various things and affairs. As such, he is well-
positioned, ‘Allāmih Ḥillī argued, to choose the appropriate course of action at a given 
time and place. This is why Ḥusayn’s brother, Ḥasan, chose to conclude a peace treaty 
with Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah’s father, while Ḥusayn refused to acquiesce to the rule of 
Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah. Both actions are, according to ‘Allāmih Ḥillī, equally legitimate 
and religiously warranted given the status of Ḥasan and Ḥusayn as the “bearers of the 
Divine Wilāyah.” ‘Allāmih Ḥillī concludes that Ḥusayn could have chosen peace because 
of his legal and religious authority.    
There is an important implication of ‘Allāmih Ḥillī’s interpretation of Ḥusayn’s 
decision to fight, even though it was elaborated upon by later Fuqahā. The Wilāyah of the 
Imām means not only the legitimacy of his actions and decisions, but also the ultimate 
                                                 
313 See Murtaẓawī, S. Ḍ. ‘Āshūra dar Fiqh.  
314 For ‘Allāmih Ḥillī’s extensive discussion of various legal aspects of Hudnih and Ḥarb, see ‘Allāmih 
Ḥillī, Tadhkirah al-Fuqahā’, Vol. 9, pp. 5-390. Another prominent jurist, Shahīd al-Thānī, –i.e. the Second 
Martyr–, also accepts ‘Allāmih Ḥillī’s argument regarding Ḥusayn’s decision to fight [see Murtaẓawī, S. Ḍ. 
‘Āshūra dar Fiqh; Shahīd al-Thānī, Masālik al-Afhām ilā Tanqīḥ Sharāyi‘ al-Islām, Vol. 3, pp. 5-96; and 
Ibid. Vol. 13, pp. 228-30].  
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expediency embedded in such actions and decisions.315 Since the Imāms are, according to 
Shī‘ī beliefs, an essential part of the Divine design for the humanity, their actions are in 
line with the ultimate goal of creation. Such goal is inherently benevolent. This means 
that Ḥusayn’s refusal to accommodate Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah’s rule and his death in 
Karbalā was necessary in the grand scheme of events that were to follow, even though in 
the short run the decision might have appeared to be futile.316  
Muḥaqqiq al-Karakī317 made the next important contribution to the jurisprudential 
study of Ḥusayn’s martyrdom in Karbalā. Murtaẓawī reviews the major points of 
differentiation between ‘Allāmih Ḥillī and Muḥaqqiq al-Karakī regarding the issue of war 
and peace.318 ‘Allāmih Ḥillī in Tadhkirah al-Fuqahā’ argues that in no condition 
Mudāhinah, i.e. opting for truce or peace treaty, is religiously “obligatory,” or al-Wājib. 
Such a course of action may be, nonetheless, legitimate if the expediency and concerns 
for the Shī‘ah community’s survival demand it.319 The argument was in line with 
                                                 
315 The notion of expediency and prudence is particularly associated with the decisions regarding Hudnih, 
i.e. truce and peace treaties, in Shī‘ah juridical texts. The stark contrast between the peace treaty of “Imām 
Ḥasan” and the martyrdom of “Imām Ḥusayn” has demanded quite a large number of theoretical efforts by 
Shī‘ah theologians aimed at resolving the seeming tension. One outcome of these efforts has been further 
theorization of the notion of prudence and its legitimacy based on Ḥasan’s peace treaty with Mu‘āwīyah ibn 
Abī Sufyān. In the following Chapter on expediency, a brief analysis of this peace treaty in shaping Shī‘ī 
strategic cultures is offered.    
316 The notion that Ḥusayn’s martyrdom in Karbalā was meant to be an essential step in the progress of 
Islam as the final message of God is seared into Shī‘ī collective imagination. There are many references to 
this image of Karbalā as the “guarantor of Islam’s future.” Ayatollah Khomeini, for instance, declared that 
“it has been Muḥarram and Ṣafar [i.e. the two months in Muslim calendar associated with the events of 
Karbalā and the commemoration of Ḥusayn’s martyrdom by Shī‘ah Muslims] that have protected Islam” 
[see Ayatollah Khomeini, Ṣaḥīfih Nūr, Vol. 15, p. 330. Retrieved from www.tebyan.net on January 23, 
2012].    
317 He is also known as Muḥaqqiq al-Thānī. 
318 Murtaẓawī, S. Ḍ. ‘Āshūra dar Fiqh, pp. 51-7. 
319 See ‘Allāmih Ḥillī, Tadhkirah al-Fuqahā’, Vol. 9, pp. 352-9 –see p. 358 in particular. 
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‘Allāmih Ḥillī’s other assertion that Ḥusayn’s decision to fight was a choice between two 
religiously allowed courses of actions, i.e. war against injustice or an expedient peace. 
In contrast, Muḥaqqiq al-Karakī argues that opting for truce may become 
religiously obligatory for the Imām if the community’s survival is hinged upon it.320 As 
Murtaẓawī notices, Muḥaqqiq al-Karakī specifically refers to the Qur’ānic command 
against self-destruction.321 According to him, the absolute terms of this verse 
circumscribe any seemingly universal command for war in Islam. Muḥaqqiq al-Karakī’s 
argument also implies that the survival of Shī‘ah community at the time did not hinge 
upon Ḥusayn’s refusal to militarily engage his enemies.  
In Muḥaqqiq al-Karakī’s theological reading of the events of Karbalā, one may 
find an example of what was to become the mainstream Shī‘ī understanding of those 
events. He argues that Ḥusayn’s decision to fight could have been the result of a number 
of considerations: that he did not trust Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah would at least in appearance 
respect a treaty; that, as some historical sources have argued, there was no real offer of 
truce and political “quietism” to begin with; that he believed the actual choice was 
between a humiliating death and an honorable one; and that he saw in a humiliating truce 
                                                 
320 Murtaẓawī, S. Ḍ. ‘Āshūra dar Fiqh, pp. 51-7; and Muḥaqqiq al-Karakī, Jāmi‘al-Maqāṣid fī Sharḥ al-
Qawā‘id, Vol. 3, pp. 466-81 –see p. 467 in particular. Murtaẓawī also reviews Sayyid ‘Alī Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s 
response to ‘Allāmih Ḥillī. Similar to Muḥaqqiq al-Karakī, Sayyid ‘Alī Ṭabāṭabā’ī rejects the notion that 
Ḥusayn could have opted for peace without violating his religious duty. He mentions that reviving the 
tradition of the Prophet was the most important consideration, i.e. Maṣlaḥah A‘ẓam or “the greatest 
expediency.” Sayyid ‘Alī Ṭabāṭabā’ī also offers an interesting observation regarding the historical and 
social context of Ḥusayn’s decision. According to him, the Shī‘ah community had been discontented with 
the peace treaty that Ḥusayn’s brother, Ḥassan, had concluded with Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān. Many 
Shī‘ah Muslims believed that the treaty was a humiliating one. Sayyid ‘Alī Ṭabāṭabā’ī argues that given the 
level of discontent in the community, had Ḥusayn opted for a truce, it would have destroyed the morale of 
the community [see Murtaẓawī, S. Ḍ. ‘Āshūra dar Fiqh. pp. 61-2; and Sayyid ‘Alī Ṭabāṭabā’ī, Rīyāḍ al-
Masā’il fī Bayān Aḥkām al-Shar‘ bil-Dalā’il, Vol. 7, pp. 494-9 –see p. 497 in particular].        
321 See the verse 2:195 in the Qur’ān. 
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with Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah a major damage to the “foundations of Islam.” Therefore, in 
contrast to ‘Allāmih Ḥillī, Muḥaqqiq al-Karakī did not see in the actions of Ḥusayn a 
possible justification for the universal application of the doctrine of Shahādah. Instead, 
the decision for war and almost certain martyrdom was shaped to a great extent by 
exceptional historical, social, and psychological contexts of the time. This is further 
supported by the fact that, as discussed before, Ḥusayn absolved his companions of their 
oaths of allegiance and allowed them to leave. 
The question of Hudnih, i.e. truce or peace treaty, versus Shahādah continued to 
be a theological problem for many Shī‘ah theologians and jurists. The underlying 
strategic question was, however, when and where Shī‘ah Muslims should emulate 
Ḥusayn’s Shahādah and when and where they should follow Ḥasan’s peace treaty. It 
seemed that the Qur’ān provided enough support for both sides of the argument.322 
Therefore, Shī‘ah theologians had to tackle the question of war and peace with their 
analytical and textual skills. For a minority community under constant threat of 
extinction, the answer to this theological question would have had significant 
implications. In his encyclopedia of the Shī‘ah jurisprudential traditions,323 Muḥammad 
Ḥasan al-Najafī324 reviews various juridical opinions regarding Hudnih and tries to strike 
a balance between appreciation of necessities and that of survival on the one hand and the 
“idealist” doctrine of Shahādah on the other. Similar to Muḥaqqiq al-Karakī, al-Najafī 
                                                 
322 While the verse 2:195 was interpreted as a categorical prohibition against self-destruction, verse 2:244 
appeared to be a universal invitation to “fight in the cause of God.” 
323 Jawāhir al-Kalām fī Sharḥ Sharāyi‘ al-Islām is a multi-volume collection of Shī‘ah juridical discourses 
and the opinions of prominent Shī‘ah jurists of the past. 
324 d. 1850 C.E. 
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views Ḥusayn’s martyrdom as an extreme and exceptional case.325 Ḥusayn’s actions, he 
argues, should be understood in the light of the extraordinary circumstances as well as 
Ḥusayn’s special status –even arguably among the Shī‘ah Imāms. As such, it does not 
relieve Shī‘ah Muslims’ from their duty to be cautious and judicious in protecting 
themselves, their religion and their community either through peace or war.326 The line of 
argument has been the main reason why few Shī‘ah jurists have dealt with the events of 
Karbalā as direct sources of religious reasoning, or Ijtihād. In other words, many Shī‘ah 
jurists perceived Ḥusayn’s unique action –compared to those of other Shī‘ah Imāms– as a  
 
tradition beyond the realm of Ijtihād. Instead, the story of Ḥusayn became the epic story 
of Shī‘ah community and one of the pivotal foundations of their self-perception. 
The above understanding of the doctrine of Shahādah as the last measure –and 
reserved for extraordinary circumstances– has been a mainstream paradigm among 
Shī‘ah jurists regarding the matter. The paradigm projected the story of Ḥusayn as the 
metaphor of an “ideal life,” a life that could serve to inspire Shī‘ah Muslims but could not 
be imitated by them.327 The most significant exception to this mainstream interpretation 
belongs to Ayatollah Khomeini. While acknowledging the special status of Ḥusayn, 
                                                 
325 See Muḥammad Ḥasan al-Najafī, Jawāhir al-Kalām fī Sharḥ Sharāyi‘al-Islām, Vol. 21, p. 3-50; and 
Ibid., Vol. 21, p. 295.  
326 See Ibid., Vol. 21, pp. 295-6; and Murtaẓawī, S. Ḍ. ‘Āshūra dar Fiqh. pp. 68-9. 
327 This understanding of Ḥusayn’s “idealistic” martyrdom continues to exist to this day. As recent as 2011, 
Grand Ayatollah Waḥīd al-Khurāsānī reiterated the tenets of this interpretation in his message for 2011 
annual commemoration of the events of Karbalā. His articulation is particularly important for Waḥīd al-
Khurāsānī is arguably the most prominent “traditional” Marja‘ in Qum’s Shī‘ah seminary and is considered 
by many to be the head –i.e. Za‘īm– of that seminary. His understanding of the “lessons of ‘Āshūrā” 
follows the mainstream Shī‘ī approach and differs decidedly with that of Ayatollah Khomeini [see 
www.vahid-khorasani.ir, Retrieved November 28, 2011].    
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Ayatollah Khomeini took issues with the notion that Ḥusayn’s action was beyond jurists’ 
reasoning. Similar to other reported traditions of the Prophet and the Shī‘ah Imāms, 
Ayatollah Khomeini argued, Ḥusayn’s martyrdom and the events of Karbalā might be 
used as a source for religious jurisdiction.328 He acknowledged that Ḥusayn’s 
“extraordinary sacrifice” had been for the higher purpose of protecting the “core of 
Islam.” Yet, he argued that a qualified Shī‘ah jurist might as well recognize a moment of 
such vital threat to Islam.329 Upon such recognition, Ayatollah Khomeini believed, the 
jurist could refer to Ḥusayn’s tradition and employ the doctrine of Shahādah. He then 
offers a number of examples to show what he means by a vital threat to the core of Islam. 
These include “a threat to the lives or dignity of a group of Muslims,” “a threat to destroy 
the traditions of Islam,” “an attempt to remove a ‘validating proof’ [i.e. Ḥujjat] of Islam,” 
and “an attempt to destroy the supreme signs and symbols of Islam [i.e. Sha‘ā’ir al-
Islām]”– such as the house of Ka‘bah in Mecca. Once such a threat is looming, a Shī‘ah 
jurist could not side with “short-term expediency,” refer to political prudence, or resort to 
the doctrine of Taqīyyah, Khomeini argued. Indeed, the reference to “the lives or dignity 
of a group of Muslims” in his argument can be applied to the Shī‘ah Muslims as a whole 
as well as smaller Shī‘ah minority communities. The argument brings the doctrine of 
Shahādah to the fore of Shī’ī strategic culture according to Ayatollah Khomeini. On the 
practical level, he employed this doctrine in formulating Iran’s war with Iraq in the 
1980s. The “forgotten” doctrine of Shahādah was revived as the tradition of “Imām 
                                                 
328 See for instance Ayatollah Khomeini, Ṣaḥīfih Nūr, Vol. 1, p. 164; Ibid. Vol. 7, p. 54; and Ibid. Vol. 17, 
pp. 58-9. Retrieved from www.tebyan.net on January 23, 2012. 
329 See Murtaẓawī, S. Ḍ. ‘Āshūra dar Fiqh. p. 74; and Ayatollah Khomeini, Taḥrīr al-Wasīlah, Vol. 1, p. 
472.  
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Ḥusayn” to protect Shī‘ah Iran. For this reason, Mesbahi argues that the doctrine of 
Shahādah was the “backbone of Iran’s national security strategy during the war with 
Iraq.”330 Yet, as Mesbahi notes, the “national security strategy” was not purely 
nationalistic. The defensive war was not merely about protecting Iran as an independent 
national unit against the invading Iraq. It was also about protecting Iran as the bastion of 
Shī‘ah Islam.     
This brings us to the more consequential item on the list of examples specified by 
Ayatollah Khomeini. He refers to ‘validating proofs,’ i.e. Ḥujjat331, of Islam as something 
to be carefully protected. Without these ‘validating proofs,’ people would get bewildered 
about the religion and they might go astray, he maintained. One of the supreme examples 
of these ‘validating proofs’ in Shī‘ah Islam is the sacred hierarchies of Wilāyah and 
Walāyah. It was, as discussed above, in protest against the grave violation of Wilāyah by 
Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah that Ḥusayn laid his life on the line. It was, Khomeini claimed, the 
serious violation of the same sacred notion by the Shah that allowed Khomeini to employ 
the doctrine of Shahādah in his struggle against the Pahlavī dynasty.332  
Ayatollah Khomeini also brought the above argument to its logical extreme. He 
asserted that Shī‘ah Muslims are obliged not only to protect Wilāyah once threatened, 
                                                 
330 M. Mesbahi, Interviews, Spring 2010, and Mesbahi, Mohiaddin. Free and Confined. See also Mesbahi’s 
chapter on Iran-Iraq War in Rajaee, Farhang. (Ed.). (1993). The Iran-Iraq War: The Politics of Aggression. 
Gainesville: University Press of Florida. 
331 The plural for Ḥujjat is Ḥujaj. 
332 For a related analysis of Ayatollah Khomieni’s direct comparison of Ḥusayn’s martyrdom and his own 
fight against the Shah, see Enayat, Hamid. Modern Islamic Political Thought. p. 194. 
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they must also strive to establish Wilāyah once it has been destroyed.333 He argued that 
Ḥusayn’s journey towards Kūfah was a proactive act of “volunteerism” to establish an 
“Islamic state” based on Ḥusayn’s Wilāyah. Ayatollah Khomeini rejected the 
interpretations of Muḥaqqiq al-Ḥillī and Ṣāḥib al-Jawāhir334, who had suggested that once 
in Karbalā, Ḥusayn had had no option but to fight. Instead, Khomeini saw the decision to 
go to Kūfah as an essentially deliberate one despite Ḥusayn’s knowledge of its fate. 
Ḥusayn’s Wilāyah demanded, in other words, a journey that would end in martyrdom.335  
 
It is not surprising, therefore, that one of the outcomes of the Iranian Revolution has been 
a political structure built upon Ayatollah Khomeini’s theory of Wilāyat Faqīh.336      
The Mystical Dimension of Shahādah 
Before visiting the implications of Ḥusayn’s martyrdom for Shī‘ī understanding of 
Jihād, it is worth discussing the mystical theme of Shahādah in Shī‘ah Islam. Shī‘ah 
Muslims trace this mystical theme to a Prophetic tradition.337 In addition, there exists the 
                                                 
333 As far as the author is aware, Ayatollah Khomeini has not offered a systematic explanation of Ḥasan’s 
peace treaty or Ḥusayn’s nearly one decade of political “quietism,” although the Imāms’ Wilāyah was 
arguably challenged in both cases.    
334 Muḥammad Ḥasan al-Najafī [see above]. 
335 See for instance Ayatollah Khomeini, Ṣaḥifih Nūr, Vol. 1, p. 164; Ibid.  Vol. 7, p. 54; and Ibid. Vol. 17, 
pp. 58-9. Retrieved from www.tebyan.net on January 23, 2012. 
336 A brief discussion of the notion of Wilāyat Faqīh is offered in Chapter V. For more information, see 
Ayatollah Khomeini’s Ḥukūmah al-Islāmīyyah. Mesbahi offers an insightful analysis of various 
ramifications of Ayatollah Khomeini’s political theory for Iran’s modern politics. This includes arguably the 
first Shī‘ī articulation of the self-referential institution of the modern state [M. Mesbahi, Lectures, Fall 
2007, and M. Mesbahi, Interviews, Fall 2011].   
337 In particular, Shī‘ah sources refer to a reported conversation between the Prophet and Ḥārithih ibn 
Mālik, one of his disciples. When Ḥārithih ibn Mālik conveyed to the Prophet the “extraordinary spiritual 
visions” he had received, he asked the Prophet to pray so that God “grants him martyrdom.” The Prophet 
did so and shortly after, Ḥārithih ibn Mālik was killed in a small battle [see ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥār al-
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Ṣūfī treatment of the notion of Shahādah. As discussed before, the word Shahādah 
essentially means to testify and Shahīd is the one who testifies. In the Ṣūfī literature, it is 
not unusual to find the term Shahīd in reference to those Ṣūfīs who have achieved the 
highest level of mystical experience, namely the experience of unification with God. 
Since such an experience involves, Ṣūfīs believed, the annihilation of one’s self in the 
Divine Self, it implied a sort of demise or “martyrdom.” At the same time, according to 
Ṣūfī doctrines, by sacrificing one’s self in the Divine Self, a Ṣūfī would testify the 
ultimate Truth of Unity –and that there is no being other than the Being. For these 
reasons, the word Shahīd, which implies both testimony to the Truth and martyrdom, has 
been an apt term for the Ṣūfīs describing their ultimate religious experiences. Such 
experiences were also tied to the notion of Walāyah, which is central in various Ṣūfī 
traditions of Sunnī or Shī‘ah origins. A Ṣūfī Shahīd was also believed to be a “bearer of 
the Divine Walāyah” for he or she had ascended through the esoteric and “metaphysical” 
sacred hierarchy –a hierarchy that the term Walāyah signified.  
In the context of Shī‘ah Islam, therefore, it is not surprising that the doctrine of 
Shahādah had obtained a mystical undertone after the events of Karbalā. Not only 
Ḥusayn literally sacrificed his self in the way of testifying the “ultimate Truth” of Islam, 
but also he was the supreme “bearer of Walāyah” at the time according to Shī‘ahs.338 As 
                                                                                                                                                 
Anwār, Vol. 67, p. 174; and Abū Ja‘far Thiqat al-Islām Kuliynī, Uṣūl al-Kāfī, Vol. 2, p. 54]. According to 
Shī‘ī interpretations of this report, Ḥārithih ibn Mālik’s mystical experience culminated in his desire to 
thoroughly sacrifice himself through martyrdom. This notion of “mystical martyrdom” was further 
elaborated by the Shī‘ah Imāms and some of the Shī‘ah theologians later on.     
338 In fact, one of the longest and most popular “mystical prayers” in Shī‘ah Islam, i.e. the prayer of 
‘Arafah, belongs to Ḥusayn who first recited it in his last pilgrimage to Mecca just before embarking on his 
final journey to Kūfah. The correlation between the “ultimate spiritual experiences” of the Shī‘ah Imām on 
the one hand and Shahādah on the other in Shī‘ī beliefs is not limited to Ḥusayn. Shī‘ah Muslims consider 
all their Imāms to be Shahīd even though only Ḥusayn was killed on the battlefield. All other Shī‘ah Imāms 
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such, Ḥusayn’s martyrdom was more than fulfilling a religious duty in the eyes of Shī‘ah 
Muslims. It was also a gratifying mystical experience of unification with God –albeit 
appearing physically painful.339 Similar to the epic Bhagavad-Gita in Hinduism, Ḥusayn’s 
martyrdom in Karbalā turned the experience of battlefield in Shī‘ah Islam into an 
extremely elaborate mystical experience of the highest order. The mystical flavour of 
Karbalā, of course, does not mean that “mysticism” has become a driving force in Shī‘ī 
strategic cultures.    
The involvement of the hierarchies of Wilāyah and Walāyah in the Shī‘ī doctrine 
of Shahādah has had yet another strategic implication. The “blissful state of martyrdom” 
cannot be achieved unless permission is granted by an appropriate religious authority, i.e. 
an authority that bears a certain level of Wilāyah and in some cases Walāyah. This is why 
the overwhelming majority of Shī‘ah jurists have argued that “offensive wars” are 
forbidden unless with the direct permission of an “infallible” Shī‘ah Imām.340 A Shī‘ah 
killed in an “offensive battle” without such permission will not be considered a martyr 
according to this ruling. In addition, many Shī‘ah jurists hold that a “defensive war” is 
                                                                                                                                                 
were killed in circumstances other than war. Yet their deaths are often understood as their final act of 
testimony to the Divine Truth and as the “ultimate mystical experience” of Shahādah. This connection is 
further solidified by a Ḥadīth attributed to the sixth Shī‘ah Imām, Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad, in which he says 
that “[t]here is [and will be] no one among us [i.e. the Shī‘ah Imāms] not killed as a martyr” [see ‘Allāmih 
Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 27, p. 209]. 
To further emphasize the “mysticism” of Shahādah, both ‘Alī and Ḥasan –i.e. the first and the second 
Shī‘ah Imāms– have argued that a “true Shī‘ah” is eventually a martyr regardless of how he or she dies for 
he or she will “achieve the Sacred Knowledge of the Divine Truth” upon death [see Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, 
Sharḥ Nahj al-Balāghah, Vol. 13, p, 111; and Shaykh Hādī al-Najafī, Mūsū‘ah Aḥādīth Ahl al-Bayt, Vol. 8, 
p. 357].         
339 The mystical interpretations of Ḥusayn’s martyrdom is not exclusive to Shī‘ah Muslims. Jalāl al-Dīn 
Rūmī, the prominent Sunnī Ṣūfī poet (d. 1273 C.E.), venerates his martyrdom as a supreme case of 
mystical union with God [see Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī, Mathnawī al-Ma‘nawī, Vol. 6, Verses 792-805].   
340 See Faghfoory, Mohammad H. Ethic of War and Peace in Shi‘ite Islam.  
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legitimate only when a qualified jurist sanctions it.341 It is only with such a sanction that 
those killed in a “defensive war” are considered martyrs. In both juridical arguments 
above, the Shī‘ah jurists have relied on the notions of Wilāyah and Walāyah. The extreme 
nature of “offensive wars” demands the supreme religious authority of the “infallible” 
Imāms who, according to Shī‘ī beliefs, possess both Wilāyah and Walāyah.342 “Defensive 
wars,” although less controversial, still require a partial level of Wilāyah, or exoteric 
religious authority, that a qualified Shī‘ah jurist possesses.    
 
Shī‘ah Understanding of Jihād 
Besides their effects on shaping the Shī‘ī doctrine of Shahādah, the events in 
Karbalā had another important consequence. They left an enduring mark on Shī‘ī 
understanding of Jihād. In recent decades and especially following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, much has been written about the notion of Jihād in Islam. Yet, the essential 
difference between the Shī‘ī and the Sunnī interpretations of this notion has often been 
overlooked. The Arabic word Jihād means, inter alia, exertion. Similar to the phrase 
Shahādah, Jihād has been used in Muslim religious discourses in various ways. Many of 
the scholars of Islam have already pointed to the incorrect translation of Jihād as “Holy 
War.”343 In traditional Muslim literature the primary meaning of the term Jihād is exertion 
                                                 
341 Ibid.  
342 As will be discussed later, there seems to be a general consensus among Shī‘ah jurists regarding this 
matter. Mullā Muḥsin Fiyḍ Kāshānī, for instance, explicitly rejects the possibility of “offensive war” during 
the Occultation of the twelfth Imām [see the book of Jihād in Mullā Muḥsin Fiyḍ Kāshānī, Mafātīḥ al-
Sharāyi‘].   
343 A prominent example of modern “Orientalist” literature in this regard is Lewis, Bernard. (2004). The 
Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror. New York: Random House. For different analyses of Jihād in 
Islam, see Schimmel, Annemarie. (1992). Islam: An Introduction. Albany: State University of New York 
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implying struggle with the ego. As such, sacrificing one’s comfort and life on the 
battlefield for a religious cause may be considered as one of the manifestations of 
Jihād.344 Accordingly, Muslim “just wars,” or “religiously sanctioned” wars, are 
considered an example of Jihād by the virtue of being an extension of believers’ 
continuous fight against their egos. While acknowledging this broader context of the term 
Jihād, this section focuses on the perception of external Jihād, or physical wars, by Shī‘ah 
Muslims; for the purpose of this section is to better understand the narrative of “just war” 
in Shī‘ī strategic cultures as well as their “metaphysical dimensions.”345  
In Sunnī Islam, there seems to be more continuity in the general perception of 
“just wars” from the time of the Prophet to the present time. Throughout his career as a 
statesman, the Prophet engaged in a number of battles346 with disbelievers, or “infidels.” 
                                                                                                                                                 
Press. pp. 68-70; Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. (Fall 1982). The Spiritual Significance of jihãd. Parabola, 7(4), 
14-19; and Shah-Kazemi, Reza. (Summer 2009). Recollecting the Spirit of Jihad. Sophia Perennis, 1(3), 
23-51].   
344 The often quoted reference in this regard is a Ḥadīth by the Prophet in which he refers to the external 
war as the smaller Jihād, i.e. Jihād al-Asqar, while praising the inner war of the soul against the ego as the 
greater Jihād –i.e. Jihād al-Akbar [see Shaykh al-Ṣadūq, Ma‘ānī al-Akhbār, p. 160]. Similar sayings have 
been reported from ‘Alī and Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī, the first and the fifth Shī‘ah Imāms. In these Ḥadīths, 
“Jihād with the ego” is often considered as the “most superior” and the “most difficult” of all Jihāds [see, 
for instance, Ibn Shu‘bah al-Ḥarrānī, Tuḥaf al-‘Uqūl, p. 286; and al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī, al-Fuṣūl al-Muhimmah 
fī Uṣūl al-A’immah, pp. 214-24]. ‘Alī considers the death of one who has been in constant struggle with his 
or her ego to be martyrdom. The verse 25:52 of the Qur’ān has also been interpreted as praising the “great 
Jihād” when referring to strivings for faith and belief [see Faghfoory, Mohammad H. Ethic of War and 
Peace in Shi‘ite Islam]. 
345 From this point onward, therefore, wherever the term Jihād is used it means external Jihād unless 
otherwise clarified.  
346 The most significant of these battles are the Battle of Badr (624 C.E.), the Battle of Uḥud (625 C.E.), the 
Battle of Khandaq (otherwise known as the Battle of Trench in 627 C.E.), and the Battle of Ḥunayn (630 
C.E.). In addition to these battles, the Prophet sealed a large number of peace and truce treaties with various 
tribes and clans. Prominent among these is the Ḥudaybīyyah Peace Treaty that was concluded in 628 C.E. 
between the Prophet and the Meccan disbelievers. The Prophetic tradition of peace treaties has functioned 
as a sort of counter-balance to his wars. This “counter-tradition” has been used by those Muslim jurists who 
have argued for the centrality of peace in Islam. For more information on the Prophet’s wars and peace 
treaties, see Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, Vol. 2, pp. 131-385.   
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The logic behind these battles, it is often argued, was to spread Islam or to secure the 
interests and the survival of the emerging and vulnerable Muslim community.347  On the 
whole, one essential feature of these wars was that they were fought between believers 
and “infidels.” This continued to be the essential feature of Muslim wars during the time 
of the first three of the “Rightly Guided Caliphs.”348 More or less similar  
 
 
conceptualization of “just wars” against “infidels” survived during the Umayyad, the 
Abbasid and the Ottoman empires.349  
Given the above historical context, the first Muslim civil wars that occurred 
during the caliphate of ‘Alī350 did appear to be great anomalies. As a result, the Sunnī 
sources have often described the period of these civil wars as the time of Fitnah, which 
implies great confusion and perilous disorder. The notion that two Muslim parties had 
engaged in war with each other created quite a number of theological dilemmas. It was 
not clear, according to Sunnī point of view, whether such wars were religiously 
legitimate. Since these civil wars did not lend themselves to the tradition of the Prophet, 
                                                 
347 Montgomery Watt offers some useful scholarship in terms of the historical context of the Prophet’s life 
and his wars. His interpretations and analyses, however, are not always beyond dispute. See Watt, W. 
Montgomery. (1961). Muhammad: Prophet and Statesman. Oxford: Oxford University Press; and Watt, W. 
Montgomery. (1981). Muhammad at Medina. Oxford: Oxford University Press. See also Lings, Martin. 
(2006). Muhammd: His Life Based on the Earliest Sources. London: Inner Tradition.      
348 For mainstream Muslim historiography of the reign of the four “Rightly Guided Caliphs,” see 
Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, Vol. 2, pp. 445-661; Ibid. Vol. 3; and Ibid. Vol. 4, pp. 2-
120. 
349 See Feirahi, Davoud. Tārīkh Taḥawwūl Duwlat dar Islām. pp. 344-6. 
350 These included the Battle of the Jamal (or Camel in 656 C.E.), the Battle of Ṣiffīn (657 C.E.) and the 
Battle of Nahrawān (658 C.E.). For some more discussion, see the following Chapter. 
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it was also not clear whether they could be considered as Jihād. The theological 
predicament becomes yet more disturbing when one considers the parties involved in 
these battles. In the Battle of Jamal, ‘Alī and some prominent disciples of the Prophet 
fought against ‘Āyishah bint Abī Bakr,351 the beloved wife of the Prophet, and two other 
prominent disciples352 of his. Similarly, in the Battle of Ṣiffīn some disciples of the 
Prophet fought against each other.353 In the Battle of Nahrawān, ‘Alī fought against 
Khawārij, an outwardly pious group of Muslims.354 Many Sunnī jurists, therefore, 
refrained from definite judgments regarding these wars. They often lean towards ‘Alī’s 
position for he was, after all, one of the “Rightly Guided Caliphs.” Yet, they usually 
hesitated to go beyond admonishing the opposing parties in these battles for breaking the 
“sacred unity” of the Ummah.355 Since there was no “disbeliever” side in these battles, 
                                                 
351 d. 678 C.E. 
352 These two prominent disciples were Zubayr ibn ‘Awwām (d. 656 C.E.) and Ṭalḥah ibn ‘Ubaydullāh (d. 
656 C.E.). It must be mentioned that as the war was to break out, Zubayr ibn ‘Awwām left the battlefield 
following a reported conversation with his former companion ‘Alī. For more discussion, see the following 
Chapter.    
353 In the Battle of Ṣiffīn, ‘Ammār ibn Yāsir who was one of the foremost disciples of the Prophet was 
killed at the age of ninety one by fellow Muslims in the army of Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān. The killing of 
a highly venerated disciple of the Prophet by a Muslim was such a terrifying development that, reportedly, 
brought the war into a pause momentarily [see Naṣr ibn Muzāḥim al-Minqarī, Waqa‘ah Ṣiffīn, pp. 342-5].   
354 This group, Khawārij, was a literalist Muslim movement. A brief introduction of this group can be found 
in Chapter II. ‘Alī was eventually assassinated by a member of the same group. 
355 See Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, Vol. 3 and Ibid. Vol. 4; as well as Ibn al-Athīr, al-
Kāmil fīl-Tārīkh, Vol. 3. It must be noted that Sunnī scholars who belong to the Shāfi‘ī School of 
jurisprudence have been sometimes less forgiving in their assessment of the opponents of ‘Alī, and 
particularly in regard to Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān. In general, however, Sunnī Muslims respect ‘Alī, 
‘Āyishah bint Abī Bakr, and Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān. It is also worth noting that Ash‘arīs usually 
consider the dead on both sides of these battles to be martyrs while Mu‘tazilīs are in general less clear in 
their judgement [see various discussion of Muslim attitudes towards Aṣḥāb al-Jamal and Aṣḥāb al-Ṣiffīn in 
Abū al-Fatḥ Shahristānī, al-Milal wal-Niḥal, Vol. 1].  
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many Sunnī jurists avoided calling them Jihād, and those killed in these wars martyrs.356 
The theological dilemmas regarding these battles had first emerged, in fact, during 
the military preparations for them. Both ‘Alī and his opponents had difficulties 
convincing some of their followers why they should fight with their “Muslim brothers.” 
‘Alī often resorted to his political legitimacy and his “Wilāyah” in his exhortation of his 
doubtful followers. Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān, on the other hand, employed his 
powerful propaganda machine to cast doubt on ‘Alī’s adherence to Islam. In fact, he 
succeeded in convincing many people in his stronghold, al-Shām, to believe that ‘Alī was 
no longer a “true Muslim.” Khawārij also claimed similar charges of Irtidād, or leaving 
the religion, against ‘Alī. Both Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān’s and Khawārij’s solutions  
 
show the difficulty of justifying wars between two groups of Muslims according to Sunnī 
Islam.  
To Shī‘ah Muslims, the situation appeared much more clear. Not only was ‘Alī 
the first Shī‘ah Imām and, according to Shī‘ah beliefs, the most prominent disciple of the 
Prophet, but also he was the “bearer of the sacred Wilāyah and Walāyah.” Any war 
against such a man was by definition illegitimate regardless of who had fought it. As a 
result, Shī‘ah Muslims had no theological hesitation in believing that the battles of ‘Alī 
were true Jihāds. They also praised and venerated those companions of ‘Alī killed in the 
battlefields as martyrs. The above perspective divorced the Shī‘ī understanding of Jihād 
from the mainstream Sunnī perception. For a war to be called Jihād, it was no longer 
                                                 
356 ‘Alī’s wars during his caliphate and their implications for Shī‘ī strategic cultures, especially in terms of 
the Shī‘ī doctrine of Taqīyyah and political prudence, will be discussed in some more detail in the 
following Chapter under the subtitle “Principled Action and Expediency: The Legacy of ‘Alī.” 
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necessary for one side to consist of “infidels.” Two groups of Muslims can indeed engage 
in Jihād, according to Shī‘ah history, and only one side may end up in martyrdom.357 In 
such cases, one group is believed to be the followers of “the Truth,” while the other side 
is believed to be either hypocrite or ignorant. Not surprisingly, the criteria for adherence 
to “the Truth” in the Shī‘ī interpretation have been developed around the notions of 
Wilāyah and Walāyah. In the resulting discourse of Jihād in Shī‘ah Islam, the notion of 
“just war” was tied to the supreme principle of Divine Justice –instead of nominal 
adherence to Islam. Justice, as will be discussed in Chapter V, is at the core of the sacred 
hierarchies of Wilāyah and Walāyah in Shī‘ah Islam.358 According to Shī‘ī discourses, 
any war waged by Muslims in the cause of justice may be deemed a Jihād in the true 
sense of the term regardless of the religious status of the opposing side.359  
The shift in the paradigm of Jihād in Shī‘ah Islam was, in fact, a manifestation of 
a central theological feature of Shī‘ah Islam, namely the doctrinal version of the Divine 
                                                 
357 Note that in Sunnī Islam, the notion of war between two groups of Muslims was developed later on. 
Articulating from a majority position, however, Sunnī jurisdiction discusses the notion of Ahl al-Baghy, i.e. 
rebels, in this regard. The notion refers to a group of Muslims who rise against a legitimate caliph or sultan. 
According to mainstream Sunnī jurisdiction, it is the duty of Muslims to fight against Ahl al-Baghy; 
although the war with them is usually called Qitāl, i.e. war, and not Jihād. Note the contrast between 
minority Shī‘ahs’ point of emphasis on “justice” –and hence the legitimacy of rising against an “unjust 
rule”– on the one hand and the majority Sunnīs’ point of emphasis on legitimate rulers and the prohibition 
of challenging such a rule on the other. See, for instance, Imām al-Shāfi‘ī, Kitāb al-Umm, Vol. 4, pp. 170-
251 –see pp. 226-238 in particular.      
358 One of the important contributions to Shī‘ah Studies in general and the study of justice and spirituality 
in Shī‘ah Islam in particular is Lakhani, M. Ali. (2006). The Sacred Foundations of Justice in Islam: The 
Teachings of ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib. Bloomington: World Wisdom. Reza Shah-Kazemi’s essay on “A Sacred 
Conception of Justice: Imam ‘Ali’s Letter to Malik al-Ashtar” (Ibid. pp. 61-108) is of particular relevance.  
359 Shī‘ī discourses sometimes refer to one of the verses of the Qur’ān regarding Jihād, i.e. verse 2:193, in 
this matter. The verse does not mention “infidels” as the targets of Jihād. Instead, it describes them as al-
Ẓālimīn, i.e. those who commit injustice. The verse is particularly significant for it has been referred to by 
the prominent Sunnī jurist, Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfi‘ī, to justify “offensive Jihād against infidels.” See 
below.  
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Justice. Similar to Sunnī Mu‘tazilīs360, Shī‘ah theologians emphasized the absolute 
justness of God. They viewed the principle of justice as the fundamental moral principle 
from which other moral virtues were derived. The reverence for the principle of justice in 
Shī‘ah theology was accompanied by an acute sensitivity to social justice among the 
Shī‘ah community.361 Shī‘ī scholars developed a keen theoretical bent towards reflecting 
upon justice and injustice. They further established the theological and political emphasis 
on justice by quoting a Ḥadīth by the Prophet according to which “a state may survive 
with infidelity, but [it] would not survive with injustice.”362 Meanwhile, the scrupulous 
character of ‘Alī and his rule as the caliph consolidated the central place of justice in 
Shī‘ah theological edifice. Venerated as the “Imām of Justice,” or Imām al-‘Adl, ‘Alī has 
                                                 
360 Mu‘tazilīs were an early group of Muslim theologians who believed in, inter alia, the power of 
reasoning in interpreting the Qur’ān. They also preached “moral essentialism.” The Mu‘tazilī School was 
the dominant school of theology in the Sunnī world until about the tenth century when the rivaling Ash‘arī 
School marginalized them. The Ash‘arī School advocated a closer adherence to the literal meaning of the 
sacred Text, believed in a more limited role for human reasoning faculty and understood moral rules within 
–and dependent upon– the teachings of religion [see Frank, Richard M. (2006). Early Islamic Theology: 
The Mu‘tazilites and al-Ash‘ari. Texts and Studies on the Development of History of Kalām. Aldershot: 
Ashgate Publications; and Martin, R. C., Woodward, M. R., & Atmaja, D. S. (1997). Defenders of Reason 
in Islam: Mu‘tazilism from Medieval School to Modern Symbol. Oxford: Oneworld Publications. Part I 
provides some useful historical information about Classical Mu‘tazilī. See also Abū al-Fatḥ Shahristānī, al-
Milal wal-Niḥal, Vol. 1, pp. 43-84]. 
361 The Qur’ān and the tradition of the Prophet offered the theological platform for this peculiar attention to 
the notion of social justice. This, of course, does not mean that the questions of social and Divine Justice 
did not appear in Sunnī theology. These questions, however, obtained a prominent role within Shī‘ī Kalām, 
or theology. For an extensive discussion, see Muṭahharī, Murtaḍā, (2009). ‘Adl Ilāhī. Tehran: Ṣadrā 
Publications. 
362 “Al-mulk yabqā ma‘a al-kufr, wa lā yabqā ma‘a al-ẓulm” is the famous Ḥadīth reported in both Shī‘ī and 
Sunnī sources. See, for instance, Shaykh al-Mufīd, Kitāb al-Amāli, p. 310. Given the strong emphasis on 
justice, those Shī‘ī jurists who supported the political legitimacy of the rulers did so by arguing that these 
rulers were “just rulers.” In comparison, some of the Sunnī jurists have argued –in a rather Hobbesian way– 
that the foundation of political legitimacy is in the provision of security and order by state. For an extensive 
discussion of political legitimacy in Islām, see Feirahi, Davoud. (2009). Qudrat, Dānish wa Mashrū‘īyat 
dar Islām. Tehran: Nashr Niy. Note that the issues of Kufr, i.e. disbelief, and Ẓulm, i.e. injustice or tyranny, 
relates to the notions Ḥaqq Allāh, or “duties towards God,” and Ḥaqq al-Nās, or “duties towards fellow 
human beings,” in Shī‘ah theology and Shī‘ah jurisprudence. See Kadivar, Mohesn. (2008). Ḥaqq al-Nās: 
Islām wa Ḥuqūq Bashar. Tehran: Kawīr Publications. 
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become the icon of justice in Shī‘ī discourses.363 His actions have often been considered 
by Shī‘ah Muslims as examples of just deeds, and his wars, of course, as examples of just 
wars.  
The final turn in the Shī‘ī formulation of Jihād took place in Karbalā. The Shī‘ī 
narration of the events emphasizes the “utter injustice” that was inflicted upon the 
“House of the Prophet.” The battle was interpreted, inter alia, as one between the Truth, 
which is associated with Justice in the Qur‘an364, and falsehood. It was a legitimate Jihād 
against persecution and injustices. The event, therefore, sealed the essential character of 
Jihād in Shī‘ah Islam. The Battle of Karbalā in Shī‘ī strategic cultures, it must be noted, 
is considered Jihād par excellence. As such, it weakened the association of Jihād in its 
Shī‘ī formulation with the “spread of Islam.”365 The above approach to Jihād was 
cogently summarized in one of the well-known Shī‘ī traditions. According to this 
tradition, the Prophet has said that “[t]he most commendable of all Jihāds is [preaching] 
the word of justice at the presence of an unjust ruler.”366 In parallel to this turn of 
emphasis to justice, Shī‘ah eschatology emerged around the same notion. The coming of 
Muḥammad al-Mahdī, the Shī‘ah twelfth Imām, is believed to usher in an era of justice in 
the world. The prophesied battles of Muḥammad al-Mahdī have been projected to be 
                                                 
363 See Lakhani, M. Ali. The Sacred Foundations of Justice in Islam. 
364 See the verses 6:115, 16:76, and 31:13 in the Qur’ān. 
365 It is not, therefore, unexpected that Shī‘ah rulers have easily invoked the metaphor of Ḥusayn’s 
martyrdom in their wars with neighboring Muslim countries. In pre-modern era, Shāh Ismā‘īl (d. 1524 
C.E.) of the Safavid dynasty employed the imagery of Karbalā during the Battle of Chāldurān (1514 C.E.) 
against the Ottoman Empire. In modern times, Ayatollah Khomeini used this imagery during the Iran-Iraq 
War (1980-8). In neither case, the Shī‘ah leaders faced major difficulties in calling their wars with fellow 
Muslims Jihād.   
366 See Muḥammad al-Riyshahrī, Mīzān al-Ḥikmah, Vol. 3, pp. 1943-4, Ḥadīth No. 2690; and also 
Ayatollah Muntaẓirī, Dīrāsāt fī Wilāyah al-Faqīh wal-Fiqh al-Dawlah al-Islāmīyyah, Vol. 2, p. 245. 
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about the “spread of justice.”367  
The triangle of Ḥusayn’s martyrdom, Jihād, and justice offered a unique paradigm 
for the Shī‘ah community. In fact, one of the frequently quoted phrases in Shī‘ī popular 
culture declares that “every day is ‘Āshūrā, every land is Karbalā.”368 An underlying 
assumption of this popular phrase was the atemporal and aspatial nature of what 
happened in Karbalā. Ḥusayn’s “fight against injustice”369 was venerated as a sacred ideal 
and a supreme example of man’s inherent desire for justice. As discussed before, the 
veneration of Ḥusayn has not been generally translated into the notion that Shī‘ah 
Muslims should follow the example of their martyred Imām. Yet, combined with Shī‘ah 
eschatology, the events of Karbalā led to the emergence of a Shī‘ī “philosophy of history” 
built around the notion of justice and its eventual triumph. As Shī‘ah Muslims rose to 
power in the Safavid Persia and the minority became the majority, the flavor of this 
metaphor gradually changed. While the pre-Safavid emphasis was on Ḥusayn’s 
victimization, the new discourses became more assertive culminating in modern 
                                                 
367 A brief discussion of Shī‘ah eschatology in relation to Shī‘ī strategic cultures will follow at the end of 
Chapter V.  
368 “Kullu yawmin ‘Āshūrā, kullu arḍin Karbalā.” As mentioned before, however, Shī‘ah Muslims 
generally did not interpret this phrase as a prescription to rebel against unjust rulers whenever the 
opportunity presented itself. The mainstream approach has been more cautious and sensitive to practical 
concerns. Even the Shī‘ah Imāms who followed Ḥusayn generally refrained from radical political actions. 
The above phrase, therefore, was often treated as a description of an enduring social reality, namely that of 
widespread injustice committed against the minority Shī‘ah community. Several Shī‘ī traditions reinforced 
the exceptionality of Ḥusayn’s martyrdom in the battlefield. In addressing a fervent group of Muslims who 
were pressing him to declare Jihād, ‘Alī says “be patient […] and do not move your swords following your 
ego […] for one amongst you who dies in the bed having obtained the true knowledge of God, of his 
Prophet, and of Ahl al-Bayt, has passed away as a martyr” [see ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, Nahj al-Balāghah, 
Sermon 190].      
369 A common epithet of Ḥusayn among Shī‘ah Muslims is al-Maẓlūm, which means the “victim of 
injustice.” For an interesting discussion of this word and its connotations, see Enayat, Hamid. Modern 
Islamic Political Thought. p. 183.    
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“revisionist” narrations. In these modern narrations, Ḥusayn emerged as one who had 
fought for justice and later on, during the Islamic Revolution of 1979, for freedom.370 As 
a result, the story of Ḥusayn’s martyrdom has turned into a powerful mixture of myth and 
epic in Shī‘ah collective consciousness.       
While Shī‘ī discourses of Jihād with their emphasis on justice are markedly 
different from Sunnī understandings, there are more similarities between Shī‘ah and 
Sunnī in terms of the legal aspects of Jihād. In fact, in several areas of jurisdiction, Shī‘ah 
jurists seem to have generally followed their Sunnī counterparts in their legal rulings. In 
terms of Shī‘ī fatwās related to Jihād, this situation has caused some inconsequential 
rulings. Most of the Sunnī rulings on Jihād concern wars between Muslims on the one 
                                                 
370 ‘Alī Sharī‘tī (d. 1975), a gifted preacher, was particularly influential in formulating Ḥusayn’s martyrdom 
in more “activist” and “volunteerist” terms prior to the Revolution. In fact, Sharī‘tī may be considered as a 
prime example of a group of Muslim “activists” without any formal and traditional education in Shī‘ah 
Islam who, through self-education, began to re-interpret Shī‘ah theology and Shī‘ah history. Sharī‘tī 
believed that Ḥusayn’s decision to go to Kūfah was a conscious decision rooted in a deep sense of social 
responsibility [see Sharī‘tī, ‘Alī. (2011). Ḥusayn Wārith Ādam. Tehran: Qalam]. His formulation of 
Shahādah was also imbued with mystical notion of Divine unification through the act of martyrdom, for 
which Ḥusayn was the “supreme role model.” Sharī‘tī argued that Ḥusayn’s martyrdom was not about 
winning a battle. Instead, Ḥusayn succeeded by “sending a message through his martyrdom” to the next 
generations [Ibid.]. He also emphasized the role of Ḥusayn’s surviving sister, Zaynab bint ‘Alī, in 
“propagating the message of Karbalā.” In addition, Sharī‘tī dismissed the traditional Shī‘ī understanding of 
Taqīyyah as strategies of expediency. He reinterpreted Taqīyyah as either “Taqīyyah Waḥdat,” i.e. Taqīyyah 
aimed at strengthening unity among Muslims, or “Taqīyyah Mubārizih,” i.e. tactics of concealment for 
those who struggle against injustice. He claimed that Taqīyyah Mubārizih is not about protection of 
individual believers, but about protection of the Shī‘ī “belief system” itself [see Sharī‘tī, ‘Alī. (2011). 
Tashayyu‘ ‘Alawī, Tashayyu‘ Ṣafawī. Tehran: Sipīdih Bāwarān]. As such, Sharī‘tī saw Taqīyyah as a 
practical tactic for “activists” in their “never-ending struggle against unjust rulers.” To Sharī‘tī, history of 
mankind was the continuation of the archetypical rivalry between Abel and Cain, or the forces of good and 
evil. The evil was also associated with socioeconomic injustice, discriminations, and property ownership in 
Sharī‘tī’s discourse [see Sharī‘tī, ‘Alī. (2008). Islām Shināsī. Tehran: Ilhām]. It was within such a black-
and-white philosophy of history that Sharī‘tī re-conceptualized quite a number of Shī‘ī notions such as 
Shahādah and Taqīyyah. These reinterpretations often diverged from the traditional Shī‘ī theological 
discourses, especially on Taqīyyah [see the following Chapter]. Nevertheless, his formulations of Shahādah 
and Taqīyyah became influential during the Revolution and even informed the discourses of some of the 
Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā on the subjects. For more discussion of this “revisionist” understanding of martyrdom see 
Enayat, Hamid. Modern Islamic Political Thought. pp. 190-4. Enayat argues that in this modern discourse, 
martyrdom was transformed from a “passive and harmless” doctrine to a “rhetorical instrument of political 
mobilisation” [Ibid. p. 184].   
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hand and non-Muslims on the other. The rulings are not unexpected as the majority of the 
military encounters of Sunnī Muslims were against non-believers along the expanding 
borders of the Muslim world. For the most part of Shī‘ah history, such encounters were 
irrelevant to the Shī‘ah community; for they were a small minority group living among 
Sunnī Muslims and they rarely shared a border with non-Muslims. The Battle of Karbalā, 
in which a small fringe group of Muslims were surrounded by a large Muslim army, is a 
reminder of this fact. Yet, Shī‘ah jurists followed the lead of their Sunnī colleagues in 
writing extensively about “Jihād with infidels.”371 Such encounters with “infidels” did 
occur for Shī‘ah Muslims. But they were far fewer and occurred much later.372 Not 
surprisingly, in these wars with the “infidels,” the general Muslim discourse of Jihād 
proved to be a powerful mobilizing force.373  
As suggested before, however, there is a distinct element in Shī‘ī jurisdiction of 
Jihād compared to the Sunnī discourses. For a war to be considered Jihād, there should be 
                                                 
371 One of the clear examples of this rather Sunnī articulation can be find in the writings of Muḥammad 
Ḥasan al-Najafī (Ṣāḥib al-Jawāhir), the prominent Shī‘ah jurist of the nineteenth century. Arguably 
neglecting the tradition of the Shī‘ah Imāms –‘Alī and Ḥusayn– and their “Jihāds” against “unjust” 
Muslims, he argues that Jihād signifies war against disbelievers with the purpose of spreading Islam [see 
Muḥammad Ḥasan al-Najafī, Jawāhir al-Kalām fī Sharḥ Sharāyi‘al-Islām, Vol. 21, p. 3].  
372 The most notable of these wars were a series of wars between the Shī‘ah Persia under the Qājār dynasty 
and Orthodox Christian Russian Empire. The first Russo-Persian Wars happened between 1804 and 1813 
C.E. and ended with Persia’s defeat and the humiliating Gulistān Peace Treaty of 1813 C.E. The Second 
Russo-Persian Wars took place between 1826 and 1828 C.E. resulting, again, in Persia’s defeat and yet 
more humiliating Turkmanchāy Peace Treaty of 1828 C.E. In addition to the Russo-Persian wars, the other 
significant case of encounter between Shī‘ah Muslims and non-Muslims took place in Iraq in 1920. The 
Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā of Najaf and Karbalā including Ayatollah Muḥammad Taqī Shīrāzī (d. 1920) and Shaykh al-
Sharī‘ah Fatḥallāh Iṣfahānī (d. 1920) declared Jihād against the occupying British forces. The fatwās led to 
a “Shī‘ah revolt” against the British that was soon crushed [see Chapter 4 in Dawisha, Adeed. (2009). Iraq: 
A Political History from Independence to Occupation. Princeton: Princeton University Press].     
373 Prominent Shī‘ah jurists of the time including Shaykh Ja‘far Kāshif al-Ghiṭā’ and Mullā Aḥmad Narāqī 
(d. 1829 C.E.) issued fatwās and declared the coming wars with Russian Empire as –defensive– Jihād. In 
fact, it was due to the insistence and religious exhortation of some of these prominent Shī‘ah jurists that 
Fatḥ ‘Alī Shāh of the Qājār dynasty reluctantly agreed to engage in the second round of wars with the 
Russian Empire in 1826 C.E.   
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a “bearer of Wilāyah” present. Faghfoory discusses the various rulings of Shī‘ah jurists 
when it comes to Jihād.374 According to him, the majority of Shī‘ah jurists believe that 
“offensive Jihād” is only possible when the Prophet or an “infallible” Shī‘ah Imām is 
present.375 As for the “defensive Jihād,” nearly all Shī‘ah jurists allow it with the 
permission of a qualified jurist. In other words, a qualified Shī‘ah jurist may call a 
defensive war Jihād by issuing a fatwā. Secular authorities including the kings could not 
declare their wars as Jihād. Faghfoory also claims that those Shī‘ah jurists who have 
condoned “offensive Jihād”376 were under the influence of their Sunnī counterparts and 
particularly the writings of Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfi‘ī377. Imām al-Shāfi‘ī’s influence 
                                                 
374 See Faghfoory, Mohammad H. Ethic of War and Peace in Shi‘ite Islam.  
375 Faghfoory quotes Murtaḍā Muṭahharī (d. 1979), one of the prominent and influential Shī‘ah scholars of 
the past century, who categorically rejects “offensive wars” as “evil and illegitimate” [see Ibid. and 
Muṭahharī, Murtaḍā, (1998). Jihād. Tehran: Ṣadrā Publications. p. 43]. Muṭahharī also rejects the notion of 
“spreading Islam through Jihād” as self-contradictory.  According to his perspective, there is no such a 
thing as “offensive Jihād” for Jihād is by definition legitimate while “offensive wars” cannot be so. 
376 These include Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, ‘Allāmih Ḥillī, Shahīd al-Thānī, Ṣāḥib al-Jawāhir, and Sayyid al-Khū’ī 
(d. 1992) [see for instance Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, al-Tibyān fī Tafsīr al-Qur‘ān, Vol. 5, p. 202-3; Amīn al-Islām 
Ṭabarsī, Majma‘al-Bayān, Vol. 5, pp. 39-40; and Muḥammad Ḥasan al-Najafī, Jawāhir al-Kalām fī Sharḥ 
Sharāyi‘al-Islām, Vol. 21, p. 4]. It must be mentioned, however, that Ṣāḥib al-Jawāhir’s position regarding 
“offensive Jihād” has not been clearly stated. It seems that he accepts the possibility of challenging the 
Shī‘ī consensus –i.e. the consensus about the impermissibility of “offensive Jihād” in the absence of the 
Imām. He does not, however, further elaborate on this matter. It must be also noted that, despite his above 
position, ‘Allāmih Ḥillī is considered as one of the Shī‘ah jurists who believe in centrality of peace and 
exceptionality of war [see Faghfoory, Mohammad H. Ethic of War and Peace in Shi‘ite Islam]. 
Sunnī jurists who have argued for the possibility of “offensive Jihād” often refer to a controversial Ḥadīth 
attributed to the Prophet. As Faghfoory points out, Shī‘ah jurists have questioned the authenticity of this 
Ḥadīth by doubting the trustworthiness of its chain of transmitters. Instead, the above Shī‘ah jurists use one 
Ḥadīth by Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad, the sixth Shī‘ah Imām, to establish their argument regarding “offensive 
Jihād” [see Ibid.; and al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī, Wasā’il al-Shī‘ah fī Taḥṣīl al-Masā’il al-Sharī‘ah. Vol. 15, pp. 34-
56].  
377 Known as Imām al-Shāfi‘ī (d. 820 C.E.), Muḥammad ibn Idrīs is one of the most prominent Sunnī 
jurists and the founder of the Shāfi‘ī School of jurisprudence, one of the four mainstream Sunnī legal 
Schools. The other three Schools of Fiqh in Sunnī Islam are the Ḥanafī, the Mālikī and the Ḥanbalī 
Schools.  
Ni‘matullāh Ṣāliḥī Najafābādī, a prominent Shī‘ah scholar and theologian, argues in his Jihād dar Islām, or 
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is particularly evident, Faghfoory argues, when it comes to Shaykh al-Ṭūsī’s position on 
Jihād.378 It has been argued that Imām al-Shāfi‘ī’s consequential stance regarding 
“offensive Jihād” was rooted in the sociopolitical context of his time and the need of the 
powerful Abbasid empire to religiously justify its rapid territorial expansion.379 In this era 
of Muslim conquests, few Sunnī jurists questioned the legitimacy of such territorial 
expansions. Those Prophetic traditions380 that might have restricted or slowed down these 
                                                                                                                                                 
“Jihād in Islam,” that most of the Sunnī and Shī‘ah jurists who have accepted the possibility of “offensive 
Jihād” have been under the influence of Imām al-Shāfi‘ī and his rather extreme interpretation of the verse 
2:193 of the Qur’ān in his famous book [see Kitāb al-Umm, Vol. 6, p. 38]. Although several Mālikī and 
Ḥanbalī jurists have accepted Imām al-Shāfi‘ī’s stance regarding Jihād, his interpretation has not remained 
unchallenged. Ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, the prominent Sunnī commentator on the Qur’ān, is among those who 
have rejected Imām al-Shāfi‘ī’s interpretation of the verse 2:193 [see Faghfoory, Mohammad H. Ethic of 
War and Peace in Shi‘ite Islam; and Ṣāliḥī Najafābādī, Ni‘matullāh. (2008). Jihād dar Islām. Tehran: Nashr 
Niy].    
378 See Faghfoory, Mohammad H. Ethic of War and Peace in Shi‘ite Islam; and Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, al-Nihāyah 
fī Mujarrad al-Fiqh wal-Fatwā, pp. 289-93. As noted by Faghfoory, several other early jurists of Ḥillī 
origin followed Shaykh al-Ṭūsī’s position on “offensive Jihād.” These include Aḥmad ibn Idrīs Ḥillī (d. 
1202 C.E.) [see in particular his al-Sarā’ir al-Ḥāwī li-Taḥrīr al-Fatāwī, Vol. 2, pp. 3-19] and ‘Allāmih 
Ḥillī.   
379 See Faghfoory, Mohammad H. Ethic of War and Peace in Shi‘ite Islam; and Ni‘matullāh Ṣāliḥī 
Najafābādī, Jihād dar Islām.  
380 Generally speaking, Muslim jus in bello and jus ad bellum contain some of the generic ethics-of-war 
items such as protection of civilians and the environment as well as the laws of proportionality. There are 
several obligations in regards to declaration of war, sending warnings, and giving ultimatums [see 
Faghfoory, Mohammad H. Ethic of War and Peace in Shi‘ite Islam; and Muḥammad Ḥasan al-Najafī, 
Jawāhir al-Kalām fī Sharḥ Sharāyi‘al-Islām, Vol. 21, pp. 51-4]. There are certain prohibitions against 
cutting trees, destroying farms and villages, killing animals, polluting rivers, cursing the enemy, catapulting 
fireballs, and flooding the enemy as well as strong prohibitions against poisoning enemy’s drinking waters 
[see ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 32, p. 399; Ibid. Vol. 19, p. 179; al-Najafī, Jawāhir al-Kalām fī 
Sharḥ Sharāyi‘al-Islām, Vol. 21, pp. 66-8; Abū al-Majd al-Ḥalabī, Ishārat al-Sabaq, pp. 142-3; ‘Allāmih 
Ḥillī, Tadhkirah al-Fuqahā’, Vol. 1, p. 413 (Maktabah al-Murtaḍawīyyah’s edition); and Quṭb al-Dīn al-
Biyhaqī, Iṣbāḥ al-Shī‘ah bi Miṣbāḥ al-Sharī‘ah, pp. 187-9]. Insulting the enemy’s dead and mutilation are 
forbidden [see Abū Ṣalāḥ al-Ḥalabī, al-Kāfī fīl-Fiqh, pp. 255-7; and al-Najafī, Jawāhir al-Kalām fī Sharḥ 
Sharāyi‘al-Islām, Vol. 21, pp. 77-8]. Fighting is prohibited in sacred places such as the vicinity of Ka‘bah 
as well as during four sacred months of Muslim calendar [see al-Najafī, Jawāhir al-Kalām fī Sharḥ 
Sharāyi‘al-Islām, Vol. 21, pp. 32-4]. Killing of women, children, the elderly, the disabled, and the blind are 
generally prohibited [see al-Najafī, Jawāhir al-Kalām fī Sharḥ Sharāyi‘al-Islām, Vol. 21, p. 68; and Ibid. 
pp. Vol. 21, 73-7]. There are also some strong prohibitions against killing scholars, monks, and residents of 
monasteries and nunneries [see Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, Vol. 2, pp. 131-385; 
‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 21, p. 60; al-Najafī, Jawāhir al-Kalām fī Sharḥ Sharāyi‘al-Islām, 
Vol. 21, p. 76; and ‘Allāmih Ḥillī, Tadhkirah al-Fuqahā’, Vol. 1, p. 412 (Maktabah al-Murtaḍawīyyah’s 
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expansions were also overlooked.   
Unlike Imām al-Shāfi‘ī, however, the Shī‘ah Imāms who lived during the 
Umayyad and Abbasid expansions did not accept the legitimacy of their rule, let alone 
sanctioning their wars as Jihād. Therefore, even the Shī‘ah jurists who have condoned the 
possibility of “offensive Jihād” accept the Shī‘ah consensus. According to this juridical 
consensus, for an “offensive Jihād” to be legitimate, the permission of an “infallible 
Imām” is necessary.381 In Shī‘ah history, however, there exists a precedent that renders 
“offensive Jihād” relatively problematic. According to Shī‘ī historiographies, ‘Alī did not 
allow his army to initiate war.382 It might be due to such precedents that scholars such as 
Murtaḍā Muṭahharī have identified Jihād with “defensive wars.”383  
Finally, it is worth visiting the often-mentioned division between Dār al-Ḥarb, i.e. 
the Abode of War, and Dār al-Islām, i.e. the Abode of Islam, when it comes to studying 
                                                                                                                                                 
edition)] although the legal details on all the above items vary from one jurist to another. 
381 See Muḥaqqiq Ḥillī, Sharāyi‘ al-Islām fī Masā’il al-Ḥalāl wal-Ḥarām, Vol. 1, p. 232; Ibn Idrīs Ḥillī, al-
Sarā’ir al-Ḥāwī li Taḥrīr al-Fatāwī, Vol. 2, p. 25; and Muḥammad Ḥasan al-Najafī, Jawāhir al-Kalām fī 
Sharḥ Sharāyi‘al-Islām, Vol. 21, pp. 11-14. The only exception to this juridical consensus is a number of 
contemporary Shī‘ah jurists. They have argued that not only “offensive Jihād” is possible, but also it could 
be undertaken by the permission of a qualified jurist. The most significant Shī‘ah jurist who has taken this 
position is Ayatollah Sayyid Abū al-Qāsim al-Khū’ī [see al-Mīrzā Jawād al-Tabrīzī, Ṣirāṭ al-Nijāt fī 
Ajwibah al-Istiftā’āt, Vol. 3, p. 359]. Ayatollah Khomeini’s position on this issue seems less clear. In his 
earlier works such as Taḥrīr al-Wasīlah, he argues that “offensive Jihād” lies within the religious authority 
of the “infallible Imāms”; and his emphasis is clearly on defense and resistance. Towards the end of his life 
and in his position as the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic in Iran, however, Ayatollah Khomeini 
seemed to have adopted a position that viewed the authority of a qualified jurist identical to that of the 
“infallible Imāms” [see Ayatollah Khomeini, Ṣaḥīfih Nūr, Vol. 20, p. 451-2. Retrieved from 
www.tebyan.net on January 23, 2012].   
382 See, for instance, Naṣr ibn Muzāḥim al-Minqarī, Waqa‘ah Ṣiffīn, p. 153; and ‘Alī ibn Abī-Ṭālib, Nahj al-
Balāghah, Letter 14 according to which ‘Alī explicitly forbids initiation of war. 
383 See Muṭahharī, Murtaḍā. Jihād. p. 39. In his argument, Muṭahharī specifically refers to the verses 22:39-
40 of the Qur’ān. In addition to Muṭahharī, Faghfoory refers to Ayatollah Ṣāliḥī Najafābādī as well as 
Ayatollah Muḥaqqiq Dāmād as prominent Shī‘ah jurists who categorically reject “offensive Jihād” [see 
Faghfoory, Mohammad H. Ethic of War and Peace in Shi‘ite Islam].   
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Jihād in Islam. The two terms appeared in Sunnī legal discourses due to the expansion of 
–Sunnī– Islam during the Umayyad and Abbasid empires. Some of the Shī‘ah jurists then 
followed their Sunnī predecessors in employing these and several similar terms. Yet, the 
reduction of the complex legal system of Sunnī Muslims –in regards to non-Muslims– to 
Dār al-Ḥarb and Dār al-Islām seems unwarranted. In fact, depending on the political 
conditions of the time, Sunnī jurists devised a spectrum of concepts such as Dār al-
Hudnih, i.e. the Abode of Truce, Dār al-Ṣulḥ, i.e. the Abode of Peace, Dār al-Amn, i.e. 
the Abode of Safety, and Dār al-Da‘wah, i.e. the Abode of Invitation or Calling.384 For 
each of these “Abodes,” they developed various rulings that differed from one jurist to 
another. The diverse legal rulings highlight the complexities inherent in Sunnī and Shī‘ah 
legal systems when it comes to the issues such as war, peace, Jihād as well as the 
treatments of different groups of non-Muslims during and after wars.385 
                                                 
384 Ibid. 
385 Before concluding this Chapter, it is worth briefly reviewing the issue of suicide and surprise attacks. 
Suicide attacks, properly speaking, are a modern phenomenon. These attacks are technically possible only 
because of the modern advancements in explosive technologies. In the pre-modern world, there existed the 
notion of surprise attacks with the attacker risking certain death in the course of the assault. Yet, the 
attacker would not kill himself. For this rather evident technical reason, there is nothing in Shī‘ī theological 
sources that directly engages the issue of suicide attacks and its permissibility. There is, as discussed 
before, the categorical rejection of committing suicide in the Qur’ān [2:195]. There is also the verse 5:32, 
which declares murdering another human being unjustly is as if “one kills the whole of humanity.” Those 
modern jurists who are against committing suicide attacks generally base their arguments upon these two 
verses. They also refer to a variety of traditions attributed to the Prophet and the Shī‘ah Imāms against 
“surprise attacks.” The frequently quoted of these traditions is a Ḥadīth by Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad, the sixth 
Shī‘ah Imām, who reports that the Prophet never conducted “surprise night assaults” against his enemies 
[see Abū Ja‘far Thiqat al-Islām Kuliynī, Uṣūl al-Kāfī, Vol. 5, pp. 27-8; Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, al-Nihāyah fī 
Mujarrad al-Fiqh wal-Fatwā, p. 298; and ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 19, p. 167]. In another 
report attributed to Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad, it is claimed that “Islam rejects Fitk” [see ‘Allāmih Majlisī, 
Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 47, p. 137; Shaykh Hādī al-Najafī, Mūsū‘ah Aḥādīth Ahl al-Bayt, Vol. 2, p. 47; and 
Ibid. Vol. 8, p. 280]. In classical Arabic, Fitk means killing someone off-guard or attacking someone by 
surprise [see Muḥammad ibn Manẓūr, Lisān al-‘Arab]. There is also a general prohibition against “surprise 
attacks” attributed to the Prophet himself [see Muḥammad Ḥasan al-Najafī, Jawāhir al-Kalām fī Sharḥ 
Sharāyi‘al-Islām, Vol. 21, p. 82]. Finally, there is the tradition of ‘Alī in the Battles of Jamal, Ṣiffīn, and 
Nahrawān who rejected surprise night attacks against the enemy [see Naṣr ibn Muzāḥim al-Minqarī, 
Waqa‘ah Ṣiffīn, pp. 193-225]. 
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CHAPTER IV 
TAQĪYYAH: STRATEGIES OF EXPEDIENCY 
Introduction 
The violent events in Karbalā bolstered the place of Shahādah and the metaphor 
of an “ideal death” in Shī‘ah theology. Yet, the implications of the killing of the Prophet’s 
grandson proved to be more complicated. As discussed before, the majority of Shī‘ah 
jurists began to view Ḥusayn’s final decisions and his martyrdom as exceptional;386 and 
so did the majority of the Shī‘ah community. The fact that Ḥusayn’s dramatic fate was 
not paralleled with that of any other Shī‘ah Imām further established the notion that 
Karbalā was an extraordinary page in Shī‘ah history. Ḥusayn’s martyrdom, in other 
words, was believed to be the result of “the gravest of conditions.” At the same time, the 
naked vulnerability of the Shī‘ah community, so radically illustrated in Karbalā, called 
for urgent measures in order to guarantee the survival of the community. The Shī‘ah 
Imāms and, later on, the Shī‘ah jurists understood the implications of Karbalā well. They 
tried, therefore, to strike a balance between the rather “idealistic” messages of the story of 
Ḥusayn on the one hand and the growing, pragmatic, concerns on the other. Following 
                                                                                                                                                 
Based on the above traditions, some Shī‘ah jurists have rejected suicide attacks, for they both entail the 
forbidden act of committing suicide; and there is an element of surprise embedded within them. Arguably 
the most prominent Shī‘ah jurist in our time who has ruled against the practice and, in a number of 
interviews, has called it an “act of terrorism” is Ayatollah Yūsuf Ṣāni‘ī [retrieved from www.saanei.org on 
February 29, 2012]. It must be also noted that traditional Shī‘ah jurists have generally tended to be 
conservative in their social rulings. The roots of this conservativeness have been both theological and 
institutional. In terms of the issue of Qatl, or killing, some of these jurists have been extra cautious. 
Muḥaqqiq al-Ardabīlī (d. 1585 C.E.), for instance, calls Qatl “a grave affair” that demands “the greatest 
caution” [see al-Sayyid al-Khānsārī, Jāmi‘ al-Madārik, Vol. 7, p. 35]. According to Mohsen Kadivar, Abul-
Faḍl Bahā’ al-Dīn Iṣfahānī, also known as Fāḍil Hindī (d. 1725 C.E.), goes as far to argue that legitimate 
killing is only possible with the permission of the “infallible Imām” [see Kadivar, Mohesn. Ḥaqq al-Nās: 
Islām wa Ḥuqūq Bashar. p. 181; and Fāḍil Hindī, Kashf al-Lithām ‘an Qawā‘id al-Aḥkām]. 
386 As discussed in the preceding Chapter, a number of modern Shī‘ah jurists and scholars have disputed 
this mainstream interpretation, with Ayatollah Khomeini being the most influential among them. 
144 
 
the examples of the Shī‘ah Imāms who succeeded Ḥusayn, the early Shī‘ah theologians 
managed to elaborate a complex juridical edifice. Their legal construct was an effort to 
accommodate both their ideals and the severity of the reality. A delicate and at times 
brittle combination of “principled action” and “pragmatism” was the result. The 
combination of these two dynamics was intended to provide Shī‘ah Muslims with an 
aspiring drive to achieve “spiritual ideals” and, at the same time, to socialize them to 
heed constraints and limitations. It imparted, furthermore, a sense of “religious” respect 
for the protection of the Shī‘ah community as well as that of individual Shī‘ah Muslims. 
It must be reminded that this combination was due to the strategic assessment of the early 
Shī‘ah community’s situation by the Shī‘ah Imāms –especially the fourth, the fifth, and 
the sixth Imāms. The result was the sometimes misunderstood Shī‘ī doctrine of 
Taqīyyah387.  
Before examining this doctrine, it must be noted that neither Shahādah nor 
Taqīyyah are central theological notions in Shī‘ah Islam.388 Nevertheless, they appear to 
be the most important strategic notions in Shī‘ah theology. Therefore, they have been 
particularly consequential in shaping Shī‘ī strategic cultures. As will be discussed in the 
following Chapter however, both the doctrine of Shahādah and that of Taqīyyah rest upon 
a central Shī‘ī theological notion, i.e. Wilāyah and Walāyah
                                                 
387 The Arabic word Taqīyyah comes from the Arabic root w-q-y (i.e. قوی). According to Wehr’s Arabic-
English Dictionary, w-q-y means, inter alia, “to guard”; “to preserve”; “to shield”; “to be wary”; “to be on 
one’s guard”; and “to fear.” The term Taqīyyah does not appear in the Qur’ān. However, one of the key 
Qur’ānic terms, “Taqwā,” comes from the same root. Taqwā means piety, virtue, and righteousness and its 
observance is among the major callings that the Qur’ān makes to its readers [see, for instance, 2:197; 5:2; 
7:26; 20:132; 22:37; 48:26; 58:9 and 49:13 –or the “verse of diversity”– in the Qur’ān].   
388 Some of the central theological notions in Shī‘ah Islam are the doctrine of Divine Unity, the principle of 
Prophethood, the principle of Afterlife and the Day of Judgement, the principle of Divine Justice, and the 
ontology of Wilāyah and Walāyah.  
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Unlike Shahādah, the doctrine of Taqīyyah has not been extensively elaborated 
upon in Shī‘ah Islam. Neither has it been visibly manifested in a particular episode in 
Shī‘ah history as did Shahādah in Karbalā. Nevertheless, Taqīyyah has imbued Shī‘ī 
strategic cultures with a keen sense of prudence and expediency. It is not, therefore, 
surprising that among numerous minority groups that emerged throughout the Muslim 
world, Shī‘ah Muslims have proved to be among the most viable and self-sufficient ones.  
The Foundations of Shī‘ī Doctrine of Taqīyyah and Its Implications 
In his Modern Islamic Political Thought, Hamid Enayat has written a few pages 
on the notion of Taqīyyah. His approach is within the theoretical framework of political 
thought studies. However, given the importance and relevance of Enayat’s analysis, it is 
worth beginning with a rather long quotation from his work. After reviewing the 
etymology of the word Taqīyyah, and its Arabic root, Enayat writes    
“[t]here is thus nothing in the term [i.e. Taqīyyah] itself to justify its 
standard translation in English either as dissimulation or (expedient) 
concealment, although both acts may be necessary to guard oneself 
from physical or mental harm on account of holding a particular 
belief opposed to that held by the majority. The Shī‘ī case for the 
necessity of Taqiyyah is based on a commonsense ‘counsel of 
caution’ on the part of a persecuted minority. Since for the greater 
part of their history the Shī‘īs have been a minority amidst the global 
Islamic community and have lived mostly under regimes hostile to 
their creed, the only wise course for them to follow has been to avoid 
exposing themselves to the risk of extinction resulting from an open 
and defiant propagation of their beliefs, although they have not 
shunned their mission, whenever the opportunity has presented itself, 
to give a jolt to the Muslim conscience by revolting against impious 
rulers. This precautionary attitude has not been confined to the Shī‘īs 
alone in Islamic history […]. But the practice has come to be almost 
exclusively associated with Shī‘īsm, partly because of the enduring 
status of the Shī‘īs in history as a minority, or ‘unorthodox’ group, 
and   partly    because   their  opponents   have  found  in  it  valuable 
 ammunition for their propaganda.”  (emphasis in the text)
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Enayat notes the strategic thinking that underlies the doctrine of Taqīyyah as well as the 
element of “common sense” embedded within it. The causal link between the minority 
status of Shī‘ah Muslims and the emergence of this doctrine seems evident.389 Yet, Shī‘ah 
jurists proactively strived to establish the religious foundation of Taqīyyah. The practice, 
these jurists maintained, had Qur’ānic roots. Several verses in the Qur’ān imply the 
permissibility of expediency and, more explicitly, that of prudent concealment. The most 
important among these is the verse 16:106. According to this verse, “[w]hoso disbelieves 
in God, after he has believed –excepting him who has been compelled, and his heart is 
still at rest in his belief– but whosoever’s breast is expanded in unbelief, upon them shall 
rest anger from God, and there awaits them a mighty chastisement.”390 The sixth Shī‘ah 
Imām, Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad, is also reported to have related the famous verse 2:195 to 
the doctrine of Taqīyyah. As discussed before, this is the verse that rejects self-
destruction. Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad has been reported commenting upon the verse by 
arguing that it refers to the practice of Taqīyyah.391     
 
 
                                                 
389 It must be mentioned that the notion of Taqīyyah also exists in Sunnī Islam –albeit with a different 
flavor; for, as Hamid Enayat reminds, there is a “commonsense” element in this notion that renders it 
unavoidable in any comprehensive system of life [see Ibid.]. 
390 This is Arberry’s translation. It has been reported that the verse was revealed during the early years of 
Islam and that it addresses ‘Ammār ibn Yāsir, who was one of the earliest disciples of the Prophet. Under 
tortures at the hand of Meccan idol-worshipers, ‘Ammār ibn Yāsir had rejected Islam by tongue while still 
a believer in heart. The verse is understood as God’s absolving ‘Ammār ibn Yāsir of guilt in doing so. 
Various Shī‘ī and Sunnī commentaries on the Qur’ān have reported this historical context for the verse. 
See, for instance, Shaykh Makārim Shirāzī, Tafsīr Nimūnih; Amīn al-Islām Ṭabarsī, Majma‘ al-Bayān; and 
‘Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Abī Bakr al-Suyūṭī, al-Durr al-Manthūr fīl-Tafsīr bil-Ma’thūr. In several traditions 
reported from the Shī‘ah Imāms, the practice of Taqīyyah is justified by reference to this particular verse. 
See, for instance, al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī, Wasā’il al-Shī‘ah fī Taḥṣīl al-Masā’il al-Sharī‘ah, Vol. 11, pp. 479-80.     
391 See Ibid. Vol. 11, p. 467. 
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In addition to the Qur’ānic verses392, several traditions, or Ḥadīths, attributed to  
the Shī‘ah Imāms further solidified the permissibility of cautionary acts of Taqīyyah. The 
overwhelming majority of these Ḥadīths comes from the sixth Shī‘ah Imām. The large 
number of Ḥadīths by Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad is in part a result of the fact that he was 
exceptionally active in teaching his Shī‘ah followers. In fact, the number of the Ḥadīths 
attributed to Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad is more than that of any other Shī‘ah Imām. Yet, it is 
also reasonable to believe that the building social pressure had had something to do with 
the unusually large number of “Taqīyyah Ḥadīths” by him. During Ja‘far ibn 
Muḥammad’s imamate, high expectations emerged among the Shī‘ah community about 
the necessity of political engagement by their Imām.393 As a result, Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad 
seems to have had to justify his aloof approach in politics; and he did so through a 
number of teachings on Taqīyyah. Later on, these teachings constituted the “Ḥadīth 
Foundation,” or Dalā’il al-Rawā’ī, of the doctrine of Taqīyyah.  
In several Ḥadīths, Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad is reported to have commented upon the 
Qur’ānic verses 28:54 and 41:34 in which “good deeds” and “evil deeds” are compared. 
In his comments, he teaches his followers that “Taqīyyah is [what is referred in these 
verses as] the good deed while divulging [the secrets of the community] is an act of 
evil.”394 He then argues that the “best defense” for Shī‘ah Muslims is to practice 
                                                 
392 Other Qur’ānic verses that refer to the permissibility of expediency in general and that of Taqīyyah in 
particular are 3:28 and 40:28. Note that these Qur’ānic references have generally sparked a similar response 
among both Shī‘ah and Sunnī commentators. The practical relevance of expediency and caution to Shī‘ah 
Muslims, however, created more incentive for Shī‘ah jurists to elaborate upon the doctrine, its implications, 
as well as its limitations.   
393 For a more detailed discussion of the political context of Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad’s imamate, see below.  
394 See Sayyid Ḥasan al-Bujnūrdī, al-Qawā‘id al-Fiqhīyah, Vol. 5, p. 77; Abū Ja‘far Thiqat al-Islām 
Kuliynī, Uṣūl al-Kāfī, Vol. 2, pp. 217-8; and al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī, Wasā’il al-Shī‘ah fī Taḥṣīl al-Masā’il al-
148 
 
Taqīyyah so that “the one whom between you and him is enmity [would turn around] as 
though he has been a devoted friend.”395 In another commentary upon the Qur’ānic 
verses 18:94 and 18:95, Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad likens the practice of Taqīyyah to erecting 
a “strong barrier” between one and one’s enemies.396 In several other traditions, he 
declares Taqīyyah to be the “protective screen,” or Junnah, the “shield,” or Turs, and the 
“sanctuary,” or Ḥirz, for “the believers.”397 He emphasizes that the practice of Taqīyyah is 
the tradition of his fathers, i.e. the previous Shī‘ah Imāms, and that of the prophets.398 In 
parallel to these traditions, a number of Ḥadīths encouraged Shī‘ah Muslims to be 
vigilantly discreet and to practice Kitmān, which implies secrecy, restraint, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Sharī‘ah, Vol. 11, pp. 459-61. Several other Ḥadīths include the Shī‘ah Imāms’ commentaries on verses 
such as  2:83; 3:200; 41:34; 41:35; 49:13; and 103:3; in which Taqīyyah is related to various acts including 
“speaking leniently to [non-Shī‘ah] others,” practicing “endurance,” “winning over one’s enemies,” 
practicing “patience,” observing “piety and righteousness,” and “doing the righteous deeds” all in a spirit of 
expediency and caution [see Ibid. Vol. 11, p. 463; Ibid. Vol. 11, p. 466; Ibid. Vol. 11, p. 473; and ‘Allāmih 
Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 72, p. 401].  
395 See al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī, Wasā’il al-Shī‘ah fī Taḥṣīl al-Masā’il al-Sharī‘ah, Vol. 11, p. 461. The latter part 
of the above Ḥadīth contains a direct quotation from the verse 41:34 of the Qur’ān [consulted with Yūsuf 
‘Alī’s translation]. 
396 Ibid. Vol. 11, p. 467. Note that the socio-historical context of these teachings by Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad 
was the rising tendency within the Shī‘ah community to become politically more assertive. Such course of 
actions would have entailed certain unrestrained public acts against which Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad adamantly 
argued. See Sayyid Ḥasan al-Bujnūrdī, al-Qawā‘id al-Fiqhīyah, Vol. 5, p. 77.   
397 See al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī, Wasā’il al-Shī‘ah fī Taḥṣīl al-Masā’il al-Sharī‘ah, Vol. 11, pp. 460-61. Arguably, 
the most explicit affirmation of Taqīyyah appears in a short Ḥadīth attributed –with slight differences– to 
various Shī‘ah Imāms including Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad. The Ḥadīth declares that lā dīna li man lā taqīyyata 
lahū, which means “one who does not observe Taqīyyah has no religion” [see Ibid. Vol. 11, pp- 465-6; and 
Ibid. Vol. 11, p. 468]. 
398 See Ibid. Vol. 11, p. 460; Ibid. Vol. 11, p. 463; Ibid. Vol. 11, p. 464; and also ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥār al-
Anwār, Vol. 75, p. 347. It is worth noting that, despite the explicit defense of Taqīyyah in these Ḥadīths, 
there is no Shī‘ī tradition from the Imāms clearly and comprehensively defining what constitutes Taqīyyah. 
This might be an indication that, at the time, the Shī‘ah community had a relatively clear, intuitive, 
understanding of what the notion of Taqīyyah implied. The Imāms, therefore, did not feel obliged to 
expound upon the definition of the notion; and they did not go beyond relating Taqīyyah to commonsense 
prudence, dissimulation, and discretion.    
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discretion.399 In one Ḥadīth, the sixth Imām elaborates on the practice of Kitmān by 
encouraging the Shī‘ah community to be “subtle” in their social interactions and to 
observe extreme care in following –and fulfilling– the Imām’s wishes.400 These Ḥadīths 
unequivocally repudiated the act of Idhā‘ah, or divulging the secrets [of the 
community].401 The body of traditions, therefore, related the doctrine of Taqīyyah with 
the notions of Wilāyah and Walāyah, which constituted some of the central “Sacred 
Secrets” of the Shī‘ah community.402 In a Ḥadīth attributed to the eighth Shī‘ah Imām, the 
“secret” that must be protected against Idhā‘ah is stated to be Wilāyah –which had been 
transferred from God to the Prophet and from him to the Shī‘ah Imāms.403         
One can infer from the above Shī‘ī traditions that, from the beginning, the 
doctrine of Taqīyyah has had an esoteric aspect as well. The esoteric dimension went 
                                                 
399 See, for instance, Abū Ja‘far Thiqat al-Islām Kuliynī, Uṣūl al-Kāfī, Vol. 2, pp. 221-5.  
400 See Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 223. The Imām uses the derivatives of the Arabic word Luṭf, which means subtlety 
and delicacy, in reference to the practice of Kitmān. In another Ḥadīth, he relates the practice of Taqīyyah 
to that of Kaẓm al-Ghayẓ, i.e. containing one’s indignation, in front of one’s enemy [see al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī, 
Wasā’il al-Shī‘ah fī Taḥṣīl al-Masā’il al-Sharī‘ah, Vol. 12, pp. 179-80].   
401 See, for instance, Ibid. Vol. 11, pp. 492-6. In the same body of Ḥadīths, the Shī‘ah Imāms also warn their 
followers against divulging the Imāms’ Amr. Here, Amr, which can loosely be translated into “affairs,” 
might also refer to the extensive yet underground Shī‘ah network that had emerged around the offices of the 
Imāms.        
402 During the imamate of the last eight Imāms, it seems that the protection of the Shī‘ah “secrets,” or al-
Asrār, had become a major issue in the community. Ja‘afar ibn Muḥammad, for instance, declares that 
protection of the Imām’s Sirr, or secret, is the “Jihād of Shī‘ah Muslims,” and that divulging such a Sirr is 
nothing short of “intentionally killing” the Imām [see Ibid. Vol. 11, pp. 494-5]. 
The relation between Taqīyyah and Jihād is further elaborated upon in another Ḥadīth by the sixth Imām. In 
this Ḥadīth, Ja‘afar ibn Muḥammad says that the Jihād of Shī‘ah Muslims against “God’s enemies” is with 
“sword” under the auspices of a just ruler and with “Taqīyyah” under the reign of an unjust one [See Ibid.  
Vol. 11, p. 464].  
403 For this Ḥadīth, see Ibid. Vol. 11, p. 492. The sixth Shī‘ah Imām also confirms that “bearing,” i.e. 
Iḥtimāl, of the “heavy doctrine” of Wilāyah and Walāyah entails not only accepting its truth, but also 
protecting it from disclosure to any “unsuited audience” [see Ibid. Vol. 11, p. 484; and Abū Ja‘far Thiqat al-
Islām Kuliynī, Uṣūl al-Kāfī, Vol. 2, pp. 222-3].  
150 
 
beyond the exoteric implications of the doctrine for the survival of the Shī‘ah community. 
“Esotericism” of Taqīyyah may be approached in two different ways. First is related to 
the “esoteric teachings” of the Shī‘ah Imāms and what such teachings entailed. Hamid 
Enayat elaborates upon this aspect elegantly. He writes  
“[t]here is another argument in defence of taqiyyah which is mystic-
philosophical, and is predicated on the esoteric character of Shī‘īs 
[…]. If the raison d’être and the essential function of the Imāms 
should be sought in their status as the repository of the truth of the 
religion, or the ‘sacred trust’[404] placed exclusively at their disposal, 
then their knowledge of that truth cannot be communicable through 
propagation (idhā‘ah), otherwise […] the knowledge itself will be in 
danger of being misrepresented and vulgarised.”405 (emphases in the 
text)   
 
According to Enayat, the concern for the protection of the Bāṭinī, or inward, teachings of 
the Imāms was one of the reasons that led the Shī‘ah community to be cautious and to 
practice Taqīyyah. Accompanying this outlook was the belief that Shī‘ah Muslims would 
always be a minority in the Muslim world; for the “heavy burden of the Sacred Truth”406 
would render it “unbearable” for the majority of mankind. The emergence of this belief 
was due to the esoteric nature of parts of the teachings of the Shī‘ah Imāms. These 
teachings, early Shī‘ah Muslims believed, were not meant to be disseminated to the larger 
                                                 
404 This “sacred trust” refers, inter alia, to the notion of “Divine Trust” as articulated in the Qur’ān, 7:172. 
See the preceding Chapter for some more discussion. 
405 Enayat, Hamid. Modern Islamic Political Thought. p. 176. 
406 The notion of the “heavy burden of the Truth” is elaborated upon in some of the Ḥadīths attributed to the 
first Shī‘ah Imām, ‘Alī. See, for instance ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, Nahj al-Balāghah, Letter 53; and Ibid. Ḥikmah 
376. To further establish their assertion that there exists a correlation between Shī‘ahs’ minority status and 
the truth of their beliefs, Shī‘ah authors have referred to several verses of the Qur’ān including 2:249; 4:66; 
6:119; 7:17; 8:34; 11:40; 12:106; 23:70; and 34:13. Needless to say, these Qur’anic references provided 
early Shī‘ah communities with the much-needed theological and spiritual comfort in coming in terms with 
their inferior social status.    
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public. As a result, during the life of the eight Shī‘ah Imāms who succeeded Ḥusayn, a 
far-reaching, yet secret, network of Shī‘ah Muslims emerged. The network effectively 
connected Shī‘ah Muslims throughout the large and expanding Muslim territory to their 
Imāms in Medina, Baghdad, Khurāsān, or Sāmarrā. The teachings and instructions of the 
Imāms were disseminated through this network while it also made extensive financial 
transactions among Shī‘ah Muslims possible.407     
There is, however, another esoteric dimension of Taqīyyah that Enayat does not 
address in his book. This relates to the self-perception of the Shī‘ah community as the 
“bearers and protectors” of Wilāyah and Walāyah, which they viewed as the core 
teachings of Islam. Belief in such a unique position demanded Shī‘ah Muslims to 
consider their very existence as a sacred object. Shī‘ah self-perception also meant that 
their collective survival was of utmost –spiritual– importance for it was necessary for the 
protection of the “Divine Secrets.” The doctrine of Taqīyyah, therefore, was not merely to 
protect secret teachings. It also meant to protect a “chosen community.”408 Several 
Ḥadīths reinforced this communal aspect of Taqīyyah. These Ḥadīths often ties the 
                                                 
407 For more information on this extensive Shī‘ī network, its sophisticated division of labors, and its many 
layers –such as Nuqabā, Nuẓarā, Du‘āt, and Du‘āt al-Du‘āt– see Feirahi, Davoud. Tārīkh Taḥawwūl Duwlat 
dar Islām. pp. 241-3. Tha‘ālibī argues that the clan of Banī ‘Abbās successfully used parts of this extensive 
Shī‘ī network in their struggle against the Umayyad dynasty, which eventually led to the establishment of 
the Abbasid dynasty in 750 C.E. [see below for more discussion and also Tha‘ālibī, ‘Abd al-‘Azīz. (1995). 
Suqūṭ al-Dawlah al-Umawīyah wa Qīyām al-Dawlah al-‘Abbāsīyah. Beirut: Dār al-Maghrib al-Islāmī].    
408 The notion of Shī‘ah community as a “chosen community” has one of its roots in Shī‘ah Ḥadīths. In one 
reported tradition, the sixth Shī‘ah Imām instructs one of his disciples, Ibn Abī Ya‘fūr, to protect his beliefs 
by practicing Taqīyyah. In justifying his instruction, the Imām argues that “you [i.e. the Shī‘ahs] among the 
people are like honeybees among the birds. Had the birds known what [precious secrets] honeybees carry 
within, they would have destroyed the bees altogether and at once” [see Muḥammad al-Riyshahrī, Mīzān 
al-Ḥikmah, Vol. 4, p. 3652, Ḥadīth no. 4178]. See the following Chapter for more discussion. 
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necessity of Taqīyyah with the “rights of the Shī‘ah community.”409 The fifth Imām, for 
instance, relates the practice of Taqīyyah to the protection of the Shī‘ah “brethren.”410 
Some of the most legally binding descriptions of Taqīyyah may be found in this body of 
Shī‘ī traditions. In these Ḥadīths, Shī‘ah Muslims are encouraged to “know what 
Taqīyyah entails” in any given circumstances.411 The under-defining character of these 
Ḥadīths is yet another indication of the fluidity of the doctrine of Taqīyyah and its 
circumstantial and contingent nature.    
The above Qur’ānic and Ḥadīth foundations are the reason behind many 
prominent Shī‘ah jurists’ unequivocal emphasis on the necessity of Taqīyyah. The 
writings of these jurists on the subject show the existence of a general consensus about 
the meaning of the term Taqīyyah. In Shī‘ī legal texts, Taqīyyah often refers to acts of 
prudence and discretion in dealing with one’s potential enemy in order to protect one’s 
life and/or belongings or to protect one’s community. Furthermore, the “enemy” is often 
understood as someone with a different religious belief system. In dealing with such an 
enemy, Taqīyyah is a legal permission to practice expediency including, but not limited 
to, concealing one’s true beliefs.412  
                                                 
409 In a Ḥadīth by the fourth Imām, for instance, “abolishing Taqīyyah” is mentioned along with “violating 
the rights of the brethren” as “unforgivable sins” in the eyes of God [see al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī, Wasā’il al-
Shī‘ah fī Taḥṣīl al-Masā’il al-Sharī‘ah, Vol. 11, p. 474].  
410 For this and quite a number of other similar Ḥadīths, see Ibid. Vol. 11, pp. 472-5.  
411 See, for instance, the Ḥadīth by the tenth Imām in Ibid. Vol. 11, p. 475. 
412 As mentioned before, the notion of Taqīyyah –especially for the purpose of protecting one’s life against 
non-Muslims– exists in both Shī‘ī and Sunnī legal discourses. See, for instance, Shaykh al-Mufīd, Taṣḥīḥ 
al-I‘tiqādāt al-Imāmīyah; Amīn al-Islām Ṭabarsī, Majma‘al-Bayān; Shaykh al-Anṣārī, Kitāb al-Makāsib; 
Sayyid Ḥasan al-Bujnūrdī, al-Qawā‘id al-Fiqhīyah; Maḥmūd al-Ālūsī, Rūḥ al-Ma‘ānī fi Tafsīr al-Qur’ān 
al-‘Aẓīm wal-Sab‘ al-Mathānī; Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, Tafsīr al-Minār; Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī, Tafsīr al-
Kabīr; Ibn Kathīr, Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-‘Aẓīm; and Abū al-Qāsim Zamakhsharī, al-Kashshāf ‘an Ḥaqā’iq al-
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One of the earliest Shī‘ah theologians, Muḥammad ibn Bābawayh al-Qumī,413 
equates the religious necessity of observing Taqīyyah with that of Muslim daily 
prayers.414 In fact, he goes even further to argue that “Taqīyyah is religiously obligatory 
and its abolishment is not allowed until the appearance of the Imām al-Qā’im[415 at the 
end of the time].”416 Later Shī‘ah theologians and jurists continued to write about the 
necessity of practicing Taqīyyah –especially for those living under unjust rulers– in order 
to protect one’s survival as well as that of the community. Mūḥammad ibn Makkī417, 
Shaykh al-Mufīd418, Shaykh al-Ṭūsī419, Amīn al-Islām Ṭabarsī420; Muḥaqqiq al-Karakī421, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Tanzīl wa ‘Uyūn al-Aqāwīl fi Wujūh al-Ta’wīl. It seems that the Sunnī legal discourse often considers 
Taqīyyah as a “permissible,” or Mubāḥ, act in “extreme conditions” while Shī‘ī discourse differentiates 
among “obligatory,” “permissible,” and “forbidden” cases of Taqīyyah. See below for further discussion.   
413 He is also known as Shaykh al-Ṣadūq (d. 991 C.E.). 
414 See Shaykh al-Ṣadūq, al-I‘tiqādāt fī Dīn al-Imāmīyah. p. 107. 
415 Al-Qā’im is one of the epithets for the twelfth Shī‘ah Imām, Muḥammad al-Mahdī, who is believed to 
be hidden and is believed to reappear at the end of the time. See the following Chapter for some more 
discussion of Shī‘ah eschatology.  
416 See Ibid. p. 108. This argument is based on a Ḥadīth reported from the eighth Shī‘ah Imām in which 
Taqīyyah is declared obligatory till the return of the “hidden Imām,” i.e. the end of the time. In the same 
Ḥadīth, the Imām declares that “whoever abolishes the practice of Taqīyyah prior to that time [i.e. the 
coming back of the “hidden Imām”] is not of us” [see al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī, Wasā’il al-Shī‘ah fī Taḥṣīl al-
Masā’il al-Sharī‘ah, Vol. 11, p. 466]. According to ‘Allāmih Majlisī, in another Ḥadīth, Ja‘far ibn 
Muḥammad states that as the time of the return of the “hidden Imām” approaches, the practice of Taqīyyah 
becomes more prevalent –or necessary [see ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 72, p. 434; and also in 
al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī, Wasā’il al-Shī‘ah fī Taḥṣīl al-Masā’il al-Sharī‘ah, Vol. 11, p. 462].  
417 d. 1384 C.E. He is also known as Shahīd al-Awwal, or the First Martyr. See Shahīd al-Awwal, al-
Qawā’id wal-Fawā’id fīl-Fiqh wal-Uṣūl wal-‘Arabīyah, Vol. 2, p. 155. Shahīd al-Awwal relates Taqīyyah 
to the practice of Mujāmilah, which means amiability and agreeableness. As will be discussed, Taqīyyah 
has also been associated with Mudārāt, which implies amicable coexistence [see Enayat, Hamid. Modern 
Islamic Political Thought. p. 177; and ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 72, p. 401]. The Mudārātī 
Taqīyyah is sometimes called Taḥbībī, which implies “displaying affection.”  
418 See Shaykh al-Mufīd, Taṣḥīḥ al-I‘tiqādāt al-Imāmīyah, p. 137. Shaykh al-Mufīd notices that the Shī‘ah 
Imāms ordered some of their followers to practice Taqīyyah while asked others to reveal their beliefs in 
order to invite people “to the Truth.” In the latter case, however, there was no fear of being harmed due to 
abandoning Taqīyyah. Based on this observation, Shaykh al-Mufīd concludes that practicing Taqīyyah is 
sometimes obligatory while in other situations it might not be allowed [see Ibid.].   
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and Shaykh al-Anṣārī422, among others, have written about the legal aspects of the 
doctrine of Taqīyyah, its conditions, and its limits.423 Jurists such as Shaykh al-Ṭūsī and 
Aḥmad ibn Idrīs Ḥillī424, in particular, categorically reject Taqīyyah when the issue of 
Dimā’, or spilling of blood, might be an outcome. This legal qualification on the practice 
of Taqīyyah is based on a Ḥadīth reported from the fifth Shī‘ah Imām. According to the 
Ḥadīth, “Taqīyyah has been allowed for the purpose of protecting bloods [from being 
spilled]; once [the practice of Taqīyyah] leads to the [spilling of] blood, Taqīyyah no 
                                                                                                                                                 
419 See Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, al-Tibyān fī Tafsīr al-Qur‘ān, Vol. 2, p. 435. Shaykh al-Ṭūsī reports a tradition from 
the Prophet regarding Taqīyyah, which Sunnī jurists, according to him, have “misinterpreted.” Sunnī jurists 
have understood this particular tradition as an indication that Taqīyyah is allowed; yet revealing one’s true 
belief even when one might die for doing so is preferable. Shaykh al-Ṭūsī then rejects this interpretation 
and asserts that observing Taqīyyah in such conditions is “obligatory,” or al-Wājib.    
420 See Amīn al-Islām Ṭabarsī, Majma‘al-Bayān, Vol. 2, p. 272. This is Amīn al-Islām Ṭabarsī’s 
commentary on the verse 40:28 of the Qur’ān that, as mentioned before, is one of the three Qur’ānic verses 
used to justify Taqīyyah.  
421 See Muḥaqqiq al-Karakī, Rasā’il al-Karakī, Vol. 2, pp. 49-54. Muḥaqqiq al-Karakī argues that 
justification of Taqīyyah comes from not only the consensus of Shī‘ah jurists but also “the deeds and the 
sayings” of the Shī‘ah Imāms [see Ibid. p. 51]. For more discussion of the “deeds” of the Shī‘ah Imāms 
regarding Taqīyyah, see below. 
422 See Shaykh al-Anṣārī, al-Taqīyyah. This short treatise belongs to a genre of writings by various Shī‘ah 
scholars including, for instance, Muḥaqqiq al-Karakī on the notion of Taqīyyah. These short treatise were in 
part an effort to respond to some of the accusations raised against Shī‘ah Muslims for their practice of 
Taqīyyah. The opponents of Taqīyyah maintained that by observing Taqīyyah, Shī‘ah Muslims were in fact 
being hypocrite. In his essentially Realist argument, Shaykh al-Anṣārī tries to sketch the legal boundaries of 
Taqīyyah and the type of “dire conditions,” or Aḥwāl al-Iḍṭirār, that would render practicing Taqīyyah 
permissible, preferable, or even obligatory. He also reviews the conditions in which practicing Taqīyyah is 
not preferable, such as pretending to be a disbeliever, as well as conditions in which practicing Taqīyyah is 
forbidden, such as drinking alcoholic beverages or an act of Taqīyyah that could lead to the death of 
another Muslim [see Ibid. pp. 39-40 and Ibid. p. 57]. Shaykh al-Anṣārī clearly expands the notion of 
Taqīyyah from its usual connotation to its essence of observing prudence [see Ibid. pp. 53-5]. See below for 
further discussion of the broader implications of the doctrine of Taqīyyah and its consequences for Shī‘ī 
strategic cultures.       
423 Another useful juridical discussion of Taqīyyah can be found in the work of one of the prominent Shī‘ah 
jurists of the past century, Sayyid al-Bujnūrdī (d. 1975). See Sayyid Ḥasan al-Bujnūrdī, al-Qawā‘id al-
Fiqhīyah, Vol. 5, pp. 47-81. 
424 See Enayat, Hamid. Modern Islamic Political Thought. p. 179; Shaykh al-Anṣārī, al-Taqīyyah, p. 57; 
and also Aḥmad ibn Idrīs al-Ḥillī, al-Sarā’ir al-Ḥāwī li Taḥrīr al-Fatāwī, Vol. 2, p. 26.  
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longer applies.”425 In another Ḥadīth by the sixth Imām, Taqīyyah is said to be 
impermissible if it leads to “the corruption of the religion.”426 Amīn al-Islām Ṭabarsī, on 
the other hand, reports a tradition from the first Shī‘ah Imām, ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, in which 
Taqīyyah is related to Wilāyah and Walāyah. In this Ḥadīth, protection of one’s self is 
legally permitted as long as one continues to be a Mawāl, or a follower of the [Imām’s] 
Walāyah, in one’s heart.427 As Enayat writes, however, a common theme in nearly all of 
these legal writings is that Taqīyyah is “an exceptional dispensation granted only in cases 
of emergency and compulsion (iḍṭirār).”428 At the same time, the legal discussion of the 
subject has created a small yet complicated body of juridical arguments with various 
categorizations of obligatory429, preferable430, permissible431, non-preferable432, and 
                                                 
425 See al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī, Wasā’il al-Shī‘ah fī Taḥṣīl al-Masā’il al-Sharī‘ah, Vol. 11, p. 483. 
426 See Shaykh al-Anṣārī, Kitāb al-Ṭahārah, Vol. 2, p. 400; and Abū al-Qāsim al-Khū’ī, Kitāb al-Ṭahārah, 
Vol. 4, pp. 253-68. 
427 See Amīn al-Islām Ṭabarsī, Kitāb al-Iḥtijāj, Vol. 1, pp. 354-5; and al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī, Wasā’il al-Shī‘ah fī 
Taḥṣīl al-Masā’il al-Sharī‘ah, Vol. 11, pp. 478-9. 
428 Enayat, Hamid. Modern Islamic Political Thought. p. 177 (emphasis in the text). The notion of Dār al-
Taqīyyah, or the Abode of Taqīyyah, has been used in Shī‘ah Ḥadīths in reference to this situation of Iḍṭirār, 
which leads to the obligation to observe Taqīyyah [see al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī, Wasā’il al-Shī‘ah fī Taḥṣīl al-
Masā’il al-Sharī‘ah, Vol. 11, p. 466]. See also Ibid. Vol. 11, p. 468, Ḥadīths no. 1 and 2; as well as Ibid. 
Vol. 11, p. 469, Ḥadīth no. 8. According to Shī‘ah Fiqh, Taqīyyah is not allowed in the absence of Iḍṭirār 
[see Shaykh al-Anṣārī, al-Taqīyyah]. As for the notion of Dār al-Taqīyyah itself, some Shī‘ī sources go as 
far to label the age of Occultation of the twelfth Imām as an example of Dār al-Taqīyyah. One of the Ḥadīth 
foundations of this argument is a discourse attributed to the eighth Shī‘ah Imām in which he qualifies the 
permissibility of Jihād with “infidels” in the absence of the “just Imām.” Such an absence is then identified 
as a characteristic of Dār al-Taqīyyah [see Muḥammad Ḥasan al-Najafī, Jawāhir al-Kalām fī Sharḥ 
Sharāyi‘al-Islām, Vol. 21, pp. 12-3].   
429 As mentioned before, a key condition for the obligation of Taqīyyah is Iḍṭirār.  
430 For instance, when the practice of Taqīyyah might lead to winning over one’s enemies or helps 
strengthening the unity among Shī‘ah and Sunnī Muslims. See below. 
431 For instance, when avoiding Taqīyyah might lead to one’s “martyrdom” without endangering others in 
the community [see al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī, Wasā’il al-Shī‘ah fī Taḥṣīl al-Masā’il al-Sharī‘ah, Vol. 11, pp. 476-
7]. In such cases, both practicing and abandoning Taqīyyah may be legally permitted.  
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forbidden433 acts of Taqīyyah.434 Enayat writes    
“[f]our categories are particularly mentioned: (1) the enforced 
(ikrāhiyyah), (2) precautionary or apprehensive (khawfiyyah), (3) 
arcane (kitmāniyyah), and (4) symbiotic (mudārātī). The enforced 
taqiyyah consists of acting in accordance with the instructions of an 
oppressor, and under necessity, in order to save one’s life. […] The 
precautionary or apprehensive taqiyyah consists of the performance 
of acts and rituals according to the fatwās (authoritative opinions) of 
the Sunnī religious leaders, and in Sunnī countries. […] The arcane 
taqiyyah is to conceal one’s faith or ideology […] to carry out 
clandestine activity for furthering religious goals. […] Finally, the 
symbiotic type is simply a code of coexistence with the Sunnī 
majority, and of participation in their social and ritual congregations 
for maintaining Islamic unity.”435 (emphases in the text)   
 
Despite these legal categorizations and differentiations of various types of 
Taqīyyah, the essential undertone of the doctrine of Taqīyyah has been one of prudence 
and expediency. Taqīyyah socialized Shī‘ah Muslims to be sensitive to practical concerns 
and to appreciate what one may call “realism.”436 As a result, the early Shī‘ah community 
                                                                                                                                                 
432 For instance, when the stakes are not high –e.g. protection of small properties [see Ibid. Vol. 11, pp. 451-
2], or when an act of Taqīyyah involves “pretending to reject the Shī‘ah Imāms” [see Shahīd al-Awwal, al-
Qawā’id wal-Fawā’id fīl-Fiqh wal-Uṣūl wal-‘Arabīyah, Vol. 2, p. 158].     
433 For instance, when there is no Iḍṭirār, or when Taqīyyah leads to violation of “another person’s rights,” 
or when it might cause “spilling of bloods,” or when it may lead to religious “innovation” –i.e. Bid‘ah [see 
al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī, Wasā’il al-Shī‘ah fī Taḥṣīl al-Masā’il al-Sharī‘ah, Vol. 11, p. 510]. According to the 
mainstream Shī‘ī beliefs, Taqīyyah was forbidden to Ḥusayn in Karbalā for the caliphate of Yazīd ibn 
Mu‘āwīyah was a blatant “corruption of the religion.” For more discussion of Ḥusayn’s martyrdom in 
Karbalā and the alternative Shī‘ī argument, which believes that Ḥusayn could have practiced Taqīyyah, see 
the preceding Chapter.     
434 For a classical example of the legal discussion of these five categories of Taqīyyah, see Shahīd al-
Awwal, al-Qawā’id wal-Fawā’id fīl-Fiqh wal-Uṣūl wal-‘Arabīyah, Vol. 2. 
435 See Enayat, Hamid. Modern Islamic Political Thought. pp. 177-8. For more on these four categories of 
Taqīyyah, see al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī, Wasā’il al-Shī‘ah fī Taḥṣīl al-Masā’il al-Sharī‘ah, Vol. 11.  
436 For an insightful discussion of the forces of “idealism” and “realism” in Shī‘ah political thought, see 
Enayat, Hamid. Modern Islamic Political Thought. pp. 26-8.  
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internalized a sense of religious duty attached to efforts aimed at protecting the 
community, be it concealing their religious adherence or practicing Sunnī rituals.437 The 
implications of the doctrine, however, were far-reaching. In fact, the practice of Taqīyyah 
made it possible for the aforementioned extensive and underground Shī‘ī network to 
emerge. The creation of the network was a notable achievement especially when one 
considers the devastating blow the Shī‘ah community had received in Karbalā. That 
Taqīyyah went beyond simply concealing Shī‘ī belief and that it implied strategies of 
expediency and prudence could be seen in the lives of the Shī‘ah Imāms. In fact, the 
foundation of the doctrine of Taqīyyah may be found more easily in the actions of these 
Imāms, rather than their words. 
The earliest precedence for the doctrine of Taqīyyah is recognizable in the life of 
the Shī‘ah patriarch, ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib. Following the death of the Prophet in 632 C.E., 
‘Alī was marginalized by the powerful sectors within the tribe of Quraysh.438 For the next 
twenty five years, he reluctantly acquiesced to the caliphate of Abū Bakr, ‘Umar ibn al-
Khaṭṭāb, and ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān. During this long period, ‘Alī’s relationship with the 
sitting caliphs was a sophisticated one. On the one hand, ‘Alī was adamant about his right 
to succeed the Prophet.439 On the other hand, however, he offered these caliphs his 
                                                 
437 Using an analogy, the sixth Shī‘ah Imām instructs his followers to internalize Taqīyyah so that it 
becomes their “overgarment and undergarment” at once. In other words, the Imām seems to demand 
expediency to become the second nature of the Shī‘ah community [see al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī, Wasā’il al-Shī‘ah 
fī Taḥṣīl al-Masā’il al-Sharī‘ah, Vol. 11, p. 466].     
438 See Madelung, Wilferd. The Succession to Muhammad. Quraysh was the tribe of the Prophet, and that of 
the first four caliphs. For a discussion of the political context of the selection of the first caliph, Abū Bakr, 
and especially of the tribal politics involved in the process, see Feirahi, Davoud. Tārīkh Taḥawwūl Duwlat 
dar Islām. pp. 158-9.    
439 For his explicit statement regarding the issue of caliphate, see ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, Nahj al-Balāghah, 
Sermon 3 –also known as the “Sermon of Shiqshiqīyyah.” 
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assistance and his advice from time to time.440 ‘Alī justified this complex relationship by 
expressing his concerns for the future of Islam and what harm his protest against the 
caliphs might do to the Muslim community.441 Nevertheless, the “twenty-five year 
silence” served as a “tradition foundation,” or Sunnah, behind the doctrine of Taqīyyah in 
Shī‘ah Islam. Even though ‘Ali’s accommodation of the three caliphs was associated to 
the issue of “future of Islam” instead of the concern for his own survival, it was 
understood as an example of observing Taqīyyah by the Shī‘ah patriarch, hence 
establishing the broader implications of Taqīyyah.  
In regards to the doctrine of Taqīyyah, however, it must be noted that ‘Alī’s 
contribution has been more restrictive than permissive. As will be discussed in the 
following section442, ‘Alī’s political legacy is often associated with his uncompromising 
adherence to his principles during his caliphate. Even during the twenty-five years of 
“political silence” prior to his caliphate, ‘Alī refrained from engagement in the tribal 
balance-of-power politics, further –politically– marginalizing himself.443 The resulting 
paradigm of “principled action” in Shī‘ah Islam later on qualified the doctrine of 
Taqīyyah in noticeable ways.  
The doctrine of Taqīyyah found its next reinforcements in the lives of the second 
and the third Imāms, namely Ḥasan and Ḥusayn. Ḥasan’s peace treaty with Mu‘āwīyah 
                                                 
440 For the examples of the helps the three first caliphs received from ‘Alī see Shaykh al-Mufīd, al-Irshād, 
Vol. 1, pp. 201-212; and also Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, Vol. 3; Ibn al-Athīr, al-
Kāmil fīl-Tārīkh, Vol. 3; and Aḥmad ibn Abī Ya‘qūb, Tārīkh Ya‘qūbī, Vol. 2.   
441 See, for instance, ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, Nahj al-Balāghah, Letter 62. 
442 See the section titled “Principled Action and Expediency: The Legacy of ‘Alī” below.  
443 See Madelung, Wilferd. The Succession to Muhammad.   
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ibn Abī Sufyān signed in 661 C.E.444 has become one of the most debated aspects of 
Shī‘ah history among Shī‘ah commentators. His concession of the caliphate to the 
archenemy of his father has called for complex intellectual and theological arguments by 
the Shī‘ahs to defend the actions of their Imām. The main thrust of these arguments, 
however, has been the pragmatic concerns of Ḥasan regarding the prospect of a war with 
the organized army of Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān.445 As a result, the peace treaty is 
sometimes associated with the practice of Taqīyyah.446 Ḥasan’s brother, Ḥusayn, also 
continued the same expedient approach upon becoming the third Shī‘ah Imām in 670 
C.E. Even though Ḥusayn is generally associated with the more assertive doctrine of 
Shahādah and the events of Karbalā, he did observe Taqīyyah as long as Mu‘āwīyah ibn 
Abī Sufyān was alive.447 This constituted ten years of Ḥusayn’s imamate from 670 C.E. 
to 680 C.E. It was only in the months that followed the death of Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī 
Sufyān when Ḥusayn refused to observe Taqīyyah. The result, as discussed in the 
preceding Chapter, was his death in the same year in Karbalā.          
      
                                                 
444 See Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, Vol. 4, pp. 126-9; and Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil fīl-
Tārīkh, Vol. 3, pp. 404-7. 
445 See Shaykh al-Ṣadūq, ‘Ilal al-Sharāyi‘, Vol. 1, pp. 210-9; ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 44, 
pp.1-33; and Amīn al-Islām Ṭabarsī, Kitāb al-Iḥtijāj, Vol. 2, pp. 8-12.  
446 Ayatollah Kāẓim Sharī‘atmadārī (d. 1986), for instance, favored cautious “quietism” during and after the 
Islamic Revolution in Iran by referring to “Imām Ḥasan’s tradition” and to the Shī‘ī principle of Taqīyyah 
[M. Mesbahi, Interview, February 27, 2012]. Ayatollah Sharī‘atmadārī’s argument was in line with Ḥasan’s 
own justification of the peace treaty with Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān. In a conversation with some of his 
followers who protested against the peace treaty, Ḥasan argues that the treaty was necessary so that “you 
and I may survive among them [i.e. the enemies]” [see Muḥammad al-Riyshahrī, Mīzān al-Ḥikmah, Vol. 2, 
p. 1620].    
447 See, for instance, Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, Vol. 4, p. 126; Amīn al-Islām 
Ṭabarsī, Kitāb al-Iḥtijāj, Vol. 2, pp. 20-1; and Abū Muḥammad ibn Qatibah al-Daynūrī, al-Imāmah wal-
Sīyāsah, Vol. 1, p. 201. 
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It was, however, after the horrifying events of Karbalā that Taqīyyah became the 
essential modus vivendi of the Shī‘ah community and that of the Shī‘ah Imāms. The 
Imāms who succeeded Ḥusayn –with arguably the exception of Mūsā ibn Ja‘far, the 
seventh Imām– are believed to have chosen the “politics of Taqīyyah.”448 The fact that 
these Imāms observed Taqīyyah, however, does not mean that they concealed their Shī‘ī 
beliefs; for these were prominent figures known to be the heads of the Shī‘ah community. 
Instead, their observance of Taqīyyah meant a particularly prudent approach in politics. 
The fourth Shī‘ah Imām, ‘Alī ibn Ḥusayn449, was one of the few male companions of 
Ḥusayn who survived the Battle of Karbalā. Yet, he never sought to avenge his father’s 
death by the Umayyad. Other branches of Banī Hāshim450 did rebel against the Umayyad 
                                                 
448 Feirahi, Davoud. Tārīkh Taḥawwūl Duwlat dar Islām. p. 252. 
449 658 – 712 C.E. He is also known by his epithets al-Sajjād and Zayn al-‘Ābidīn. 
450 Along with Banī Umayyah, i.e. Sons of Umayyah, Banī Hāshim, i.e. Sons of Hāshim, was one of the 
main clans of Quraysh, the tribe of the Prophet. Prior to Islam, Banī Umayyah was the most powerful clan 
of Quraysh. When Muḥammad, who belonged to Banī Hāshim, revealed his prophetic mission, the fiercest 
opposition came from Banī Umayyah. With the success of the Prophet in establishing his authority, 
therefore, Banī Umayyah was temporary marginalized. This relative marginalization continued during the 
reign of Abū Bakr, who was from Banī Tamīm clan of Quraysh, and ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, who was from 
Banī ‘Adī clan of that tribe. With the rise of ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān, who was from Banī Umayyah, to the 
caliphate in 644 C.E., Banī Umayyah began to resume their position of power. Their return was so 
successful that by the time ‘Alī, who was from Banī Hāshim, became the caliph in 656 C.E., it was already 
impossible to reverse Banī Umayyah’s hold on power. ‘Alī’s archenemy, Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān was in 
fact the head of Banī Umayyah at the time and the rise of the Umayyad dynasty had already been in the 
making. After ‘Alī, Banī Hāshim was divided into several sub-clans. The most important among these were 
the ‘Alawīs, i.e. Sons of ‘Alī, and Banī ‘Abbās, i.e. Sons of ‘Abbās, the Prophet’s uncle. The Shī‘ah Imāms 
all belong to the ‘Alawī sub-clan of Banī Hāshim. Banī ‘Abbās were either identified themselves as Shī‘ah 
or were sympathetic to the Shī‘ī cause. This is probably why they were a part of the underground Shī‘ī 
network that emerged after Karbalā. It was partly due to employing this network that Banī ‘Abbās managed 
to advance their fight against the Umayyad dynasty. Later on, however, Banī ‘Abbās and the ‘Alawīs parted 
ways. This divergence culminated in 750 C.E. when the former group rose to power by establishing the 
Abbasid caliphate –under the banner of returning the caliphate to the “family of the Prophet.” The Abbasid 
caliphs persecuted the ‘Alawīs and their Imāms as potential challengers to their claim of political 
legitimacy [see Ibid. pp. 241-51; and Aḥmad ibn Abī Ya‘qūb, Tārīkh Ya‘qūbī, Vol. 2]. The fear of the 
‘Alawīs also caused the Abbasid dynasty to adopt Sunnī jurisdiction and Sunnī theology as the legal and 
religious foundations of the state. Due to this choice, Feirahi argues that after the establishment of the 
Abbasid caliphate, the term Shī‘ah began to be used exclusively in reference to the ‘Alawīs, and no longer 
included Banī ‘Abbās [see Feirahi, Davoud. Tārīkh Taḥawwūl Duwlat dar Islām. p. 265; and Ibid. p. 182. 
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to revenge the martyrdom of Ḥusayn. In fact, one of the most important Shī‘ī uprisings 
against the Umayyad dynasty took place during ‘Alī ibn Ḥusayn’s imamate. The leader of 
the rebellion was Mukhtār al-Thaqafī451 whose avowed mission was to avenge Ḥusayn. 
Yet, he did not claim this revenge on behalf of ‘Alī ibn Ḥusayn. Instead, he fought under 
the banner of Muḥammad ibn Ḥanafīyyah (d. 700/701 C.E.), who was Ḥusayn’s step-
brother. Many Shī‘ahs joined Mukhtār al-Thaqafī in this uprising that seriously 
challenged the hold of Banī Umayyah to power. Yet ‘Alī ibn Ḥusayn refrained from 
public engagement in the affair and, according to the Shī‘ī sources, referred the matter to 
his uncle, Muḥammad ibn Ḥanafīyyah.452 Meanwhile, according to the mainstream 
Shī‘ah historiography, ‘Alī ibn Ḥusayn initiated a quiet “educational movement” aimed at  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Also, Ibid. p. 160-1 offers a useful discussion of the rising political tensions between Banī Hāshim and 
Banī Umayyah following the death of the Prophet]. For a classical account of the tensions between Banī 
Hāshim and Banī Umayyah, see Taqī al-Dīn Abī Muḥammad al-Maqrīzī, al-Nizā‘ wal-Takhāṣum fīmā bayn 
Banī Umayyah wa Banī Hāshim.              
451 Mukhtār al-Thaqafī’s rebellion was eventually crushed by the forces of Umayyad caliph and he was 
killed in 687 C.E. See Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, Vol. 4, pp. 513-76; and Ibn al-
Athīr, al-Kāmil fīl-Tārīkh, Vol. 4, pp. 211-77. 
452 According to Shī‘ah sources, ‘Alī ibn Ḥusayn did give his implicit consent to Mukhtār al-Thaqafī’s 
uprising and Mukhtār al-Thaqafī also respected ‘Alī ibn Ḥusayn’s high stature among the Shī‘ah 
community [see ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 45, p. 339; Ibid. Vol. 45, p. 351; and, particularly 
for ‘Alī ibn Ḥusayn’s implicit support, see Ibid. Vol. 45, p. 365. See also Aḥmad ibn Abī Ya‘qūb, Tārīkh 
Ya‘qūbī, Vol. 2]. Despite this mutually respectful relationship, however, there seems to be a general 
consensus among the historians that Mukhtār al-Thaqafī considered –or at least represented– Muḥammad 
ibn Ḥanafīyyah as the head of the community and maybe even as the “Shī‘ah Imām.” Prominent 
contemporary historian, Sayyid Ja‘far Shahīdī, for instance, believes that ‘Alī ibn Ḥusayn did not respond 
to Mukhtār al-Thaqafī’s initial invitation sent to him; and after the uprising, he only partially approved of 
Mukhtār al-Thaqafī’s acts of revenge [see Shahīdī, Sayyid Ja‘far. (1995). Zindigānī ‘Alī ibn al-Ḥusayn. 
Tehran: Daftar Nashr Farhang Islāmī. p. 92; and also Abū al-Ḥasan Mas‘ūdī, Murawwij al-Dhahab wa 
Ma‘ādin al-Jawhar, Vol. 2]. As a result, later Shī‘ah Imāms, while often speaking highly of Mukhtār al-
Thaqafī, refrained from fully sanctioning his actions [see, for instance, ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, 
Vol. 45, pp. 343-5].   
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spreading Shī‘ī teachings.453 In particular, he laid the foundation for the rise of Shī‘ī Fiqh, 
or jurisprudence, during the imamate of the next two Shī‘ah Imāms.454 
The fifth and the sixth Shī‘ah Imāms, Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī and Ja‘far ibn 
Muḥammad, followed the same “politics of Taqīyyah.” They permitted a selected number 
of their followers to serve in various governmental positions without revealing their Shī‘ī 
beliefs.455 These elite “secret Shī‘ahs” proved to be helpful in protecting the Shī‘ah 
community because of their high positions within the bureaucracy of the caliphate. The 
                                                 
453 One the important yet understudied Shī‘ī classical texts is Ṣaḥīfah al-Sajjādīyah, a book of prayers 
taught by ‘Alī ibn Ḥusayn. Along with the Qur’ān and Nahj al-Balāghah by ‘Alī, Ṣaḥīfah al-Sajjādīyah is 
among the central texts in Shī‘ah Islam. Sometimes dubbed as the “Sister of the Qur’ān,” Ṣaḥīfah al-
Sajjādīyah is more than a book of prayers however; for it lays the general ground of the Shī‘ī worldview 
through these prayers. The fifty four prayers of the mainstream version of the book cover a long list of 
subjects including questions of theology, divinity, prophethood, fate, and Providence; existential issues such 
as pain, suffering, death, sickness, health, desires, sorrow, fear, repentance, supplication, contentment, 
gratefulness, and humility; social issues such as parents, progeny, friends, neighbours, as well as discretion, 
poverty, and benevolence; rituals of Islam such as the “prayer of the night,” pilgrimage, and fasting; the 
central Shī‘ī issues of justice and injustice; and finally a major discourse on ethics and high morals. As the 
diverse subjects of these prayers indicate, Ṣaḥīfah al-Sajjādīyah functioned as a set of reflections for the 
Shī‘ah community following the disaster of Karbalā. This is why many Shī‘ah authors have argued that it 
was ‘Alī ibn Ḥusayn who laid the foundations of what was to become the elaborate legal and theological 
edifice of Shī‘ah Islam. Needless to say, he succeeded in spreading his teachings by resorting to an 
extremely prudent approach in politics justified by the flexible doctrine of Taqīyyah.       
454 ‘Alī ibn Ḥusayn’s complex “politics of Taqīyyah” can also be recognized in the anti-Umayyad rebellion 
of the people of Medina. The revolt, also known as Qīyām al-Ḥurrah, took place about a year after the 
events of Karbalā and ‘Alī ibn Ḥusayn, who was a prominent figure in the city, did not support it. When the 
rebels took the control of the city in their hand, the family of Marwān ibn Ḥakam sought the protection of 
‘Alī ibn Ḥusayn, which they were granted. Protection of Marwān ibn Ḥakam’s family is significant for he 
was an archenemy of the ‘Alawīs and, later on, he went on to become the fourth Umayyad caliph. The 
revolt was eventually crushed by the army of Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwīyah and he ordered that prominent figures 
of Medina to be publicly humiliated. The only exception was ‘Alī ibn Ḥusayn who was treated with respect 
after the fall of the city. The Shī‘ah sources argue that it was the Taqīyyah of the Imām during the revolt 
that spared him the public humiliation [see Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, Vol. 4, pp. 
370-380; Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah wal-Nihāyah, Vol. 6, pp. 261-3; Aḥmad ibn Abī Ya‘qūb, Tārīkh Ya‘qūbī. 
Vol. 2, p. 250; and Shahīdī, Sayyid Ja‘far. Zindigānī ‘Alī ibn al-Ḥusayn]. The other aspect of ‘Alī ibn 
Ḥusayn’s “politics of Taqīyyah” may be found in his adamant opposition to Shī‘ahs’ interactions with those 
associated with the Umayyad court. In a famous letter ‘Alī ibn Ḥusayn strongly censures his former 
student, Muḥammad ibn Muslim al-Zuhrī, for “cozying up to the unjust [Umayyad] rulers” and 
“accompanying the betrayers” [see Ibn Shu‘bah al-Ḥarrānī, Tuḥaf al-‘Uqūl, p. 274-7].       
455 For an example of such permissions, see al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī, Wasā’il al-Shī‘ah fī Taḥṣīl al-Masā’il al-
Sharī‘ah, Vol. 11, p. 460. 
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“educational” consequences of the two Imāms’ Taqīyyah, however, were more significant 
than implantation of their agents in positions of high power. By observing Taqīyyah, they 
managed to solidify the basic tenets of the Shī‘ī School of jurisprudence during an 
extremely turbulent period of Muslim history. These two Imāms spent the majority of 
their lives quietly teaching large crowds of devoted followers. According to Shī‘ī reports, 
these teachings covered a wide spectrum of subjects in theology, exegesis of the Qur’ān, 
logic, ethics, and jurisprudence. Both Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī456 and Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad 
based their “system of education” in the city of Medina, a city that, while religiously and 
symbolically significant to Muslims, had become marginalized by the rise of such 
powerful centers of politics as Baghdad and Damascus. The retreat to Medina gave them 
a leeway to expand their circle of students.457 As the Ummayad dynasty was falling to its 
knees due to the internal conflicts as well as the forceful opposition of Banī ‘Abbās, the 
Shī‘ah Imāms made sure to steer clear of politics. In Shī‘ah historiography, the “quietist” 
attitude of Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī and Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad is often viewed as arguably 
the most significant examples of practicing Taqīyyah. At the same time, the approach 
proved successful as, by the time of Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad’s death in 765 C.E., Shī‘ah 
                                                 
456 Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī was particularly influential in establishing the Shī‘ī methodology of critical 
reasoning in jurisprudence. The method was then employed in practicing Ijtihād, i.e. the “process of 
arriving at judgements on points of religious law using reason and the [science] of principles of 
jurisprudence” [see Subḥānī, Ja‘far. Doctrines of Shi‘i Islam., p. 182]. In regard to his epithet, al-Bāqir, and 
its relation to his method of critical reasoning, see Aḥmad ibn Abī Ya‘qūb, Tārīkh Ya‘qūbī. Vol. 2; and 
Shaykh al-Ṣadūq, ‘Ilal al-Sharāyi‘, Vol. 1, p. 233.   
457 Even in their teachings, Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī and Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad observed a form of Taqīyyah 
that is sometimes called Taqiīyyah fil-Ḥukm, i.e. “Taqīyyah in Opinion.” This Taqīyyah refers to 
concealing one’s jurisprudential opinion in order to protect oneself. Both Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī and Ja‘far 
ibn Muḥammad attracted large number of students among whom existed many non-Shī‘ahs. The occasional 
discrepancies in the jurisprudential opinions of these Imāms are often related to their “Taqīyyah in 
Opinion” in responding to different audiences. See in particular Ṣafarī, Ni‘matullāh. (2003). Naqsh 
Taqīyyah dar Istinbāṭ. Qum: Būstān Kitāb Qum.       
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Islam had already obtained an elaborate and comprehensive theological and juridical 
paradigm.458   
The broad implications of the doctrine of Taqīyyah go beyond the common 
understanding of “expedient concealment.” That becomes more evident when one 
considers the political context of Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad’s life. In 740 C.E., an important 
Shī‘ī uprising broke out under the leadership of Zayd ibn ‘Alī, son of the fourth Shī‘ah 
Imām, ‘Alī ibn Ḥusayn. The revolt was against the crumbling Umayyad dynasty in order 
to reclaim the ‘Alawī’s right to the caliphate.459 Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad, however, did not 
join the revolt. While most of the Shī‘ah community followed Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad’s 
“quietism,” some joined Zayd ibn ‘Alī’s movement and even considered him instead of 
Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad to be the Shī‘ah Imām. Eventually, the revolt was suppressed by 
the Umayyad forces and Zayd ibn ‘Alī was killed in the same year. Yet, the disagreement 
between the two sides of the Shī‘ah community survived. The majority followed what 
was to become the Twelver Shī‘ah Islam while the minority Zaydīyyah branched out.  
 
 
 
                                                 
458 As mentioned before, most of the Shī‘ah Ḥadīths are reported from the sixth Shī‘ah Imām, Ja‘far ibn 
Muḥammad. In fact, given the central role played by Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad in the development of the Shī‘ī 
School of jurisprudence, this School is often called the “Ja‘farī School of Fiqh” [see, for instance, Shaykh 
al-Mufīd, al-Irshād, Vol. 2, pp. 179-214 for a mainstream Shī‘ī account of Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad’s status in 
Shī‘ah jurisprudence]. It must be added that both Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī and Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad are 
among the respected religious and scholarly authorities in Sunnī Islam as well. 
459 See Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, Vol. 5, pp. 481-506; and Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil fīl-
Tārīkh, Vol. 5, pp. 242-7. 
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On the theological level, the alleged disagreement460 between Zayd ibn ‘Alī and 
Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad was the result of their different understandings of the doctrine of 
Shahādah and that of Taqīyyah. Zayd ibn ‘Alī understood his grandfather’s martyrdom in 
Karbalā as setting a universal example to be –literally– followed. He saw the doctrine of 
Shahādah as a universal creed –a creed that only under extremely rare circumstances 
might give way to the doctrine of Taqīyyah.461 As a result, Zayd ibn ‘Alī and his 
followers believed that whenever the opportunity to rise against “injustice” presented 
itself, it would be obligatory to engage in Jihād.462 Because of this interpretation, Zaydī 
Shī‘ahs believed that the Imām must have two characteristics. First, he must be a “pious 
and knowledgeable” descendant of the Prophet through his daughter Fāṭimah bint 
Muḥammad. Second, he must rise against injustice by resorting to Jihād, i.e. Qiyām bil-
                                                 
460 Similar to the case of Mukhtār al-Thaqafī, the fact that the Shī‘ah Imām did not publicly approve of 
Zayd ibn ‘Alī’s revolt did not prevent Shī‘ah theologians to generally revere Zayd ibn ‘Alī as a pious and 
knowledgeable member of Banī Hāshim. According to the mainstream reports, Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad paid 
deference to his uncle Zayd ibn ‘Alī, and so did the following Shī‘ah Imāms [see, for instance, Muḥammad 
‘Alī al-Ardabīlī, Jāmi‘ al-Ruwāt, Vol. 1, p. 343; Shaykh al-Mufīd, al-Irshād, Vol. 2, pp. 172-3; and also 
Shaykh al-Ṣadūq, ‘Uyūn Akhbār al-Ridhā, Vol. 2]. Some of the Shī‘ah theologians, such as Shahīd al-
Awwal, have even argued that Zayd ibn ‘Alī had had the implicit permission of the Imām in his revolt [see 
Shahīd al-Awwal, al-Qawā’id wal-Fawā’id fīl-Fiqh wal-Uṣūl wal-‘Arabīyah, Vol. 2, p. 207]. Note that in 
contemporary –“revisionist”– Shī‘ah historiography, one may find an attempt in softening the difference 
between Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad’s approach and that of Zayd ibn ‘Alī. This “revisionist” historiography 
bourgeoned in particular after the Iranian Revolution of 1979. The “revolutionary Shī‘ah intelligentsia” that 
emerged during the Revolution found it necessary to project the life of the Shī‘ah Imāms as unequivocally 
pro-revolution –and thus sanctioning every revolutionary move. The task proved to be a difficult one given 
the extensive tradition of political “quietism” and the practice of Taqīyyah by the Shī‘ah Imāms. 
Nonetheless, an example of this “revisionist” historiography in regards to Zayd ibn ‘Alī’s movement can be 
found in Razawi Ardekani, Abufazel. (1996). Shakhsīyat wa Qīyām Zayd ibn ‘Alī. Tehran: Daftar Tablīghāt 
Islāmī.       
461 In fact, some have argued that Taqīyyah is forbidden in Zaydī Shī‘ah Islam [see Mullā Ṣāliḥ 
Māzandarānī, Sharḥ Uṣūl al-Kāfī, Vol. 9, pp. 118-136]. Later on, some branches of Zaydīyyah, such as 
Hādawīyyah, accommodated versions of Taqīyyah in part to explain Ḥasan ibn ‘Alī’s peace treaty with 
Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān; for similar to Twelver Shī‘ahs, Zaydī Shī‘ahs consider Ḥasan ibn ‘Alī as one of 
their Imāms.  
462 For a discussion of Shī‘ī understanding of Jihād and its relation to the principle of Justice in Shī‘ah 
Islam, see the preceding Chapter.  
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Sayf, whenever it is possible.463 In contrast, Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad viewed the events of 
Karbalā as an extraordinary episode. He did not believe that Ḥusayn’s martyrdom must 
be universally followed by Shī‘ah Muslims. Instead, he maintained that it was Ḥusayn’s 
“protest against injustice” that was to be followed by Shī‘ah Muslims –via various 
measures including the practice of Taqīyyah. Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad also had a broader 
understanding of the doctrine of Taqīyyah that entailed more caution compared to the 
assertive approach of Zayd ibn ‘Alī. The notion of the universality of the doctrine of 
Shahādah, which is sometimes inaccurately associated with Twelver Shī‘ah Islam, is 
therefore a Zaydī Shī‘ah doctrine. Following this Zaydī doctrine, quite a number of 
“Zaydī Imāms” continued Zayd ibn ‘Alī’s Jihād against the Umayyad and the Abbasid 
caliphs after his death.464  
The split between Twelver Shī‘ahs and Zaydī Shī‘ahs was an example of a 
recurring pattern in the early history of Shī‘ah Islam. After the death of Ḥusayn in 
Karbalā, the sub-clan of the ‘Alawīs of Banī Hāshim divided into three branches. These 
included the Ḥasanīs, i.e. the descendants of Ḥasan, the Ḥusaynīs, i.e. the descendants of 
Ḥusayn, and the Kaysānīyyah, i.e. the descendants of Muḥammad ibn Ḥanafīyyah.465 All 
the Twelver Shī‘ah Imāms who succeeded Ḥusayn came from the Ḥusaynī branch of the 
‘Alawīs. Yet, none of them resorted to Jihād in revenge of their ancestor’s martyrdom or 
                                                 
463 See Shaykh al-Mufīd, Awā’il al-Maqālāt fīl-Madhāhib wal-Mukhtārāt, p. 39; Shaykh al-Mufīd, al-
Muqni‘ah, p. 655; Ḥasan ibn Mūsā Nawbakhtī and Sa‘d ibn ‘Abdullāh al-Qummi, Firaq al-Shī‘ah, pp. 31-
4; and Abū al-Ḥasan Mas‘ūdī, Murawwij al-Dhahab wa Ma‘ādin al-Jawhar. 
464 See Aḥmad ibn A‘tham al-Kūfī, Kitāb al-Futūḥ, Vol. 8; Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-
Ṭabarī, Vol. 5, 6 & 7; and Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil fīl-Tārīkh, Vol. 5 & 6.  
465 See Feirahi, Davoud. Tārīkh Taḥawwūl Duwlat dar Islām. p. 252.  
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to claim their right to the caliphate. Instead, other prominent figures from all the three 
branches466 of the ‘Alawīs revolted against the Umayyad and the Abbasid from time to 
time. The reaction of the Shī‘ah Imāms to most if not all of these recurring rebellions 
were neither open approval nor public condemnation, but almost everything in between. 
It ranged from silent consent to quiet dismissal and to implicit rejection.467 These 
sophisticated and calculated reactions were nothing short of the manifestations of their 
“politics of Taqīyyah.”468 In an unusually direct explanation of his policy of non-
engagement, Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad argued that the uprising of other factions among Banī 
Hāshim had provided the Shī‘ah community with the much-needed breathing space; for it 
had kept anti-Shī‘ah forces occupied.469 
The imamate of Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad also witnessed a significant transition from 
the Umayyad dynasty to the Abbasid dynasty in 750 C.E. As mentioned before, Banī 
‘Abbās, who constituted the main oppositional thrust against the Umayyad dynasty, 
                                                 
466 For instance, Mukhtār al-Thaqafī from the Kaysānīyyah branch, Zayd ibn ‘Alī from the Ḥusaynī branch, 
and ‘Abdullāh ibn Ḥasan, also known as Nafs al-Zakīyyah (d. 762 C.E.), from the Ḥasanī branch rebelled 
against the sitting caliphs. None of them received the public sanction of their contemporary Shī‘ah Imāms, 
further emphasizing the distinct political approach of these Imāms. In the case of ‘Abdullāh ibn Ḥasan, 
Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad was more firm in his dismissal of the rebellion, even though he still expressed his 
disagreement in a rather lenient way [see Shaykh al-Mufīd, al-Irshād, Vol. 2, pp. 190-3]. Modarresi 
Tabatabaii refers to Kuliynī’s Uṣūl al-Kāfī as well as other sources and reports that the followers of 
‘Abdullāh ibn Ḥasan harassed Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad after the latter’s refusal to join them [see Modarresi 
Tabatabaii, Hossein. (2007). Maktab dar Farāyand Takāmul: Naẓarī bar Taṭawwur Mabānī Fikrī Tashayyu‘ 
dar Sih Qarn Nukhustīn. Trans. Hashem Izadpanah. Tehran: Intishārāt Kawīr. p. 112].      
467 In some of the more significant cases of these Shī‘ah-sympathetic uprisings, the later Shī‘ah Imām 
highly praised the efforts. In the case of Zayd ibn ‘Alī, for instance, his “martyrdom” was recognized by the 
Imāms who came after his death even though his contemporary Imām had not joined his campaign [see, for 
instance, ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 45, pp. 186-209]. This pattern of recognition after the 
event was arguably another example of practicing Taqīyyah for it increased the survivability of the Shī‘ah 
community.    
468 See Feirahi, Davoud. Tārīkh Taḥawwūl Duwlat dar Islām. p. 252. 
469 See Muḥammad al-Riyshahrī, Mīzān al-Ḥikmah, Vol. 1, p. 182, Ḥadīth no. 238; and al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī, 
Wasā’il al-Shī‘ah fī Taḥṣīl al-Masā’il al-Sharī‘ah, Vol. 11, p. 39, Ḥadīth no. 12. 
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employed the clandestine Shī‘ī network in their campaign. Moreover, their key strategy 
was to question the political legitimacy of the Umayyad dynasty and to call for the return 
of the caliphate to its legitimate bearers, namely “the family of the Prophet.” The fact that 
Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad was a direct descendant of the Prophet rendered him an obvious 
candidate to whom Banī ‘Abbās was referring. Yet, there seems to be a consensus among 
the Shī‘ah historians that Banī ‘Abbās did not have the intention of offering the caliphate 
to the ‘Alawīs once they succeeded. At any rate, Banī ‘Abbās seemed to have managed to 
conceal their intentions of marginalizing the ‘Alawīs throughout their campaign in order 
to exploit the popularity of Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad among the Shī‘ahs.470 The strategy 
created high expectations among the Shī‘ah community regarding the political future of 
their Imām. In fact, upon the imminent success of Banī ‘Abbās movement, some 
marginalized elements within that movement approached Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad with an 
invitation to become the new caliph.471 He refused the invitation possibly due to his 
awareness of the firm intention of Banī ‘Abbās to establish an ‘Abbāsī rather than an 
‘Alawī caliphate.472 Meanwhile, Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad’s refusal to engage in politics 
when the environment appeared to be so favorable confused the Shī‘ah community. 
Modarresi Tabatabaii believes that the Imām’s “political silence,” which was in fact the 
continuation of his father’s and his grandfather’s policy, was added to a series of 
                                                 
470 See Feirahi, Davoud. Tārīkh Taḥawwūl Duwlat dar Islām. p. 251. 
471 For more information on these pro-‘Alawī individuals among Banī ‘Abbās and their eventual failure, see 
Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah wal-Nihāyah, Vol. 10, pp. 44-5. 
472 See Feirahi, Davoud. Tārīkh Taḥawwūl Duwlat dar Islām. p. 252; and Aḥmad ibn Abī Ya‘qūb, Tārīkh 
Ya‘qūbī, Vol. 2. To counter the argument of the ‘Alawīs, the Abbasid argued that their ancestor, ‘Abbās, had 
been the legitimate successor to the Prophet. Unlike Shī‘ahs, however, they did not refer to any particular 
Prophetic tradition in establishing this claim [see Feirahi, Davoud. Tārīkh Taḥawwūl Duwlat dar Islām. pp. 
259-69]. 
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“disappointments” in the community.473 Despite their popularity and high stature among 
Banī Hāshim and even among the larger Muslim society, Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī and Ja‘far 
ibn Muḥammad had refused to engage in politics.474 Their decision led to a painful 
process of socialization of the notion of Taqīyyah among the Shī‘ah Muslims. The 
experience further distanced the Shī‘ah community from the Zaydīs. The less political 
and more esoteric image of the Imāms was also solidified in this period.475 This “spiritual 
image” of the Imāms had now had a solid theological foundation in the teachings of the 
fourth, the fifth, and the sixth Shī‘ah Imāms.  
The seventh Shī‘ah Imām, Mūsā ibn Ja‘far, was politically more active compared 
to his father and his grandfather. Yet, according to Shī‘ah historiography, he was still an 
observer of the “politics of Taqīyyah.” Despite his more vocal opposition to the Abbasid 
caliphate, for instance, he did not resort to violent measures. Instead, he successfully 
created an organized Shī‘ī network by appointing representatives and deputies throughout 
                                                 
473 See Modarresi Tabatabaii, Hossein. Maktab dar Farāyand Takāmul. pp. 34-6. Modarresi Tabatabaii 
reports that the more fervent followers of the Imām tried in vain to convince him to lead the anti-Umayyad 
movement while others simply expressed their disappointment. He writes “not only the Imām completely 
avoided political entanglements, but also he strongly proscribed his followers from doing so; and 
commanded that the Shī‘ahs would not be allowed to join any of the active armed groups [among the 
opposition] or [even] to engage in Shī‘ī propaganda” [Ibid. p. 36]. The disappointment can be better 
understood when one considers that a large number of the Imām’s followers resided in the strategic region 
of Iraq –the future seat of the Abbasid dynasty–, and that they were waiting for the Imām’s permission to 
rebel against the Umayyad.     
474 With the benefit of the hindsight and given the ill fate of the Shī‘ī movements of the time, the 
disengagement of Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī and Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad from politics appear to be a wise course 
of action. To the contemporary Shī‘ah society, however, the aloofness of the Imāms during “such ripe 
times” was baffling. 
475 Modarresi Tabatabaii believes that the Shī‘ī doctrine of the “infallibility of the Imāms” –i.e. the doctrine 
of ‘Iṣmah– was also developed in the same period. Prior to this time, the Shī‘ah community –except for a 
few number of devoted followers– revered their Imāms only as extremely pious and knowledgeable 
descendants of the Prophet [see Ibid. 32; Ibid. p. 39; and Ibid. pp. 73-87].       
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the Muslim world.476 The network facilitated an increasing number of financial, legal, 
and educational interactions between the community and the Imām as well as within the 
community itself. The transactions that went through this network were under the radar of 
the Abbasid caliphate; and they posed a direct challenge to the authority of the caliph. As 
a result, the powerful Abbasid caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd477 eventually imprisoned Mūsā ibn 
Ja‘far; and after a number of years in prison, Mūsā ibn Ja‘far was reportedly killed by 
poison in 799 C.E.478 
The next, somewhat controversial, application of the doctrine of Taqīyyah 
happened during the imamate of the eighth Imām, ‘Alī ibn Mūsā479. Unlike the Umayyad 
system, which was essentially the reproduction of pre-Islam inter- and intra-tribal 
politics, the Abbasid political system was quite sophisticated. Ruling over a large multi-
ethnic territory, the Abbasid had to balance different factions of the society over which 
they ruled. They soon adopted the complex bureaucracy of the earlier Persian Empires 
and hired a number of influential Persian viziers. To establish their political legitimacy, 
they also developed systematic relations with the prominent Sunnī ‘Ulamā of the time.480 
In this sophisticated political structure, the relationship between the Abbasid court and 
the ‘Alawīs was even more complicated. The two had begun as implicit allies in their 
opposition to the Umayyad dynasty and had grown into enemies after the establishment 
                                                 
476 See Ibid. pp. 40-1. 
477 d. 809 C.E. 
478 See Shaykh al-Mufīd, al-Irshād, Vol. 2, pp. 237-243. 
479 765 – 817 C.E. He is also known by his epithet al-Riḍā. 
480 See Feirahi, Davoud. Tārīkh Taḥawwūl Duwlat dar Islām. pp. 259-69.  
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of the Abbasid dynasty, for the Abbasid saw the ‘Alawīs as competitors with a more 
plausible claim to the caliphate. As mentioned before, this enmity had already been 
crystallized in the fate of the seventh Shī‘ah Imām. Moving among their Arab, Persian, 
and Turkic bases, however, the Abbasid caliphs had to constantly revise the list of their 
enemies and their allies. The situation created a dynamic Abbassid-Shī‘ah relationship. 
Traditionally, the Shī‘ah Imāms had had a large number of followers in today’s Iraq 
region. Gradually, however, they were obtaining a solid base among the Persians as well. 
This was in part due to the fact that the Persians had grown disillusioned with the 
Abbasid’s initial campaign to reverse the Umayyad’s “anti-Persian policies.” The rising 
opposition between the ‘Alawīs (or Shī‘ahs) and the Abbasid, therefore, had led to pro-
Shī‘ah leanings among the Persians. To appease the growing number of ‘Alawī 
sympathizers in Persia, the Abbasid caliphs felt the necessity of employing radically 
different strategies vis-à-vis the Shī‘ah Imāms. As a result, while caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd 
had ordered the execution of Mūsā ibn Ja‘far in prison, his son481 designated Mūsā ibn 
Ja‘far’s son as his successor.482  
The Shī‘ah historiography views ‘Alī ibn Mūsā’s response to the caliph’s 
appointment as nothing short of practicing Taqīyyah. Prior to his appointment, ‘Alī ibn 
Mūsā had been strictly following the usual “politics of Taqīyyah” for about fifteen years. 
During this period, he had engaged mainly in administering the affairs of the Shī‘ah 
community through the large network of his delegates and devotees. He had also 
                                                 
481 This is Ma’mūn al-‘Abbāsī (d. 833 C.E.). 
482 According to Modarresi Tabatabaii, “many historians have speculated that the action of [the caliph] 
Ma’mūn [al-‘Abbāsī in appointing ‘Alī ibn Mūsā as his successor] was to contain the rising [Shī‘ī] fervor” 
[Modarresi Tabatabaii, Hossein. Maktab dar Farāyand Takāmul. p. 42].  
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exploited the breathing space caused by the death of Hārūn al-Rashīd and by the brutal 
rivalry between Hārūn al-Rashīd’s two sons, Amīn al-‘Abbāsi483 and Ma’mūn al-‘Abbāsi, 
over the caliphate.484 Once Ma’mūn al-‘Abbāsi consolidated his hold on power as the 
caliph, he made the Persian city of Marw in the eastern province of Khurāsān his interim 
capital city. The choice of Marw was already an indication of Ma’mūn al-‘Abbāsī’s rising 
worries about the seething ‘Alawī enclaves throughout Persia. In an attempt to contain 
the ‘Alawīs, Ma’mūn al-‘Abbāsī invited ‘Alī ibn Mūsā from Medina to Marw485 and 
designated him as the next caliph. According to the Shī‘ah historiography, ‘Alī ibn Mūsā 
was forced to accept the position, making him an unwilling figurehead.486 
Before accepting Ma’mūn al-‘Abbāsī’s offer, however, ‘Alī ibn Mūsā stipulated 
several conditions. These conditions manifest the prevailing attitude of Taqīyyah that had 
been taking roots in the political philosophy of the Shī‘ah Imāms after Ḥusayn. 
                                                 
483 d. 813 C.E. 
484 See Feirahi, Davoud. Tārīkh Taḥawwūl Duwlat dar Islām. p. 277. 
485 According to Shī‘ah sources, ‘Alī ibn Mūsā used the long trip from the Arabian Peninsula to Eastern 
Persia to “spread his Shī‘ī teachings.” As a result, a large number of traditions going back to him is reported 
in Shī‘ah theological texts. Many of these traditions are collected in ‘Uyūn Akhbār al-Ridhā by Shaykh al-
Ṣadūq. This multi-volume book is among the main reference text in Shī‘ah jurisprudence. It is in this 
collection where two of the explicit articulations of the Shī‘ī notions of Wilāyah and Walāyah may be 
found. The first is called the “Ḥadīth Silsilah al-Dhahab,” or the Ḥadīth of the Golden Chain. In this Ḥadīth, 
the Muslim doctrine of the Divine Unity is likened to a fort. The security of this fort, however, can be 
enjoyed only by those who submit to the Wilāyah and Walāyah of God, of the Prophet, and of the chain of 
the Shī‘ah Imāms who followed the Prophet [see Shaykh al-Ṣadūq, ‘Uyūn Akhbār al-Ridhā, Vol. 1, pp. 143-
5; and also ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 49, pp.120-3].  
The second widely quoted Ḥadīth specifically likens the “Wiāyah of ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib” to a Divine 
fortress, protecting its residents “against the Divine Wrath” [see Shaykh al-Ṣadūq, ‘Uyūn Akhbār al-Ridhā, 
Vol. 1, p. 146]. For more discussion of Wilāyah and Walāyah and their relation to the notion of 
metaphysical security, see the following Chapter.              
486 The Shī‘ah historiography maintains that Ma’mūn al-‘Abbāsī threatened ‘Alī ibn Mūsā to death after the 
latter’s initial refusal to accept the position. In order to protect himself, therefore, ‘Alī ibn Mūsā conceded 
to Ma’mūn al-‘Abbāsī’s proposal [see Shaykh al-Ṣadūq, ‘Uyūn Akhbār al-Ridhā, Vol. 1, pp. 150-3]. 
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According to Shī‘ah sources, ‘Alī ibn Mūsā’s conditions included “not to be asked to 
interfere in the appointments of government’s officials; not to be asked to interfere in 
government’s procedures and protocols; not to be asked to serve as a judge; and not to be 
asked to engage in the politics of the Abbasid caliphate.”487 For someone who had been 
designated as the next caliph, these conditions appear to be counterintuitive. Yet, they 
suggest that ‘Alī ibn Mūsā was not optimistic about the prospect of his political career 
within the Abbasid court. By these conditions, therefore, he tried to steer clear of the 
affair of that court. In the next few years prior to his death488, ‘Alī ibn Mūsā’s chief 
activity was to attend scholarly forums sponsored by Ma’mūn al-‘Abbāsī. In these 
forums, which has become one of the hallmarks of Ma’mūn al-‘Abbāsī’s caliphate489, 
‘Alī ibn Mūsā and his Muslim and non-Muslim interlocutors discussed various 
theological and ethical issues.          
The next three Shī‘ah Imāms, i.e. Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī490, Alī ibn Muḥammad491, 
and Ḥasan ibn ‘Alī492, continued the “politics of Taqīyyah.” They avoided political 
                                                 
487 For ‘Alī ibn Mūsā’s conditions in response to Ma’mūn al-‘Abbāsī’s “threats,” see Shaykh al-Ṣadūq, 
‘Uyūn Akhbār al-Ridhā, Vol. 1, p. 152; Ibid. Vol. 1, p. 161; and Abū Ja‘far Thiqat al-Islām Kuliynī, Uṣūl al-
Kāfī, Vol. 1, p. 489.  
488 According to Shī‘ah sources, ‘Alī ibn Mūsā was eventually poisoned by Ma’mūn al-‘Abbāsī in 817 C.E. 
See Shaykh al-Ṣadūq, ‘Uyūn Akhbār al-Ridhā, Vol. 1, pp. 267-8. Feirahi argues that after consolidating his 
authority over Persia, Ma’mūn al-‘Abbāsī tried to appease, once again, his Arab base by killing his 
powerful Persian vizier Faḍl ibn Sahl, by poisoning ‘Alī ibn Mūsā, and by his return to Baghdad –i.e. the 
traditional seat of the Abbasid dynasty [see Feirahi, Davoud. Tārīkh Taḥawwūl Duwlat dar Islām. p. 277].  
489 See Cooperson, Michael. (2005). Al-Ma’mun. Oxford: Oneworld Publications.   
490 810 – 835 C.E. He is also known by his epithets al-Taqī and al-Jawād. 
491 827 – 868 C.E. He is also known by his epithets al-Hādī and al-Naqī. 
492 846 – 874 C.E. He is also known by his epithet al-‘Askarī. 
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engagements and quietly expanded the Shī‘ī network of representatives and deputies 
initially organized by Mūsā ibn Ja‘far. They also reduced their engagement with the 
Shī‘ah community by further delegating partial authorities to their deputies.493 The 
disengagement was, in part, due to the rising pressure lifted against the Imāms by the 
Abbasid caliphs. The result was socialization of the Shī‘ah community to be able to 
survive in the absence of the Imām. To achieve such an objective, the doctrine of 
Taqīyyah was of increasing importance. It taught Shī‘ah Muslims to be self-sufficient and 
to be extra cautious in dealing with their enemies. It also encouraged them to be prudent 
when relying on their allies.  
Historically, the lives of the Shī‘ah Imāms –with few, yet significant, exceptions– 
have been shaped by the practice of Taqīyyah. The different sociopolitical contexts in 
which these Imāms practiced Taqīyyah provided the Shī‘ah community with a rich set of 
precedence. Taqīyyah provided the Shī‘ah community with a strategic “system of formal 
and informal rules.”494 The system guaranteed the survival of the Shī‘ah community in 
the turbulent decades that followed the death of the eleventh Shī‘ah Imām in 874 C.E. 
During this period, the absence of the Shī‘ah Imām and the doctrine of the “hidden 
Imām”495 created quite a confusion within the community. Towards the end of the ninth 
century C.E., according to Modarresi Tabatabaii, many Shī‘ah Muslims had already 
                                                 
493 The majority of the reported interactions between these last three Imāms and the community are of 
financial nature. Religious and spiritual matters were generally delegated to the representatives of the 
Imāms. An excellent summary can be found in Modarresi Tabatabaii, Hossein. Maktab dar Farāyand 
Takāmul. pp. 43-53. See also Modarresi Tabatabaii, Hossein. Crisis and Consolidation in the Formative 
Period of Shi‘ite Islam. 
494 See Onuf, Nicholas. (1998). Constructivism: A User’s Manual. In V. Kubálková, N. Onuf, & P. Kowert 
(Eds.), International Relations in a Constructed World (pp. 58-78). Armonk: M.E. Sharpe. 
495 See Chapter I and the following Chapter. 
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grown doubtful of their Shī‘ī beliefs and some had already left Shī‘ah Islam for other 
Muslim denominations.496 One of the dynamics that seems to have protected the 
community from extinction was the theoretical and practical contributions of the Shī‘ah 
theologians and jurists in the decades that followed the death of the eleventh Imām. Their 
efforts were two-fold. On the purely theoretical level, the jurists and theologians 
elaborated upon various Shī‘ī doctrines in theology (including the notions of Wilāyah and 
Walāyah) and in jurisprudence.497 On the practical level, however, these emerging 
religious leaders of the Twelver Shī‘ah community continued the practice of Taqīyyah. 
They observed expediency and caution498 not only in dealing with the Sunnī –Abbasid– 
caliphate, but also in responding to the rise of other branches of Shī‘ah Islam499 to power. 
The habit of political prudence eventually helped the Twelver Shī‘ahs to survive the 
“great bewilderment” and to begin to grow in number once again during the tenth century 
C.E.           
Given the flexibility of the doctrine of Taqīyyah, it is difficult to overlook the 
powerful forces that this doctrine could release. As Enayat argues, Taqīyyah and its 
                                                 
496 See Modarresi Tabatabaii, Hossein. Maktab dar Farāyand Takāmul. pp. 158-9; and Ibid. p. 183-7. 
Shī‘ah sources call this period the age of “great bewilderment” among Shī‘ah Muslims; for many had 
become uncertain about the existence of the –hidden–  twelfth Imām [see Ibid p. 186-7; ‘Allāmih Majlisī, 
Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 51, p. 109; Ibid. Vol. 51, p. 118; and Ibid. Vol. 51, p. 142]. 
497 See Modarresi Tabatabaii, Hossein. Maktab dar Farāyand Takāmul. pp. 188-99. 
498 Enayat refers to “Shī‘īs’ extreme caution in accepting responsibility for the administration of justice,” 
which might have been an example of this attitude. See Enayat, Hamid. Modern Islamic Political Thought. 
p. 27. 
499 This includes the Ismā‘īlī Fāṭimid dynasty (909 – 1171 C.E.) in North Africa and the –Zaydī– Būyid 
dynasty in Persia (932 – 1062 C.E.) [see Feirahi, Davoud. Tārīkh Taḥawwūl Duwlat dar Islām. pp. 283-
334; and also Bosworth, Clifford Edmund. (1996). The New Islamic Dynasties. New York: Columba 
University Press. pp. 63-5; and Ibid. pp. 154-7].  
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underlying expediency can be used and have been used as a pretext to violate other Shī‘ī 
principles.500 To address this challenge, Shī‘ah jurists have tried to clarify the legal 
boundaries of Taqīyyah, its conditions, and its limits some of which have been discussed 
above. Arguably the most important counterforce to Taqīyyah, however, emerged in the 
Shī‘ah historiography of the life of the first Imām, ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib. In the following 
section, a brief review of this historiography and the resulting paradigm of “principled 
action” will be discussed.    
 
Principled Action and Expediency: The Legacy of ‘Alī  
After the Prophet, ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib is the most important religious figure in 
Shī‘ah Islam. It may be argued, in fact, that Shī‘ah Islam is based on ‘Alī’s understanding 
of the teachings of the Prophet. It is not surprising, therefore, that ‘Alī’s life and the 
traditions attributed to him play a central role in shaping Shī‘ī strategic cultures.501 The 
legitimizing influence of his “twenty-five year silence” on the doctrine of Taqīyyah has 
already been discussed above. In this section, another political legacy of ‘Alī will be 
reviewed –a legacy that is arguably the most important political tradition associated with 
him in Shī‘ah Islam. 
 
                                                 
500 See Enayat, Hamid. Modern Islamic Political Thought. pp. 177-80. 
501 There are few good sources in English dealing with the life and the teachings of ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib. This 
is in part due to the fact that the focus of Islamic Studies has traditionally been on Sunnī Islam. More 
recently, however, there have been several insightful contributions to address the dearth of knowledge 
about this early Muslim figure in the West. See, for instance, Shah-Kazemi, Reza. (2006). Justice and 
Remembrance: Introducing the Spirituality of Imam ‘Alī. New York: I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd; Shah-Kazemi, 
Reza. (2011). Spiritual Quest: Reflections on Qur’anic Prayer According to the Teaching of Imam ‘Alī. 
New York: I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd; and Lakhani, M. Ali. The Sacred Foundations of Justice in Islam.   
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The mainstream understanding of the Shī‘ah-Sunnī split underlines the political 
dispute over the succession of the Prophet. In the “Orientalist” account of the “roots of 
Shī‘ah Islam,” consequential theological differences between the two versions of the 
religion are often put aside. Yet, it seems that ‘Alī’s political career either as a “silent 
protestor” or, later on, as a caliph had its roots in his more esoteric understanding of 
Islam. It is not surprising, therefore, that ‘Alī’s political approach had an immediate 
impact on Shī’ah political philosophies.  
During the rule of the first three caliphs,502 ‘Alī did not endorse their legitimacy 
as the successor of the Prophet.503 As discussed before, however, he refused to openly 
challenge the first three caliphs; and on certain occasions he provided them with his 
consultations. According to Shī‘ah historiography, ‘Alī’s “silent protest” and reluctant 
accommodation during this period was an act of “sacrificing” his own political right for 
the sake of the long-term interests of the Muslim community. In other words, by 
abstaining from a “devastating revolt” against these caliphs, ‘Alī practiced political 
expediency for the “greater cause” of the survival of Islam. 
In contrast, during his rather short tenure as the fourth caliph504, ‘Alī appeared as 
what can be called a full-fledged “principlist,” or someone who acts in accordance to his 
                                                 
502 This period includes the caliphate of Abū Bakr (632 – 634 C.E.), ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb (634 – 644 C.E.), 
and ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān (644 – 656 C.E.). According to the Sunnī historiography ‘Alī –reluctantly or 
otherwise– accepted the three caliphs preceding him [see, for instance, Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, 
Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, Vol. 2, p. 448; and Abū Muḥammad ibn Qatibah al-Daynūrī, al-Imāmah wal-Sīyāsah, 
Vol. 1, pp. 30-2].   
503 See, for example, ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, Nahj al-Balāghah, Sermon 3; and Ibid. Sermon 77. According to 
the mainstream Shī‘ah historiography, ‘Alī did not accept the political legitimacy of the first three caliphs 
“even for an hour” [see Shaykh al-Mufīd, al-Fuṣūl al-Mukhtārah, p. 56].  
504 656 – 661 C.E. 
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principles regardless of the political consequences. Both Sunnī and Shī‘ah sources report 
his peculiar and uncompromising approach in politics. As the caliph, ‘Alī consciously 
refused to put politics above his “principles.” For his disregard for political expediency, 
‘Alī has been both admired and criticized. He has been admired, mostly by Shī‘ah 
writers, as a “true” companion of the Prophet who remained faithful to the teachings of 
the Prophet. After all, according to Shī‘ah theology, ‘Alī was the bearer of the “sacred 
and supreme Knowledge,” or Wilāyah and Walāyah, after the Prophet. As the head of the 
Muslim community, therefore, ‘Alī could have not compromised his “sacred principles.” 
According to the Shī‘ī perspective, it was precisely his tradition of “principled action”505 
that differentiated ‘Alī’s “legitimate” caliphate from that of the first three caliphs. 
Several episodes in ‘Alī’s political career, in particular, manifests his 
uncompromising adherence to the paradigm of “principled action.” One early indication 
of his political philosophy may be found in his behavior as a member of the Council, 
known as the Shawrā, responsible for selecting the third caliph. This electoral Council 
was created after the assassination of ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, the second caliph, and 
according to his instructions.506 Appointed by ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, ‘Alī and five other 
senior members of the Muslim community507 were to select the next caliph. The 
deliberations of the Council resulted in a final choice between ‘Alī or ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān 
                                                 
505 The use of the term “principled action” instead of the rather problematic terms “principlism” and 
“principlist” was first suggested to me by Professor Farhang Rajaee [F. Rajaee, personal communication, 
July 7, 2011]. 
506 See, for instance, Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, Vol. 3, pp. 292-302. 
507 Similar to ‘Alī, these were some prominent disciples of the Prophet, namely ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān, ‘Abd 
al-Raḥmān ibn ‘Awf, Zubayr ibn ‘Awwām, Ṭalḥah ibn ‘Ubaydullāh, and Sa‘d ibn Abī Waqqāṣ. 
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to be the successor of ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb. According to the Shī‘ah historiography, the 
Council asked ‘Alī and ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān whether they would follow “the Book of 
God, the tradition of the Prophet, and the examples of the two previous caliphs.”508 
‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān gave an unqualified affirmative response; and ‘Alī confirmed that he 
would follow the Qur’ān and the tradition of the Prophet, or Sunnah, while remaining 
quiet about his loyalty to “the examples of the two previous caliphs.”509 The Council, 
then, selected ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān as the caliph. ‘Alī’s refusal to practice Taqīyyah in 
responding to the Council even though the stakes were noticeably high was later on 
interpreted by Shī‘ah commentators as an example of “principled action.”   
When elected the caliph, ‘Alī appeared even more stringent in his adherence to his 
principles. One may even argue that this uncompromising approach in politics eventually 
caused ‘Alī to lose his control over a large part of the Muslim world. During his reign as 
the fourth caliph, ‘Alī had three major military engagements one of which caused an 
irrecoverable split in the Muslim world and paved the way for the rise of the Umayyad 
dynasty. ‘Alī’s first major war, the Battle of Jamal, was with a well-known group of 
people associated directly to the Prophet. These included ‘Āyishah bint Abī Bakr, one of 
the wives of the Prophet, and Zubayr ibn ‘Awwām and Ṭalḥah ibn ‘Ubaydullāh, two of 
the esteemed companions of the Prophet. While Zubayr ibn ‘Awwām and Ṭalḥah ibn 
‘Ubaydullāh were among the first who pledged their allegiances to ‘Alī as the caliph510, 
they gradually grew discontented with him. According to the Shī‘ah historiography, the 
                                                 
508 See Aḥmad ibn Abī Ya‘qūb, Tārīkh Ya‘qūbī. Vol. 2, p. 162. 
509 Ibid. 
510 See Ibid. Vol. 2, p. 178. 
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breaking point was reached when ‘Alī refused to accommodate their political wishes and, 
in particular, to appoint them as his governors.511 ‘Alī’s treatment of his fellow disciples, 
Zubayr ibn ‘Awwām and Ṭalḥah ibn ‘Ubaydullāh, has often been understood as another 
example of “principled action.” By declining the requests of the influential companions 
of the Prophet, ‘Alī alienated them and activated several destructive dynamics against his 
rule.512 The Battle of Jamal was the first major war between two prominent groups of 
Muslims.513 As discussed in the preceding Chapter, this Muslim “civil war” proved to  
 
                                                 
511 The Sunnī account of the causes of discontent that ‘Āyishah bint Abī Bakr, Zubayr ibn ‘Awwām, and 
Ṭalḥah ibn ‘Ubaydullāh felt towards ‘Alī emphasizes their demand for punishing those responsible in the 
murder of ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān, the third caliph. ‘Āyishah bint Abī Bakr, Zubayr ibn ‘Awwām, and Ṭalḥah 
ibn ‘Ubaydullāh, as well as Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān, maintained that the accomplices in the murder of 
‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān had been left unpunished. They urged ‘Alī to remove his “protection of the murderers” 
and to prosecute them. ‘Alī, on the other hand, rejected the accusations. In response, Shī‘ah sources accuse 
Ṭalḥah ibn ‘Ubaydullāh, ‘Āyishah bint Abī Bakr, and ‘Amr ibn al-‘Āṣ, who was Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī 
Sufyān’s chief commander and his close confidant, of being responsible for agitations that led to the murder 
of ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān [see Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, Vol. 3, pp. 399-425; Ibn al-
Athīr, al-Kāmil fīl-Tārīkh, Vol. 3, p. 286; Aḥmad ibn Abī Ya‘qūb, Tārīkh Ya‘qūbī. Vol. 2, pp. 174-6; Abū 
Muḥammad ibn Qatibah al-Daynūrī, al-Imāmah wal-Sīyāsah, Vol. 1, pp. 56-63; Aḥmad ibn A‘tham al-Kūfī, 
Kitāb al-Futūḥ, Vol. 2, p. 393; Ibid. Vol. 2, p. 417; and Ibid. Vol. 2, p. 421. See also ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, Nahj 
al-Balāghah, Sermon 22; Ibid. Sermon 137; and Ibid. Sermon 174 in which ‘Alī complains that “those 
responsible for ‘Uthmān [ibn ‘Affān]’s death have disguised themselves as the champions of his revenge”]. 
Historically, no one was tried for the murder of ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān, either under ‘Alī’s reign or that of 
Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān.   
In regards to Zubayr ibn ‘Awwām’s and Ṭalḥah ibn ‘Ubaydullāh’s political aspirations and specifically their 
demands to be appointed as the governors of Kūfah and Baṣrah, see ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, Nahj al-Balāghah, 
Sermon 148; Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, Vol. 3, p. 459; Abū Muḥammad ibn Qatibah 
al-Daynūrī, al-Imāmah wal-Sīyāsah, Vol. 1, p. 70; and Feirahi, Davoud. Tārīkh Taḥawwūl Duwlat dar 
Islām. p. 194. 
512 It is reasonable to believe that had ‘Alī acquiesced to political ambitions of Zubayr ibn ‘Awwām and 
Ṭalḥah ibn ‘Ubaydullāh, he could have prevented the Battle of Jamal and the great confusion it caused 
within the Muslim society. It was arguably the aftershocks of the Battle of Jamal that deprived ‘Alī of a 
decisive victory in the Battle of Ṣiffīn. This, in turn, led to the split of Khawārij from ‘Alī’s army, the 
consequent Battle of Nahrawān, and eventually the assassination of ‘Alī by a member of Khawārij.  
513 For the early historical accounts of the Battle of Jamal, see Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-
Ṭabarī, Vol. 3, pp. 465-545; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil fīl-Tārīkh, Vol. 3, pp. 205-59; and Aḥmad ibn Abī 
Ya‘qūb, Tārīkh Ya‘qūbī. Vol. 2, pp. 181-3. 
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have had lasting legacies –one of which was the consequential Battle of Ṣeffīn between 
the army of ‘Alī and that of Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān.  
The Battle of Ṣiffīn was the culmination of a series of tensions between ‘Alī, the 
caliph, and Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān, then governor of al-Shām. Appointed by caliph 
‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, in 640 C.E., Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān had managed to establish 
and consolidate his rule over that strategic territory prior to ‘Alī’s caliphate. Using his 
political shrewdness over a long tenure of governorship, Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān had 
cultivated the loyalty of powerful figures in al-Shām.514 In one of his first edicts as the 
fourth caliph, ‘Alī removed Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān from the position of 
governorship.515 Not surprisingly, Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān defied and questioned the 
legitimacy of ‘Alī’s caliphate by accusing him of “sheltering the murderers of ‘Uthmān 
ibn ‘Affān.” Eventually, the two sides came to a military conflict in the region of Ṣiffīn 
that ended in an inconclusive arbitration. The war resulted in bifurcation of the Muslim 
world and severely weakened ‘Alī’s hold on power. It also gave birth to a group of bitter 
“extremists,” Khawārij516, who broke away in 657 C.E. Khawārij protested ‘Alī’s 
handling of the Battle of Ṣiffīn and eventually assassinated him in 661 C.E. 517    
‘Alī’s uncompromising treatment of Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān and his refusal to 
renew his tenure as the governor were understood by Shī‘ah Muslims as manifestations 
                                                 
514 For a concise yet helpful account of this period see Armstrong, Karen. (2002). Islam: A Short History. 
New York: Random House.   
515 See Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil fīl-Tārīkh, Vol. 3, p. 201. 
516 See Chapter II.  
517 For the early historical accounts of the Battle of Ṣiffīn and its consequences, see Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-
Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, Vol. 3, pp. 562-71; Ibid. Vol. 4, pp. 2-52; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil fīl-Tārīkh, Vol. 3, 
pp. 276-315; and Aḥmad ibn Abī Ya‘qūb, Tārīkh Ya‘qūbī. Vol. 2, pp. 187-90. 
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of his paradigm of “principled action.” Once again, had ‘Alī extended Mu‘āwīyah ibn 
Abī Sufyān’s governorship, he could have arguably spared his caliphate from the second 
devastating Muslim “civil war.”518 Yet, he unequivocally expressed his opposition to 
Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān as a “matter of principles”519 and justified his disregard for 
political expediency, or “shrewdness,” i.e. Dahā’. In a sermon, ‘Alī asserts that 
“by God, Mu‘āwīyah [ibn Abī Sufyān] is not shrewder than I am; but [his 
shrewdness is because] he perpetrates acts of deception and evil. Had it 
not been for my despising of deceit and guile, I would have been the 
shrewdest of all people. But, in fact, every act of deceit is an act of great 
evil; and, as such, an affront to God. And it is [destined] for every 
deceitful man to carry a banner [of shame] to be recognized in the Day of 
Judgment.  
By God, his [i.e. Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān’s] wicked ploys will not 
cause me to become forgetful [of my obligations towards God by 
committing the same evil]; and [even though this will cause me hardships] 
I will not be overwhelmed by the difficulties.”520      
                                                 
518 According to Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Mughayrah ibn Shu‘bah, who was one of the companions 
of the Prophet, tried in vain to dissuade ‘Alī from removing Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān at that time. He 
argued that by immediately replacing powerful figures such as Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān, ‘Alī would 
endanger the future of his caliphate. He even urged ‘Alī to keep “all governors” of ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān in 
their position until ‘Alī would consolidate his hold on power and would ensure the loyalty of his army. 
After such a transition period, Mughayrah ibn Shu‘bah says to ‘Alī, “you may replace them or leave them 
to govern” [see Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, Vol. 3, p. 459; and also Feirahi, Davoud. 
Tārīkh Taḥawwūl Duwlat dar Islām. p. 194].        
519 For ‘Alī’s position on Mu‘āwīyah ibn Abī Sufyān’s governorship and some of his letters to Mu‘āwīyah 
ibn Abī Sufyān, see ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, Nahj al-Balāghah, Letters 6, 7, 9, 10, 17, 28, 30, 32, 37, 48, 49, 55, 
64, 65, 73, and 75. See also Abū Muḥammad ibn Qatibah al-Daynūrī, al-Imāmah wal-Sīyāsah, Vol. 1. 
520 See Ibid. Sermon 200. 
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Throughout Shī‘ah history, ‘Alī’s paradigm of “principled action” has become the 
hallmark of his political philosophy. In particular, his legacy of “principled action” has 
served as paradigm against unrestricted use of expediency in Shī‘ī strategic cultures. The 
fact that the patriarch of Shī‘ah Islam refused to be politically expedient to the extent that 
it cost him his caliphate and indeed his life has been a source of aspiration throughout 
Shī‘ah history and especially for those Shī‘ahs who have not been comfortable with the 
implications of the doctrine of Taqīyyah.521  
To better understand the significance of the paradigm of “principled action” in 
Shī‘ah Islam, it is worth briefly reviewing its powerful comeback after the Islamic 
Revolution of 1979 in Iran. As Mesbahi argues, the newly established state in Iran had to 
struggle with a wide range of theoretical and practical challenges.522 Mesbahi claims that 
the new Shī‘ah state dealt with these challenges by employing the paradigm of political 
expediency which, as discussed above, is at the heart of the doctrine of Taqīyyah. It was  
 
                                                 
521 One of the important articulations of ‘Alī’s paradigm of “principled action” may be found in ‘Alī ibn 
Abī Ṭālib, Nahj al-Balāghah, Letters 53. This is a letter written by ‘Alī to his appointed governor of Egypt, 
Mālik al-Ashtar al-Nakha‘ī. Along with the so-called “Medina Constitution,” ‘Alī’s letter is among the 
important ancient documents in Shī‘ah political philosophy. In the letter, ‘Alī expounds upon what 
constitutes “good governance” in his opinion. It is a coherent and forceful argument that stands in a stark 
contrast with –at least any generous– practice of political expediency. Interestingly, however, ‘Alī 
formulates his paradigm of “principled action” as a kind of “ultimate consequentialism.” He does so by 
adding the metaphysical dimension into the chain of causes and effects. In any case, even though after the 
Prophet, ‘Alī is the most celebrated figure among Shī‘ah religious and political establishment, this letter 
appears to have been of limited influence. See Homayounvash, M., & Mirtaheri, S. A. (Forthcoming 2012). 
Honoring Contracts as a Foundation of Peace: A Shī‘ah Articulation. Journal of Religion, Conflict and 
Peace. See also Reza Shah-Kazemi’s essay on “A Sacred Conception of Justice: Imam ‘Ali’s Letter to 
Malik al-Ashtar” in Lakhani, M. Ali. The Sacred Foundations of Justice in Islam. pp. 61-108. For the text 
of the “Medina Constitution” see Ibn Hishām, Sīrah al-Nabawīyyah, Vol. 2, pp. 348-51. 
522 Analyzing the challenge posed by the institution of modern nation-state –in the Muslim world in general 
and in the Shī‘ah world in particular– goes beyond the scope of this dissertation. This challenge, however, 
may affect the eventual manifestations of various Shī‘ī strategic cultures in different ways [M. Mesbahi, 
Lectures, Fall 2007, and M. Mesbahi, Interviews, Fall 2011].  
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in response to the extensive use of political expediency by the state that the paradigm of 
“principled action” made its forceful return in the political career of Ayatollah Muntaẓirī.  
A senior student and close companion of Ayatollah Khomeini, Ayatollah 
Muntaẓirī was a highly venerated figure among the revolutionaries in 1979. He was 
generally respected by other usually more junior leaders of the Revolution, many of 
whom were Ayatollah Muntaẓirī’s former students. Given his status, in the early 1980s, 
Ayatollah Muntaẓirī was appointed as the future successor of Ayatollah Khomeini by the 
Iranian “Assembly of Experts.”523 Moreover, as a Shī‘ah jurist universally admired for 
his extent of knowledge and his jurisprudential skills, Ayatollah Muntaẓirī wrote arguably 
the most powerful Shī‘ah treatise in support of Wilāyat Faqīh.524  
Despite his high stature within the political establishment and among Shī‘ah 
jurists, Ayatollah Muntaẓirī publicly voiced his criticism of what he perceived as “too 
generous” employment of political expediency at the costs of Shī‘ī “principles.” He 
refused to condone certain actions by the government especially in regards to the 
treatment of political prisoners; and he did so based on religious arguments. In fact, 
similar to ‘Alī, he refused to allow raison d’état to play any significant role in his political 
                                                 
523 In Iran’s complicated bureaucratic system, the “Assembly of Experts” is the elected body of high-rank 
‘Ulamā responsible, according to the Constitution, for supervising and electing the leader in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. 
524 Wilāyat Faqīh is the foundational theory behind the Iranian state that emerged after the Revolution. The 
term has often been translated as “Guardianship or Supervision of Jurist.” For some more discussion of the 
theory of Wilāyat Faqīh and the relevant notions of Wilāyah and Walāyah in Shī‘ah Islam, see the following 
Chapter.  
Ayatollah Muntaẓirī’s multi-volume book on Wilāyat Faqīh, Dīrāsāt fī Wilāyah al-Faqīh, is in Arabic. The 
book is written in the same legalistic tradition of classical Shī‘ī treatise using jurisprudential methodology 
and the Science of Principles –i.e. ‘Ilm al-‘Uṣūl– to religiously justify the “truth of the theory of Wilāyat 
Faqīh.” Ayatollah Muntaẓirī’s formulation of the theory, however, shows a consequential difference with 
that of Ayatollah Khomeini. The former articulation is dryly legalistic while the latter’s approach to Wilāyat 
Faqīh is unreservedly esoteric. 
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judgments. As a result, the tension between him and the office of Ayatollah Khomeini 
gradually rose. Eventually, this tension culminated in Ayatollah Muntaẓirī’s removal from 
his position just month before Ayatollah Khomeini’s death. Ayatollah Muntaẓirī’s 
students and followers usually interpret the episode as the testimony to Ayatollah 
Muntaẓirī’s adherence to the paradigm of “principled action,” for according to them, 
Ayatollah Muntaẓirī who was aware of the deteriorating health of Ayatollah Khomeini, 
refused to remain silent for a few months and walked away from the most powerful seat 
in the country without hesitation.525   
 Following the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, Ayatollah Muntaẓirī continued his 
uncompromising political approach and showed little concern for immediate 
consequences. He challenged the newly elected leader, Khamenei, in a similar fashion 
and by resorting to essentially Shī‘ī arguments. He repeatedly advocated a return to what 
he believed to be the religious principles of Shī‘ah Islam. Prime among such principles, 
Ayatollah Muntaẓirī believed, was the notion that political and social injustice should be 
protested at any cost. Because of his open and direct criticism of the leader of the country, 
he was eventually put under house arrest, which lasted for several years. When he died in 
2010, Ayatollah Muntaẓirī had already become the modern icon of the Shī‘ī paradigm of 
“principled action” in Iran.526 
                                                 
525 In response to Ayatollah Muntaẓirī’s criticism, the Iranian state resorted to the notion of expediency. As 
Mesbahi notes, this was to establish, arguably for the first time in Shī‘ah history, a full-fledged religious 
articulation of raison d’état. The state dismissed Ayatollah Muntaẓirī’s criticism as “naïve arguments” that 
do not take into account the complex realities of politics [M. Mesbahi, Interviews, Fall 2011 & Spring 
2012]. In fact, in the official state propaganda, Ayatollah Muntaẓirī was derogatorily labeled as the “naïve 
Shaykh.”   
526 The significance of Ayatollah Muntaẓirī’s “school of thought” in political philosophy and especially in 
relation to the doctrine of Taqīyyah became clear to me through my personal communications with 
186 
 
CHAPTER V 
WILĀYAH AND WALĀYAH: A SHĪ‘AH ONTOLOGY 
Understanding Wilāyah and Walāyah 
The reader may have noticed throughout the preceding Chapters that the notions 
of Wilāyah and Walāyah527 lie at the heart of Shī‘ah theology. It is, in fact, one of the 
central claims of my dissertation that unless taking these two notions into account, one 
cannot fully explain the differences between Shī‘ah Islam and Sunnī Islam. In terms of 
Shī‘ī strategic cultures, Wilāyah and Walāyah are the theological concepts upon which 
the doctrines of Shahādah and Taqīyyah rely. As discussed before, Shī‘ah theologians 
strived to achieve a balance between Shī‘ī “ideals” and the practical concerns. On the one 
hand, the story of Ḥusayn in Karbalā seemed to suggest fulfilling one’s –religious– duties 
regardless of worldly consequences. As a result, the doctrine of Shahādah highlighted the 
“metaphysical dimension” of human existence in which death and physical insecurity 
                                                                                                                                                 
Professor Mohsen Kadivar during September 2010. See also Mohsen Kadivar’s articles on various aspects 
of “Muntaẓirī school of thought” on www.kadivar.com [retrieved on February 29, 2012]. 
527 The Arabic words Wilāyah and Walāyah come from the Arabic root w-l-y (i.e. لوی). According to 
Wehr’s Arabic-English Dictionary, w-l-y means, inter alia, “to be near”; “to be a friend”; “to be in charge”; 
“to rule”; “to have authority”; “to be a patron”; “to assume the responsibility”; and “to follow in 
succession.” The word Wilāyah in particular means “sovereign power,” “rule,” and “authority.” The word 
Walāyah –and its other common form, Walā’– means “to be a friend,” “friendship,” “guardianship,” 
“curatorship,” as well as “devotion,” “loyalty,” and “clientage.” In addition, both Wilāyah and Walāyah 
mean “to be in charge” and “to have authority.” The word Walāyah appears in the Qur’ān in the verse 8:72 
where it means “friendship” or “protection,” and in the verse 18:44 where it means “protection.” The word 
Wilāyah does not appear in the Qur’ān. Other derivatives of the root w-l-y –especially the word Walī 
meaning someone who possesses Wilāyah or Walāyah– appear in the Qur’ān quite a number of times [see, 
for instance, 2:107, 120, 257, 282; 3:28, 68, 122, 175; 4:45, 75, 76, 89, 119, 123, 139, 144, 173; 5:51, 55, 
57, 81, 107; 6:14, 51, 70, 121, 127, 128; 7:3, 27, 30, 155, 196; 8:34, 40, 72, 73, 75; 9:23, 71, 74; 10:62; 
11:20, 113; 12:101; 13:16, 37; 16:63; 17:33, 97, 111; 18:17, 26, 50, 102; 19:5, 45, 70; 22:13, 78; 25:18; 
27:49; 29:22, 41; 32:4; 33:6, 17, 65; 34:41; 39:3; 41:31, 34; 42:6, 8, 9, 28, 31, 44, 46; 44:41; 45:10, 19; 
46:32; 47:11, 20; 48:22; 60:1; and 62:6]. As will be further elaborated upon, in Shī‘ah theology, Wilāyah 
and Walāyah respectively refer to the exoteric and esoteric aspects of the “metaphysical structure” of the 
universe around which the world is organized, and through which the Grace of God is believed to be 
bestowed upon man. 
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appeared trivial. The doctrine broadened the meaning of survival to encompass the 
“blissful and eternal state” of those who dismiss the fear of death for a “holy cause.” On 
the other hand, the same events of Karbalā gave birth to a cautious “pragmatism,” which 
emphasized the necessity of protecting an “invaluable yet vulnerable community.” The 
fate of Ḥusayn reminded early Shī‘ah Muslims that the only alternative to recklessness 
and oblivion might be extinction. What happened to the Shī‘ah Imāms who followed 
Ḥusayn only added to this sense of vigilance. Even though most if not all of these Imāms 
were politically cautious528 and avoided the type of open political encounter that Ḥusayn 
had had, they ended up being imprisoned and/or poisoned.529 Consequently, the Shī‘ah 
Imāms condoned certain measures of prudence in order to protect the survival of the 
Shī‘ah community and that of Shī‘ah individuals. At the same time, none of the Shī‘ah 
Imāms –and indeed no single Shī‘ah theologian or jurist throughout Shī‘ah history– has 
failed to praise Ḥusayn and his “heroic deeds” in Karbalā as an ultimate example of 
religious sacrifice –and “utmost salvation.”  
In certain ways the above tension between the “ideals” and the reality reminds 
one of a similar dynamic within Hinduism. While dharma emphasizes one’s 
                                                 
528 For a detailed discussion of “politics of Taqīyyah” and the specific manifestations of such a politics in 
the lives of the Shī‘ah Imāms, see the preceding Chapter.  
529 As discussed in Chapter IV, the extent of political engagement by the Shī‘ah Imāms depended upon their 
socioeconomic settings as well as their characters. While ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alī, Mūsā ibn 
Ja‘far, and arguably ‘Alī ibn Mūsā were politically more active, the rest were rather “quietists,” e.g. ‘Alī 
ibn Ḥusayn, Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī (the fifth Imām), or Ja‘far ibn Muḥammad, and/or under considerable 
restrictions by the state, e.g. Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī (the ninth Imām), ‘Alī ibn Muḥammad, and Ḥasan ibn 
‘Alī. The second Imām, Ḥasan ibn ‘Alī, chose the course of political “quietism” following his short-lived 
tenure as the caliph following the assassination of his father. This tradition of political “quietism” has 
survived to this day as one may observe it in the behavior of many senior Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā residing in Najaf, 
Iraq. Prior to the Islamic Revelation of 1979 in Iran, political “quietism” was also the mainstream approach 
among most senior Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā living in Qum, Iran.  
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responsibilities towards society –and towards the world–, moksha invites the believer to 
the “ultimate liberation of the soul.”530 Similarly, Shī‘ah Muslims were urged to pay 
attention to their precarious situation as a community and to fulfill their responsibilities 
towards that community. At the same time, they were encouraged to view Ḥusayn’s fate 
as salvation and the “liberation of the soul” par excellence. Similar to Hinduism, 
therefore, it was necessary for Shī‘ah theologians to reconcile powerful implications of 
martyrdom and the demands of preservation. The implicit solution was based on the 
notions of Wilāyah and Walāyah.   
Wilāyah and Walāyah are two closely related concepts in Muslim theology.531 The 
two notions are of particular significance among two overlapping groups of Muslims, 
namely Shī‘ah Muslims and Shī‘ah and Sunnī Ṣūfīs.532 In the field of Islamic Studies, 
there has been some discussion about the delicate differences between the two terms 
Wilāyah and Walāyah. The discussion aims at clarifying the meanings of the two terms 
based on an ancient tradition of etymological discussions on Wilāyah and Walāyah 
among the Ṣūfīs.533 An extensive etymological discussion, however, is beyond the scope 
                                                 
530 See Kinsely, David R. (1993). Hinduism: A Cultural Perspective. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall. 
531 In fact, the two terms Wilāyah and Walāyah have been often used interchangeably by scholars of Islam 
and even by Muslims themselves.  
532 For more discussion of the similarities between Shī‘ah Islam and Taṣawwuf, i.e. the Ṣūfī traditions, see 
various works by Henry Corbin including Corbin, Henry. (1978). The Man of Light in Iranian Sufism. 
London: Shambhala; and Corbin, Henry. (1986). Temple and Contemplation. London: Routledge. 
Following Corbin, one may argue that there is an “in-built Taṣawwuf” within Shī‘ah Islam. This “inherent 
Taṣawwuf,” even when left unacknowledged, brings the religious experiences of Shī‘ah Muslims close to 
those of Ṣūfīs according to Corbin.     
533 See, for instance, Cornell, Vincent J. (1998). Realm of the Saints: Power and Authority in Moroccan 
Sufism. Austin: University of Texas Press. Cornell uses other forms of the two terms, i.e. Wilayat and 
Walayat, as well [see Ibid. p. xix]. See also Enayat, Hamid. Modern Islamic Political Thought. pp. 45-6. 
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of this dissertation. Suffice to say that Wilāyah and Walāyah respectively refer to the 
exoteric and esoteric aspects of a particular ontology adopted by both Shī‘ah Muslims 
and Ṣūfīs. Esoterically, Walāyah refers to a metaphysical cosmology.534 It projects a 
spiritual hierarchy of the world or a metaphysical “system” through which the Grace of 
God is bestowed upon men.535 Within this context, the term Walāyah implies closeness to 
the “Absolute.” The closer one gets to the “Foundation of all existence,” the more 
powerful one becomes spiritually and metaphysically speaking. According to the Ṣūfī 
doctrines, this may result in one’s turning into a channel of Divine Grace and that of 
Divine Providence.536 That is why Ṣūfī saints are traditionally called “Walīs of God,” 
which means, inter alia, “friends of God.” This terminology is believed to be sanctioned 
                                                 
534 In fact, the esoteric dimension of Islam may be understood through the notion of Walāyah. Walāyah 
brings the Ṣūfī or the “seeker” in touch with the “Divine Essence” by means of what is usually called 
“initiation.” Eventually, the Ṣūfī “Path” is to lead to the experience of “annihilation,” i.e. Fanā, of the 
“seeker” within the “Divine Essence” and his or her identification with God. In Ṣūfī literature, therefore, 
the structure of Wilāyah and Walāyah covers the exoteric and esoteric aspects of the “Path” towards God. 
This structure manifests itself in the persons of the Imāms emphasized in Shī‘ah Islam, or in Ṣūfī Shaykhs 
emphasized in Sunnī Ṣūfī traditions. These religious and spiritual authorities guide and mentor their 
students through the students’ “inner journeys” towards God. See Lings, Martin. (1993). What is Sufism. 
Cambridge: The Islamic Text Society; Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. (1972). Sufi Essays. Albany: State University 
of New York Press; and Schuon, Frithjof. (2006). Sufism: Veil and Quintessence. Bloomington: World 
Wisdom.   
535 See Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. Knowledge and The Sacred. In particular, see chapter six. For related notions 
of the “hierarchy of being,” the “hierarchy of knowledge,” and the “hierarchy of existence” see Nasr, 
Seyyed Hossein. Sufi Essays. In terms of Islamic cosmology and the related “hierarchy of the universe,” the 
most authoritative work is Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. (1993). An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological 
Doctrines. Albany: State University of New York Press. The notion of the “hierarchy of being” has been 
elaborated upon by various Ṣūfī writers including Ibn ‘Arabī, also known as Shaykh al-Akbar (d. 1240 
C.E.). Arguably the most extensive treatment of the notion can be found in the works of the prominent 
Shī‘ah philosopher and mystic, Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, also known as Mullā Ṣadrā (d. 1640 C.E.). His theory 
of Tashkīk al-Wujūd, or “Gradation of Being,” is essentially based upon the notion of the “hierarchy of 
existence or being,” which has close affinity to the notions of Wilāyah and Walāyah. See Kalin, Ibrahim. 
(2010). Knowledge in Later Islamic Philosophy: Mullā Ṣadrā on Existence, Intellect and Intuition. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press; and Rustom, Muhammed. (Forthcoming 2012). The Triumph of Mercy: 
Philosophy and Scripture in Mullā Ṣadrā. Albany: State University of New York Press.       
536 For the related notion of Barakah, or “spiritual blessings [emanated from saints],” see Nasr, Seyyed 
Hossein. Sufi Essays; and Schuon, Frithjof. Sufism: Veil and Quintessence.   
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by the Qur’ān.537 In Shī‘ah Islam, Walāyah refers to a “type of existential authority and 
domination [over other beings] of an extraordinary nature.”538 Walāyah is an embedded 
feature of the “esoteric structure” of the world. This “esoteric structure,” however, is 
accompanied by an exoteric manifestation, namely Wilāyah. Wilāyah refers to the 
structure of external authority that comes from the possession of Walāyah. In other 
words, the closer one gets to God, the higher becomes one’s spiritual status and this, in 
turn, may lead to external authority. Wilāyah, therefore, is associated with more outward 
meanings such as guardianship, protection, and eventually political authority.  
While according to Muslim theology, the ultimate Wilāyah lies with God, His 
Wilāyah could be manifested among humankind as well. In Shī‘ah Islam, certain 
individuals are believed to have been granted the status of Walī in the sense of being the 
vessels of the Divine (exoteric) Wilāyah. To Shī‘ah Muslims, these individuals include 
the Prophet and the Imāms, i.e. ‘Alī and his eleven descendants, who are the bearers of 
not only Wilāyah but also the esoteric Walāyah.539 “The [Shī‘ī] imamate,” Muṭahharī 
                                                 
537 As discussed before, the word Walī comes from the same root of w-l-y. Walī appears in the Qur’ān in 
numerous places in both single and plural forms. See above.   
538 See Muṭahharī, Murtaḍā. (2010). Walā’-hā wa Wilāyat-hā. Tehran: Ṣadrā Publications. p. 75. 
539 For an authoritative account of Walāyah –and Wilāyah– in Shī‘ah Islam, see Ṭabāṭabā’ī, Sayyid 
Muḥammad Ḥusayn. Shi‘ite Islam. Ṭabāṭabā’ī believes that the Qur’ānic term “Imām” refers to the bearer 
of Walāyah who is ultimately responsible for all the “spiritual guidance” in the world [see the verse 2:124 
of the Qur’ān and Muṭahharī, Murtaḍā. Walā’-hā wa Wilāyat-hā. p. 97]. In fact, in one of the classical 
collections of Shī‘ī Ḥadīths, i.e. Uṣūl al-Kāfī, there is a section under the title of the “Imāms as the Light of 
God” referring to their functions as the guides for men [see Abū Ja‘far Thiqat al-Islām Kuliynī, Uṣūl al-
Kāfī, Vol. 1, pp. 194-5].  
Also, for an example of the Shī‘ī Ṣūfī literature, see Ṭabāṭabā’ī, Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn. (2003). 
Kernel of the Kernel. Trans. M. H. Faghfoory. Albany: State University of New York Press. See also Nasr, 
Seyyed Hossein. (1985). Ideals and Realities of Islam. London: George Allen & Unwin. Note that an 
important dimension of the Imāms’ Walāyah is their “penetrating knowledge.” Mainstream Shī‘ah sources 
argue that the Imām’s knowledge, or ‘Ilm al-Imām, is of esoteric essence and, thus, extraordinary. See, for 
instance, Shaykh Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Muẓaffar, ‘Ilm al-Imām. This “extraordinary knowledge” of the 
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writes, “is a type of Wilāyah, for it entails a certain degree of right to domination over, 
expedient administration of, and intervention in the affairs of the people.”540 
Similar to the doctrines of Shahādah and Taqīyyah, the notions of Wilāyah and 
Walāyah in Shī‘ah Islam have their roots in the Qur’ān. As indicated before, the word 
Walī and its plural form Awlīyā’ appear many times in the Qur’ān. Several verses, 
however, are of particular importance when it comes to these two notions. Verse 9:71, for 
instance, implies that there is a hierarchy among the “believers” for some have “Wilāyah 
over the others.” Verse 5:55 declares that the bearers of Wilāyah and Walāyah are God, 
the Prophet, and those believers who “perform the prayers, and pay the alms while they 
are bowing down [in praying to God].” The verse is sometimes called the “verse of 
Wilāyah”541 by Shī‘ah writers and there is a consensus among many Shī‘ah 
commentators that the latter part of the verse refers to ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, the first  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Imāms bring the Shī‘ī doctrine of imamate close to the Ṣūfī notion of al-Insān al-Kāmil, i.e. “the universal 
or the perfect man.” See Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. (2007). The Essentials Seyyed Hossein Nasr. Bloomington: 
World Wisdom. pp. 65-72. For more on the philosophical-mystical mixture of Shī‘ī and Ṣūfī Islams and the 
resulting notion of “Wilāyah al-Takwīnī,” see Modarresi Tabatabaii, Hossein. Maktab dar Farāyand 
Takāmul. pp. 105-6. It must be added that the concept of the Imām’s “extraordinary knowledge” did not go 
undisputed within the Shī‘ah community as a group of early Shī‘ah scholars challenged it. These scholars 
argued that the Imāms were “extremely pious and knowledgeable” individuals but denied most of the 
claims regarding their supernatural capabilities. This school of Shī‘ī thought, sometimes derogatorily called 
Muqaṣṣirah or “those who have failed [in appreciating the true status of the Imāms],” seems to have been 
marginalized throughout history. For an extensive discussion see Modarresi Tabatabaii, Hossein. Maktab 
dar Farāyand Takāmul. Especially, see pp. 58-107.  
540 See Muṭahharī, Murtaḍā. Walā’-hā wa Wilāyat-hā. p. 65. See also Shaykh al-Ṣadūq, ‘Uyūn Akhbār al-
Ridhā, Vol. 2, pp. 195-200.   
541 Besides these verses, Shī‘ah scholars have often referred to the verses 2:124, 207, 257, 269; 3:61; 4:59; 
5:3, 67; 7:44; 8:62; 9:3; 9:19-22, 100, 119; 13:7, 43; 19:96; 21:73; 32:24; 33:33; 39:32-4; 42:23; 56:10-2; 
66:4; 69:11-2; 76:5-10; and 98:7-8 to establish their claim that after the Prophet, it was ‘Alī who possessed 
Wilāyah and Walāyah. See Shaykh Makārim al-Shirāzī, Āyāt Wilāyat dar Qur’ān.  
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Imām.542 Therefore, they argue that the status of Wilāyah and Walāyah was transmitted 
from the Prophet to ‘Alī.    
In terms of the “Ḥadīth foundation” of Wilāyah and Walāyah, Shī‘ah sources 
report several Prophetic traditions. The two traditions frequently quoted are the so-called 
“Ḥadīth of Wilāyah” and “Ḥadīth of Ghadīr al-Khum.” Both traditions have been 
reported by Shī‘ah and Sunnī sources, albeit with slight differences. In regard to these 
traditions, the main distinction between the Shī‘ahs and the Sunnīs lies in their different 
understandings of the implications of the two Ḥadīths. According to the “Ḥadīth of 
Wilāyah,” the Prophet has declared that “‘Alī will be the Walī of every believer after me 
[i.e. the Prophet].”543 Sunnī commentators view this narration as a special praise of ‘Alī 
by the Prophet in response to some criticism raised against ‘Alī.544 Shī‘ah commentators, 
                                                 
542 See, for instance, Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, al-Tibyān fī Tafsīr al-Qur‘ān, Vol. 3, p. 561; and ‘Allāmih Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 
al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān, Vol. 6, pp. 5-25. In his rather long commentary upon the verse, ‘Allāmih 
Ṭabāṭabā’ī articulates the mainstream Shī‘ī understanding of Wilāyah and Walāyah based on the Qur’ānic 
verses as well as the Shī‘ah body of Ḥadīth. Note that ‘Allāmih Ṭabāṭabā’ī uses the term Wilāyah al-
Takwīn, or “Wilāyah of Formation or Origination,” to refer to what is called Walāyah in this dissertation 
[see Ibid. Vol. 6, p. 13]. See also Amīn al-Islām Ṭabarsī, Kitāb al-Iḥtijāj, Vol. 1, p. 161; and Ibid. Vol. 1, p. 
197. Several Sunnī commentators have also reported that the above verse was first revealed in reference to 
‘Alī [see, for instance, Sa‘d al-Dīn Taftāzānī, Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid fī ‘Ilm al-Kalām, Vol. 2, pp. 288-9; Mīr 
Sayyid Sharīf Jurjānī, Sharḥ al-Mawāqif, Vol. 8, p. 360; and ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Abī Bakr al-Suyūṭī, al-
Durr al-Manthūr fīl-Tafsīr bil-Ma’thūr, Vol. 2, p. 294. See also Qāḍī ‘Aḍid al-Dīn Ījī, al-Mawāqif fī ‘Ilm al-
Kalām; and Maḥmūd al-Ālūsī, Rūḥ al-Ma‘ānī fi Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-‘Aẓīm wal-Sab‘ al-Mathānī]. For 
related reports, see Abū al-Qāsim Zamakhsharī, al-Kashshāf ‘an Ḥaqā’iq al-Tanzīl wa ‘Uyūn al-Aqāwīl fi 
Wujūh al-Ta’wīl, Vol. 1, p. 623; and Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī, Tafsīr al-Kabīr, Vol. 12, p. 26.    
543 This Ḥadīth has been reported in various sources including Muḥammad al-Tirmadhī, al-Ṣaḥīḥ, Vol. 5, 
pp. 296-7; Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, al-Musnad, Vol. 4, pp. 437-8; ‘Alā al-Dīn ‘Alī al-Hindī, Kanz al-‘Ummāl fī 
Sunan al-Aqwāl wal-Af‘āl, Vol. 11, p. 608. See also Muḥammad ibn Ismā‘īl al-Bukhārī, al-Ṣaḥīḥ, Vol. 5, p. 
85. 
544 According to Sunnī sources, quite a number of the praises of ‘Alī attributed to the Prophet were issued in 
defense of the former against various criticisms. This indicates that even at the time of the Prophet, some 
tension existed between ‘Alī and some of his fellow disciples. In fact, ‘Alī appears to be a rather polarizing 
figure in the early history of Islam. Often, a small group of prominent disciples including Salmān al-Fārsī, 
Abūdhar al-Ghifārī, and Miqdād ibn Aswad are cited as close friends of ‘Alī [see Muḥammad al-Tirmadhī, 
al-Ṣaḥīḥ, Vol. 5, p. 299]. For a Shī‘ī account of ‘Alī’s character, see Muṭahharī, Murtaḍā. (1989). Jādhibih 
wa Dāfi‘ih ‘Alī. Tehran: Ṣadrā Publications. See also Muḥammad al-Tirmadhī, al-Ṣaḥīḥ, Vol. 5, pp. 296-
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in contrast, interpret the tradition as a clear indication that ‘Alī was declared as the future 
bearer of the Prophetic Wilāyah and Walāyah.545 
“Ḥadīth of Ghadīr al-Khum” refers to another Prophetic tradition reported by both 
Sunnī and Shī‘ah sources.546 The Ḥadīth is arguably the most frequently quoted Ḥadīth 
by the Shī‘ah sources in regard to their argument about ‘Alī’s Wilāyah and Walāyah. 
According to the narration, in the year 632 C.E., the Prophet performed his last 
pilgrimage to Mecca –often called the “Farewell Pilgrimage.”547 He was accompanied by 
a large number of Muslims from various regions of the Arabian Peninsula. After the 
conclusion of the rituals and before the many caravans departed for their hometowns, the 
Prophet summoned all to gather in a place called Ghadīr al-Khum, the Pond of Khum, 
and gave a sermon. Then, according to Shī‘ah sources, he raised the hand of ‘Alī and 
declared that “to whomever I have been the Mawlā[548], ‘Alī here is to be his Mawlā.”549 
                                                                                                                                                 
306. The fact that ‘Alī had no strong tribal support within Quraysh was also a factor in the emergence of 
the forces against him, which eventually marginalized ‘Alī after the Prophet died. See the preceding 
Chapter for more discussion.  
545 See for instance, Ayatollah Muntaẓirī, Niẓām al-Ḥukm fīl-Islām, p. 36; and al-Sayyid al-Mar‘ashī, Sharḥ 
Iḥqāq al-Ḥaqq, Vol. 15, pp. 92-113. See also Muḥammad al-Riyshahrī, Mūsū‘ah al-Imām ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib 
fil-Kitāb wal-Sunnah wal-Tārīkh, Vol. 2, pp. 25-8; Ibid. Vol. 2, pp. 31-7; and, in particular, Ibid. Vol. 2, pp. 
196-228.  
546 See, for instance, Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, al-Musnad, Vol. 1, p. 119; Ibid. Vol. 4, p. 370; Ibid. Vol. 5, p. 419; 
Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah wal-Nihāyah, Vol. 9, p. 194; Abū ‘Abdullāh ibn Mājah, Sunan ibn Mājah, Vol. 1, pp. 
43-5; and Muḥammad al-Tirmadhī, al-Ṣaḥīḥ, Vol. 5, p. 297. Numerous Shī‘ah sources have reported the 
Ḥadīth as well. For the Shī‘ah version of the “Sermon of Ghadīr al-Khum” see ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥar al-
Anwār, Vol. 37, pp. 204-217.            
547 For more information on the “Farewell Pilgrimage,” see Muḥammad ibn Ismā‘īl al-Bukhārī, al-Ṣaḥīḥ, 
Vol. 5, pp. 123-5; Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah wal-Nihāyah, Vol. 5, pp. 125-227; and Aḥmad ibn Abī Ya‘qūb, 
Tārīkh Ya‘qūbī, Vol. 2, pp. 109-12. 
548 Similar to the word Walī, Mawlā implies “bearer of Wilāyah and Walāyah.” Walī is sometimes 
associated with Walāyah and Mawlā with Wilāyah. Such associations, however, are not clear-cut and both 
terms can imply either Wilāyah or Walāyah. For a mainstream Shī‘ī discussion of the word Mawlā in this 
Ḥadīth, see ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥar al-Anwār, Vol. 37, pp. 237-253.     
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The word Mawlā comes from the same Arabic root w-l-y, from which the terms Wilāyah 
and Walāyah are derived. Therefore, Shī‘ah writers have generally interpreted the 
“Ḥadīth of Ghadīr al-Khum” as the official announcement that ‘Alī would be the bearer 
of Wilāyah and Walāyah after the Prophet.550 They have understood the term Mawlā in its 
more literal sense of the “ruler” or the “patron.” The Shī‘ī interpretation rests upon 
several Shī‘ī premises. First is the Shī‘ī emphasis on the principle of Divine Justice that, 
according to Shī‘ah Islam, has been manifested in the sacred hierarchies of Wilāyah and 
Walāyah. The Muslim doctrine of the “Seal of Prophecy,”551 therefore, did not mean that 
God would leave Muslims without a Mawlā after the prophets, Shī‘ahs argued. Such an 
“abandoning of mankind” would have contradicted the Divine Justice and the Divine 
Providence for His devotees.552 According to Shī‘ahs, this is why the Prophet made such 
an announcement in the Valley of Khum just months before his death. It was to declare 
the “continuation of the Divine Grace” through Wilāyah and Walāyah in the person of 
‘Alī. In the Shī‘ī version of the “Farewell Sermon,” furthermore, the Prophet goes on to 
compare ‘Alī’s status to himself as identical to that of Aaron to Moses.553 The 
                                                                                                                                                 
549 See ‘Allāmih Amīnī, al-Ghadīr; ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥar al-Anwār, Vol. 37, pp. 126-253; Aḥmad ibn Abī 
Ya‘qūb, Tārīkh Ya‘qūbī, Vol. 2, p. 112; al-Sayyid al-Mar‘ashī, Sharḥ Iḥqāq al-Ḥaqq, Vol. 21, pp. 21-121; 
and Muḥammad al-Riyshahrī, Mūsū‘ah al-Imām ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib fil-Kitāb wal-Sunnah wal-Tārīkh Vol. 2, 
pp. 251-386. See also Muḥammad al-Tirmadhī, al-Ṣaḥīḥ, Vol. 5, p. 297.            
550 See, for instance, Muḥammad al-Riyshahrī, Mūsū‘ah al-Imām ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib fil-Kitāb wal-Sunnah 
wal-Tārīkh Vol. 2, pp. 251-386. 
551 Based on the Qur’ānic verses, Muslims believe that the Prophet was the last of the chain of the prophets 
sent by God. This belief is usually referred to as the “Seal of Prophecy” for in the verse 33:40 the Prophet is 
called Khātam al-Nabīyīn, or “the seal of the prophets.”   
552 See, for instance, See Muṭahharī, Murtaḍā. Walā’-hā wa Wilāyat-hā. pp. 67-8. 
553 See ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥar al-Anwār, Vol. 37, pp. 139-40; and Ibid. Vol. 37, p. 206. Sunnī sources have 
also reported such comparisons made by the Prophet, although without mentioning whether or not it 
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comparison, according to Shī‘ah Muslims, is an indication that the Prophet transmitted 
his Wilāyah to ‘Alī in the fullest extent possible in Ghadīr al-Khum.554 By doing so, the 
Prophet guaranteed that the world would not be devoid of a Walī after his death. 
Secondly, Shī‘ah jurists have argued that the “fate of the Ummah” was so important to 
the Prophet that he could have not simply ignored the issue of his political succession 
during his lifetime.555 To these jurists, the Prophet did address that question in Ghadīr al-
Khum.556  
Sunnī commentators, on the other hand, have interpreted the Ḥadīth of Ghadīr al-
Khum as yet another special praise of ‘Alī by the Prophet. In fact this narration along 
with several other Prophetic traditions has led to the venerated status of ‘Alī among Sunnī 
                                                                                                                                                 
happened during the “Farewell Pilgrimage.” See, for instance, Muḥammad al-Tirmadhī, al-Ṣaḥīḥ, Vol. 5, p. 
304; and Abū ‘Abdullāh ibn Mājah, Sunan ibn Mājah, Vol. 1, p. 45.            
554 One of the explicit Shī‘ī accounts of ‘Alī’s Wilāyah and Walāyah in Ghadīr al-Khum is reported by 
Shaykh al-Ṭūsī. According to Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, in one of the anniversaries of the day of Ghadīr al-Khum, 
‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib gave a sermon. In the sermon, ‘Alī articulated a Shī‘ī account of the ontology of Wilāyah 
and Walāyah in relation to the events of Ghadīr al-Khum. He referred to a “selected group of people” after 
the Prophet whom God had chosen to be “the callers to the Truth and the guides to God.” These people 
were, according to him, “God’s validating proof,” or Ḥujjat. He then asserted the Walāyah of these 
“selected devotees to God” by declaring that “God had made them witness to His creation [or to His 
people]; and has transferred His Walāyah to them on whatever of His affairs He has desired so.” See 
Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, Mīṣbāḥ al-Mutahajjid, pp. 752-7. 
555 For various Shī‘ī articulations of these arguments, see al-Shaykh Kāshif al-Ghiṭā’, Aṣl al-Shī‘ah wa 
Uṣūlahā, Vol. pp. 221-31; al-Sayyid al-Ḥusaynī al-Mīlānī, al-Imāmah fī Ahamm al-Kutub al-Kalāmīyyah 
wa ‘Aqīdah al-Imāmīyyah –in particular pp. 43-56; and Shaykh Muḥammad Riḍā al-Muẓaffar, ‘Aqā’id al-
Imāmīyyah, pp. 65-76.   
556 It must be mentioned that an important genre of writings by prominent Shī‘ah theologians deal with the 
question of Wilāyah and Walāyah of ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib. The genre of writings investigates the Qur’ānic and 
Ḥadīth foundations of this Shī‘ī argument. This is for ‘Alī’s Wilāyah and Walāyah is the bedrock of the 
whole Shī‘ī ontology of Wilāyah and Walāyah. It is also the basis for their belief that the metaphysical 
hierarchy of Wilāyah and Walāyah is an essential feature of the “created world”; and that such hierarchy did 
not cease to exist after the Prophet died. The continuation of Wilāyah and Walāyah after the Prophet was 
for the simple reason that the world, according to Shī‘ah theology, cannot continue to exist without Divine 
Wilāyah and Walāyah channeled through the Walī(s). Arguably the most well-known example of this genre 
of Shī‘ī writing is the multi-volume al-Ghadīr by ‘Allāmih Amīnī (d. 1970). See also al-Sayyid al-
Mar‘ashī, Sharḥ Iḥqāq al-Ḥaqq; and Muḥammad al-Riyshahrī, Mūsū‘ah al-Imām ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib fil-
Kitāb wal-Sunnah wal-Tārīkh. 
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Muslims. They have understood the word Mawlā to imply “friend”; and the likening of 
‘Ali to the Prophet as Mawlā of every Muslim was to deflect some of the critiques against 
the former.557 In fact, one of the mainstream Muslim biographers of the Prophet, Ibn 
Hishām, reports that during the “Farewell Pilgrimage,” some of the ‘Alī’s companions 
complained to the Prophet about ‘Alī’s strict manners. The Prophet then dismissed the 
complaints and praised ‘Ali for his “strict adherence to Islam.” The incident is, therefore, 
taken as a further indication that the word Mawlā in the above Ḥadīth refers to a 
Prophetic command to befriend ‘Alī and to guard him against future criticisms.558 In 
addition, Sunnī writers have argued that had the Prophet meant ‘Alī to be his successor, 
he would have announced such an important decision more clearly and in a number of 
occasions prior to his death.559 
                                                 
557 See, for instance, Mīr Sayyid Sharīf Jurjānī, Sharḥ al-Mawāqif al-Ījī, Vol. 8, pp. 359-61. 
558 See Ibn Hishām, Sīrah al-Nabawīyyah, Vol. 4, pp. 1021-2. Note that Ibn Hishām does not report the 
“Ḥadīth of Ghadīr al-Khum” in his version of the “Farewell Sermon,” which was apparently delivered right 
after the abovementioned dispute between ‘Alī and others.    
559 For a mainstream Sunnī response to Shī‘ī arguments regarding the “verse of Wilāyah” and the “Ḥadīth 
of Ghadīr al-Khum” see Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī, Tafsīr al-Kabīr, Vol. 12, pp. 25-31. Note that there is, arguably, 
another interpretation distinct from the mainstream Shī‘ī and from the mainstream Sunnī accounts of the 
“Ḥadīth of Ghadīr al-Khum.” This belongs to Sunnī Ṣūfī Muslims. While Shī‘ah Muslims believe that in 
Ghadīr al-Khum, ‘Alī became the bearer of the Prophetic Wīlayah, i.e. external and exoteric authority, and 
Walāyah, i.e. esoteric and spiritual authority, these Sunnī Ṣūfī commentators have argued that it was the 
latter authority, i.e. Walāyah, that was transmitted to ‘Alī. There is no wonder, therefore, that the majority 
of traditional Ṣūfī orders have their Silsilahs, or “spiritual genealogy,” going back to the Prophet through 
‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib [see Dakake, Maria M. (2007). The Charismatic Community: Shi‘ite Identity in Early 
Islam. Albany: State University of New York Press. pp. 33-48]. The remaining few have Abū Bakr, the first 
Sunnī caliph, as their spiritual patriarch after the Prophet. A few Ṣūfī orders, e.g. the North African Shādhilī 
Order, have both ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib and Abū Bakr in their Silsilah. Mainstream Sunnī commentators, on the 
other hand, reject that the “Ḥadīth of Ghadīr al-Khum” implies any internal or external authority being 
transmitted to ‘Alī.    
Note that the “Ḥadīth foundation” of Wilāyah and Walāyah in Shī‘ah Islam goes beyond these two 
Prophetic traditions. The Shī‘ah Imāms themselves produced an important body of teachings regarding 
Wilāyah and Walāyah. As mentioned before, two of the more important Ḥadīths in this regard are attributed 
to the eighth Imām, ‘Alī ibn Mūsā. These are the “Ḥadīth of the Golden Chain” and the “Ḥadīth of the 
Fortress of Wilāyah.” See the preceding Chapter as well as Shaykh al-Ṣadūq, ‘Uyūn Akhbār al-Ridhā, Vol. 
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It must be underlined that the notions of Wilāyah and Walāyah exist in Sunnī 
Islam as well, and especially within the metaphysical doctrines of various Ṣūfī orders in 
the Sunnī world.560 The main difference between Ṣūfī Sunnīs and Shī‘ah Muslims in this 
regard is that the status of the Shī‘ah Imāms are less highlighted by the former group. 
Sunnī Ṣūfīs do believe that, following the death of the Prophet, there have been and will 
always be certain number of living saints who would carry the status of Walāyah. In fact, 
many Sunnī Ṣūfī orders incorporated the names of the Shī‘ah Imāms within the ranks of 
their venerated saints and Shaykhs.561 In contrast, Shī‘ah Muslims believe that the status 
of the Imāms are considerably higher than those of other Muslim saints. In fact, the 
mainstream Shī‘ī belief holds that the spiritual status of the Imāms is the “highest 
achievable” rank after the “Seal of Prophecy.” While acknowledging the significance of 
non-Imām Awlīyā’ (or “possessors of Walāyah), Shī‘ah Muslims considered them 
decisively inferior to the Imāms and, in fact, indebted to the Imāms’ Walāyah for 
bestowing upon the saints their spiritual status.562 In any case, the importance of Walāyah 
in Taṣawwuf did not translate to its significance in Sunnī theology for in general 
                                                                                                                                                 
1, pp. 143-5; Ibid. Vol. 1, p. 146; and ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, Vol. 49, pp.120-3.  
560 Henry Corbin believes that a common core of Taṣawwuf and Shī‘ah Islam is the notion of Walāyah. See 
Corbin, Henry. The Man of Light in Iranian Sufism. See also Muṭahharī, Murtaḍā. Walā’-hā wa Wilāyat-hā. 
p. 85. For the discussion of Walāyah and Wilāyah in Sunnī Ṣūfī traditions, see Chodkiewicz, Michel. 
(1993). Seal of the Saints: Prophethood and Sainthood in the Doctrine of Ibn ‘Arabī. Cambridge: The 
Islamic Text Society. See pp. 47-59 in particular. See also various works of the prominent Sunnī Ṣūfī, Ibn 
‘Arabī especially Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam and Futūḥāt al-Makkīyyah, as well as the excellent summary of the 
notion of Walāyah by Hermann Landolt in Encyclopedia of Religion [see Eliade, Mircea. (Ed.). (1987). 
Encyclopedia of Religion. New York: Macmillan. Vol. 15, pp. 316-22].    
561 In many Sunnī Ṣūfī Silsilahs one may find the names of all or some of the first eight Shī‘ah Imāms.  
562 In addition, there is arguably the middle group of Shī‘ah Ṣūfīs. Their position lies somewhere between 
that of mainstream Shī‘ī beliefs and the position of Sunnī Ṣūfīs. While venerating the Imāms as supreme 
saints, Shī‘ah Ṣūfīs, in general, have paid more tribute to non-Imām saints of Sunnī or Shī‘ī origin. 
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Taṣawwuf has not been the mainstream interpretation of Islam in the Sunnī world. 
Moreover, the notion of Wilāyah and external “sacred” authority is generally less 
highlighted in Taṣawwuf compared to Shī‘ah Islam. This is yet another reason why the 
ontology of Wilāyah and Walāyah remains an important point of distinction between 
Sunnī Islam and Shī‘ah Islam.  
Besides their theological implications, Wilāyah and Walāyah shaped the minority 
Shī‘ah Muslims’ self-perception in important ways. While Sunnī Muslims viewed 
themselves as the architects and the guardians of Muslim civilizations, early Shī‘ah 
Muslims tended to see themselves as the guardians of Islam’s “Sacred secrets,” and above 
all Wilāyah and Walāyah.563 The geographical expansion of the Muslim world to North 
Africa, the Levant, Mediterranean Europe, South, East and Central Asia was, for the most 
part, due to the campaigns of the Sunnī caliphs. The Umayyad dynasty laid the material 
foundations for the rise of Muslim civilizations, which culminated in the “Golden Age” 
during the Abbasid caliphate. It was under the patronage of Sunnī Abbasid caliphs that 
Baghdad became one of the prominent centers of education and arts in the eighth century. 
Later on, it was the Sunnī Ottomans who championed the so-called “Muslim cause” in 
the face of rising Europe into the modern times. The fact that many early Western 
                                                 
563 Along with ‘Uthmān ibn Maẓ‘ūn and Salmān al-Fārsī, ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib was among the disciples of the 
Prophet who appear to have been particularly interested in the esoteric aspects of Islam along with its 
exoteric teachings. In addition, ‘Alī appears to have been an essential figure among the disciples for his 
contribution to Muslim mysticism. His rather different understanding of the Prophet’s life and message is 
evident when one compares the reported body of traditions and sayings by ‘Alī with that of other disciples. 
Some of the extremely mystical Shī‘ī prayers such as “The Sha‘bānīyyah Supplication,” or Munājāt, “The 
Prayer of Kumayl,” “The Supplication of the Kūfah Mosque,” and “The Prayer of the Morning,” or Ṣabāḥ, 
belong to ‘Alī. See ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, Nahj al-Balāghah; and Shah-Kazemi, Reza. Justice and 
Remembrance. For an interesting account of the mystical –and rather obscure– disciple, ‘Uthmān ibn 
Maẓ‘ūn, see ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, Nahj al-Balāghah, Ḥikmah 289. For an insightful discussion of association 
between the Shī‘ah minority status and the “Truth” of their beliefs, see Enayat, Hamid. Modern Islamic 
Political Thoughts. pp. 18-21.        
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scholars equated Islam with Sunnī Islam is an indication of how powerful the role of 
Sunnī Muslims had been in shaping the image of Islam in the West. Similar arguments 
may be put forward when it comes to the South and East Asia. The above argument about 
the role played by Sunnī Muslims is not to deny the important contributions of the Shī‘ah 
communities and the Shī‘ah “pious merchants”564 in the spread of Islam in these regions. 
To this day, however, the overwhelming majority of Muslims in the South, East, and 
Central Asia are Sunnī. Throughout centuries, Sunnī Muslims expanded and protected the 
borders of the Muslim world. Brilliant empire builders, they tapped into the reservoir of 
scholars, architects, and artists from different parts of this multi-ethnic world including 
Persians, Turks, North Africans, Andalusians, Chinese, South and East Asians. They 
enriched the intellectual tapestry of Muslim civilization as patrons of the arts and 
sciences. Once again, this is not to dismiss the essential contributions of many Shī‘ah 
scholars, scientists, Ṣūfīs, poets, and theologians in the rise of Muslim civilizations; nor 
to deny the noticeable cases of Shī‘ī “sub-civilizations” such as the Safavid Persia565 or 
the Fāṭimid Egypt566. The point is that, for the most part of the history and over the 
greater part of Muslim geography, it was the Sunnī rulers, caliphs, and sultans who 
functioned as the builders and protectors of Muslim civilizations. 
 
                                                 
564 F. Rajaee, personal communication, July 7, 2011. See also Nasr. Seyyed Hossein. (2003). Islam: 
Religion, History and Civilization. New York: HarperCollins. p. 142. 
565 In recent years, there has been a new scholarly interest in important civilizational achievements of the 
Safavid. See, for instance, Newman, Andrew J. (2006). Safavid Iran: Rebirth of a Persian Empire. New 
York: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd.    
566 See Feirahi, Davoud. Tārīkh Taḥawwūl Duwlat dar Islām. pp. 281-314. 
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Meanwhile, Shī‘ah Muslims assumed the position of the bearers of the “Sacred 
Knowledge,” or the “Heart of Islam.”567 Long before they rose to power in any quarter of 
the Muslim world, Shī‘ah Muslims compensated for their social inferiority and material 
weakness by a firm belief in their central “metaphysical role” as a community, a chosen 
people. They believed that the majority of Muslims had digressed from the “Truths” of 
Wilāyah and Walāyah, and that they had forgotten the sacred “spiritual structure” the 
Prophet meant to reveal. Shī‘ah Muslims took it, therefore, as their responsibility to 
protect the institution of Wilāyah and Walāyah manifested, they believed, in the persons 
of the Imāms.568 The esoteric dimension of Wilāyah-Walāyah ontology proved to be a 
suitable match for the socioeconomic setting of a minority community bereft of hopes for 
any external social progress. It is also in this context that one can understand why many 
prominent Shī‘ah jurists have used the term Biyḍih Islām when referring to the protection 
of the Shī‘ah community and later on in reference to Shī‘ī states.569 The word Biyḍih, 
literally meaning egg, implies the essence or foundation; and for centuries, the Shī‘ah 
                                                 
567 This term is borrowed from Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. (2002). The Heart of Islam: Enduring Values for 
Humanity. New York: HarperCollins. See pages 63, 67, and 225-6 in particular. In this regard, Hamid 
Enayat writes “[e]soterism is closely intertwined with Shī‘ī theosophy, which explains the rationale of 
Shī‘īsm as being merely the awareness and guardianship of the secret truth of Islam” [Enayat, Hamid. 
Modern Islamic Political Thoughts. p. 22]. Enayat also quotes Henry Corbin’s characterization of Shī‘ah 
Islam as “the sanctuary of Islamic esoterism” [Ibid.]. 
568 See Dakake, Maria M. The Charismatic Community for an extensive discussion of esoteric Walāyah in 
early Shī‘ah Islam. 
569 This term can be found in the works of many later Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā. In modern times, the term was 
famously used in ‘Allāmih Nā’īnī’s influential Tanbīh al-Ummah wa Tanzīh al-Millah. As indicated in 
Chapter II, the book was written prior to the Constitutional Revolution of 1905 in Persia and soon became 
the classic pro-Constitution document from a Shī‘ī perspective. The notion of protecting the Biyḍih Islām, 
i.e. “the essence or the foundation of Islam,” was employed by both pro-Constitution and anti-Constitution 
‘Ulamā in their efforts to religiously articulate and justify their positions. The extent of its use has rendered 
the notion of “protecting the Shī‘ah community” a working “jurisdictional principle,” i.e. Qā‘idah al-Fiqhī, 
in Shī‘ah Islam. This “working principle” has been further reinforced by the doctrine of Taqīyyah as 
discussed in the preceding Chapter. See also Ayatollah Khomeini, Taḥrīr al-Wasīlah, Vol. 1, pp. 485-6.       
201 
 
‘Ulamā have argued that protection of the Shī‘ah community570 is “religiously 
mandatory,” or al-Wājib, for it has been identified with “protecting the essence of 
Islam.”571  
Strategic Implications  
With regard to Shī‘ī strategic cultures, Wilāyah and Walāyah created a paradigm 
that allowed the doctrines of Shahādah and Taqīyyah to coexist, for Wilāyah and Walāyah 
projected the Shī‘ah community as a “special community.” The notion implied that the 
community may undertake extraordinary measures such as expediency, secrecy, and 
concealment during episodes of terror. Such was the case, according to Shī‘ah 
historiographies, during the lives of most of the Shī‘ah Imāms. There are, however, other 
times when the Shī‘ah community must or may disregard prudence and political 
calculations for the sake of “upholding justice.” Such was, according to mainstream Shī‘ī 
beliefs, the lesson of Ḥusayn’s martyrdom. As discussed in Chapter III, however, for the 
Shī‘ah community to choose Shahādah over Taqīyyah, the permission of the legitimate 
bearer of Wilāyah and Walāyah became a necessity. As a result, Twelver Shī‘ah Muslims 
historically chose sociopolitical prudence as their modus vivendi.  
Meanwhile, the impacts of Wilāyah and Walāyah on Shī‘ī strategic cultures went 
beyond mere accommodation of Shahādah and Taqīyyah. The two notions have also had 
                                                 
570 It must be mentioned that in the works of many Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā, the two terms “Shī‘ah” and “Islām” have 
been used interchangeably, for the main audience of these works were the Shī‘ahs and any such distinction 
deemed unnecessary.   
571 Note that the above perception has its root in Shī‘ah Ḥadīths. For instance, the fifth Shī‘ah Imām is 
reported to have said that “[t]he foundations of Islam are five: the daily prayers, the alms giving, the fasting 
[in Ramadan], the pilgrimage [to Mecca], and Wilāyah.” He then declares that the most essential of the five 
“foundations” is Wilāyah [see al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī, Wasā’il al-Shī‘ah fī Taḥṣīl al-Masā’il al-Sharī‘ah, Vol. 1, 
p. 7].  
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some direct impacts upon Shī‘ī strategic discourses and practices. Above all, Wilāyah and 
Walāyah served the community by strengthening the sense of internal unity. It goes 
without saying that for a minority strategic culture, strong bonds of unity become of 
significance. The more doctrinal versions of Wilāyah and Walāyah emphasized precisely 
such bonds of friendship and trust within the community. They also warned against 
developing similar bonds with people outside the community. Murtaḍā Muṭahharī, one of 
the chief Shī‘ah thinkers of the past century, points to this particular function of Wilāyah 
and Walāyah in his short treatise on the subject.572 He argues that, based on the Qur’ānic 
verses, there are two types of Wilāyah, namely “positive and negative.”573 A “negative 
Wilāyah,” which is rejected in the Qur’ān, refers to the external authority of an 
illegitimate and thus unjust ruler. In the verse 4:144, for instance, the believers are 
warned against “taking non-believers as their Walīs.”574 According to Muṭahharī, the 
verse does not mean that “Muslims should not be kind to non-Muslims or that they 
should not treat non-Muslims benevolently.” Instead, it means that they should not 
“accept the Wilāyah of non-Muslims and should not consider non-Muslims as one of 
themselves.”575 In his formulation of Wilāyah, therefore, Muṭahharī binds the notion of 
                                                 
572 See Muṭahharī, Murtaḍā. Walā’-hā wa Wilāyat-hā. Note that Muṭahharī uses the term Wilā’ Zi‘āmat, or 
“Wilayah of Leadership or Lordship,” to refer to what is called Wilāyah in this dissertation [see Ibid. p. 66]; 
and he employs the term Wilā’ Taṣarruf, or “Wilāyah of Custodian Intervention,” to refer to what is called 
Walāyah in this dissertation [see Ibid. p. 75].     
573 See Ibid. pp. 16-7. 
574 A similar theme can be found in the verses 60:1 and 60:2 of the Qur’ān. 
575 Muṭahharī, Murtaḍā. Walā’-hā wa Wilāyat-hā. pp. 21-2. Muṭahharī goes on to claim that “the enemies of 
Islam always try to transform negative Wilāyah into positive Wilāyah [and vice versa…], that is all their 
efforts aim at fostering intimately close relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims while creating 
inimical relations among Muslims themselves” [Ibid. p. 35]. This imagery is further fortified in Shī‘ī 
popular culture through various Shī‘ī supererogatory prayers. In one of the commonest of these prayers, i.e. 
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internal unity to that of strict and uncompromising boundaries between the “self” and the 
“other.”576 Later on, this self-other bifurcation obtained a sophisticated dynamic with the 
consolidation of the doctrine of Taqīyyah in the practice of Shī‘ah Muslims.   
On the other hand, Wilāyah and Walāyah instilled a sense of “metaphysical 
security” among the Shī‘ah Muslims. As custodians of the “Divine Sacred Wilāyah,” the 
Shī‘ah community found a sense of purpose and a “calling” to bear with external 
difficulties. This particular function of Wilāyah and Walāyah aligned with that of the 
doctrine of Shahādah, for the latter doctrine also belittled physical pain and external 
suffering for the sake of a higher vocation. The “metaphysical security” was further 
fortified by the often quoted “Ḥadīth of the Fortress, or Ḥiṣn, of Wilāyah.” In the Ḥadīth, 
the eighth Shī‘ah Imām likened the “Wilāyah of ‘Alī” with a fortress guarding its 
inhabitants “against the Divine Wrath,”577 which, needless to say, implied a sense of 
utmost security.      
Furthermore, the discourse of Wilāyah and Walāyah socialized the Shī‘ah 
community with a powerful sense of authority and hierarchy. Again, the hierarchical 
structure was of strategic significance for the survival of a persecuted community as the 
Shī‘ahs were during the early centuries of Islam. The Imāms were revered as the persons 
of supreme authority at the center of the community. They were not only the external 
                                                                                                                                                 
Du‘ā al-Iftitāḥ, Shī‘ahs lament to God about “the absence of their Walī, the multitude of their enemy, the 
fewness of their numbers, and the severity of the calamities upon them.” Here, the notion of Wilāyah and 
that of Walī are tied to concerns about the protection of a persecuted minority community.     
576 See Wendt, Alexander. Social Theory of International Politics. pp. 224-32. See also ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, 
Nahj al-Balāghah, Sermon 27 for the notion of “unity based upon the Truth” and its significance according 
to the Shī‘ah patriarch.  
577 See Shaykh al-Ṣadūq, ‘Uyūn Akhbār al-Ridhā, Vol. 1, p. 146. 
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head of the community but also, due to their esoteric position in the “metaphysical 
hierarchy” of the world, the Divine Ḥujjat.578 The status meant that an immense power 
was associated with the office of the Imāms. Naturally, this exoteric and esoteric 
authority of the office of the Imāms created a number of challenges. The transition from 
one Imām to the next, for instance, became problematic from time to time, for several 
people claimed to be the next bearer of Wilāyah and Walāyah. As a result, a number of 
divisions took place in the Shī‘ah community based on different chains of the bearers of 
Wilāyah and Walāyah. The most prominent cases of such divisions include the 
Kīsānīyyah who believed Muḥammad ibn Ḥanafīyyah to be the fourth Imām; the Zaydīs 
who followed Zayd ibn ‘Alī and Muḥammad ibn ‘Abdullāh instead of Ja‘far ibn 
Muḥammad; the Ismā‘īlīs who believed ‘Ismā‘īl ibn Ja‘far to be the seventh Imām; and 
Ja‘farīyyah who believed Ja‘far ibn ‘Alī to be the twelfth Imām.579 One after another, 
these groups broke away from the Twelver Imāmīyyah, who constitute the majority of the 
Shī‘ah Muslims today. 
Besides the divisions that occurred as a result of disagreements about who the 
next Imām would be, the high authority of Wilāyah and Walāyah caused difficulties even 
within the Twelver Shī‘ah community. Shī‘ah sources report that the members of the 
community sometimes challenged the living Imām’s decisions or even defied his specific 
commands especially during the imamate of the last Imāms.580 Some of these challengers 
                                                 
578 See Dakake, Maria M. The Charismatic Community. 
579 See Modarresi Tabatabaii, Hossein. Maktab dar Farāyand Takāmul. pp. 111-67; Feirahi, Davoud. Tārīkh 
Taḥawwūl Duwlat dar Islām. pp. 295-334; Abū al-Fatḥ Shahristānī, al-Milal wal-Niḥal, Vol. 1, pp. 146-
189; and Ibid.Vol. 1, pp. 191-7. 
580 See Modarresi Tabatabaii, Hossein. Maktab dar Farāyand Takāmul. pp. 114-42. See also Abū al-Ḥasan 
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were in fact prominent Shī‘ah disciples praised by the Imāms on some other occasions.581 
It seems that this less than ideal relationship between the Imāms and the community was 
tolerated for the most part. In several Ḥadīths, however, the Imāms indicate that “true 
Shī‘ahs” are rare.582 These Ḥadīths might be, inter alia, an indication that the Shī‘ah 
community did not always fully observed the implications of the doctrine of Wilāyah and 
Walāyah.  
Towards the end of the chain of the Imāms, the internal challenges against the 
authority of the Imām heightened. The internal defiance culminated during the imamate 
of the eleventh Imām, Ḥasan ibn ‘Alī. In fact, he is reported to have complained that 
more than any of his forefathers, i.e. the previous Shī‘ah Imāms, he and his imamate has 
been doubted and defied by the Shī‘ah community.583 It is with regard to these rising 
                                                                                                                                                 
ibn Bābawayh al-Qumī, al-Imāmah wal-Tabṣirah, pp. 60-77; Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, Kitāb al-Ghaybah, pp. 18-70; 
Ibid.  pp. 192-9; Ibid. pp. 218-28; Ibid. pp. 351-2; Abū Ja‘far Thiqat al-Islām Kuliynī, Uṣūl al-Kāfī, Vol. 1, 
pp. 320-4; Ibid. Vol. 1, p. 411; Ibid. Vol. 1, p. 511; ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥar al-Anwār, Vol. 26, p. 15; 
Ḥusayn ibn Ḥamdān al-Khaṣībī, al-Hidāyah al-Kubrā, pp. 295-6; Ibid. p. 385; Shahīd al-Thānī, Ḥaqā’iq 
al-Imān, pp. 150-1; Ibn Shahr Āshūb, Manāqib Āl Abī Ṭālib, Vol. 3, p. 354; al-Qāḍī Nu‘mān al-Maghribī, 
Sharḥ al-Akhbār, Vol. 3, p. 312; Modarresi Tabatabaii, Hossein. Maktab dar Farāyand Takāmul. pp. 51-2; 
and Ibid. pp. 89-90 for various intra-Shī‘ah disputes, uncertainties, and disagreement as well as several 
examples of Shī‘ahs challenging or defying the authority of their Imāms –or demanding the Imāms’ 
explanation for their actions. For similar reports, see also Shaykh al-Ṣadūq, Kamāl al-Dīn wa Tamām al-
Ni‘mah; and Shaykh al-Kashī, Rijāl al-Kashī.  
581 Even the Shī‘ah patriarch, ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, was not spared the occasional protests by the closest of his 
disciples. See Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, Sharḥ Nahj al-Balāghah, Vol. 3, pp. 115-116 for Mālik al-Ashtar al-
Nakha‘ī’s questioning the wisdom of one of Alī’s decisions or Ibid. Vol. 6, p. 78 for Muḥammad ibn Abī 
Bakr’s grievance over ‘Alī’s removal of him from the governorship of Egypt.   
582 See, for instance, ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥar al-Anwār, Vol. 26, pp. 1-17; Ibid. Vol. 65, p. 156; Shaykh al-
Ṣadūq, Kamāl al-Dīn wa Tamām al-Ni‘mah, p. 470; Ibid. p. 473; Abū Ja‘far Thiqat al-Islām Kuliynī, Uṣūl 
al-Kāfī, Vol. 2, pp. 242-4; and Muḥammad al-Riyshahrī, Mīzān al-Ḥikmah, Vol. 2, pp. 1545-8. 
583 See Modarresi Tabatabaii, Hossein. Maktab dar Farāyand Takāmul. p. 134; and Shaykh al-Ṣadūq, 
Kamāl al-Dīn wa Tamām al-Ni‘mah, p. 222. See also Ḥusayn ibn Ḥamdān al-Khaṣībī, al-Hidāyah al-
Kubrā, pp. 325-50; Ibn Shu‘bah al-Ḥarrānī, Tuḥaf al-‘Uqūl, pp. 486-7; Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāwandī, al-
Kharā’ij wal-Jarā’ih, Vol. 1, pp- 440-50; al-Qāḍī Nu‘mān al-Maghribī, Sharḥ al-Akhbār, Vol. 3, p. 312; 
and Sayyid al-Khū’ī, Mu‘jam Rijāl al-Ḥadīth, Vol. 12, p. 319.  
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challenges against the authority of the Imāms that the doctrine of the “hidden –twelfth– 
Imām”584 becomes of strategic significance. The doctrine spared the Shī‘ah community 
the type of bickering and internal strife that plagued other branches of Shī‘ah Islam. As a 
result, it prevented further division and weakening of the Twelver community in the long 
run.585 The strategic effects of the doctrine of the “hidden Imām” becomes more evident 
when one considers the ill fate of the Ismā‘īlī Fāṭimid dynasty in North Africa, that of 
Nizārī Ismā‘īlīs under the leadership of Ḥasan al-Ṣabbāḥ586 in Persia, or that of the 
Zaydīs.587 These other branches of Shī‘ah Islam had to deal with the destructive dynamics 
of transition from one Imām to the next as well as the internal challenges to the “supreme 
authority” of the living Imām.588 For Twelver Shī‘ahs, such destructive dynamics were 
averted by the belief in the indirect yet supreme authority of the “hidden Imām.” It 
                                                 
584 See the following section of the Chapter for more discussion. Modarresi Tabatabaii reports a 
controversial statement attributed to the prominent Shī‘ah scholar, Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī (d. 1274 C.E.), 
declaring ‘adamahu minnā –i.e. “his [i.e. the twelfth Imām’s] absence is because of us [i.e. the Shī‘ahs’ 
failing to behave towards their Imāms properly]” [see Modarresi Tabatabaii, Hossein. Maktab dar 
Farāyand Takāmul. p. 135]. The mainstream Shī‘ī belief holds that the absence of the twelfth Imām was 
mainly due to the mounting pressure raised against them by the Sunnī caliphate. 
585 Similar to the notions of Wilāyah, Walāyah, and Taqīyyah, the Shī‘ī doctrine of the “hidden Imām” was 
articulated and established due to the endeavors of the early generations of Shī‘ah theologians. The 
strategic significance of the theological efforts of these early Shī‘ah scholars becomes more notable when 
one considers their social and historical context. As discussed in Chapter IV, the turbulent decades after the 
death of the eleventh Imām are often called the age of “great bewilderment” in Shī‘ah classical sources. 
The rising uncertainty within the community and the absence of the Imām brought the Shī‘ah community to 
the verge of extinction. It was the writings of these early Shī‘ah theologians –such as Muḥammad ibn 
‘Abdullāh Iṣfahānī and Abū Ja‘far ibn Qibih Rāzī– that eventually saved the community from being 
perished. See Modarresi Tabatabaii, Hossein. Maktab dar Farāyand Takāmul. pp. 183-199; and Ibid. pp. 
213-38. For more discussion, see the preceding Chapter.      
586 d. 1124 C.E. 
587 See, for instance, Feirahi, Davoud. Tārīkh Taḥawwūl Duwlat dar Islām. pp. 313-314; and Ibid. pp. 331-
4.  
588 For an insightful analysis of the destructive dynamics released by the high authority of Wilāyah in 
Shī‘ah Safavid era, see Matthee, Rudi. (2012). Persia in Crisis: Safavid Decline and the Fall of Isfahan. 
New York: I.B.Tauris & Co. See especially pp. 1-26.   
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created, in other words, an authority that would be impossible to be challenged. It also 
shifted the meaning of the authority of the Imām from outward Wilāyah towards inward, 
and more mystical, Walāyah. The doctrine of the “hidden Imām” may appear 
counterintuitive to non-Shī‘ahs yet it has been among the central strategic doctrines that 
guaranteed the long-term viability of the Twelver Shī‘ah community.589  
                                                 
589 Before turning to a discussion of Shī‘ah eschatology, it is worth briefly reviewing one of the modern 
manifestations of Wilāyah and Walāyah in Shī‘ah politics. This is the theory of Wilāyat Faqīh, or 
“Guardianship or Supervision of Jurist,” as formulated by Ayatollah Khomeini. The basic tenet of the 
theory has been generally accepted by prominent Shī‘ah jurists throughout history. The mainstream version 
of the theory of Wilāyat Faqīh is as follows. The Shī‘ah Imāms possess both Wilāyah, or external authority, 
and Walāyah, or mystical authority, to the greatest extent possible for a human being after the age of the 
prophets. In the absence of the Imāms, the theory maintains that Shī‘ah Fuqahā are entitled to a limited 
scope of Wilāyah, i.e. certain aspects of the Imāms’ outward authority. The limited Wilāyah of Fuqahā 
allows them, in the absence of the Imāms, to have the final word in certain affairs of the Shī‘ah community 
including financial issues and judicial disputes. Most of the prominent Shī‘ah Fuqahā, including Mullā 
Aḥmad Narāqī, Muḥaqqiq al-Karakī, Ja‘far Kāshif al-Ghiṭā’, Shaykh al-Anṣārī, and ‘Allāmih Nā’īnī, 
accept the authority of jurists in the absence of the Imāms. In two aspects Ayatollah Khomeini’s articulation 
and implementation of the theory Wilāyat Faqīh are distinct from the mainstream version. The first 
distinction is the extent to which the Imāms’ Wilāyah is transmitted to the jurist according to Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s theory of Wilāyat Faqīh. The second distinction is the implicit inclusion of Walāyah in 
Ayatollah Khomeini’s practice of Wilāyat Faqīh. In regard to the first distinction, Ayatollah Khomeini 
brought the theory to its logical extreme and argued that jurist’s external authority was identical to that of 
the Imāms. He also urged the Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā to fulfill their “religious duty” by engaging in politics and by 
“applying their Wilāyah.” As such, Ayatollah Khomeini’s articulation of Wilāyat Faqīh was a departure 
from the politically “quietist” tradition of most Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā throughout history. See Ayatollah Khomeini, 
Ḥukūmah al-Islāmīyyah. See also Ayatollah Muntaẓirī, Dīrāsāt fī Wilāyah al-Faqīh; Ayatollah Muntaẓirī, 
Niẓām al-Ḥukm fīl-Islām; Sachedina, Abdulaziz A. (1988). The Just Ruler in Shi‘ite Islam: The 
Comprehensive Authority of the Jurist in Imamite Jurisprudence. Oxford: Oxford University Press; and 
Hamid Enayat’s chapter in Piscatori, James P. (Ed.). (1983). Islam in the Political Process. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 In addition to his generous expansion of jurist’s Wilāyah, the way Ayatollah Khomeini implemented the 
theory in Iran diverged from traditional Shī‘ī understanding too. The official discourse of Wilāyat Faqīh in 
Iran implicitly incorporated the notion of Walāyah. The resulting discourse was similar to that about the 
status of the Safavid Shahs. These Shahs, too, claimed both Wilāyah and Walāyah. In the case of the 
Safavid, however, only the Shah’s Wilāyah was justified through Shī‘ī discourses. The Shahs’ Walāyah 
essentially came from Taṣawwuf and the fact that the Safavid Shah was, at the same time, the head of the 
Ṣafawīyyah Ṣūfī Order. In contrast, Ayatollah Khomeini’s practice of Wilāyat Faqīh was essentially Shī‘ī in 
all its aspects. In fact, prior to the Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini was a well-established teacher of Shī‘ī 
mysticism and Shī‘ah theosophy in Qum seminary. He was an avowed admirer of Muslim mystics and 
theosophers such as Suhrawardī (d. 1191 C.E.), Ibn ‘Arabī, and Mullā Ṣadrā. It is not surprising therefore 
that Ayatollah Khomeini’s approach towards Wilāyat Faqīh had a strong mystical undertone in which the 
Ayatollah implicitly exerts a form of mystical and inner authority, or Walāyah. This brought his status yet 
closer to that of the Shī‘ah Imāms as the “masters of both inner and outer worlds.” Living in the 
neighborhood of Jamārān in Tehran, Ayatollah Khomeini used to be called by his devout followers as the 
Pīr-i Jamārān, i.e. Pīr of Jamārān. Pīr is the Farsi term for a Ṣūfī Shaykh and implies the person’s spiritual 
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A Note on Shī‘ah Eschatology  
As Christian eschatology was established around the person of Jesus, Shī‘ah 
eschatology has been essentially developed around the person of Muḥammad al-Mahdī, 
the twelfth Shī‘ah Imām. The similarity has sometimes led to (mis)understanding Shī‘ah 
eschatology in the light of Christian notions, for it is more convenient to explain Shī‘ah 
eschatology through the familiar prism of Christianity. A genre of Western studies on the 
subject, therefore, have tried to identify the “Shī‘ī equivalents” to Christians notions such 
as Armageddon and the anti-Christ. Such analogies, however, fail to understand Shī‘ah 
eschatology within the larger edifice of Shī‘ah theology. It must be emphasized that 
historically, Shī‘ah eschatology has not been a driving force in Shī‘ī strategic cultures. 
The purpose of this section is, therefore, to address some of the common 
misunderstandings regarding this eschatology and its interaction with strategy.590 
Two particular misunderstandings need to be addressed here. The first is related to 
the significance of Shī‘ah eschatology in the overall structure of mainstream Shī‘ah 
theology. The second is related to the distinctly Shī‘ī character of this eschatology, which 
                                                                                                                                                 
authority. Both in discourse and practice, therefore, Ayatollah Khomeini’s Wilāyat Faqīh was shaped by 
Wilāyah and Walāyah. The same jurisdictional-mystical formulation of Wilāyat Faqīh continued after 
Ayatollah Khomeini’s death. In contrast to this mystical understanding of the theory of Wilāyat Faqīh, 
Ayatollah Muntaẓirī’s articulation of the theory remained strictly legal and jurisprudential as he avoided 
any reference to the mystical or metaphysical authorities of the jurist in charge. See Mirtaheri, S. Amir. 
(November 2009). Republic of ‘Urafā: The Mystical Dimension of Iranian Politics. Middle East Studies 
Association Annual Meeting. Boston; Feirahi, Davoud. Tārīkh Taḥawwūl Duwlat dar Islām. pp. 395-415; 
and Matthee, Rudi. Persia in Crisis.  
590 In fact, as Mesbahi argues, mainstream Shī‘ah eschatology has been essentially “non-activist” and has 
been built around the notion of “passive waiting” for the coming of the “hidden Imām.” This is why 
historically, “more Mahdīism has generally meant more quietism in Shī‘ah Islam” [M. Mesbahi, personal 
communication, March 9, 2012]. This brings Shī‘ah eschatology close to prudence-driven modus vivendi of 
Shī‘ah Muslims based on the doctrine of Taqīyyah –at least in the discourses of the mainstream Shī‘ah 
‘Ulamā. Although some non-‘Ulamā Shī‘ah “activists” of modern times such as ‘Alī Sharī‘atī tried to 
transform passive Shī‘ah eschatology into an “activist” and “volunteerist” doctrine by dismissing the long 
tradition of Shī‘ī theological discourses on the subject.  
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renders it a fitting module of Shī‘ī system of thought. Shī‘ah eschatology, in other words, 
is an organic extension of the Shī‘ī belief system based on the experience of a minority 
community. At the same time, its distinct Shī‘ī character means that Shī‘ah eschatology 
cannot be properly understood unless one understands some of the foundational Shī‘ī 
concepts. Two such concepts are of particular relevance here, namely the notion of 
Wilāyah-Walāyah and the principle of justice. The following discussion of Shī‘ah 
eschatology, therefore, rests upon the discussion of justice in Chapter III as well as that of 
Wilāyah and Walāyah in this Chapter. Before further exploring the common 
misunderstandings of Shī‘ah eschatology, it is useful to briefly review the main premises 
of this eschatology. 
According to Shī‘ah historiographies, the last Shī‘ah Imāms and especially those 
who succeeded the eighth Imām591 were under mounting social and political pressure by 
the Abbasid caliphate. Given the antagonistic relationship between the Abbasid and the 
‘Alawīs (or Shī‘ahs), it is reasonable to believe that these last Imāms lived under the 
surveillance of the authorities and that their contacts with their followers became 
increasingly restricted. Such a restriction considerably truncated the ability of the Imāms 
to effectively function as the leaders of the community. The limited direct access to the 
Imāms was partially compensated by the network of Shī‘ī delegates and representatives 
first organized by the seventh Imām. Towards the imamate of the tenth and the eleventh 
Imāms, these delegates assumed a central role in administering the affairs of the 
community.592 The representatives were usually responsible for addressing the financial 
                                                 
591 These include Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī, ‘Alī ibn Muḥammad, and Ḥasan ibn ‘Alī.  
592 See Modarresi Tabatabaii, Hossein. Maktab dar Farāyand Takāmul. 
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and sometimes educational needs of the community. Few of these early representatives, 
however, were Shī‘ah scholars capable of spreading the teachings of Imāms or answering 
religious questions by the community.593 Most of the representatives were chosen from 
trusted Shī‘ah elites in various places; and they were primarily responsible for the 
financial transactions of the community and especially for the collection of religious 
alms.594 The network of financial and religious representatives was to serve as a model 
for handling the internal affairs of the dispersed Shī‘ah community in the centuries to 
come.    
According to Shī‘ah sources, the repression of the community and the restrictions 
imposed on the Imām heightened during the imamate of the eleventh Imām. For a long 
period, he was put under house watch in the city of Sāmarrā, then a military stronghold of 
the Abbasid caliphate.595 According to Shī‘ah historiographies, his contemporary Abbasid 
caliphs were determined to kill any son of his so that they would solve their “‘Alawī 
problem” once and for all. The headless Shī‘ah community, then, was doomed to perish. 
This bleak fate was averted, Shī‘ahs believe, by the miraculous continuation of Wilāyah 
and Walāyah in the person of Muḥammad al-Mahdī, the only son of Ḥasan ibn ‘Alī who 
                                                 
593 See Ibid. pp. 49-50. 
594 The alms-giving duty in Shī‘ah Islam includes Zakāt and Khums. Paying Zakāt is the common practice 
among both Shī‘ah and Sunnī Muslims. Paying Khums, however, is a distinctly Shī‘ī practice in which 
each Shī‘ah Muslim has to pay a fifth of his overall profit at the end of the year to the Imām or his 
representatives. According to Modarresi Tabatabaii, the early Shī‘ah Imāms did not demand their followers 
to pay Khums. During the imamate of the ninth Imām, however, the practice of paying Khums to the office 
of the Imām became a routine Shī‘ī duty [see Ibid.  pp. 44-5; and Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, Tahdhīb al-Aḥkām, Vol. 
4, p. 141]. During the age of Occultation when there is no access to the Imām, qualified Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā 
collect Zakāt and Khums “on behalf of the hidden Imām.”    
595 See, for instance, Ibn Shahr Āshūb, Manāqib Āl Abī Ṭālib, Vol. 3, pp. 522-41. The confinement in a 
military center became such a determining characteristic of the eleventh Imām’s imamate that brought him 
the epithet al-‘Askarī meaning the “one who is affiliated with military.”  
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“was born under a veil of secrecy.”596 Muḥammad al-Mahdī’s birth is believed to have 
been carefully concealed from the outside world and even from the majority of the Shī‘ah 
community in order to protect the life of the young Imām.597  
Upon the death of his father, however, it was no longer possible to conceal 
Muḥammad al-Mahdī’s existence. The problem was solved in an extraordinary fashion, 
namely by Occultation of Muḥammad al-Mahdī in 874 C.E. The Occultation continues to 
this day and it is believed that the “hidden Imām,” or al-Imām al-Ghā’ib, continues to 
direct the affairs of the “chosen community” in indirect and mystical ways. The situation 
is believed to last until the end of days when the “return of Muḥammad al-Mahdī” ushers 
in the final phase of man’s life on earth. The “return” also brings the Shī‘ī belief in 
imamate and indeed in Wilāyah and Walāyah into direct association with Shī‘ah 
eschatology.598           
                                                 
596 For mainstream Shī‘ī accounts of Muḥammad al-Mahdī, the conditions surrounding his alleged birth, 
and the doctrine of the “hidden Imām,” see Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, Kitāb al-Ghaybah; and Shaykh al-Mufīd, 
Rasā’il fīl-Ghaybah. 
597 As mentioned before, there existed rather widespread uncertainties within the Shī‘ah community at the 
time regarding the existence of Muḥammad al-Mahdī. Later on, however, the overwhelming majority of 
Shī‘ah Muslims accepted the accuracy of the few reports of his birth and his Occultation. Shī‘ah Muslims 
also substantiated their claim by resorting to several Ḥadīths attributed to the Prophet and to other Shī‘ah 
Imāms prophesying the coming of Muḥammad al-Mahdī, the circumstances of his birth, and his imamate 
till the end of days [see for instance Ibid.]. For more information on the early debates about the existence of 
Muḥammad al-Mahdī among Shī‘ah Muslims, see Modarresi Tabatabaii, Hossein. Crisis and Consolidation 
in the Formative Period of Shi’ite Islam. The book is arguably the most informative work available in 
English on the early history of Shī‘ah Islam.   
598 In Sunnī eschatology, it is believed that a descendant of the Prophet named Muḥammad will appear at 
the end of history. Some Sunnī sources have also identified this descendant as al-Mahdī. See, for instance, 
Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. Islam: Religion, History and Civilization. pp. 73-4. See also Abū ‘Abdullāh ibn 
Mājah, Sunan ibn Mājah, Vol. 2, pp. 1366-8; Ibn al-Ash‘ath al-Sajistānī, Sunan Abī Dāwūd, Vol. 2, pp. 309-
11; Muḥammad al-Tirmadhī, al-Ṣaḥīḥ, Vol. 3, p. 344; and Modarresi Tabatabaii, Hossein. Maktab dar 
Farāyand Takāmul. pp. 173-4.  
For more general information on Shī‘ah eschatology, see Sachedina, Abdulaziz A. Islamic Messianism; 
Modarresi Tabatabaii, Hossein. Crisis and Consolidation in the Formative Period of Shi‘ite Islam; and 
chapter 2 in Nasr, S. H. et al (Eds.). Expectation of the Millennium.        
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In fact, proper understanding of the Shī‘ī doctrine of the “hidden Imām” hinges 
upon paying attention to the implications of the Wilāyah and Walāyah ontology in Shī‘ah 
Islam. Similar to Ṣūfīs, Shī‘ah Muslims believe that the earth would never be depleted of 
Awlīyā’, or those possessing the status of Wilāyah and Walāyah and those channeling the 
Grace of God upon mankind.599 Therefore, the doctrine of the “hidden Imām” for Shī‘ah 
Muslims goes beyond providing the community with a sacred, albeit unseen, patron. The 
“hidden Imām” is believed to be the very reason for the continuation of the Grace of God 
upon earth. Without him, in other words, the whole “metaphysical structure” of the 
universe would, it is believed, collapse.600 That is why Muḥammad al-Mahdī’s eventual 
death after his reappearance ushers in the final chapter of the history and the beginning of 
the Day of Judgment, for once he is gone, there will no longer exist any channel of 
Wilāyah and Walāyah to hold the universe in place. 
Following the “Occultation of the Imām,” the already existing network of Shī‘ah 
scholars and financial agents gradually took upon themselves to organize the community. 
Similar to the painful socialization that the early Christians underwent after Crucifixion, 
early Shī‘ah Muslims slowly and reluctantly lost their hope in the immanent reappearance 
of Muḥammad al-Mahdī.601 As indicated before, it was the later Shī‘ah scholars who 
developed an elaborate theological structure to explain the type of relationship the 
                                                 
599 According to some Ṣūfī traditions, the number of these –often unidentified– Awlīyā’ at any time is fixed 
–usually at seven or forty. Once a Walī passes away, these Ṣūfī traditions maintain, a new one will be 
selected by God who receives Divine guidance in one way or another. These men are sometimes called al-
Abdāl and are believed to be responsible for “preserving the cosmic order” [see the entry for “Badal” by R. 
A. Nicholson in 1993 reprint of E. J. Brill’s First Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. IX, p. 35]. 
600 See, for instance, Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm al-Nu‘mānī, Kitāb al-Ghaybah, pp. 136-41. 
601 See Modarresi Tabatabaii, Hossein. Maktab dar Farāyand Takāmul, pp. 180-8. 
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“hidden Imām” held with the community during Occultation.602 The latter point relates to 
one of the misunderstandings that one may find in Western studies of Shī‘ah eschatology, 
namely the place of this eschatology in the overall system of Shī‘ah theology. 
Even though all of the prominent Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā believe in the abovementioned 
association of Shī‘ah eschatology and the twelfth Imām, historically, the Shī‘ah religious 
establishment has not been comfortable with extensive or “activist” discussion of 
eschatological subjects. The cautious approach is arguably the result of several bitter 
experiences throughout the history of Shī‘ah Islam when false claims of Muḥammad al-
Mahdī’s reappearance rendered the community riven and bewildered. The most famous 
episode of such traumatic confusions happened in 1844 C.E. when Sayyid ‘Alī 
Muḥammad Shīrāzī claimed to be Muḥammad al-Mahdī and took the title Bāb, or the 
“gate.” Even though Bāb was imprisoned, tried, and eventually executed in 1850 C.E., 
the Shī‘ah religious establishment of the time could not contain the “Bābī Movement.” 
Unlike previous messianic movements in the Shī‘ah history, the Bābī Movement broke 
away from Islam and eventually gave birth to the Bahā’ism, which was established by 
Bahā’allāh, a follower of Bāb.603 As a result of this traumatic rupture based on Shī‘ah 
eschatology, Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā grew extra cautious about excessive discussion of 
Muḥammad al-Mahdī especially by non-‘Ulamā. To further justify this caution, they 
often quote Shī‘ah Ḥadīths that urges Shī‘ah Muslims to reject those who claim to know 
                                                 
602 See, for instance, Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm al-Nu‘mānī, Kitāb al-Ghaybah, pp. 200-8; al-Sharīf al-
Murtaḍā, al-Muqni‘ fīl-Ghaybah, pp. 60-5; and Ibid. pp. 74-9. 
603 For more information on the history of Bābism and Bahā’ism from an inside perspective, see Smith, 
Peter. (1987). The Babi and Baha’i Religions: From Messianic Shi‘ism to a World Religion. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. See also Chapter 24 [pp. 474-91] in Wessinger, Catherine. (Ed.). (2011). The 
Oxford Handbook of Millennialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
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the exact time of the reappearance of Muḥammad al-Mahdī.604 In fact, a universal fear 
among traditional Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā has been the emergence of new eschatological 
movements that divorce themselves from the religious establishments and seek “direct 
contacts” with the “hidden Imām.”605 Such a course of action would mean circumvention 
of the religious authority of the ‘Ulamā who function as the representatives of the 
“hidden Imām.” The traditional ‘Ulamā, therefore, venerate Muḥammad al-Mahdī as the 
“hidden leader of the community” –and indeed “that of the world”– while generally 
avoiding extensive eschatological discussions.  
One may also find another confusion regarding Shī‘ah eschatology in some of the 
recent discussions of the subject, which relates to the chronology of the events at the end 
of history according to this eschatology. Shī‘ah sources do not provide a definite account 
of the end of history and its detailed events. Instead, the subject is often treated by 
reporting a number of scattered and at times conflicting reports about what will happen 
then.606 In particular, there is no clear equivalent to Christian “Armageddon” as an epic 
battle between the forces of good and evil. To be sure, Muḥammad al-Mahdī has been 
reported to engage in series of battles following his reappearance. These battles, 
according to Shī‘ah eschatology, would be necessary to fulfill Muḥammad al-Mahdī’s 
                                                 
604 These Ḥadīths can be found in various Shī‘ah sources. See, for instance, Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, Kitāb al-
Ghaybah, pp. 397-414; Ibid. pp. 425-8; and Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm al-Nu‘mānī, Kitāb al-Ghaybah, pp. 
299-306. 
605 In popular Shī‘ah culture, this approach is sometimes called mahdawīyyat bidūn rūḥānīyyat –i.e. “belief 
in Muḥammad al-Mahdī’s hidden imamate without [needing] the ‘Ulamā.” It is not difficult to understand 
why such an approach has faced fierce opposition by traditional religious establishment throughout the 
Shī‘ah world.  
606 See, for instance, Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, Kitāb al-Ghaybah, pp. 433-66; Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm al-Nu‘mānī, 
Kitāb al-Ghaybah, pp. 255-355; as well as Shaykh al-Mufīd, al-Irshād, Vol. 2, pp. 368-88. 
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mission on earth, namely to “restore justice.” In fact, the saliency of the Shī‘ī principle of 
justice in Shī‘ah eschatology has been sometimes overlooked in the Western literature. As 
a result, the distinctly Shī‘ī character of this eschatology in contrast to Sunnī eschatology 
has been missed too.  
One frequently quoted eschatological statement in various Shī‘ah texts, prayers, 
and Ḥadīths states that Muḥammad al-Mahdī will reappear once the earth “has been filled 
with injustice and cruelty.” In such a “desperate situation,” the statement continues, 
Muḥammad al-Mahdī will rise to “fill the same earth with justice.”607 Similar to many 
other Shī‘ī doctrines, therefore, Shī‘ah eschatology has been built around the principle of 
justice. Once again, this is a reminder of the historical trajectory that the Shī‘ah 
community has gone through as a persecuted minority. The promise of “restoration of 
justice” by Muḥammad al-Mahdī offered the community a soothing hope for what lies in 
their future.608 To be sure, it is believed that the “restoration of justice” by Muḥammad al-
Mahdī is accompanied by the spread of “true Islam.”609 Yet, the notion of “true Islam” 
                                                 
607 The statement, yamla’uhā qisṭan wa ‘adlan kamā muli’ta ẓulman wa jawra, can be found in quite a 
number of Shī‘ah classical sources, albeit in slightly different wordings. See, for instance, Shaykh al-
Ṣadūq, al-Tawḥīd, p. 82; Shaykh al-Ṣadūq, Kamāl al-Dīn wa Tamām al-Ni‘mah, p. 342; Ibid. p. 369; Ibid.  
p. 380; Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, Kitāb al-Ghaybah, p. 174; Ibid. 188; Ibid. p. 464; Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm al-
Nu‘mānī, Kitāb al-Ghaybah, p. 69; and Ibid. pp. 83-4.  
608 In fact, available Shī‘ī eschatological reports indicate that Muḥammad al-Mahdī’s mission will be 
received positively by various non-Muslim people. This imagery might be relevant to the universal appeal 
of justice that appears as a central element in Shī‘ah eschatology [see Ibid.]. On the other hand, this version 
of the conclusion of history is a matching end for the overall historical experience of the Shī‘ahs as a 
community craving for eventual and absolute justice. The utopian age promised under Muḥammad al-
Mahdī offers such a perspective for the “chosen community” to finally put behind the position of being a 
minority. Shī‘ah classical sources often refer to the verses 24:55, 28:5, 7:128 and 21:105 of the Qur’ān in 
establishing their arguments regarding the centrality of justice in Shī‘ah eschatology.  
609 It has been indicated that Muḥammad al-Mahdī’s call to “true Islam” will appear as if he is inviting men 
to a “new religion” or a “new Islam,” for by that time, Islam will have become “corrupted and distorted” to 
such an extent that no one would recognize “true Islam.” See, for instance, ‘Allāmih Majlisī, Biḥar al-
Anwār, Vol. 52, p. 338; and Shaykh al-Mufīd, al-Irshād, Vol. 2, p. 384. 
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seems to have been overshadowed by a justice-oriented language that, as Enayat writes, 
projects a “link between the Return [of Muḥammad al-Mahdī] and the ultimate, global 
sovereignty of the righteous and the oppressed.”610 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
610 Enayat, Hamid. Modern Islamic Political Thought. p. 25. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
The historical trajectory of the Shī‘ah community combined with a Shī‘ī 
understanding of Islam created a unique perspective on questions of identity, security, and 
survival. As discussed in the preceding Chapters, the Shī‘ah Imāms provided the 
community with a rich set of precedence. Their Ḥadīths as well as their actions indicated 
a combination of “idealistic principled actions,” especially in the cases of ‘Alī and 
Ḥusayn, as well as prudence and caution, especially in the cases of the Imāms who 
followed Ḥusayn. Building upon this mixture and with an eye on the state of their 
persecuted community, the early Shī‘ah jurists developed a complex theological edifice. 
They combined a number of aspiring religious ideals with rational discourses of 
expediency and vigilance. The uneasy mixture was in part possible due to the unique 
Shī‘ah ontology of Wilāyah and Walāyah, for this ontology projected the Shī‘ah 
community as a “special community” who were to guard the “heart of Islam” and, 
therefore, the heart of the “final” message of God to humanity. Such a special status 
entailed a religious necessity to protect this community. At the same time, this 
“uniqueness” demanded special metaphors of religious ideals. While the doctrine of 
Taqīyyah addressed the former necessity, the doctrine of Shahādah responded to the latter 
need. At the same time, Taqīyyah and Shahādah constituted the theological backbone of 
Shī‘ī strategic cultures and, by extension, the modern notion of national security for 
various Shī‘ī political actors.  
For analytical purposes, the doctrine of Shahādah is sometimes associated with 
“idealism” in this dissertation while that of Taqīyyah is related to “realism.” It must be 
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emphasized, however, that similar to any analytical simplification, the above bifurcation 
is neither clear-cut nor exhaustive. The complexity of the Shī‘ī theological edifice simply 
defies any such “reductionism,” as do most ancient theologies. The complexity becomes 
more evident when one adds the notions of Wilāyah and Walāyah to the picture. Wilāyah 
and Walāyah allowed the emergence of what one may call a Shī‘ī “transcendental 
realism” for which Shahādah and Taqīyyah were but different manifestations. The 
“transcendental” discourse allowed Shī‘ah jurists to avoid an otherwise uncomfortable 
contradiction. The ostensibly “idealistic” doctrine of Shahādah appeared as “true 
realism,” for if one adds the metaphysical dimension to one’s calculation of the chains of 
causes and effects, one could dismiss physical pain.611 From a non-phenomenological 
perspective, such an assertion might be received with skepticism. From a 
phenomenological outlook, however, the implications of believing in the “metaphysical 
structure” of the world come to the center of the inquiry. To a believer’s eyes, such a 
structure is more than a faded attachment to the “real” reality of the material world. 
Instead, it is understood as an integrated part of the reality or, if one closely follows the 
metaphysical doctrines of most religions, even the reality itself.612  
According to this perspective, even the doctrine of Taqīyyah reflects the 
“transcendental realism,” for the ontology of Wilāyah and Walāyah projects the world as 
                                                 
611 For an articulation of this “transcendental realism,” see ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, Nahj al-Balāghah, Letters 53. 
In this letter, ‘Alī defends an absolute adherence to pacta sunt servanda. One of his key arguments contains 
his warnings against negative “metaphysical consequences” of breaking a contract. See Homayounvash, 
M., & Mirtaheri, S. A. (Forthcoming 2012). Honoring Contracts as a Foundation of Peace: A Shī‘ah 
Articulation. Journal of Religion, Conflict and Peace. 
612 This is arguably one of the reasons why in the discourses of traditional metaphysics as well as those 
contemporary Traditionalists and metaphysicians the term “realism” has a quite different connotation. 
Various articulations of this “metaphysical realism” may be found in mainstream doctrines of different Ṣūfī 
orders.  
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a single whole in which the material and the metaphysical are intertwined. The notion of 
“single whole” is also in line with the doctrine of Unity in Islam, or al-Tawḥīd. 
Welcoming the ideal of “sacrifice for justice,” or Shahādah, becomes as much a reflection 
of “heeding the reality” as observing the imperatives of prudence, or Taqīyyah. In the 
resulting paradigm, the seemingly contradictory doctrines accommodate a reality that is 
at once mundane and transcendental, which is yet another reason for caution in 
employing convenient notions such as “idealism” and “realism.” 
Theological discussions often have concrete and practical implications. By 
moving from questions of Political Theory into the realm of Strategic Studies,613 my 
dissertation tries to better understand such implications. It is a fundamental assumption 
here that Shī‘ī strategic thinking has some of its roots in Shī‘ah theology. This theology 
has been the product of complex interactions between the understanding of Islam by 
Shī‘ah’s “founding fathers” on the one hand and the Shī‘ah history on the other. We have 
already discussed some distinct dimensions of the Shī‘ī understanding of Islam in 
Chapter V. Therefore, it is worth briefly reviewing the overall picture of Shī‘ah history 
here.  
For analytical purposes, one can divide this history into two phases.614 First is the 
“formative phase” of Shī‘ah Islam during which Shī‘ah Muslims were minorities living 
under a non-Shī‘ah, Muslim political rule. The “formative phase” arguably stretches 
about nine centuries from 632 C.E., i.e. the death of the Prophet, to the rise of the Safavid 
                                                 
613 See Chapter II.  
614 This division of Shī‘ah history was initially developed through a series of discussions with Professor 
Mohsen Kadivar in September 2010.  
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dynasty in Persia in 1501 C.E.615 The “formative phase” also witnessed the consequential 
death of the Prophet’s grandson, Ḥusayn, in Karbalā in 680 C.E. The foundation of most 
of the major themes in Shī‘ah theology was laid during this phase first by the Shī‘ah 
Imāms and then by the Shī‘ah jurists. In particular, important Shī‘ī doctrines related to 
security and survival were articulated in this phase and under the overwhelming influence 
of being a minority. 
The second phase of the Shī‘ah history began when Twelver Shī‘ahs rose to 
power in a major political unit of the Muslim world, i.e. Persia. Safavid Persia has been 
the beginning of the most viable Shī‘ī political rule in Muslim history.616 The second 
phase itself may be divided into two periods. The first stretches from 1501 C.E. until 
1979 when Shī‘ah Shahs were in power. During this period, Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā did not have 
“direct” access to political power, although they often exerted indirect influence over 
politics.617 In 1979, however, the Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā became the “bearer of political Wilāyah”  
 
                                                 
615 This bifurcation of the Shī‘ah history is not a definite one. In particular, it does not mean that during the 
“formative phase” there has been no Shī‘ī political rule. To the contrary, during these centuries, there have 
been important episodes in which Shī‘ah Muslims rose to power for short periods of time in certain parts of 
the Muslim world. These significant exceptions, however, did not lead to a viable Shī‘ī political structure 
similar to what the rise of the Safavid gave birth to in Persia. Notable cases of Shī‘ī rise to political power 
in the first period of Shī‘ah history include the reign of Idrīsid in Morocco (8th – 10th centuries); Hamdānid 
in Syria (9th – 11th centuries); Fāṭimid in Egypt (10th – 12th centuries); Zīyārid in Persia (10th – 11th 
centuries), and Būyid in Persia (10th – 11th centuries). Some prominent scholars of Shī‘ah history such as 
Richard Bulliet believe that the lasting legacies of these pre-Safavid Shī‘ī dynasties have been small 
compared to those of the Safavid [R. Bulliet, personal communication, March 5, 2010].   
616 Again, this is not to dismiss the short-lived non-Shī‘ah rules that emerged in Persia in between the 
demise of the Safavid dynasty in 1736 C.E. and the rise of the Shī‘ī Qājār dynasty in late eighteenth 
century. 
617 This separation of “religious authority” from “political authority” arguably allowed Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā to 
temporarily contain the tension in Shī‘ah political theology between “idealistic” pro-justice forces on the 
one hand and political expediency on the other.     
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in Iran. In both periods of the second phase, however, the Shī‘ī theological doctrines that 
had been articulated in the “formative phase” survived.    
During its formative centuries, Shī‘ah Islam was under considerable 
socioeconomic pressures. Similar to many other minority groups, therefore, justice 
became a central notion in Shī‘ah theology. In parallel, the physical insecurity of Shī‘ah 
Muslims led to the emergence of survival strategies, or Taqīyyah, and survival metaphors, 
e.g. Shahādah. As discussed in Chapter IV, Taqīyyah was sanctioned by Shī‘ah religious 
authorities and provided Shī‘ah Muslims with a considerable flexibility aimed at survival. 
It allowed Shī‘ah Muslims under a perceived threat of death or bodily injury to conceal 
their beliefs. More importantly, the practice of Taqīyyah helped Shī‘ah Muslims to 
internalize the notion of expediency and to feel religiously comfortable in observing it. 
As discussed in Chapter IV, however, there have been legal and theological nuances 
around the notion of Taqīyyah because of its considerable potential.  
The more “idealistic” doctrine of Shahādah also emerged in this formative phase. 
As discussed in Chapter III, Shī‘ī Shahādah also obtained a “mystical” flavor due to its 
ultimately sacrificial imagery. In terms of perception of security and survival, the doctrine 
projected utmost physical insecurity of death as utmost metaphysical security of 
redemption. As a result, Shahādah may be considered as the central Shī‘ī metaphor of 
security. In this metaphor, the insecurity of a “chosen” group of Muslims was 
compensated by a narrative of “metaphysical security” manifested par excellence in the 
story of the Prophet’s grandson, Ḥusayn, in Karbalā.  
The narrative, itself, could be considered as a Constructivist articulation of human 
security in which the “cosmic dimension” emerges as an essential element of human 
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existence in this world. Ḥusayn became the embodiment of “moral and metaphysical 
victory” despite his utter physical defeat, the slaughter of his companions, and the 
imprisonment of his family. It was through his iconic martyrdom, the narrative maintains, 
that Ḥusayn achieved the ultimate security through “immediate salvation.” The resulting 
discourse of Shahādah held that physical and temporal pain was not comparable to the 
reward that lies afterwards. It became a construction of security in which death, the usual 
emblem of ultimate insecurity, was represented as the cradle of ultimate security. Such a 
social construction was further strengthened by a social reality that denied Shī‘ah 
Muslims an outlook of material security and prosperity. Deprived of security, Shī‘ah 
Muslims took refuge in “metaphysical security.” As discussed in Chapter V, a similar 
notion of “metaphysical security” emerged within the ontology of Wilāyah and Walāyah. 
The two notions established a Shī‘ī version of “Special Providence.” They articulated 
various channels through which the Grace of God is bestowed upon the Shī‘ah 
community as well as the whole of humanity. The notions carried in themselves a theme 
of invincibility and “determinism” towards the “eventual and guaranteed salvation,” for 
deliverance was believed to be assured for those living under Divine Wilāyah and 
Walāyah.          
The interplay of justice, insecurity, and Shahādah also led to an often overlooked 
difference between the Shī‘ī paradigm of Jihād and the Sunnī one. In Shī‘ah Islam, Jihād 
implied fighting against “injustice.” In Sunnī Islam, it often referred to wars against 
“infidels.” The difference is yet another example of the centrality of justice in Shī‘ī 
discourses. In terms of Shī‘ī strategic cultures, this “justice-oriented” Jihād allowed  
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Shī‘ah jurists to consider intra-Muslim wars as examples of Jihād more comfortably than 
their Sunnī counterparts. 
Even though the doctrine of Shahādah offers powerful potential for Shī‘ī strategic 
cultures, its impacts should not be overstated. As Enayat argues, the doctrine has often 
served the symbolic and spiritual needs of the Shī‘ah community throughout history.618 In 
contrast, Shī‘ī strategic cultures have historically been dominated by prudent “quietism.” 
As discussed in Chapter IV, political “quietism” has been the long-term consequence of 
the rather nebulous doctrine of Taqīyyah, which provided Shī‘ah Muslims with a flexible 
menu of options in dealing with security challenges. At the same time, a primary source 
of insecurity for Shī‘ahs during the first historical phase was the Sunnī caliphate. 
Therefore, an antagonism emerged in early Shī‘ah theology towards political power. As a 
result, some scholars of Shī‘ah politics have focused on the “Theology of Discontent” in 
Shī‘ah Islam.619 It is true that in Shī‘ah political theology, political power has sometimes 
been deemed as essentially evil. It is also true that for centuries, mainstream Shī‘ah 
theology considered any political rule as inherently inclined towards injustice unless 
controlled and guided by the “infallible” Shī‘ah Imāms. Yet, it is incorrect to reduce the 
complex system of strategic thinking among Shī‘ah Muslims to mere power rejection and 
protest. The doctrine of Taqīyyah, for instance, is a notable example of sophisticated 
approach taken by Shī‘ah Muslims towards political power and towards the state.620  
                                                 
618 See Enayat, Hamid. (2010). Andīshih Sīyāsī dar Islām Mu‘āṣir. Tehran: Intishārāt Khārazmī. pp. 310-5. 
619 See Dabashi, Hamid. The Theology of Discontent. 
620 The anti-political-rule theme in Shī‘ah Islam, as Enayat writes, “does not mean that Shī‘īsm never 
compromised with the powers that be. On the contrary, for the best part of their history, Shī‘ī theologians 
and jurisconsults displayed an impressive ingenuity in devising practical arrangements with the rulers to 
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The rapid change of status for Shī‘ah Muslims from a persecuted minority to a 
majority in power in early Safavid period was not unproblematic. In a matter of decades, 
the whole socio-religious scene of Persia was transformed.621 As one may expect, the 
anti-political-power tendencies at the heart of Shī‘ah political theology created a number 
of challenges for the nascent Shī‘ī state. A genre of studies in the field of Shī‘ah Studies 
address this tension between a political theology rooted in minority status and the 
political rule.622 The second period, therefore, was a dynamic one as Shī‘ah’s anti-
political-power and anti-state stances had to gradually embrace the emergence of Shī‘ī 
political powers.  
Despite the above tension at the heart of Shī‘ah political theology, Shī‘ī strategic 
cultures continued to be developed around the triangle of Shahādah, Taqīyyah, and 
Wilāyah-Walāyah. In particular, the practice of expediency at the core of Taqīyyah 
proved to be essential in shaping the complex relationship between Shī‘ah ‘Ulamā and 
the Shī‘ah courts. At the same time, a more or less national notion of security began to 
                                                                                                                                                 
ensure the safety and survival of their followers” [Enayat, Hamid. Modern Islamic Political Thoughts. p. 
26].    
621 As Professor Richard Bulliet indicates, the roots of Shī‘ah Islam had been strong in Persia even before 
the rise of the Safavid to power. This was, however, an “informal” version of Shī‘ah Islam revolving 
around a “popular love for the Shī‘ah Imāms.” In fact, the rapid success of the Safavid in turning Persia 
from Sunnī Islam to Shī‘ah Islam was arguably due to these pre-existing Shī‘ī sympathies among other 
things [R. Bulliet, personal communication, March 5, 2010]. See also Feirahi, Davoud. Tārīkh Taḥawwūl 
Duwlat dar Islām. pp. 411-4.   
622 This tension became clear to me through a number of interviews with Professor Mesbahi. As Mesbahi 
argues, the accommodation of a Shī‘ī rule proved to be a long process. This was due to the deep 
internalization of the anti-state Shī‘ah political theology and the notion of Ghaṣb, or usurpation [of the 
legitimate authority of the Imāms]. For the most part, in fact, the fundamental antagonism towards political 
power in the absence of the “infallible” Imāms remained intact while practical and “realistic” 
accommodations of Shī‘ī rulers were justified on the ground of expediency. In times of political crisis, the 
collective interest of the Shī‘ah community was invoked to provide the Shī‘ah Shahs with the necessary 
support [M. Mesbahi, Lectures, Fall 2007, and M. Mesbahi, Interviews, Fall 2011].   
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emerge, first against the Sunnī Ottomans, and secondly against Christian colonial powers 
of Russian, British, and Portuguese origins. As discussed in Chapter II, the anti-
imperialist resistance also gave prominence to the Shī‘ī doctrine of Nafy-i Sabīl. 
Eventually, however, the separation of political and religious authorities proved 
unsustainable as the political power of the ‘Ulamā gradually increased. By the time of the 
universal Marja‘īyah of Grand Ayatollah Burūjirdī (d. 1961 C.E.), the power accumulated 
in the office of a Grand Marja’ was a political force waiting to be tapped into. The 
situation eventually led to the Islamic Revolution of 1979.  
The dynamics of power before and after the Revolution in Iran lie beyond the 
scope of this dissertation.623 Yet, the strategic culture of the new political entity that 
emerged after 1979 offers an interesting case of a Shī‘ī strategic culture. This modern 
strategic culture too has its roots in the same theological triangle, namely Shahādah, 
Taqīyyah, and Wilāyah-Walāyah. The foundational theory of the new state, or the theory 
of Wilāyat Faqīh, was a manifestation of the Shī‘ī ontology of Wilāyah and Walāyah, 
albeit an extreme one as discussed in Chapter V. Secondly, the doctrine of Taqīyyah was 
manifested itself in religious articulation of raison d’état after 1979 and the extensive use 
                                                 
623 Mesbahi argues that the rise of the Islamic Republic in Iran has been one of the important political 
developments since the beginning of the “age of Occultation” in Shī‘ah Islam. The Revolution, he argues, 
may be considered as the beginning of modern politics in the Shī‘ah world, for Ayatollah Khomeini was the 
first Shī‘ah Faqīh to articulate an essentially Hobbesian notion of state and that of national security. The 
significance of this development is more evident when one considers the broader crisis of modern nation-
state in the Muslim world. Historically, it has not been without difficulty for Muslims to internalize the self-
referential character of modern nation-states, as well as its glorification in the modern ideology of 
nationalism. In addition, the institution of modern state in the Muslim world initially emerged as the legacy 
of colonialism. As such, it suffered from legitimacy deficiency from the beginning. The fact that modern 
nation-state was a substitute for the “sacred institution of caliphate” further undermined its legitimacy in 
the Sunnī world. Needless to say, the objection to the legitimacy of modern nation-state in the Shī‘ī world 
has been yet stronger given the Shī‘ī anti-power political theology. It is in this context that Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s religious formulation of raison d’état becomes of significance [M. Mesbahi, Interviews, Fall 
2011. See also Piscatori, James. Islam in a World of Nation-States].      
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of the notion of political expediency in justifying the survival of the state. In fact, the 
state modernized the doctrine of Taqīyyah and even institutionalized it.624 As the state had 
to tame the anti-power forces in Shī‘ah Islam, which has been the legacy of many past 
centuries, the notion of Maṣlaḥah, or expediency, proved to be invaluable.  
Finally, scholars such as Mesbahi have argued that it was the doctrine of 
Shahādah that emerged as the “backbone of Iran’s national security during the Iran-Iraq 
war in the 1980s.”625 The assessment is based on the acts of sacrifice that the Shī‘ī 
doctrine of Shahādah could demand the community over limited periods of time. During 
such times of crisis, the doctrine has been particularly powerful in shaping Shī‘ī strategic 
behaviors. Over the long run, however, the doctrine of Shahādah has often had a 
symbolic value for the community.626 Beyond the exceptional episodes of crisis, Taqīyyah 
has been the modus vivendi of the community. Moreover, a consensus gradually emerged 
among Shī‘ah jurists about the necessity of permission by a legitimate “bearer of 
Wilāyah” to engage in non-defensive Jihād.627 This further diminished the immediate 
relevance of the doctrine of Shahādah beyond the times of “defensive wars.”628 In any 
case, it can be argued that Iranian modern strategic culture has employed both Shahādah 
                                                 
624 For instance, a government body called the “Expediency Council” was created with the responsibility 
of, inter alia, identifying and protecting the strategic interests of the state.   
625 M. Mesbahi, Interviews, Spring 2010, and Mesbahi, Mohiaddin. Free and Confined.  
626 According to Enayat, this has been the case until modern times partly because of the dominance of the 
doctrine of Taqīyyah in Shī‘ī strategic thoughts. See Enayat, Hamid. Andīshih Sīyāsī dar Islām Mu‘āṣir. pp. 
314-5. 
627 See Chapter III. 
628 The rising importance of the doctrine of Shahādah in certain Shī‘ī discourses is a rather modern 
phenomenon. See Enayat, Hamid. Andīshih Sīyāsī dar Islām Mu‘āṣir. pp. 322-34. 
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and Taqīyyah thus far. Whether this strategic culture will be dominated by the Shī‘ī 
modus vivendi of Taqīyyah or whether it will highlight Shahādah remains to be seen. The 
layout of this strategic culture, nevertheless, shows how ancient theological notions of 
Taqīyyah, Shahādah, and Wilāyah-Walāyah could serve as theological foundations for a 
Shī‘ī strategic culture.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
228 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Abisaab, Rula Jurdi. (1994). The Ulama of Jabal ‘Amil in Safavid Iran, 1501-1736: 
Marginality, Migration and Social Change. Iranian Studies, 27(1-4), 103-22. 
Abrahamian, Ervand. (1982). Iran between Two Revolutions. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Adamsky, Dima. (2010). The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural 
Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press. 
Al-Fārābi, Abū Naṣr (1985). On the Perfect State. USA: Oxford University Press. 
Algar, Hamid. (1981). Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam 
Khomeini (1941-1980). Berkeley: Mizan Press. 
Almond, G. A., Appleby, S., & Sivan, E. (2003). Strong Religion: The Rise of 
Fundamentalisms Around the World. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
Amir-Arjomand, Said. (1984). The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam: Religion, 
Political Order, and Societal Change in Shi‘Ite Iran from the Beginning to 1890. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Amir-Arjomand, Said. (1988). The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Amir-Arjomand, Said. (1988). Authority and Political Culture in Shi‘ism. Albany: State 
University of New York Press.  
Amir-Moezzi, Mohammad A. (1994). The Divine Guide in Early Shi‘Ism: The Sources of 
Esotericism in Islam. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Anderson, Benedict. (2003). Imagined Communities. New York: Verso.  
Angell, Norman. (1972). The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power in 
Nations to Their Economic and Social Advantage. New York: Arno Press.  
Antoun, Richard T. (2001). Understanding Fundamentalism: Christian, Islamic, and 
Jewish Movements. Walnut Creek: AltaMira Press.  
Appleby, Scott. (2003). Serving Two Masters? Affirming Religious Belief and Human 
Rights in a Pluralistic World. In J. D. Carlson and E. C. Owens (Eds.), The Sacred and 
the Sovereign: Religion and International Politics (pp. 170-195). Washington: 
Georgetown University Press. 
Armstrong, Karen. (2001). The Battle for God. New York: Random House.  
229 
 
Armstrong, Karen. (2002). Islam: A Short History. New York: Random House.   
Asad, Talal. (1983). Anthropological Conceptions of Religion: Reflections on Geertz. 
Man (NS), 18(2), 237-259.  
Asad, Talal. (2003). Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press. 
Bataille, George. (1989). Theory of Religion. New York: Zone Books. 
Bennison, Amira K. (2009). The Great Caliphs: The Golden Age of the ‘Abbasid Empire. 
London: I.B.Tauris & Co. 
Berger, Peter. (1967). The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion. 
New York: Anchor Books.  
Berger, Peter. (Ed.). (1999). The Desecularization of the World. Washington: Ethics and 
Public Policy Center.  
Berger, Peter. (2000). Secularism in Retreat. In J. L. Esposito & A. Tamimi (Eds.), Islam 
and Secularism in the Middle East (pp. 38–51). New York: New York University Press.  
Berger, Thomas U. (1996). Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan. 
In P. J. Katzenstein (Ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World 
Politics (pp. 317-356). New York: Columbia University Press. 
Bireley, Robert. (1990). The Counter-Reformation Prince: Anti-Machiavellianism or 
Catholic Statecraft in Early Modern Europe. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press. 
Black, Jeremy. (2004). Rethinking Military History. New York: Routledge. 
Black, Jeremy. (2012). War and the Cultural Turn. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Bosworth, Clifford Edmund. (1996). The New Islamic Dynasties. New York: Columba 
University Press. 
Buley, Benjamin. (2008). The New American Way of War: Military Culture and the 
Political Utility of Force. New York: Routledge. 
Bull, Hedley. (1995). The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. New 
York: Columbia University Press. 
Bulliet, Richard W. (1994). Islam: The View from the Edge. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
Burch, Kurt. (2002). Toward a Constructivist Comparative Politics. In Daniel Green 
(Ed.), Constructivism and Comparative Politics (pp. 60-87). New York: M. E. Sharpe. 
230 
 
Burckhardt; Titus. (1987). Mirror of the Intellect: Essays on Traditional Science & 
Sacred Art. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & de Wilde, J. (1998). Security: A New Framework for Analysis. 
Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Calhoun, C., Juergensmeyer, M., & VanAntwerpen, J. (Eds.). (2011). Rethinking 
Secularism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Carlson, J. D., & Owens, E. C. (Eds.). (2003). The Sacred and the Sovereign: Religion 
and International Politics. Washington: Georgetown University Press.  
Carr, E. H. (2001). The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of 
International Relations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Casanova, José. (1994). Public Religions in the Modern World. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Casanova, José. (2006). Secularization Revisited: A Reply to Talal Asad. In D. Scott & C. 
Hirschkind  (Eds.), Powers of the Secular Modern: Talal Asad and His Interlocutors (pp. 
12-30). Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Chodkiewicz, Michel. (1993). Seal of the Saints: Prophethood and Sainthood in the 
Doctrine of Ibn ‘Arabī. Cambridge: The Islamic Text Society. 
Cohen, Eliot A. (1996). A Revolution in Warfare. Foreign Affairs, 75(2), 37-54.   
Connor, Walker. (1972). Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?. World Politics, 24(3), 
319-355. 
Coomaraswamy, Ananda. (2007). Figures of Speech or Figures of Thought?: The 
Traditional View of Art. Bloomington: World Wisdom. 
Cooperson, Michael. (2005). Al-Ma’mun. Oxford: Oneworld Publications.   
Corbin, Henry. (1978). The Man of Light in Iranian Sufism. London: Shambhala.  
Corbin, Henry. (1986). Temple and Contemplation. London: Routledge. 
Cornell, Vincent J. (1998). Realm of the Saints: Power and Authority in Moroccan 
Sufism. Austin: University of Texas Press. 
Cozette, Murielle. (2008). What Lies Ahead: Classical Realism on the Future of 
International Relations. International Studies Review, 10, 667-679. 
Dabashi, Hamid. (2006). The Theology of Discontent: The Ideological Foundation of the 
Islamic Revolution in Iran.  New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. 
231 
 
Dakake, Maria M. (2007). The Charismatic Community: Shi‘ite Identity in Early Islam. 
Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Dawisha, Adeed. (2009). Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Duffield, John S. (Autumn 1999). Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany 
Confounds Neorealism. International Organization, 53(4), 765-803. 
Durkheim, Émile. (2001). The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
El Fadl, Khaled Abou.  (2002). The Place of Tolerance in Islam. Boston: Beacon Books. 
Eliade, Mircea. (Ed.). (1987). Encyclopedia of Religion. New York: Macmillan. 
Elshtain, Jean. (2004). Military Intervention and Justice as Equal Regard. In R. A. Seiple 
& D. R. Hoover (Eds.), Religion and Security: The New Nexus in International Relations 
(pp. 115-130). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Enayat, Hamid. (1982). Modern Islamic Political Thought. Austin: University of Texas 
Press.  
Enayat, Hamid. (2010). Andīshih Sīyāsī dar Islām Mu‘āṣir. Tehran: Intishārāt Khārazmī.  
Esposito, John L. (2000). Islam and Secularism in the Twenty-First Century. In John L. 
Esposito & Azzam Tamimi (Eds.), Islam and Secularism in the Middle East (pp. 1–12). 
New York: New York University Press. 
Faghfoory, Mohammad H. (Forthcoming April 2012). Ethic of War and Peace in Shi‘ite 
Islam. In G. M. Reichberg & H. Syse (Eds.), Ethics of War and Peace in World Religions. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Falk, Richard A. (2001). Religion and Humane Global Governance. New York, Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Falk, Richard A. (2003). A Worldwide Religious Resurgence in an Era of Globalization 
and Apocalyptic Terrorism. In F. Petito & P. Hatzopoulos (Eds.), Religion in International 
Relations: The Return from Exile (pp. 181-208).  New York: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Fanon, Frantz. (2004). The Wretched of the Earth. New York: Grove Press. 
Farrell, Theo. (2005). The Norms of War: Cultural Beliefs and Modern Conflict. Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner. 
Feirahi, Davoud. (2009). Qudrat, Dānish wa Mashrū‘īyat dar Islām. Tehran: Nashr Niy. 
Feirahi, Davoud. (2009). Tārīkh Taḥawwūl Duwlat dar Islām. Qum: Intishārāt Dānishgāh 
232 
 
Mufīd. 
Feng, Huiyun. (2007). Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision-Making: 
Confucianism, Leadership and War. New York: Routledge. 
Finnemore, Martha. (1996). National Interests in International Society. New York: 
Cornell University Press.  
Fox, Jonathan, & Sandler, Shmuel. (2004). Bringing Religion Into International 
Relations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Frank, Richard M. (2006). Early Islamic Theology: The Mu‘tazilites and al-Ash‘ari. Texts 
and Studies on the Development of History of Kalām. Aldershot: Ashgate Publications. 
Gaddis, John L. (2004). Surprise, Security, and the American Experience. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. 
Geertz, Clifford. (1973). The Interpretations of Cultures. New York, Basic Books. 
Glenn, J., Howlett, D., & Poore, S. (Eds.). (2004). Neorealism versus Strategic Culture. 
Burlington: Ashgate Publishing. 
Gellner, Ernest. (1992). Postmodernism, Reason, and Religion. London: Routledge. 
Goldziher, Ignác. (1971). Muslim Studies (Vol. II). New York: Aldine Publishing.   
Goldziher, Ignác. (2006). Muslim Studies (Vol. I). Chicago: Aldine Publishing.   
Gopin, Marc. (2000). Between Eden and Armageddon: The Future of World Religions, 
Violence, and Peacemaking. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Gray, Colin. (1986). Nuclear Strategy and National Style. Lanham: Hamilton Press. 
Gray, Colin. (1999). Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes 
Back. Review of International Studies, 25, 49–69. 
Guénon, René. (1989). Oriental Metaphysics. Unknown: Hanuman Books. 
Guénon, René. (1995). Fundamental Symbols: The Universal Language of Sacred 
Science. Cambridge: Fons Vitae. 
Guénon, René. (2001). The Crisis of Modern World. Hillsdale: Sophia Perennis. 
Guénon, René. (2004). The Multiple States of Being. Hillsdale: Sophia Perennis. 
Guénon, René. (2004). The Reign of Quantity and the Signs of the Times. Hillsdale: 
Sophia Perennis. 
233 
 
Habermas, Jürgen. (2002). Religion and Rationality: Essays on Reason, God and 
Modernity. Cambridge: The MIT Press. 
Habermas, Jürgen, et al. (2010). An Awareness of What is Missing: Faith and Reason in a 
Post-secular Age. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Hairi, Abdul Hadi. (1977). Shiism and Constitutionalism in Iran: A Study of the Role 
Played by the Persian Residents of Iraq in Iranian Politics. Leiden: Brill.   
Hall, M., and Jackson, P. T. (Eds.). (2007). Civilizational Identity: The Production and 
Reproduction of “Civilizations” in International Relations. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Harris, Brice F. (2009). America, Technology and Strategic Culture: A Clausewitzian 
Assessment. New York: Routledge. 
Haynes, Jeffrey. (1998). Religion in Global Politics. New York: Longman.  
Haynes, Jeffrey. (2011). Religion, Politics, and International Relations: Selected Essays. 
New York: Routledge. 
Heidegger, Martin. (2004). The Phenomenology of Religious Life. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press. 
Hertog, Katrien. (2010). The Complex Reality of Religious Peacebuilding: Conceptual 
Contributions and Critical Analysis. Plymouth: Lexington Books. 
Hoover, Dennis R., and Johnston, Douglas M. (Eds.). (2012). Religion and Foreign 
Affairs: Essential Readings. Waco: Baylor University Press. 
Huntington, Samuel P. (1996). The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World 
Order. New York: Simon & Schuster. 
Hurd, Elizabeth S. (2004). The Political Authority of Secularism in International 
Relations. European Journal of International Relations, 10(2), 235-262. 
Hurd, Elizabeth S. (2008). The Politics of Secularism in International Relations. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Husserl, Edmund. (1970). The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 
Jafri, Askari. (1988). Nahj al-Balāghah (Peak of Eloquence): Sermons and Letters of 
ImamAli Ibn Abi Talib. Karachi: Islamic Seminary Publications. 
Johnson, Robert. (2012). The Afghan Way of War: How and Why They Fight. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
234 
 
Johnston, Alastair I. (1995). Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in 
Chinese History. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Johnston, Alastair I. (1995). Thinking about Strategic Culture. International Security, 
19(4), 32-64.   
Johnston, Alastair I. (1996). Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China. In P. J. 
Katzenstein (Ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics 
(pp. 216-268). New York: Columbia University Press. 
Johnston, Douglas, & Sampson, Cynthia. (Eds.). (1994). Religion, the Missing Dimension 
of Statecraft. Oxford: Oxford University Press.     
Jones, David R. (1990). Soviet Strategic Culture. In C. G. Jacobsen (Ed.), Strategic 
Power: USA/USSR (pp. 35-49). London: St. Martin’s Press. 
Juergensmeyer, Mark. (1993). The New Cold War?. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
Juergensmeyer, Mark. (2001). The Global Rise of Religious Nationalism. In D. N. 
Hopkins, L. A. Lorentzen, E. Mendieta, & D. Batstone (Eds.), Religions/Globalizations: 
Theories and Cases (pp. 66-83). London: Duke University Press. 
Juergensmeyer, Mark. (2003). Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious 
Violence. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Kadivar, Mohsen. (2006). Qarā’at Farāmūsh Shudih: Bāzkhānī Naẓarīyih “‘Ulamā 
Abrār” –Talaqqī Awwalīyih Islām Shī‘ī az Aṣl “Imāmat”. Madrisih, 1(3), 92-102. 
Kadivar, Mohsen. (2007). Sīyāsat-Nāmih Khurāsānī. Tehran: Kawīr Publications. 
Kadivar, Mohesn. (2008). Ḥaqq al-Nās: Islām wa Ḥuqūq Bashar. Tehran: Kawīr 
Publications. 
Kalin, Ibrahim. (2010). Knowledge in Later Islamic Philosophy: Mullā Ṣadrā on 
Existence, Intellect and Intuition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kant, Immanuel. (2011). Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: A –German-
English Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Katzenstein, Peter J. (Ed.). (1996). The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity 
in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Keddie, Nikki. (1966). Religion and Rebellion in Iran: The Tobacco Protest of 1891-92. 
London: Frank Cass. 
235 
 
Keddie, Nikki. (1968). An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious 
Writings of Sayyid Jamal al-Din “al-Afghani”. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Keddie, Nikki. (1972). Sayyid Jamal al-Din “al-Afghani”: A Political Biography. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Keddie, Nikki. (1980). Iran: Religion, Politics and Society: Collected Essays. New York: 
Frank Cass. 
Keddie, Nikki. (1983). Religion and Politics in Iran: Shi‘ism from Quietism to 
Revolution. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Keddie, Nikki. (1995). Iran and the Muslim World: Resistance and Revolution. New 
York: New York University Press.  
Keddie, Nikki. (2006). Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
Keohane, Robert O. (2002). Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World. 
New York: Routledge. 
Kier, Elizabeth. (1997). Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between 
the Wars. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Kierkegaard, Søren. (1962). Afsluttende Uvidenskabelig Efterskrift. København: 
Gyldendal. 
Kinsely, David R. (1993). Hinduism: A Cultural Perspective. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice 
Hall 
Kratochwil, Friedrich V. (1989). Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of 
Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Krause, Keith R. (1999). Culture and Security: Multilateralism, Arms Control and 
Security Building. New York: Frank Cass Publisher. 
Kubálková, Vendulka. (2000). Towards an International Political Theology. Millennium - 
Journal of International Studies, 29, 675-704. 
Kubálková, Vendulka. (2003). Toward an International Political Theology. In F. Petito & 
P. Hatzopoulos (Eds.), Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile (pp. 
79-105). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.   
Lakhani, M. Ali. (Ed.). (2006). The Sacred Foundations of Justice in Islam: The 
Teachings of ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib. Bloomington: World Wisdom.  
236 
 
Lambton, Ann K. S. (1980). Theory and Practice in Medieval Persian Government. 
London: Variorum Reprints. 
Lambton, Ann K.S. (1981). State and Government in Medieval Islam: An Introduction to 
the Study of Political Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Laustsen, Carsten B., & Wæver, Ole. (2000). In Defence of Religion: Sacred Referent 
Objects for Securitization,  Millennium - Journal of International Studies, 29, 705-739.  
Lewis, Bernard. (1990). The Roots of Muslim Rage. The Atlantic Monthly, 266(3), 47–
58. 
Lewis, Bernard. (2004). The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror. New York: 
Random House  
Liddell-Hart, Basil H. (1991). Strategy. New York: Penguin Books. 
Lings, Martin. (1993). What is Sufism. Cambridge: The Islamic Text Society. 
Lings, Martin. (2006). Muhammd: His Life Based on the Earliest Sources. London: Inner 
Tradition. 
Lings, Martin. (2006). Symbol & Archetype: A Study of the Meaning of Existence. 
Cambridge: Fons Vitae. 
Lobell, S. E., Ripsman, N. M., & Taliaferro, J. W.  (Eds.). (2009). Neoclassical Realism, 
the State, and Foreign Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Madelung, Wilferd. (1985). Religious Schools and Sects in Medieval Islam. London: 
Variorum Reprints. 
Madelung, Wilferd. (1988). Religious Trends in Early Islamic Iran. Albany: State 
University of New York Press.  
Madelung, Wilferd. (1992). Religious and Ethnic Movements in Medieval Islam. 
Hampshire: Variorum. 
Madelung, Wilferd. (1997). The Succession to Muhammad: A Study of the Early 
Caliphate. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Mahnken, Thomas. (2008). Technology and the American Way of War Since 1945. New 
York: Columbia University Press. 
Malekpour, Jamshid. (2004). The Islamic Drama. Portland: Frank Cass Publishers. 
Martin, R. C., Woodward, M. R., & Atmaja, D. S. (1997). Defenders of Reason in Islam: 
Mu‘tazilism from Medieval School to Modern Symbol. Oxford: Oneworld Publications. 
237 
 
Matthee, Rudi. (2012). Persia in Crisis: Safavid Decline and the Fall of Isfahan. New 
York: I.B.Tauris & Co. 
Mead, Walter R. (2002). Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It 
Changed the World. New York: Routledge. 
Mearsheimer, John J. (1983). Conventional Deterrence. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.  
Mendieta, Eduardo. (Ed.). (2005). The Frankfurt School on Religion: Key Writings by the 
Major Thinkers. New York: Routledge. 
Mesbahi, Mohiaddin. (Spring 2011). Free and Confined: Iran and the International 
System. Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs. 2(5), 9-34. 
Meyer, Christoph O. (2006). The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: Changing 
Norms on Security and Defence in the European Union. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Modarresi Tabatabaii, Hossein. (1993). Crisis and Consolidation in the Formative Period 
of Shi‘ite Islam: Abu Ja‘far Ibn Qiba Al-Razi and His Contribution to Imamite Shi‘ite 
Thought. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Modarresi Tabatabaii, Hossein. (2007). Maktab dar Farāyand Takāmul: Naẓarī bar 
Taṭawwur Mabānī Fikrī Tashayyu‘ dar Sih Qarn Nukhustīn. Trans. Hashem Izadpanah. 
Tehran: Intishārāt Kawīr. 
Morgan, Forrest E. (2003). Compellence and Strategic Culture of Imperial Japan: 
Implications for Coercive Diplomacy in Twenty-First Century. Westport: Praeger 
Publishers. 
Morgenthau, Hans J. (1946). Scientific Man vs Power Politics. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Mottahedeh, Roy. (2000). The Mantle of The Prophet: Religion and Politics in Iran. 
Oxford: Oneworld Publications. 
Mufti, Malik. (2009). Daring and Caution in Turkish Strategic Culture: Republic at Sea. 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Murtaẓawī, S. Ḍia’. (1998). ‘Āshūra dar Fiqh. Qum: Intishārāt Daftar Tablīghāt. 
Muṭahharī, Murtaḍā. (1989). Jādhibih wa Dāfi‘ih ‘Alī. Tehran: Ṣadrā Publications.    
Muṭahharī, Murtaḍā, (1998). Jihād. Tehran: Ṣadrā Publications. 
Muṭahharī, Murtaḍā, (2009). ‘Adl Ilāhī. Tehran: Ṣadrā Publications. 
Muṭahharī, Murtaḍā. (2010). Walā’-hā wa Wilāyat-hā. Tehran: Ṣadrā Publications. 
238 
 
Nasr, S. H., Dabashi, H., & Nasr, S. V. R. (Eds.). (1989). Expectation of the Millennium: 
Shi‘ism in History. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. (1972). Sufi Essays. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. (Fall 1982). The Spiritual Significance of jihãd. Parabola, 7(4), 
14-19. 
Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. (1985). Ideals and Realities of Islam. London: George Allen & 
Unwin. 
Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. (1989). Knowledge and The Sacred. Albany: State University of 
New York Press. 
Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. (1993). An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines. 
Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. (1996). Religion and the Order of Nature. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. (1997). Man and Nature: The Spiritual Crisis in Modern Man. 
Chicago: Kazi Publications. 
Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. (2002). The Heart of Islam: Enduring Values for Humanity. New 
York: HarperCollins. 
Nasr. Seyyed Hossein. (2003). Islam: Religion, History and Civilization. New York: 
HarperCollins. 
Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. (2007). The Essential Seyyed Hossein Nasr. Bloomington: World 
Wisdom. 
Nasr, Vali. (2006). Shi‘a Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future. New 
York: WW Norton & Co.  
Newman, Andrew J. (2006). Safavid Iran: Rebirth of a Persian Empire. New York: 
I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd. 
Niebuhr, Reinhold. (1932). Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and 
Politics. New York: Charles Scribner’s. 
Norris, Pippa, & Inglehart, Ronald. (2004). Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics 
Worldwide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Onuf, Nicholas. (1989). World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and 
International Relations. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.  
239 
 
Onuf, Nicholas. (1998). Constructivism: A User’s Manual. In V. Kubálková, N. Onuf, & 
P. Kowert (Eds.), International Relations in a Constructed World (pp. 58-78). Armonk: 
M.E. Sharpe. 
Piscatori, James P. (Ed.). (1983). Islam in the Political Process. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Piscatori, James P. (1986). Islam in a World of Nation-States. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Raines John. (Ed.). (2002). Marx on Religion. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
Rajaee, Farhang. (Ed.). (1993). The Iran-Iraq War: The Politics of Aggression. 
Gainesville: University Press of Florida. 
Rose, Gideon. (1998). Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy. World 
Politics, 51(1), 144-172. 
Rosecrance, Richard. (1986). The Rise of The Trading States: Commerce and Conquest in 
the Modern World. New York: Basic Books.  
Rosenthal, Erwin. (1962). Political Thought in Medieval Islam: An Introductory Outline. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Roskin, Michael. (1999). From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: Shifting Generational 
Paradigms and Foreign Policy. In G. J. Ikenberry (Ed.), American Foreign Policy: 
Theoretical Essays (pp. 315-336). New York: Longman. 
Ruggie, John G. (1998). Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International 
Institutionalization. New York: Routledge.  
Rustom, Muhammed. (Forthcoming 2012). The Triumph of Mercy: Philosophy and 
Scripture in Mullā Ṣadrā. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Sachedina, Abdulaziz A. (1981). Islamic Messianism: The Idea of the Mahdi in Twelver 
Shi‘ism. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Sachedina, Abdulaziz A. (1988). The Just Ruler in Shi‘ite Islam: The Comprehensive 
Authority of the Jurist in Imamite Jurisprudence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Ṣafarī, Ni‘matullāh. (2003). Naqsh Taqīyyah dar Istinbāṭ. Qum: Būstān Kitāb Qum. 
Sagan, Scott D., & Waltz, Kenneth N. (2002). The Spread of Nuclear Weapon: A Debate 
Renewed. New York: WW Norton & Co.  
Said, Edward. (1978). Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books. 
Ṣāliḥī Najafābādī, Ni‘matullāh. (1970). Shahīd Jāwīd. Tehran: Unknown. 
240 
 
Ṣāliḥī Najafābādī, Ni‘matullāh. (2008). Jihād dar Islām. Tehran: Nashr Niy. 
Seiple, Robert A., & Hoover, Dennis R. (Eds.). (2004). Religion and Security: The New 
Nexus in International Relations. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.  
Schimmel, Annemarie. (1992). Islam: An Introduction. Albany: State University of New 
York Press  
Schmitt, Carl. (1986). Political Theology: Four Chapters on The Concept of Sovereignty. 
Cambridge: MIT Press.  
Schmitt, Carl. (1996). The Concept of the Political. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Schuon, Frithjof. (1982). Esoterism As Principle and As Way. Hillsdale: Sophia Perennis. 
Schuon, Frithjof. (1984). The Transcendent Unity of Religions. Wheaton: Quest Books. 
Schuon, Frithjof. (2003). Form and Substance in Religions. Bloomington: World 
Wisdom.  
Schuon, Frithjof. (2003). Stations of Wisdom. Bloomington: World Wisdom.  
Schuon, Frithjof. (2003). The Eyes of the Heart: Metaphysics, Cosmology, Spiritual Life. 
Bloomington: World Wisdom. 
Schuon, Frithjof. (2003). To Have a Centre. Bloomington: World Wisdom. 
Schuon, Frithjof. (2006). Sufism: Veil and Quintessence. Bloomington: World Wisdom. 
Shah, T. S., Stepan, A., & Toft, M. D. (Eds.). (2012). Rethinking Religion and World 
Affairs. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Shahīdī, Sayyid Ja‘far. (1995). Zindigānī ‘Alī ibn al-Ḥusayn. Tehran: Daftar Nashr 
Farhang Islāmī. 
Shah-Kazemi, Reza. (2006). A Sacred Conception of Justice: Imam ‘Ali’s Letter to Malik 
al-Ashtar. In M. A. Lakhani (Ed.), The Sacred Foundations of Justice in Islam: The 
Teachings of ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib (pp. 61-108). Bloomington: World Wisdom. 
Shah-Kazemi, Reza. (2006). Justice and Remembrance: Introducing the Spirituality of 
Imam ‘Alī. New York: I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd. 
Shah-Kazemi, Reza. (Summer 2009). Recollecting the Spirit of Jihad. Sophia Perennis, 
1(3), 23-51. 
Shah-Kazemi, Reza. (2011). Spiritual Quest: Reflections on Qur’anic Prayer According 
to the Teaching of Imam ‘Alī. New York: I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd. 
241 
 
Sharī‘tī, ‘Alī. (2008). Islām Shināsī. Tehran: Ilhām. 
Sharī‘tī, ‘Alī. (2011). Ḥusayn Wārith Ādam. Tehran: Qalam.  
Sharī‘tī, ‘Alī. (2011). Tashayyu‘ ‘Alawī, Tashayyu‘ Ṣafawī. Tehran: Sipīdih Bāwarān.  
Smart, Ninian. (1996). Dimensions of the Sacred: An Anatomy of the World’s Beliefs. 
London: Fontana Press. 
Smith, Huston. (1992). Forgotten Truth: The Common Vision of The World’s Religions. 
New York: HarperCollins.  
Smith, Huston. (2001). Why Religion Matters: The Fate of the Human Spirit in an Age of 
Disbelief. New York: HarperCollins. 
Snyder, Jack L. (1977). The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options, 
R-2154-AF. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation. 
Snyder, Jack L. (Ed.). (2011). Religion and International Relations Theory. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
Sondhaus, Lawrence (2006). Strategic Culture and Ways of War. New York: Routledge. 
Steiner, Barry H. (1991). Bernard Brodie and the Foundations of American Nuclear 
Strategy. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press.  
Sterling-Folker, Jennifer. (Spring 2002). Realism and the Constructivist Challenge: 
Rejecting, Reconstructing, or Rereading. International Studies Review, 4(1), 73-97. 
Stern, Jessica. (2003). Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill. New 
York: Harper Collins Publishers. 
Subḥānī, Ja‘far. (2001). Doctrines of Shi‘i Islam: A Compendium of Imami Beliefs and 
Practices. London: I. B. Tauris. 
Ṭabāṭabā’ī, Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn. (1975). Shi‘ite Islam. Trans. S. H. Nasr. Albany: 
State University of New York Press. 
Ṭabāṭabā’ī, Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn. (2003). Kernel of the Kernel. Trans. M. H. 
Faghfoory. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Taylor, Charles. (2007). A Secular Age. Harvard: Harvard University Press. 
Taylor, Charles. (2012). The Meaning of Secularism. In D. R. Hoover and D. M. Johnston 
(Eds.), Religion and Foreign Affairs: Essential Readings (pp. 11-20). Waco: Baylor 
University Press. 
Thomas, Scott M. (2000). Religion and International Conflict. In K. R. Dark (Ed.), 
242 
 
Religion and International Relations (pp. 1-23). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Thomas, Scott M. (2000). Taking Religious and Cultural Pluralism Seriously: The Global 
Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Society. Millennium, 
29(3), 815-841. 
Thomas, Scott M. (2005). The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of 
International Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Toje, Asle. (2008). America, the EU and Strategic Culture: Renegotiating the 
Transatlantic Bargain. New York: Routledge. 
Vasquez, John A. (1998). The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to 
Neotraditionalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Wallerstein, Immanuel. (2005). Render Unto Caesar?: The Dilemmas of a Multicultural 
World. Sociology of Religion, 66(2), 121-133. 
Walzer, Michael. (2006). Just and Unjust Wars:A Moral Argument With Historical 
Illustrations. New York: Basic Books.  
Watt, W. Montgomery. (1961). Muhammad: Prophet and Statesman. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Watt, W. Montgomery. (1981). Muhammad at Medina. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Weber, Max. (1993). The Sociology of Religion. Boston: Beacon Press. 
Weber. Max.  (2002). The Protestant Ethics and the “Spirit” of Capitalism and Other 
Writings. New York: Penguin Books.  
Wendt, Alexander. (1999). Social Theory of International Politics. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Wessinger, Catherine. (Ed.). (2011). The Oxford Handbook of Millennialism. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Williams, Michael C. (2007). Culture and Security: Symbolic Power and the Politics of 
International Security. New York: Routledge. 
Zhang, Shu Guang. (1992). Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American 
Confrontations, 1949-1958. New York: Cornell University Press. 
Classical Sources (in Arabic) 
‘Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Abī Bakr al-Suyūṭī. (Unknown). al-Durr al-Manthūr fīl-Tafsīr bil-
Ma’thūr. Beirut: Dār al-Ma‘rifah lil- Ṭibā‘ah.  
243 
 
‘Alā al-Dīn ‘Alī al-Hindī. (1989). Kanz al-‘Ummāl fī Sunan al-Aqwāl wal-Af‘āl. Beirut: 
Mu’assisah al-Risālah. 
‘Alī ibn Abī-Ṭālib. (1988). Nahj al-Balāghah. Karachi: Islamic Seminary Publications. 
‘Allāmih Amīnī. (1977). al-Ghadīr. Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-‘Arabī.  
‘Allāmih Ḥillī. (1993). Tadhkirah al-Fuqahā’. Qum: Mu’assisah Āl al-Bayt li Iḥyā’ al-
Turāth.  
‘Allāmih Ḥillī. (Unknown). Tadhkirah al-Fuqahā’. Tehran: Maktabah al-Murtaḍawīyyah 
li-Iḥyā’ al-Āthār al-Ja‘farīyyah.  
‘Allāmih Majlisī. (1983). Biḥar al-Anwār. Beirut: Mu’assisah al-Wafā’. 
‘Allāmih Ṭabāṭabā’ī. (Unknown). al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān. Qum: Manshūrāt Jamā‘ah 
al-Mudarrisīn.  
Abū ‘Abdullāh ibn Mājah. (Unknown). Sunan ibn Mājah. Unknown: Dār al-Fikr lil-
Ṭibā‘ah.   
Abū al-Fatḥ Shahristānī. (Unknown). al-Milal wal-Niḥal. Beirut: Dār al-Ma‘rifah lil- 
Ṭibā‘ah. 
Abū al-Ḥasan ibn Bābawayh al-Qumī. (1984). al-Imāmah wal-Tabṣirah. Qum: Madrasah 
al-Imām al-Mahdī.  
Abū al-Ḥasan Mas‘ūdī. (Unknown). Murawwij al-Dhahab wa Ma‘ādin al-Jawhar. 
Unknown: Dār al-Andulus. 
Abū al-Majd al-Ḥalabī. (1994). Ishārat al-Sabaq. Qum: Mu’assisah al-Nashr al-Islāmī al-
Tābi‘ah li Jamā‘ah al-Mudarrisīn. 
Abū al-Qāsim al-Khū’ī. (1990). Kitāb al-Ṭahārah. Qum: Dār al-Hādī lil-Maṭbū‘āt.  
Abū al-Qāsim Zamakhsharī. (1966). al-Kashshāf ‘an Ḥaqā’iq al-Tanzīl wa ‘Uyūn al-
Aqāwīl fi Wujūh al-Ta’wīl. Egypt: Maṭba‘ah Muṣṭafā al-Bābī.  
Abū Ja‘far Thiqat al-Islām Kuliynī. (1984/5). Uṣūl al-Kāfī. Tehran: Dār al-Kutub al-
Islāmīyyah.  
Abū Muḥammad ibn Qatibah al-Daynūrī. (1992/3). al-Imāmah wal-Sīyāsah. Qum: 
Intishārāt Sharīf al-Raḍī.  
Abū Ṣalāḥ al-Ḥalabī. (Unknown). al-Kāfī fīl-Fiqh. Isfahan: Maktabah al-Imām Amīr al-
Mu’minīn ‘Alī al-‘Āmmah.   
Aḥmad ibn A‘tham al-Kūfī. (1990/1). Kitāb al-Futūḥ. Beirut: Dār al-Aḍwā’. 
244 
 
Aḥmad ibn Abī Ya‘qūb. (Unknown). Tārīkh Ya‘qūbī. Beirut: Dār Ṣādir. 
Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal. (Unknown). al-Musnad. Beirut: Dār Ṣādir.  
Aḥmad ibn Idrīs Ḥillī. (1989/90). al-Sarā’ir al-Ḥāwī li-Taḥrīr al-Fatāwī. Qum: 
Mu’assisah al-Nashr al-Islāmī al-Tābi‘ah li Jamā‘ah al-Mudarrisīn.  
al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī. (1983). Wasā’il al-Shī‘ah fī Taḥṣīl al-Masā’il al-Sharī‘ah. Beirut: Dār 
Iḥyā’ al-Turāth al-‘Arabī. 
al-Ḥurr al-‘Āmilī. (1997/8). al-Fuṣūl al-Muhimmah fī Uṣūl al-A’immah. Qum: 
Mu’assisah Ma‘ārif Islāmī Imām Riḍā.  
al-Mīrzā Jawād al-Tabrīzī. (1995). Ṣirāṭ al-Nijāt fī Ajwibah al-Istiftā’āt. Qum: Daftar 
Nashr Barguzīdih.  
al-Qāḍī Nu‘mān al-Maghribī. (1993/4). Sharḥ al-Akhbār. Qum: Mu’assisah al-Nashr al-
Islāmī al-Tābi‘ah li Jamā‘ah al-Mudarrisīn.  
al-Qundūzi al-Ḥanafī. (1995/6). Yanābi‘ al-Mawaddah li-dhawī al-Qurbā. Qum: Dār al-
Uswah lil-Ṭibā‘ah.  
al-Sayyid al-Ḥusaynī al-Mīlānī. (1993). al-Imāmah fī Ahamm al-Kutub al-Kalāmīyyah 
wa ‘Aqīdah al-Imāmīyyah. Qum: Intishārāt Sharīf al-Raḍī.  
al-Sayyid al-Khānsārī. (1985). Jāmi‘ al-Madārik. Tehran: Maktabah al-Ṣadūq.  
al-Sayyid al-Mar‘ashī. (Unknown). Sharḥ Iḥqāq al-Ḥaqq. Qum: Maktabah Āyatullāh al-
Mar‘ashī al-Najafī. 
al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā. (1989). Tanzīh al-Anbīyā’. Beirut: Dār al-Aḍwā’.  
al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā. (1995). al-Muqni‘ fīl-Ghaybah. Beirut: Mu’assisah Āl al-Bayt li 
Iḥyā’ al-Turāth.    
al-Shaykh Kāshif al-Ghiṭā’. (1994/5). Aṣl al-Shī‘ah wa Uṣūlahā. Qum: Mu’assisah al-
Imām ‘Alī.   
Amīn al-Islām Ṭabarsī. (1966). Kitāb al-Iḥtijāj. Najaf: Dār al-Nu‘mān lil-Ṭibā‘ah. 
Amīn al-Islām Ṭabarsī. (1995). Majma‘al-Bayān. Beirut: Mu’assisah al-A‘lamī lil-
Maṭbū‘āt. 
Ayatollah Khomeini. (1970/1). Taḥrīr al-Wasīlah. Najaf: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmīyyah. 
Ayatollah Khomeini. (1979). Ḥukūmah al-Islāmīyyah. Beirut: al-Mu’assisah al-
‘Arabīyyah. 
245 
 
Ayatollah Muntaẓirī. (1988). Dīrāsāt fī Wilāyah al-Faqīh wal-Fiqh al-Dawlah al-
Islāmīyyah. Qum: al-Markaz al-‘Ālamī lil-Dirāsāt al-Islāmīyyah. 
Ayatollah Muntaẓirī. (2001/2). Niẓām al-Ḥukm fīl-Islām. Qum: Hāshimiyūn.  
Fāḍil Hindī. (1995/6). Kashf al-Lithām ‘an Qawā‘id al-Aḥkām. Qum: Mu’assisah al-
Nashr al-Islāmī al-Tābi‘ah li Jamā‘ah al-Mudarrisīn. 
Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī. (1978/9). Tafsīr al-Kabīr. Egypt: Unknown.   
Ḥasan ibn Mūsā Nawbakhtī & Sa‘d ibn ‘Abdullāh al-Qummi. (1992). Firaq al-Shī‘ah. 
Cairo: Dār al-Rashād.  
Ḥasan ibn Sulaymān al-Ḥillī. (1950). Mukhtaṣar Baṣā’ir al-Darajāt. Najaf: al-Maṭba‘ah 
al-Ḥaydarīyyah. 
Ḥusayn ibn Ḥamdān al-Khaṣībī. (1991). al-Hidāyah al-Kubrā. Beirut: Mu’assisah al-
Balāgh lil-Ṭibā‘ah.  
Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd. (Unknown). Sharḥ Nahj al-Balāghah. Qum: Mu’assisah Ismā‘īlīyān 
lil-Ṭibā‘ah.  
Ibn al-Ash‘ath al-Sajistānī. (1990). Sunan Abī Dāwūd. Unknown: Dār al-Fikr lil-Ṭibā‘ah.   
Ibn al-Athīr. (1966). al-Kāmil fīl-Tārīkh. Beirut: Dār Ṣādir/Dār Beirut. 
Ibn Hishām. (1963). Sīrah al-Nabawīyyah. Cairo: Maktabah Muḥammad ‘Alī Ṣabīḥ & 
Sons.  
Ibn Kathīr. (1988). al-Bidāyah wal-Nihāyah. Beirut: Dār Iḥyā’ al-Turāth al-‘Arabī. 
Ibn Kathīr. (1992). Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-‘Aẓīm. Beirut: Dār al-Ma‘rifah lil-Ṭibā‘ah.  
Ibn Shahr Āshūb. (1956). Manāqib Āl Abī Ṭālib. Najaf: al-Maktabah al-Ḥaydarīyyah. 
Ibn Shu‘bah al-Ḥarrānī. (1984). Tuḥaf al-‘Uqūl. Qum: Mu’assisah al-Nashr al-Islāmī al-
Tābi‘ah li Jamā‘ah al-Mudarrisīn. 
Imām al-Shāfi‘ī. (1983). Kitāb al-Umm. Unknown: Dār al-Fikr lil-Ṭibā‘ah.  
Mīr Sayyid Sharīf Jurjānī. (1907). Sharḥ al-Mawāqif. Egypt: Maṭba‘ah al-Sa‘ādah.  
Muḥammad al-Riyshahrī. (1995/6). Mīzān al-Ḥikmah. Unknown: Dār al-Ḥadīth lil-
Ṭibā‘ah.  
Muḥammad al-Riyshahrī. (2000). al-‘Aql wal-Jahl fīl-Kitāb wal-Sunnah. Beirut: Dār al-
Ḥadīth lil-Ṭibā‘ah. 
246 
 
Muḥammad al-Riyshahrī. (2004/5). Mūsū‘ah al-Imām ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib fil-Kitāb wal-
Sunnah wal-Tārīkh. Qum: Dār al-Ḥadīth lil-Ṭibā‘ah. 
Muḥammad al-Tirmadhī. (1983). al-Ṣaḥīḥ. Beirut: Dār al-Fikr lil-Ṭibā‘ah.  
Muḥammad Ḥasan al-Najafī. (1986/7). Jawāhir al-Kalām fī Sharḥ Sharāyi‘al-Islām. 
Tehran: Dār al-Kutub al-Islāmīyyah.   
Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm al-Nu‘mānī. (2001/2). Kitāb al-Ghaybah. Qum: Anwār al-Hudā.  
Muḥammad ibn Ismā‘īl al-Bukhārī. (1981). al-Ṣaḥīḥ. Istanbul: Dār al-Fikr lil-Ṭibā‘ah. 
Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī. (1983). Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī. Beirut: Mu’assisah al-A‘lamī 
lil-Maṭbū‘āt. 
Muḥaqqiq Ḥillī. (1988/9). Sharāyi‘ al-Islām fī Masā’il al-Ḥalāl wal-Ḥarām. Tehran: 
Intishārāt Istiqlāl.  
Muḥaqqiq al-Karakī. (1987/8). Jāmi‘al-Maqāṣid fī Sharḥ al-Qawā‘id. Qum: Mu’assisah 
Āl al-Bayt li Iḥyā’ al-Turāth.  
Muḥaqqiq al-Karakī. (1988/9). Rasā’il al-Karakī. Qum: Maktabah Āyatullāh al-Mar‘ashī 
al-Najafī.  
Mullā Muḥsin Fiyḍ Kāshānī. (1980/1). Mafātīḥ al-Sharāyi‘. Qum: Majma‘ al-Dhakhā’ir 
al-Islāmīyyah.   
Mullā Ṣāliḥ Māzandarānī. (2000). Sharḥ Uṣūl al-Kāfī. Beirut: Dār Iḥyā’ al-Turāth al-
‘Arabī. 
Najm al-Dīn Ja‘far ibn Namā Ḥillī. (1950). Muthīr al-Aḥzān wa Munīr Subul al-Ashjān. 
Najaf: Manshūrāt al-Maṭba‘ah al-Ḥiydarīyyah.  
Naṣr ibn Muzāḥim al-Minqarī. (1962/3). Waqa‘ah Ṣiffīn. Cairo: al-Mu’assisah al-
‘Arabīyyah al-Ḥadīthah lil-Ṭab‘.    
Qāḍī ‘Aḍid al-Dīn Ījī. (1997). al-Mawāqif fī ‘Ilm al-Kalām. Beirut: Dār al-Jīl. 
Quṭb al-Dīn al-Biyhaqī. (1995). Iṣbāḥ al-Shī‘ah bi Miṣbāḥ al-Sharī‘ah. Qum: Mu’assisah 
al-Imām al-Ṣādiq.    
Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāwandī. (1989). al-Kharā’ij wal-Jarā’ih. Qum: Mu’assisah al-Imām al-
Mahdī. 
Sa‘d al-Dīn Taftāzānī. (1981). Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid fī ‘Ilm al-Kalām. Pakistan: Dār al-
Ma‘ārif al-Nu‘mānīyyah.   
Sayyid ‘Alī Ṭabāṭabā’ī. (1998/9). Rīyāḍ al-Masā’il fī Bayān Aḥkām al-Shar‘ bil-Dalā’il. 
247 
 
Qum: Mu’assisah al-Nashr al-Islāmī al-Tābi‘ah li Jamā‘ah al-Mudarrisīn. 
Sayyid al-Khū’ī. (1992). Mu‘jam Rijāl al-Ḥadīth. Unknown: Unknown.   
Sayyid Ḥasan al-Bujnūrdī. (1998/9). al-Qawā‘id al-Fiqhīyah. Qum: Nashr al-Hādī.  
Sayyid ibn Ṭāwūs. (1996/7). al-Luhūf fī Qatlā al-Ṭufūf. Qum: Anwār al-Hudā. 
Sayyid Muḥsin al-Amīn al-‘Āmilī. (Unknown). A‘yān al-Shī‘ah. Beirut: Dār al-Ta‘āruf 
lil-Maṭbū‘āt. 
Shahīd al-Awwal. (Unknown). al-Qawā’id wal-Fawā’id fīl-Fiqh wal-Uṣūl wal-
‘Arabīyah. Qum: Maktabah al-Mufīd.  
Shahīd al-Thānī. (1988/9). Ḥaqā’iq al-Imān. Qum: Maktabah Āyatullāh al-Mar‘ashī al-
Najafī. 
Shahīd al-Thānī. (1993/4). Masālik al-Afhām ilā Tanqīḥ Sharāyi‘ al-Islām. Qum: 
Mu’assisah al-Ma‘ārif al-Islāmīyyah.  
Shaykh ‘Abbās al-Qumī. (2000/1). Nafs al-Mahmūm. Iran: Intishārāt Dhawil-Qurbā. 
Shaykh al-Anṣārī. (1991/2). al-Taqīyyah. Qum: Mu’assisah Qā’im Āl Muḥammad.  
Shaykh al-Anṣārī. (1994/5). Kitāb al-Ṭahārah. Qum: Mu’assisah al-Hādī.   
Shaykh al-Anṣārī. (1996). Kitāb al-Makāsib. Qum: Mu’assisah al-Hādī.  
Shaykh al-Ḥuwayzī. (1991/2). Tafsīr Nūr al-Thaqalayn. Qum: Mu’assisah Ismā‘īlīyān lil-
Ṭibā‘ah. 
Shaykh al-Islām al-Juwiynī. (1978). Farā’id al-Simṭayn. Beirut: Mu’assisah al-Maḥmūdī 
lil-Ṭibā‘ah. 
Shaykh al-Kashī. (1969/70). Rijāl al-Kashī. Mashhad: Unknown.  
Shaykh al-Mufīd. (1989/90). al-Muqni‘ah. Qum: Mu’assisah al-Nashr al-Islāmī al-
Tābi‘ah li Jamā‘ah al-Mudarrisīn. 
Shaykh al-Mufīd. (1993). al-Fuṣūl al-Mukhtārah. Beirut: Dār al-Mufīd lil-Ṭibā‘ah.  
Shaykh al-Mufīd. (1993). al-Irshād. Beirut: Dār al-Mufīd lil-Ṭibā‘ah. 
Shaykh al-Mufīd. (1993). al-Masā’il al-‘Akbarīyyah. Beirut: Dār al-Mufīd lil-Ṭibā‘ah. 
Shaykh al-Mufīd. (1993). Awā’il al-Maqālāt fīl-Madhāhib wal-Mukhtārāt. Beirut: Dār al-
Mufīd lil-Ṭibā‘ah.   
248 
 
Shaykh al-Mufīd. (1993). Kitāb al-Amālī. Beirut: Dār al-Mufīd lil-Ṭibā‘ah.  
Shaykh al-Mufīd. (1993). Rasā’il fīl-Ghaybah. Beirut: Dār al-Mufīd lil-Ṭibā‘ah.  
Shaykh al-Mufīd. (1993). Taṣḥīḥ al-I‘tiqādāt al-Imāmīyah. Beirut: Dār al-Mufīd lil-
Ṭibā‘ah. 
Shaykh al-Ṣadūq. (1959). Ma‘ānī al-Akhbār. Qum: Mu’assisah al-Nashr al-Islāmī al-
Tābi‘ah li Jamā‘ah al-Mudarrisīn. 
Shaykh al-Ṣadūq. (1966). ‘Ilal al-Sharāyi‘. Najaf: al-Maktabah al-Ḥaydarīyyah.  
Shaykh al-Ṣadūq. (1984). ‘Uyūn Akhbār al-Ridhā. Beirut: Mu’assisah al-A‘lamī lil-
Maṭbū‘āt. 
Shaykh al-Ṣadūq. (1984). Kamāl al-Dīn wa Tamām al-Ni‘mah. Qum: Mu’assisah al-
Nashr al-Islāmī al-Tābi‘ah li Jamā‘ah al-Mudarrisīn. 
Shaykh al-Ṣadūq. (1993). al-I‘tiqādāt fī Dīn al-Imāmīyah. Beirut: Dār al-Mufīd lil-
Ṭibā‘ah.  
Shaykh al-Ṣadūq. (Unknown). al-Tawḥīd. Qum: Manshūrāt Jamā‘ah al-Mudarrisīn.  
Shaykh al-Ṭūsī. (1973/4). Talkhīṣ al-Shāfī. Qum: Dār al-Kutub al-Islāmīyyah.  
Shaykh al-Ṭūsī. (1985/6). Tahdhīb al-Aḥkām. Tehran: Dār al-Kutub al-Islāmīyyah.  
Shaykh al-Ṭūsī. (1989). al-Tibyān fī Tafsīr al-Qur‘ān. Unknown: Maktab al-I‘lām al-
Islāmī.  
Shaykh al-Ṭūsī. (1991). Kitāb al-Ghaybah. Qum: Mu’assisah al-Ma‘ārif al-Islāmīyyah.   
Shaykh al-Ṭūsī. (1991). Mīṣbāḥ al-Mutahajjid. Beirut: Mu’assisah Fiqh al-Shī‘ah.  
Shaykh al-Ṭūsī. (Unknown). al-Nihāyah fī Mujarrad al-Fiqh wal-Fatwā. Qum: Intishārāt 
Quds Muḥammadī.  
Shaykh Hādī al-Najafī. (2002). Mūsū‘ah Aḥādīth Ahl al-Bayt. Beirut: Dār Iḥyā’ al-Turāth 
al-‘Arabī. 
Shaykh Makārim al-Shirāzī. (2008/9). Āyāt Wilāyat dar Qur’ān. Qum: Intishārāt Nasl 
Jawān. 
Shaykh Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Muẓaffar. (1982). ‘Ilm al-Imām. Beirut: Dār al-Zahrā’ lil- 
Ṭibā‘ah.  
Shaykh Muḥammad Riḍā al-Muẓaffar. (Unknown). ‘Aqā’id al-Imāmīyyah. Qum: 
Intishārāt Anṣārīyān.  
249 
 
Taqī al-Dīn Abī Muḥammad al-Maqrīzī. (1888). al-Nizā‘ wal-Takhāṣum fīmā bayn Banī 
Umayyah wa Banī Hāshim. Leiden: Unknwon.  
Tha‘ālibī, ‘Abd al-‘Azīz. (1995). Suqūṭ al-Dawlah al-Umawīyah wa Qīyām al-Dawlah 
al-‘Abbāsīyah. Beirut: Dār al-Maghrib al-Islāmī. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
250 
 
VITA 
 
SAYED AMIR MIRTAHERI 
 
     Born, Gholhak, Iran 
 
1999-2003   B.Sc., Electrical Engineering 
    Sharif University of Technology 
    Tehran, Iran 
 
2003-2005   M.A.Sc., Telecomunication Engineering 
    Simon Fraser University 
    Vancouver, British Columbia 
 
2006-present  PhD Candidate with distinction, International Relations 
    Florida International University 
    Miami, Florida 
 
 
PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS  
 
Homayounvash, M., and Mirtaheri, S. A. (Forthcoming 2012). Honoring Contracts as a 
Foundation of Peace: A Shī‘ah Articulation. Journal of Religion, Conflict and Peace.   
 
Mirtaheri, S. Amir. (Fall 2010). European Muslims, Secularism and the Legacy of 
Colonialism. European Journal of Economic and Political Studies: Special Issue on 
Transnational Islam. 3(Special Issue): 73-86.  
 
Mirtaheri, S. Amir. (Summer 2010). Inexpensive Leadership: On Canada’s Global 
Normative Position and Its Potential. Journal of Military and Strategic Studies. 12(4): 17-
40.  
 
Miratheri, S. A. (February, 2010). Non-Linear Modeling of the Characteristic Functions 
of International Actors Using Artificial Neural Networks. Paper presented at the Annual 
Convention of International Studies Association, New Orleans, Louisiana.    
  
Mirtaheri, S. A. (April, 2009). The Emerging Otherness of Muslims in Western Europe?. 
Paper presented at the European Otherness Roundtable, FIU, Miami, Florida.   
 
Mirtaheri, S. A., and Homayounvash, M. (2007). Why Are Contracts Binding? A 
Comparative Study of Pacta Sunt Servanda in Western Legal Philosophy and Islam. 
Paper presented at the International Studies Association-South Meeting, Savannah, 
Georgia.  
 
